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P R E F A C E

Volume Forty-Two contains items written after the October Revolution, which were first published in the Complete Russian Edition of Lenin's *Collected Works* or which were published in *Lenin Miscellanies*, magazines and newspapers. These documents form an important supplement to the works included in the various volumes of this edition.

The first group of documents dates to the period from November 1917 to July 1918—the period of continued development of the socialist revolution and consolidation of Soviet power. Mention should be made first of all of “Theses on the Tasks of the Party + the Present Situation”, the article “Plekhanov on Terror”, the “Draft Resolution for the C.C., R.S.D.L.P.(B.) Concerning the Expulsion from the Party of S. A. Lozovsky”, the “Outline of a Programme of Economic Measures” and a number of chapters of the original version of the article “The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government”. These deal with the tasks that faced the working class after the conquest of power, stress the necessity for strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat and suppressing the resistance of the overthrown exploiting classes, and sharply criticise the Right-opportunist elements within the Party.

Several documents relate to Lenin's fight to get Russia out of the war, to conclude the Brest peace treaty (“Speech at a Joint Meeting of the Bolshevik and Left S.R. Groups in the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, February 19, 1918”, “Speech to the Lettish Riflemen, February 20, 1918” and others). The numerous decisions for the Council of People's Commissars drafted by Lenin reflect the first steps of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government in the field of political, economic and cultural activities.

A large part of the materials relate to the period of foreign military intervention and the civil war, among them: notes on "The Tasks and Organisation of the Work of the Council of Defence", "Notes at a Meeting of the Commission on Cartridges", "Draft Resolution for the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on Sending Groups of Workers Out on Food Transportation Jobs", "Draft Decision for the Council of Defence on the Mobilisation of Soviet Employees", "Draft Decisions for the C.C. Politbureau on Measures to Fight Mamontov", "Proposals on Military Questions", "Decisions of the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on the Order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front" and Lenin's speeches: "Speech to Ivanovo-Voznesensk Communist Workers Leaving for the Front, October 24, 1919", "Speech at the Eleventh Issue of Red Commanders of the First Moscow Machine-Gunners Training Courses, May 12, 1920", "Report on the Internal and External Position of the Republic at a Meeting of Activists of the Moscow Organisation of the R.C.P.(B.), October 9, 1920". These and many other documents strikingly illustrate the gigantic activities of the Central Committee and the Soviet Government, headed by Lenin, in organising the defeat of the interventionists and whiteguards.

A considerable part of the volume is made up of items and documents written after the war, when the problems of economic rehabilitation and socialist construction bulked large. Industry, agriculture, science and technology, public education, improvement of the machinery of state, the national question, foreign policy—all these problems were dealt with daily by Lenin, who directed the activities of the Party and the Government.

The items included in this volume contain important supplementary material showing how Lenin worked on the plan of socialist construction.

Of great significance are the chapters of the original version of "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government" (the end of Chapter IV, chapters V-IX and the beginning of Chapter X) which were first published in 1962. In these chapters Lenin sets forth in greater detail than in the final text a number of questions relating to the task of starting construction of a new society and reveals the importance

of solving economic problems and the need for proper management of the national economy during the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. In interviews given to Lincoln Eyre, correspondent of the American newspaper *The World*, and to the correspondent of the Japanese newspaper *Osaka Asahi* and in his "Notes on Electrification" Lenin characterises the role of electrification in building the economic foundation of socialism and developing the productive forces. Questions of the New Economic Policy are dealt with in the "Reply to the Debate on the Report on Concessions" at the meeting of the Communist group of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions on April 11, 1921, in speeches made at the Tenth All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) during the debate on the resolution on questions of the New Economic Policy, and in a letter "To the Russian Colony in North America".

Consistent application of democratic centralism in running the economy, scientific planning, rational and efficient management, proper organisation of labour, the introduction of cost accounting, the running of enterprises on a paying basis, and the use of moral and material incentives for developing production were considered by Lenin to be the most vital principles and methods of socialist management. Mention can here be made of such documents as the "Speech at a Meeting of the Presidium of the S.E.C., April 1, 1918", "Comments on the Draft 'Regulations for the Management of the Nationalised Enterprises'", "Salaries for Specialists", "Addendum to the Draft Regulations on Subbotniks", "Draft of the Main Point of the C.L.D. Decision on the General Planning Commission", "Plan of an Article 'Commercial Organisation'", "Motion to the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on Bonuses for Enterprises" and others.

Defining*the tasks of economic construction in his "Plan of a Speech at the Trade Union Congress", Lenin wrote: "Work discipline, higher labour productivity, work organisation, increased output, relentless fight against slipshod work and red tape. By this sign shall ye conquer" (p. 308).

Materials such as: "Addendum to the Draft Decision for the C.P.C. 'On the Distribution of Agricultural Machines'", "Draft Decision for the C.L.D. on Fowler Ploughs", the draft decision on "Measures for Improving the Organisation

of State Farms" and others show Lenin's concern for the revival of agriculture, for the supply of the peasants with machines, for the development of the state farms, for support of the co-operatives on the part of the state and for the creation of conditions for the socialist transformation of the village.

A number of materials deal with questions of cultural development: the draft decision for the C.P.C. on "Library Organisation", "Instructions for Compiling a Reading Book for Workers and Peasants", "Draft Decision for the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on the Chief Committee for Political Education", "Rough Draft of a Resolution on Proletarian Culture", "Addendum to the Draft Decision for the C.P.C. on an Obligatory Science Minimum in the Higher Schools", "Draft Decision for the Plenum of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on the Reorganisation of the People's Commissariat for Education", "Directives on the Film Business". These and other documents contain important propositions regarding the substance and ways of effecting a cultural revolution, the communist education of the working people, the political enlightenment of the masses.

Of exceptionally great significance is the letter "On the Establishment of the U.S.S.R." in which Lenin put forward the idea of creating a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a single multinational socialist state based on a voluntary association of equal and sovereign Soviet Republics. Questions concerning the national policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government are dealt with also in the "Notes at a Meeting of Delegates to the Second All-Russia Congress of Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East", "Draft Decision for the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on the Tasks of the R.C.P.(B.) in Turkestan", "Draft Decision for the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on the Tasks of the R.C.P.(B.) in Localities Inhabited by Eastern Peoples" and other items, in which Lenin urges the need for unity and fraternal co-operation among all the nationalities of the Soviet land and for waging a vigorous fight against chauvinism and nationalism.

The speech winding up the debate on the report on concessions at the meeting of the R.C.P.(B.) group at the Eighth Congress of Soviets contains Lenin's important thesis on

Soviet patriotism: "The patriotism of a person who is prepared to go hungry for three years rather than surrender Russia to foreigners is genuine patriotism, without which we could not hold out for three years. Without this patriotism we would not have succeeded in defending the Soviet Republic, in doing away with private property.... This is the finest revolutionary patriotism" (p. 245).

In his note "The Democratism and Socialist Nature of Soviet Power" and his "Speech at a Meeting in Presnya District, July 26, 1918", Lenin characterises the Soviets and reveals the genuine democratism of the Soviet Constitution.

Many documents reflect Lenin's efforts to improve the working of the machinery of state, and strengthen state, Party and public control: "Proposals for the Distribution of Functions Between the Deputy Chairmen of the C.P.C. and the C.L.D.", "Proposals Concerning the Work Routine of the Deputy Chairmen and the Chairman of the C.P.C.", "Letter to L. B. Kamenev, A. I. Rykov and A. D. Tsyurupa on the Distribution of Work Between the Deputy Chairmen of the C.P.C. and the C.L.D.", "Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) Directives on a Workers' Inspection", "Materials to the Article 'How We Should Reorganise the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection'", etc. A number of documents are devoted to the strengthening of socialist legality: "Rough Theses of a Decision on the Strict Observance of the Laws", "Proposals Concerning the Work of the Vecheke", "Speech at the Fourth Conference of Gubernia Extraordinary Commissions, February 6, 1920" and others.

Lenin regarded the Communist Party as the guiding and directing force of Soviet society. He never relaxed his efforts to strengthen the ideological and organisational unity of the Party, he urged the need for doing everything to develop inner-Party democracy, to rigidly adhere to the principle of collective leadership and to strengthen the Party's ties with the masses. These questions are dealt with in many documents included in this volume: "Speech on the Immediate Tasks of Party Development" at the Ninth All-Russia Conference of the R.C.P.(B.), draft resolution and proposals for the resolution on this question, speech to the R.C.P.(B.) group at the Eighth Congress of

Soviets during the debate on the report of the All-Russia C.E.C. and C.P.C. concerning home and foreign policies, "Speech at a Meeting of Moscow Party Activists, February 24, 1921", "Draft of a Letter of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on the Attitude to Non-Party Workers", "Outline of a Speech at a Meeting of Supporters of the 'Platform of Ten'"—delegates to the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), "Remarks Concerning the Work Plan of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.)".

Lenin's draft resolution for the Politbureau of the C.C. concerning Maxim Gorky's articles in the magazine *Communist International* is a striking illustration of his high-principled attitude, his intolerance towards the cult of personality.

Of great importance is the series of documents dealing with the Soviet state's foreign policy: the interviews with foreign correspondents, the "Draft Directives to the Deputy Chairman and All Members of the Genoa Delegation", "Draft Directives of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) for the Soviet Delegation to the Genoa Conference", "Draft Decision for the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on the Tasks of the Soviet Delegation at Genoa", "Amendments and Remarks to the Draft Declaration of the Soviet Delegation at the Genoa Conference" and others, which formulate the fundamental principles of the Soviet Republic's foreign policy and the aims and methods of Soviet diplomacy.

These documents show how consistently the Soviet Government, headed by Lenin, pursued its policy of peace and establishment of business relations with the capitalist countries. In his interview given to an American correspondent, Lenin said: "I know of no reason why a socialistic commonwealth like ours cannot do business indefinitely with capitalistic countries" (p. 177). At the same time the Soviet Government strongly rebuffed all attempts of the imperialist powers to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Republic or to impose upon it fettering terms of an economic agreement. Lenin said: "We have reiterated and reiterated our desire for peace.... But we do not propose to be strangled to death for the sake of peace" (ibid.).

Notable items in this volume are the documents which reveal the friendly fraternal relations between the Soviet state and the countries where the people had come to power. This volume contains the draft decisions for the C.P.C.

concerning a treaty with the Socialist Workers' Republic of Finland. This was the first treaty in history to be signed between two socialist republics, and represented a new type of international relations between equal sovereign states. The text of Lenin's "Talk With a Delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic" contains important guidelines on the paths of development towards socialism for countries with a pre-capitalist social system, and on the specific features of the tactics which the revolutionary parties in these countries should adopt.

The writings included in this volume are a valuable supplement to the well-known works of Lenin dealing with the international labour and communist movements. Mention should first of all be made of Lenin's letter to Chicherin (at the end of December 1918) outlining the basic ideological platform and organisational principles of the Communist International. Of considerable interest are the materials relating to the Second Congress of the Comintern—the "Plan of a Resolution Concerning the Meaning of the Concept 'Dictatorship of the Proletariat' and the Fight Against the 'Fashionable' Distortion of This Slogan", "Remarks on the Report of A. Sultan-Zade Concerning the Prospects of a Social Revolution in the East" and others. A number of documents deal with the Third Congress of the Comintern and show what a tremendous job Lenin performed in preparing the basic decisions of the Congress and guiding its proceedings. These include: "Letter to O. W. Kuusinen and Remarks on the Draft 'Theses on the Organisational Activities of the Communist Parties, on the Methods and Content of Their Work'", "Remarks on the Draft Theses on Tactics for the Third Congress of the Communist International", "Speeches at a Meeting of Members of the German, Polish, Czechoslovak, Hungarian and Italian Delegations".

These documents reflect the irreconcilable struggle which Lenin carried on against Right-wing opportunism, reformism and revisionism, and at the same time against Leftism, adventurism, dogmatism and sectarianism in the international communist movement. They contain very important guidelines on questions of the strategy and tactics of the international communist movement. The Communist Parties, Lenin emphasised, should focus their attention on the task

of winning over the majority of the working class, the bulk of the working masses, and prepare them for the socialist revolution. In a number of documents—"Draft Decision of the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) on the Tactics of the United Front", "Letter to Members of the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) with Remarks to the Draft Resolution for the First Extended Plenary Meeting of the Comintern Executive on Participation in a Conference of the Three Internationals", "Proposal to the Draft Resolution for the Eleventh Party Congress on the Report of the R.C.P.(B.) Delegation in the Comintern"—Lenin argues the case for the tactics of a united front, the adoption of a united action by the working class.

The Appendix to the volume contains questionnaires filled in by Lenin in the capacity of delegate to Communist Party congresses and conferences, in the course of reregistration of members of the Moscow organisation of the R.C.P. and under the All-Russia census of the R.C.P. members.

Of considerable interest are the records of Lenin's official orders and instructions, reception of visitors and other facts entered in the Journal of Lenin's Duty Secretaries. This document reveals how manfully Lenin fought his illness, giving all his strength to the cause of the Party, the cause of the working class.

*Institute of Marxism-Leninism
of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.*

October 1917-July 1918

**SPEECH AT A MEETING
OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS
NOVEMBER 3 (16), 1917**

Comrade Lenin objects to any agreement whatsoever with Vikzhel;¹ which tomorrow will be overthrown in a revolutionary manner, from below. Moscow must be given creative, organising, revolutionary reinforcements from Petrograd—the sailor element, to be exact. The food problem: we are getting supplies from the north. After winning Moscow and overthrowing Vikzhel from below we shall be getting food supplies from the Volga.

Printed from the handwritten copy
of the minutes

**ADDENDA TO THE DRAFT DECREE
ON THE REQUISITION OF ARTICLES
• OF WARM CLOTHING
FOR THE SOLDIERS AT THE FRONT**

The following to be added:

Heading: +... and on the requisition of flats of the rich to relieve the needs of the poor....

§ 1. ... plus one article of warm clothing in addition to a blanket (overcoat, winter coat, jacket, felt boots, etc.).

§ 2. ... The term rich flat applies to any flat in which the number of rooms equals or exceeds the number of permanent occupants.

The owners of rich flats are obliged immediately, under threat of confiscation of all their property, to draw up in duplicate a statement listing the articles of warm clothing they have and of those supplied by them to the front, one copy of which is to be handed to the House Committee, the other to the district Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

The owners of rich flats, under similar threat, are obliged immediately to submit in duplicate to the same institutions a statement to the effect that they are vacating one of two rich flats for the needs of the poor population of the capital (that is, two rich families having two rich flats are obliged to move into one of their flats during the winter, giving the other up to the use of the poor population in view of the extreme need created by the war).

The house committees shall immediately draw up lists of rich flats subject to requisition, and the district Soviets of Workers' Deputies shall endorse these lists and define the conditions and order in which families of the poor population are to move into these flats.²

Written in November,
prior to 8th (21st), 1917

Printed from the manuscript

**INTERVIEW GIVEN TO GREGORI YARROS,
CORRESPONDENT
OF THE ASSOCIATED PRESS AGENCY**

NOVEMBER 15 (28), 1917

In connection with the results of the elections in Petrograd in which the Bolsheviks won six seats,³ the *Associated Press* correspondent interviewed Lenin, the President of the Council of National Commissioners, who was elated over the great victory of his party.

"What do you think of the results of the elections to the Constituent Assembly?" the correspondent asked.

"I think that these elections have proved a great victory for the Bolshevik Party. The number of votes cast for it in the elections in May, August and in September is constantly growing.⁴ To get six seats out of twelve in a city in which the bourgeoisie (Cadets⁵) are strongest, means to win in Russia."

"Do you suppose that the Constituent Assembly of such composition as the results of the elections in Petrograd indicate will sanction all the measures of the Government of National Commissioners?"

"Yes, it will sanction, because there will be no majority, according to your supposition, against us, and together with the left social revolutionists⁶ we shall constitute a majority in Petrograd (seven out of twelve)."

"What parties will enter into the new Council of National Commissioners?"

"I do not know positively, but I think that only the left social revolutionists, besides the Bolsheviks."

Printed from the typewritten copy
of the English original

THE SALARIES OF HIGH-RANKING OFFICE EMPLOYEES AND OFFICIALS

• DRAFT DECREE FOR THE C.P.C.⁷

Recognising the need for energetic measures to reduce the salaries of high-ranking office employees and officials in all state, public and private institutions and enterprises, the Council of People's Commissars decrees:

1) that the salary limit for people's commissars be fixed at 500 rubles a month where there are no children, and 100 rubles extra for each child; housing to be at the

rate of not more than 1 room for each member of the family; 2) that all local Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies be asked to prepare and carry out revolutionary measures to impose special taxes on high-ranking employees; 3) that the Ministry for Finance be instructed to draft a general law concerning this reduction; 4) that the Ministry for Finance and all the respective commissars be instructed to immediately study the estimates of the ministries and cut all excessively high salaries and pensions.

Written November 18
(December 1), 1917

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON THE QUESTION OF THE WAR MINISTRY*

In view of the fact that General Manikovsky has issued a counter-revolutionary order to the Moscow Military District not to have appointed commanders replaced by elected ones,

in view of the fact that General Marushevsky has been conducting negotiations with Dukhonin aimed against the Council and has made a criminal attempt at sabotage during the organisation of a delegation for conducting armistice negotiations,*

1) Manikovsky and Marushevsky are to be arrested immediately and not released without the permission of the Council of People's Commissars⁹;

2) a thorough screening of the War Ministry personnel to be started immediately and all unreliable elements among the high command to be discharged;

3) reliable elements from among the commanders of the Lettish rifle regiments to be ordered out at once to Petrograd;

* The first two paragraphs are in Trotsky's handwriting.—*Ed.*

4) one Lettish rifle regiment to be ordered out to Petrograd at once¹⁰;

5) fulfilment of the above measures to be reported daily to the C.P.C.

This decision is not to be published.

Written November 19
(December 2), 1917

Printed from the manuscript

THESES FOR A LAW ON THE CONFISCATION OF APARTMENT AND TENEMENT HOUSES¹¹

1) *All* land (urban) shall become the property of the nation.

2) Houses which are *systematically* let to tenants shall be confiscated and become the property of the nation.

3) Owners of houses that are *not* let to tenants shall, pending the decision of the Constituent Assembly, remain in possession without any change in their rights of ownership.

4) Several-months compensation (2 to 3 months) to owners of confiscated houses who can prove their ... *

5) Rent shall be collected by (whom?) the *Soviets* (paid into the current accounts of the Soviets).

6) Building committees (the trade unions + building offices) shall take charge also of house supplies (fuel, etc.).

7) Rent payment to come in force immediately.

8) The building and house committees shall come into force gradually as and when they are set up by the trade unions and the Soviets.

9) The heating of the houses and their normal upkeep shall be the duty of the house committees and other institutions (trade unions, Soviets, fuel departments of the town council, etc.).

Written November 20
(December 3), 1917

Printed from the manuscript

* The sentence is unfinished.—*Ed.*

**DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.
ON THE QUESTION
OF FOLLOWING A SOCIALIST POLICY
IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD¹²**

1) Two or three engineers shall be sent to the Special Defence Council for the purposes of control and the drafting of a general plan of industrial demobilisation (Kozmin to be charged with forming this group);¹³

2) A 3-5-man commission of C.P.C. members (and non-members) shall be set up to discuss the major problems of the Government's economic policy (Pyatakov and Bukharin to be charged with forming this commission);

3) A conference of food-supply men shall be organised to discuss practical measures for combating marauding and improving the condition of the most needy sections of the population (Shlyapnikov + Manuilsky to be charged with organising this conference).

Written November 27
(December 10), 1917

Printed from the manuscript

**OUTLINE OF A PROGRAMME
OF ECONOMIC MEASURES**

Nationalisation of banks

Drawing money back into the treasury

New money for large denominations

Revolutionary measures for switching factories to useful production

Centralisation of consumption by compulsory association in consumers' societies

State monopoly of foreign trade
Nationalisation of industry
State loans.

Written not before
November 27
(December 10), 1917

Printed from the manuscript

DEMONSTRATION SLOGANS¹⁴

To the demonstration slogans published on 28.XI.,
I advise adding:

Shame to the Right S.R.s and Chernovites¹⁵ who have
broken away from the peasant congress!

Long live the Second All-Russia Congress of Peasant
Deputies, which has sided with the Soviet power!

The working people demand that the Constituent Assem-
bly recognise Soviet power and the Soviet Government!

Long live the nationalisation of the banks!

Down with the saboteurs and striking officials! Boycott
them, use revolutionary terrorism against them!

Lenin

Written November 28
(December 11), 1917

Printed from the manuscript

LIABILITY FOR UNFOUNDED ACCUSATIONS

DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR THE C.C., R.S.D.L.P.(B.)¹⁶

The C.C. establishes the principle:
that in all squabbles and personal accusations, the per-
son who makes such accusations without bringing specific
charges before a court shall be considered a slanderer;

that those who consider themselves affected by such accusations shall be invited to take legal action.

Written November 29
(December 12), 1917

Printed from the manuscript

THE CONVERSION OF MUNITION WORKS TO ECONOMICALLY USEFUL WORK

DECREE OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS

Comrade Raskolnikov is instructed to immediately contact the Commissariat for Trade and Industry, as well as the Commissariat for Food (Machine Supply Department), for the purpose of immediately arranging for orders to be placed with the works engaged in naval installations and repairs. Especially urgent is the production of farm implements and machines, and the building and repair of locomotives. Primary attention to be paid to the St. Petersburg Metalworks, which is well stocked with fuel and metal.

The Chief Naval Economic Board is instructed to immediately revise the estimates of the Ministry for Marine for 1917 with a view to stopping all expenditure on the naval construction programme and all unproductive expenditure in general, and reallocating the corresponding sums to useful national economic work. Comrade I. E. Gukovsky is delegated to take part in this work in the capacity of plenipotentiary commissar in charge of the revision of the estimates of all departments.

Daily reports to the Council of People's Commissars on the fulfilment of this order shall be made by Comrade Raskolnikov and the person authorised by the Chief Naval Economic Board (or by Comrade Gukovsky), as well as by the authorised agent of the Commissariat for Trade and Industry.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written November 29
(December 12), 1917

Printed from the manuscript

THESES ON THE TASKS OF THE PARTY + THE PRESENT SITUATION

- (a) Recognition of the revolution of 25.X. as a socialist revolution.
- (β) Rejection of all limitations to this in the spirit of reversion to the bourgeois-democratic revolution (gradual transition; "stage" of the bloc with the petty bourgeoisie, etc.).
- (γ) Dictatorship of the proletariat, its special features as compared with "general", formal (bourgeois) democracy, its tactics.
- (δ) Soviet power and the power of the Bolsheviks.
- (e) Agreement with the petty bourgeoisie not in the sense of a bloc for a bourgeois-democratic revolution, not in the sense of restricting the tasks of the socialist revolution, but exclusively in the sense of the *forms* of transition to socialism on the part of *different* sections of the petty bourgeoisie.
- (ι) Bourgeois liberties versus suppression of the exploiters.
- (χ) Saboteurs and capitalists; capitalists and "public opinion" of the bourgeoisie.
- (ξ) The Constituent Assembly and its subordination to the Soviet power, to the interests and conditions of the civil war.
- (η) Top organisations (Vikzhel, Peasants' Central Executive Committee, etc.) and the struggle against them.
- (θ) Struggle against reformism in its *modern* presentation:
 - (1) the proletariat's hands tied by fellow-travellers from among the petty bourgeoisie
 - (2) restricted scope of the revolutionary struggle of the rank and file
 - (3) rejection of terrorism.

Written November 1917

Printed from the manuscript

**ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
PUT BY A WORKERS' DELEGATION
OF ALEXANDRO-GRUSHEVSKY DISTRICT¹⁷**

1) Re the sequestration of mines and works in the Alexandro-Grushevsky District.

Mines and works may be confiscated only after the district is liberated from Kaledin's troops and influence.

2) Should the workers now quit the mines and go away to Central Russia?

They should not quit but go on working as long as possible. Resolution on this question by the Council of People's Commissars: the workers of the Alexandro-Grushevsky District to be instructed to contact Kharkov for the arming of the Red Guard. The comrades to be asked to hold out to the last, as long as they can, and not throw up their work.

3) On sending guards to the mines.

Our troops are moving in the direction of Kaledin's troops in sufficient numbers.

4) Re a subsidy of 3,000,000 rubles to carry on the work.

The question of Monotop¹⁸ will be settled on the arrival of Comrade Artyom from Kharkov.

5) Are the bank-notes issued by Kaledin's government to be considered valid?

The bank-notes are to be considered invalid.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

**DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.
ON STAFF SALARIES
IN GOVERNMENT OFFICES¹⁹**

The Council of People's Commissars decrees that the rates of pay recognised by the Government Office Staffs Commission and accepted by the All-Russia Convention of Junior Employees of Government Institutions shall be recognised as a norm to be guided by.

Written December 13 (26), 1917

Printed from the manuscript

**THE ORGANISATION OF A COMMISSION
OF PRACTITIONERS**

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.²⁰

The Council of People's Commissars directs the Supreme Economic Council to organise immediately a Commission of Practitioners to be charged with collecting orders for useful products from all departments, institutions and organisations, passing these orders on to factories that are at a standstill or are being closed down, and checking to what extent these orders are being passed on and carried out. The Commission, guided by the general economic plan of the Supreme Economic Council, is to submit to the Council of People's Commissars revolutionary measures for the immediate fulfilment of its task and report on its activities twice a week.

Written December 15 (28), 1917

Printed from the manuscript

INSTRUCTIONS ON THE PROCEDURE FOR TABLING QUESTIONS IN THE C.P.C.

Every commissar tabling a question in the Council of People's Commissars shall be required to submit a *written* statement specifying:

a) what the question is (briefly) [this statement cannot be confined to a mere reference to the subject, but must *set forth the gist* of the matter].

b) what exactly the Council of People's Commissars is being asked to do (give money; adopt *such-and-such* a resolution, etc. The person introducing the question must state clearly *what* he wants)

c) whether the question involves departments under other commissars. If so, exactly which; whether they have given their findings in writing.²¹

Lenin

Written December 16 (29), 1917

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR C.P.C. ON THE IRREGULAR ACTIONS OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR JUSTICE I. Z. STEINBERG AND MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR JUSTICE V. A. KARELIN²²

The Council of People's Commissars considers that no changes in the decisions of the Dzerzhinsky Commission or any other commission appointed by the Soviets²³ are permissible other than by way of appeal to the Council of People's Commissars, and on no account by way of personal order of the Commissar for Justice.

The Council of People's Commissars considers further that the act of comrades Steinberg and Karelin, who released the arrested men on the night of 18.XII was illegal both in form and substance, since it contravened not only the

privileges of the Dzerzhinsky Commission but the direct decision of the Council of People's Commissars adopted on the evening of 18.XII which ordered the arrested men to be detained for identification.

*Lenin**

Written December 19, 1917
(January 1, 1918)

Printed from the manuscript

PLEKHANOV ON TERROR

There was a time when Plekhanov was a socialist, a prominent exponent of revolutionary socialism.

At that time—now, alas, in the limbo of forgotten things—Plekhanov expressed his opinion on a subject which happens to have vital significance in the present period.

It happened in 1903, when the Russian Social-Democrats were framing their programme at the Second Party Congress.

The minutes of this Congress contain the following very informative entry, that might have been written specially for the present day:

"Posadovsky. The statements made here for and against the amendments strike me as being not a dispute over details but a serious difference of opinion; without a doubt we disagree on the following fundamental question: *should our future policy be governed by certain basic democratic principles, admitted to have absolute value, or are all democratic principles to be governed exclusively by what is profitable for our party?* I definitely declare for the latter. There is no democratic principle that we could not make subservient to the *interests of our party.* (Interjection: "Even inviolability of the person?") Yes! Inviolability of the person as well! As a revolutionary party striving towards its ultimate goal—that of a social revolution—we must regard democratic principles exclusively from the point of view of the speediest possible achievement of that goal, from the point of view of our party's interests. If one or another demand does not turn out to our advantage we shall not use it.

"Therefore I oppose any amendments that are likely in future to narrow our freedom of action."

"Plekhanov. I fully support what Comrade Posadovsky has said. Every given democratic principle should be examined not on its own

* This document was also signed by J. V. Stalin.—Ed.

merits in the abstract, but in its bearing on what may be called the basic principle of democracy, namely, on the principle that says: salus populi suprema lex. Translated into the language of the revolutionary, this means that the success of the revolution is the highest law. If it were necessary for the success of the revolution to restrict the effect of one or another democratic principle, it would be criminal to stop at such a restriction. As my own personal opinion I would say that even the principle of universal suffrage should be regarded from the point of view of this basic principle of democracy I have just mentioned. Hypothetically, it is conceivable that we, Social-Democrats, may have occasion to come out against universal suffrage. The bourgeoisie of the Italian republics once deprived persons belonging to the nobility of political rights. The revolutionary proletariat could restrict the political rights of the upper classes the way these classes once restricted the political rights of the proletariat. The fitness of such a measure could only be judged by the rule: salus revolutionis suprema lex. The same point of view should be adopted by us on the question of the duration of parliaments. If, on an impulse of revolutionary enthusiasm, the people were to elect a very good parliament, a sort of Chambre Introuvable, we should try and make it a long parliament; and if the elections turned out to be unfavourable we should try and dismiss it not in two years' time, but if possible in two weeks" (Minutes of the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., pp. 168-69).*

The enemies of socialism may be deprived for a time not only of inviolability of the person, and not only of freedom of the press, but of universal suffrage as well. A bad parliament should be "dismissed" in two weeks. The good of the revolution, the good of the working class, is the highest law. That was how Plekhanov spoke when he was a socialist. That was how the great majority of the present-day Mensheviks spoke, those same Mensheviks who are now screaming about "Bolshevik terror".

The "good of the revolution" now demands a grim fight against saboteurs, organisers of military cadet insurrections, and newspapers run by bankers. When the Soviet authorities embark upon such struggle, the so-called socialists from the camp of the Mensheviks and S.R.s shout from all the house-tops against civil war and terror.

When that Kerensky²⁴ of yours reintroduced capital punishment at the front, that was not terror, gentlemen, was it?

When your coalition cabinet, with the hands of the Kornilovs,²⁵ machine-gunned whole regiments for showing

The welfare of the people is the highest law.—Ed.

insufficient enthusiasm for the war, that was not civil war, gentlemen, was it?

When those Kerenskys and Avksentyevs²⁶ of yours threw 3,000 soldiers into a single prison in Minsk for "harmful agitation", that was not terror, gentlemen, was it?

When you suppressed the *workers'* newspapers, that was not terror, gentlemen, was it?

The only difference is that the Kerenskys, Avksentyevs and Lieberdants,²⁷ hand in glove with the Kornilovs and Savinkovs,²⁸ have practised terror *against the workers, soldiers and peasants* in the interests of a handful of landowners and bankers, while the Soviet government is taking strong measures against the landowners, marauders and their underlings—in the interests of the *workers, soldiers and peasants*.

Pravda, No. 221, January 4, 1918
(December 22, 1917)
and *Izvestia* No. 259,
December 23, 1917

Printed from *Pravda* text collated
with that of *Izvestia*

DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR THE C.C., R.S.D.L.P.(B.) CONCERNING THE EXPULSION FROM THE PARTY OF S. A. LOZOVSKY

Resolution of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P.(Bolsheviks)

Taking into consideration

1) that Comrade Lozovsky, from the very beginning of the October Revolution, has expressed opinions which radically diverge from those of the Party and of the revolutionary proletariat in general, but coincide on all major points with the petty-bourgeois negation of the dictatorship of the proletariat as an essential phase in the transition to socialism;

2) that by his statement of November . . . * in the newspaper *Novaya Zhizn*,²⁹ which has gone over to the bourgeoisie, Comrade Lozovsky has aroused general indignation not

* Lenin has left a space in the manuscript for the date.—Ed.

only among all Party people, but among the class-conscious workers at large,³⁰ and that the resolution of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. concerning Comrade Lozovsky's expulsion from the Party, passed soon after this statement had been made, was not announced and carried out only because of the hopes expressed by some comrades that the vacillations of Comrade Lozovsky were of a temporary nature caused by his inability to quickly grasp the significance of the historic upheaval that was taking place with such extraordinary speed;

3) that the expectations of the comrades who wished to give Comrade Lozovsky time to fully grasp the significance of the revolution that took place, have not been justified and that Comrade Lozovsky's entire political conduct and especially his articles in Nos. 7 and 8 of *Professionalny Vestnik*³¹ point to this comrade's complete divergence from the cardinal principles of socialism in his approach to the role of the proletariat in the socialist revolution;

4) that membership of the Party by a person who holds an important post in the trade union movement and is debauching that movement with shoddy bourgeois ideas, not only compromises the Party and demoralises all organisational work among the proletariat, but causes enormous practical harm to the urgent task of organising socialist production by the trade unions;

5) that joint work in the ranks of a single Party is impossible with a person who does not understand the necessity for the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is recognised by our Party Programme, who does not understand that without such a dictatorship, that is, without a systematic, ruthless suppression of the resistance of the exploiters, which sticks at no bourgeois-democratic formulas, one cannot conceive of any consistently democratic, leave alone socialist, revolution, nor of any serious measures for coping with the crisis and economic chaos caused by the war;

6) that joint work in the ranks of a single Party is impossible with a person who repudiates the socialist tasks of the proletariat, which has won political power; with a person who refuses to accept the idea that it is the duty of the trade unions to take upon themselves state functions and carry through with the greatest vigour and determination

the socialist reorganisation of production and distribution on a nation-wide scale,

the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. resolves: that Comrade Lozovsky be expelled] from the R.S.D.L.Party (Bolsheviks) and this resolution be published without delay.

Written December 30, 1917
(January 12, 1918)

Printed from the manuscript

DECISION OF THE C.P.C. ON THE FIGHT AGAINST KALEDIN³²

1

DECISION OF THE C.P.C.

The Council of People's Commissars approves Comrade Antonov's³³ vigorous measures against the Kaledinites and their accomplices, and at the same time rules that the Commander-in-Chief has the right to take repressive measures, including sentences of forced labour in the mines, against capitalist saboteurs who threaten to cause unemployment and famine.

2

ADDENDUM TO THE DECISION OF THE C.P.C.

As soon as it becomes possible to set up revolutionary tribunals they will immediately examine each case of forced labour assignment, and will either fix the term of such labour or release the persons from custody.

Written:
the Decision — December 30, 1917
(January 12, 1918); the Addendum—
January 1 (14), 1918

Printed from the manuscript

RATES OF PAY FOR HIGH-RANKING OFFICIALS

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.³⁴

Re Comrade Shlyapnikov's inquiry concerning rates of pay for high ranking officials, the C.P.C.

1) confirms that the decree establishing 500-ruble monthly salaries for members of the Council of People's Commissars is to be interpreted as an *approximate* norm for top salaries and contains no prohibition to pay specialists more;

2) calls attention once more to the fact that the decree of the C.P.C. contains a demand for revolutionary measures to be taken to reduce excessively high salaries;³⁵

3) directs all People's Commissars immediately to report what has been done in fulfilment of this decree;

4) directs the Commissar for Finance to submit a report as to whether resolute measures have been taken to collect income tax and eliminate evasions in the payment of this tax;

5) directs the local Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies to take more energetic measures to collect the special tax on excessively high incomes.

Written January 2 (15), 1918

Printed from the manuscript

MEASURES FOR IMPROVING THE FOOD SITUATION

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.³⁶

Having decided to postpone publication of the decrees concerning the Food Council pending the food congress, and while persistently urging all food supply workers not to leave their posts and to avoid partial conflicts,

The Council of People's Commissars directs the All-Russia Food Council and the Commissariat for Food to send out more and numerically larger armed detachments as well as commissars to take the most revolutionary measures

to expedite shipments, collect and store grain, etc., as well as to wage a ruthless struggle against profiteers, even to the extent of calling on the local Soviets to shoot convicted profiteers and saboteurs on the spot.

The Council of People's Commissars decrees that rations shall not be increased and that the dispatch of through goods-trains shall be stepped up and their progress carefully controlled.

Urgent steps shall be taken to clear the Petrograd railway junction, the All-Russia Food Council to be made responsible for this work.

The All-Russia Food Council shall report daily to the C.P.C. on the progress of food supply work and to submit a plan of food operations.

Written January 14 (27), 1918

Printed from the manuscript

INQUIRY OF THE C.P.C. TO THE C.C. OF THE LEFT S.R. PARTY³⁷

Following the decision of the Council of People's Commissars dated 14.I (night)—extract from the journal is herewith enclosed—we ask the C.C. of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party to answer the following questions:

1) When did the Petrograd Committee of the Left S.R.s pass its resolution refusing to have any members on the staff of the Committee of Inquiry so long as Kozlovsky was on it?

2) What is the text of that resolution?

3) Was the C.C. of the Left S.R. Party aware of this resolution and was it commented on in the C.C. of the Left S.R.s?

4) When and by whom (of the Left S.R.s) in the Petrograd Soviet or its Executive Committee was it reported that the Left S.R.s would not join the Committee of Inquiry so long as Kozlovsky was on it?

5) Did the Left S.R.s carry out the decision of the Petrograd Soviet, which asked them to present evidence against Kozlovsky within a definite period?

Written January 15 (28), 1918

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON THE ORDER OF SUBORDINATION OF THE BALTIC AND BLACK SEA FLEETS³⁸

Considering the wording of the note to § 51 to be inexact or based on a misunderstanding, since the text, if taken literally, implies a refusal to recognise the supremacy of the Soviet state authority,³⁹ the C.P.C. asks the Navy's legislative organ to revise the wording of this note.

The C.P.C. takes into consideration the statement by representatives of the Navy that the note in question in no way signifies any repudiation of the central Soviet authorities, and instructs comrades Proshyan and Lunacharsky to draw up on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars a well-reasoned memorandum to the legislative organ of the Navy clarifying the point of view of the Council of People's Commissars.

Written January 15 (28), 1918

Printed from the manuscript

ON SALARIES

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.⁴⁰

The Council of People's Commissars endorses the estimates of the Commissariat for Post and Telegraph temporarily, for two months, in order that immediate steps be taken in the meantime to revise and adjust the rates of pay and salaries for all professions and all areas in the country.

This revision to be made by the Commissariat for Labour by arrangement with all the other commissariats and workers' organisations.

Written January 16 (29), 1918

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISIONS FOR THE C.P.C. ON THE ORGANISATION OF FOOD SUPPLY⁴¹

The Council of People's Commissars asks the Food Congress immediately, not later than tomorrow morning, to appoint at least three of the most experienced food supply workers to take part at once in the work of the existing top food supply bodies and in the discussion of the most vigorous and revolutionary steps for coping with the famine.

The Council of People's Commissars asks the Food Congress to elect a committee to receive reports from all the groups, institutions and workers in the food business who are now in conflict, and to forward the committee's findings to the C.P.C.

Written January 16 (29), 1918

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY UNDER THE PETROGRAD SOVIET

Meeting of 21.I.1918

Having heard the report of the commission investigating the Committee of Inquiry, the C.P.C. resolves:

That two extra members be added to the commission, one of them Comrade Algasov, the other a Bolshevik recommended by Sverdlov.

That the commission be given the right to make searches, seizures and arrests without preliminary arrangements with any other institutions.

That the commission be given technical facilities and the right to draw on funds provided by the Commissariat for Justice.

That the commission be asked to work faster and more energetically in order to single out more quickly those whose innocence, in view of the slanderous nature of the accusations against them, is now obvious.⁴²

Printed from the manuscript

THE CONVERSION OF MUNITION WORKS TO ECONOMICALLY USEFUL WORK

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.

Expressing its extreme regret that the proper commissariats are extremely slow in taking practical steps towards switching over the metalworks to useful work, the C.P.C. asks the Petrograd Metalworkers Trade Union, in co-operation with the Commissariat for Labour, the Petrograd Soviet and the Supreme Economic Council, to start immediately converting the metalworks to repair work on and production of railway equipment as well as to the production of goods suitable for exchange for grain, etc.

All military orders to be suspended.

Written January 23 (February 5),
1918

Printed from the manuscript

ADDENDUM TO THE DRAFT OF THE "FUNDAMENTAL LAW ON THE SOCIALISATION OF THE LAND"⁴³

When the land is to be used for purposes other than farming (building, cultural and educational purposes, special industries and crafts, etc.), the size of the allotment is

determined by the local Soviets in conformity with the requirements of the persons or institutions applying for permission, depending on the social necessity of the purpose for which the land is required.

Written in January, prior to the 27th
(February 9), 1918

Printed from the manuscript

**ADDENDUM TO THE DRAFT DECREE
ON THE INSTITUTION
OF AN ALL-RUSSIA INTER-DEPARTMENTAL
EXTRAORDINARY COMMISSION FOR GUARDING
THE RAILWAYS⁴⁴**

A special duty of the guard is ruthlessly to combat profiteering and the illicit transportation of food.

Written January 30
(February 12), 1918

Printed from the manuscript

**PROPOSALS ON MEASURES
TO IMPROVE THE FOOD SITUATION IN PETROGRAD**

The Council of People's Commissars directs the Commissariat for Railways immediately to draw up and submit to it a draft decree banning free travelling on the railways except one trip home for every soldier returning from his place of service after demobilisation.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

The C.P.C. instructs the Manager of the State Bank to dispatch to the South immediately and without fail 200 million rubles at the disposal of Yakubov's expedition

for supplying grain to the needy areas as directed by the People's Commissariat for Food.

The Food Commissariat is to urgently make arrangements with the Military Commissariat for enlisting the services of the road units operating at the front. These units are to be sent to the grain-producing areas in the greatest possible numbers to take urgent measures for laying down rails and other means of improving and expediting the transportation, collection and storing of grain.

Written January 30
(February 12), 1918

Printed from the manuscripts

DECISION OF THE C.P.C. CONCERNING THE EMPLOYMENT OF SABOTEURS⁴⁵

The Council of People's Commissars resolves that no negotiations whatever are to be carried on with saboteurs.

The respective People's Commissariats may employ, as individuals, such saboteurs whose services are considered essential for the various departments provided that they fully submit to Soviet power and support it.

Written January 31
(February 13), 1918

Published February 14 (1), 1918
in *Pravda* No. 25

Printed from the manuscript

SPEECH AT A JOINT MEETING OF THE BOLSHEVIK AND LEFT S.R. GROUPS IN THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FEBRUARY 19, 1918

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

In a long speech lasting two hours, Lenin propounded the theses that there was no way out for Russia, that it was necessary immediately to conclude a separate peace,

since the Germans were advancing all along the front en masse and we were powerless to offer any resistance to this million-strong pressure. Having concluded peace, we would be able to start putting things in order at home and deepening the socialist revolution, and we would succeed in completing the radical reforms that would bring us nearer to the introduction in Russia of a socialist system.

Sotsial-Demokrat No. 28
February 20 (7), 1918

Printed from the text
of the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat*

SPEECH TO THE LETTISH RIFLEMEN FEBRUARY 20, 1918

BRIEF NEWSPAPER REPORT

Lenin made a long speech in which he called on the Letts to support Soviet power on the question of peace. The worn-out Russian people had to be given peace at all costs. In doing so we would strengthen the revolution and start building a new young Russia. In any case, the surrendered territories would not remain occupied, because the Russian revolution in the near future would spread not only to Germany, but to the other belligerent powers. The impact of the world social revolution would compel German imperialism to give up all its conquests.

Novaya Zhizn No. 30,
February 21 (8), 1918

Printed from the text
of *Novaya Zhizn*

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMISSION OF THE PETROGRAD COMMITTEE AND TO ALL DISTRICT COMMITTEES OF THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY⁴⁸

21(8).II.1918. 12.20 p.m.

In accordance with decisions of the Petrograd Soviet to be passed this evening, we advise you, without losing an hour, to rally all the workers in order to organise tens

of thousands of workers and get all the bourgeoisie, everyone of them to a man, under the control of these workers, to dig trenches outside the city. This is the only hope for the revolution. The revolution is in danger. The line of trenches will be marked out by the military. Prepare the implements, most important of all organise and mobilise one and all.

Lenin

Printed from the manuscript

**DECISION OF THE C.P.C.
ON THE ACCEPTANCE
OF THE GERMAN PEACE TERMS⁴⁷**

In accordance with the decision adopted by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies at 4.30 a.m. on February 24, the Council of People's Commissars has resolved that the terms of peace proposed by the German Government be accepted and a delegation sent to Brest-Litovsk.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written February 24, 1918

Published February 25 (12), 1918
in the evening edition
of *Pravda* No. 35,
and in the special evening edition
of *Izvestia* No. 33

Printed from the manuscript

**TREATY WITH THE FINNISH
SOCIALIST WORKERS' REPUBLIC⁴⁸**

1

DRAFT DECISION OF THE C.P.C.

The Council of People's Commissars resolves:

To acknowledge in principle the justice of the Finnish comrades' desire that part of the territory mentioned in the Finnish addendum to § 6 of the draft treaty be handed over to the Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic.

The Conciliation Board is instructed to work out ways for the practical implementation of this transfer.⁴⁹

Written February 25, 1918

2

**DIRECTIVE OF THE C.P.C.
TO THE RUSSO-FINNISH CONCILIATION BOARD**

The Council of People's Commissars gives the following directive to the Board:

That it be fair and necessary to ensure full political rights for the citizens of both republics residing in the other republic.

Written February 25, 1918

3

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.

Taking into consideration

first, that next to Finland there is a great city with an extremely high percentage of the bourgeois population;
second, that Finland usually has about thirty thousand Finnish workers living in Petrograd;

third, that the bourgeoisie of Petrograd usually has about two hundred thousand bourgeois living in Finland;

fourth, that therefore formal equality among Finnish and Russian citizens (in the matter of enjoying political rights abroad) would in practice be an obvious privilege for the Russian bourgeoisie,

the C.P.C. recommends the Russo-Finnish Conciliation Board to alter § 13 of the draft to read as follows:

either have § 13 refer, not to citizens, but only to workers and to peasants who do not exploit other people's labour;

or add to the former wording of § 13 a reservation to the effect that Russian citizens coming to Finland who are unable to prove that they belong to the two above-mentioned categories of working people, shall not enjoy political rights in Finland.⁵⁰

Written February 27, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

ADDENDUM TO THE DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. CONCERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY UNDER THE PETROGRAD SOVIET

In view of the statement by Comrade Schroeder that he was firmly convinced, despite the commission's opinion, that Comrade Mitzgendler was guilty of bribery, the C.P.C. considers Comrade Schroeder in duty bound, first, to repeat this statement in writing, and secondly, to bring his accusation against Mitzgendler before a court of law immediately in his own name.⁵¹

Written February 28, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

SPEECHES AT THE MEETING OF THE C.P.C. MARCH 4, 1918⁵²

1

I fully agree with Comrade Trutovsky that the tendencies and attempts of which we have heard here are completely at variance with the aims of the workers' and peasants' government and have nothing in common with socialism.⁵³ The aim of socialism is to turn all the means of production into the property of the whole people, and that does not at all mean that the ships become the property of the ship workers or the banks the property of the bank clerks. If people take such paltry things seriously, then we must do away with nationalisation,⁵⁴ because the whole thing is preposterous. The task, the aim of socialism, as we see it, is to convert the land and the industrial enterprises into the property of the Soviet Republic. The peasant receives land on condition that he works it properly. If the river transport workers receive ships, it is on condition that they take a proprietary interest in them: they must submit their estimates if only in order to have income and expenditure endorsed, and they must take proper care of the ships. If they cannot do this, we shall remove them. Seeing that they have been arguing for three weeks, I would propose removing all of them from the management, because this shows an utter inaptitude for organisation, a complete failure to grasp the vital tasks facing the Soviet Republic. It is chaos, disorganisation, even worse—it borders on sabotage. They have started a sort of organised crusade in the Union and come complaining. Meanwhile, the boats on the Volga stand unrepaired. What is this? What is it—a mad-house? I am perfectly sure that they realise that if we go on existing in this chaos we shall bring still greater calamities down on our heads. The chief condition with us is discipline and the organised transfer of all property to the people, the transfer of all sources of wealth to the Soviet Republic, and their strictly disciplined disposal. So when we are told that the river transport workers will be private managing proprietors, we obviously cannot agree to it. Soviet power

is to do the managing. But you organise a sort of debate preventing unity among all organisations....* If they are dissatisfied, they could have asked for the order to be rescinded. But they are proposing again that it should be decided first whom the ships belong to, so that the ship workers should demand a 140 per cent rise.

I fully agree with many things, but as to the make-up of the Board, I think the proposal of the river transport comrades is absolutely unacceptable. For one thing, that is not the question we are dealing with. The question at issue is that the men are not receiving their money. That's simply scandalous, of course. What are we allocating money for? For it to remain on paper? We have heard a thousand complaints, that unless the money is sent, our transport will collapse. If the money was assigned on February 21, and on the 22nd it was not received, then they should have come on the 23rd complaining. We are suffering from a money famine, we are short of currency notes, the treasury cannot print all we need. If we assign money and you unassign it, then actually nothing is sent. You should have come here on February 23, and not March 3. We demanded that these tens of millions should be given. I don't know who is more to blame. I believe the representatives of the Economic Council. We cannot satisfy everybody. While we are supplying Petrograd, Moscow is hungering for currency notes. . .** If people only wrote assignments and did not take any measures, they should have come here, or called me to the phone or somebody else, and complained about it. It is a rare week when I do not receive a complaint about money not being paid out, but from you I never received a single complaint. The people in charge should be made to answer for it, at least reprimanded. Under the ruling of February 21 the congress of river transport workers is obliged to submit the estimates. As regards the composition of the Management

* Part of the shorthand report has not been deciphered.—*Ed.*

** Part of the shorthand report has not been deciphered.—*Ed.*

Board, I think we should have corrected our decree rather in the vein Comrade Shlyapnikov suggested. Paragraph 3 provides for a Board of seven members. Why this wasn't inserted is incomprehensible. A number of trade union representatives could be included in it. I propose that resolute measures be taken to have this money forwarded immediately by through goods trains. Then notification should be sent in the usual way saying the money has been dispatched. As regards the second point I believe the only Board possible in this instance and most acceptable for everyone, for the Council of People's Commissars—the only possible Board is the one appointed yesterday by the Council of People's Commissars. There are no grounds for changing this. I believe we should put this through. And if it's really true about the 200 rubles salary, which was adopted as definite and made a condition for the nationalisation of transport—if that's a fact, and if demands are made for levelling up with other organisations, then I personally raise the question of cancelling nationalisation. There may come a time shortly when there will be no money at all. We had a single guarantee on the basis of which we wanted to carry out nationalisation, and this is being taken away from us. If that's the case, this measure should be revoked. Unless this is done we shall be taking on another responsibility incurring enormous losses.

3

I find the appointment of a commissar inconvenient in many respects. We have no indisputable candidate for this post. Therefore we shall not satisfy all requirements, inasmuch as both sides will be dissatisfied. The appointment of a commissar will mean setting aside the Union, and that form is undemocratic. We shall pass a decision for them to submit a proposal by the morning. If the Board is too unwieldy it could elect an executive committee. We can implement that organisationally tomorrow or the day after and have the thing put through organisationally at once within a fixed period. In appointing an executive committee, certain people could perhaps be appointed to it. This would

be correct, as we would not be setting aside the river transport workers. They can have no objection to co-operation by the trade unions. If this doesn't go through, we can then go ahead with the appointment of a commissar. The members of this Council know that the question of a candidate is, of course, a difficult one, and to decide now on appointing a commissar is to decide nothing, as we quite often waste a whole week over it. It is best to use this method. There remains one proposal—to revoke points 5, 6 and 7. Adopted. Under Paragraph 3 six Board members will be replaced by temporary representatives from the trade unions.

Printed from the shorthand record

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON THE SETTING UP OF A WATER TRANSPORT MANAGEMENT BOARD⁵⁵

That comrades Milyutin, Shlyapnikov and Aprelev be charged with organising, not later than tomorrow, a Board in pursuance of § 3⁵⁶, each special-function to be handled by a specially authorised agent answerable to the Board as a whole and to the C.P.C.

That in pursuance of § 3 any six Board members at the choice of the Supreme Economic Council and representatives of the regional councils be replaced by representatives of the all-Russia trade unions.

That two comrades, one from the Water Transport Union and one from the S.E.C., shall be appointed immediately and report not later than tomorrow to Spunde in order to have the currency notes dispatched without delay.⁵⁷

Written March 4, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

INTERVIEW WITH ARTHUR RANSOME,
CORRESPONDENT OF THE *DAILY NEWS*⁵⁸

One of the weakest spots in Balfour's speech is the statement that the Japanese are going to help the Russians.⁵⁹ *Which Russians?*

In Russia today there is one power, which by its nature is destined to wage a life and death struggle against the attacks of international imperialism—that is the Power of the Soviets. The first step, however, of those Russians, whom the Japanese intend to “help”, as soon as they heard rumours of the advance of the latter, was to demand the abolition of the Soviet Power. Should the Japanese move into Siberia, these same “Russians” whom the Japanese are going to “help”, will demand the abolition of the Soviets throughout the whole of Siberia. What can take the place of the Soviet Power?

The only power that can take its place is a bourgeois government. But the bourgeoisie in Russia has proved clearly enough that it can only remain in power with foreign help. If a bourgeois government, supported by outside help, should establish itself in power in Siberia, and Eastern Russia become lost to the Soviet, then in Western Russia the Soviet Power would become weakened to such an extent that it could hardly hold out for long; it would be followed by a bourgeois government, which would also need foreign help. The Power to give this help would, of course, not be England. It is easy to understand what avenues are opened up by this possibility.

I confirm that I really said this in a conversation with Ransome, and I give permission for it to be printed.

Lenin

Moscow 23.III.1918

Printed from the typewritten text
with a postscript in Lenin's
own hand

RE DRAFT DECREE CONCERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF STATE CONTROL OVER ALL FORMS OF INSURANCE⁶⁰

The composition of the Insurance Council to be changed in the direction of increasing the number of representatives of the working classes to approximately two-thirds of the total number of members.

The Chief Commissariat for Insurance Affairs to maintain contact with the C.P.C. by its chief Commissar attending the meetings of the C.P.C. with a consultative voice.

Add*

Written March 23, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

ORIGINAL VERSION OF THE ARTICLE "THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT"⁶¹

CHAPTER IV

**

Today this task—which is, of course, not yet sufficiently completed and can never be fully accomplished—no longer stands first among the tasks facing the Soviet government. The recent congresses of the Soviets, notably the All-Russia Congress held in Moscow, have shown that the overwhelming majority of the labouring classes have firmly and consciously sided with the Soviet power in general and with the Bolshevik Party in particular. It goes without saying that for any government that is at all democratic the task of convincing the masses can never be wholly overshadowed—on the contrary, it will always be among the important tasks of government. As a key issue, however, it will only have significance for parties of the opposition or for parties that

* Here the manuscript breaks off.—*Ed.*

** The beginning of the shorthand record has not been found.—*Ed.*

are fighting for ideals of the future. After the Bolsheviks, first under tsarism and then under Kerensky, had succeeded in winning over to their side the majority of the class-conscious active elements of the working masses, our Party was faced with the task of conquering power and suppressing the resistance of the exploiters. The task that came to the fore was that of winning, instead of convincing, Russia. From the end of October 1917 approximately up to February 1918 the militant or military task held first place, as it naturally should for any political party making a bid for power in conditions of sharp and extremely bitter struggle. Obviously, for the Party of the proletariat, the task of suppressing the resistance of the exploiters becomes a crucial issue, because the working masses who side with the proletariat are opposed here by the united members of the propertied classes armed both with the power of capital, the power of knowledge and the long-standing, if not age-old, habit and practice of government. Owing to the special conditions that were created in Russia under the influence of the unforgotten lessons of the revolution of 1905 and the influence of the far more painful and harsher lessons of the present war—owing to these conditions the Bolsheviks succeeded with comparative ease in solving the problem of winning power both in the capital and in the chief industrial centres of Russia. But in the provinces, in places far removed from the centre, and especially in districts known to have the greatest concentration of a comparatively backward population rooted in the traditions of the monarchy and medievalism—the Cossack regions, for instance—Soviet power had to contend with a resistance that took on military forms and is only now, more than four months after the October Revolution, coming to an end. At the present time the task of overcoming and suppressing the resistance of the exploiters in Russia is, in the main, completed. Russia has been won by the Bolsheviks chiefly because—as that prominent leader of the counter-revolutionary Don Cossacks, Bogayevsky himself, recently admitted—the overwhelming majority of the people even among the Cossacks have consciously, firmly and definitely sided with the Bolsheviks. But the special conditions in which the propertied classes are placed economically enable them naturally to organise not only

passive resistance (sabotage), but to repeat the attempt at military resistance to Soviet power. For that reason the task of suppressing the resistance of the exploiters cannot be regarded as having been finally completed. At any rate, it has now obviously been dealt with in its main aspects and is retreating into the background. The Soviet government will never for a moment allow itself to forget about this task and will under no circumstances let itself be diverted from it by any political or so-called socialist names or declamations. We have to speak about this because both the Mensheviks and the Right S.R.s act as the most mobile, sometimes even as the most brazen-faced counter-revolutionaries, who wage a sharper struggle against the Soviet government than the one they had allowed themselves to wage against the reactionary and landowner governments, and rely on their party's label and designation to protect them. Naturally, the Soviet government will never falter in its task of suppressing the resistance of the exploiters, no matter what party banners or what popular and specious names this resistance may be covered up with. However, at the present time the task of suppressing resistance has, in the main, been completed, and the task now confronting us is that of administering the state.

This transition from what was once the priority task of convincing the masses, a transition from the task of winning power and crushing the resistance of the exploiters by military force to what is now the primary task of administering the state—this transition is the main feature of the present moment. The difficulty which the Soviet government is experiencing is that of bringing home the essentials of this transition to all the class-conscious elements of the working masses as well as the people's political leaders. For it is self-understood that the transition to the peaceful tasks of governing the whole population irrespective of classes, a transition that is taking place in conditions when the civil war is still going on in some places, when grave military dangers are threatening the Soviet Republic from both the West and the East, and when the war has caused untold havoc throughout the country—it is self-understood that such a transition is beset with tremendous difficulties.

CHAPTER V

The task of administering the state, which now confronts the Soviet government, has this special feature, that, probably for the first time in the modern history of civilised nations, it deals pre-eminently with economics rather than with politics. Usually the word "administration" is associated chiefly, if not solely, with political activity. However, the very basis and essence of Soviet power, like that of the transition itself from capitalist to socialist society, lie in the fact that political tasks occupy a subordinate position to economic tasks. And now, especially after the practical experience of over four months of Soviet government in Russia, it should be quite clear to us that the task of administering the state is primarily a purely economic task—that of healing the country's wounds inflicted by the war, restoring its productive forces, organising accountancy in and control over production and distribution, raising the productivity of labour—in short, it boils down to the task of economic reorganisation.

This task can be said to fall under two main headings: 1) accounting and control over production and distribution in the broadest, most widespread and universal forms of such accounting and control, and 2) raising the productivity of labour. These tasks can be handled by any form of collective effort or any form of state passing over to socialism only on condition that the basic economic, social, cultural and political preconditions for this have been created in a sufficient degree by capitalism. Without large-scale machine production, without a more or less developed network of railways, postal and telegraph communications, without a more or less developed network of public educational institutions, neither of these tasks can be carried out in a systematic way on a national scale. Russia is in a position when quite a number of these initial preconditions for such a transition actually exist. On the other hand, quite a number of these preconditions are absent in our country, but can be borrowed by it fairly easily from the experience of the neighbouring, far more advanced countries, whom history and international intercourse have long since placed in close contact with Russia.

CHAPTER VI

The basic aim of every society going over to a socialist system consists in the victory of the ruling class—or rather the class that is growing up to be the ruling class—namely, the proletariat, over the bourgeoisie as described above. And this task is set before us in a substantially new way, quite unlike the way it stood in the course of many decades of the proletariat's world-wide experience of struggle against the bourgeoisie. Now, after the gains of the October Revolution, after our successes in the civil war, victory over the bourgeoisie should stand for something much bigger, albeit more peaceful in form: namely, victory over the bourgeoisie, now that it has been secured politically and made good militarily, should now be achieved in the sphere of organisation of the national economy, in the sphere of organisation of production, in the sphere of country-wide accounting and control. The problem of accounting and control over production was dealt with by the bourgeoisie all the more effectively in proportion as production expanded and the network of national economic institutions embracing tens and hundreds of millions of the population of a large modern state became more ramified. We must handle this task now in a new way, backed by the predominating position of the proletariat, supported by the bulk of the working and exploited masses, making use of those elements of organising talent and technical knowledge which have been accumulated by the preceding society, and nine-tenths, perhaps even ninety-nine hundredths of which belong to a class hostile and opposed to the socialist revolution.

CHAPTER VII

German imperialism, which has made the greatest advance not only in military power and military techniques, but in big industrial organisations within the framework of capitalism, has incidentally given proof of its economic progressiveness by being the first country to introduce labour conscription. Naturally, in the conditions of capitalist

society in general and particularly when the monarchist states are waging an imperialist war, labour conscription is nothing more than a military convict prison for the workers, a new means of enslaving the working and exploited masses, a new system of measures for suppressing all protest on the part of these masses. Nevertheless, there is no question that it is only because of the economic preconditions created by big capitalism that such a reform could be put forward and effected. And now we, amid conditions of appalling post-war economic disorganisation, are obliged to consider the urgency of a similar reform. Naturally, Soviet power, which is passing from a capitalist to a socialist organisation of society, must tackle this problem of labour conscription from the other end, opposite to that of German imperialism. For the capitalists and imperialists of Germany labour conscription meant enslavement of the workers. For the workers and peasant poor in Russia labour conscription should mean, first and foremost, recruitment of the rich and propertied classes for the discharge of their social duties. We should start labour conscription with the rich.

This is necessitated, generally speaking, not only by the fact that the Soviet Republic is a socialist republic. The necessity arises also from the fact that it was precisely the wealthy and propertied classes who, by their resistance, both military and passive (sabotage), mostly prevented Russia from healing the wounds inflicted upon her by the war, hampered the country's economic rehabilitation and progress. That is why accounting and control, which should be now considered a problem of paramount importance in the whole business of state administration, must be applied first of all to the wealthy and propertied classes. It was the members of these classes who enjoyed the tribute they collected from the working people, especially during the war; it was they who used this tribute to evade a task which is the duty of every citizen, namely, that of lending a hand in healing the country's wounds and putting it on its feet again; it was they who used the plundered tribute to retire and entrench themselves behind impregnable walls and offer every possible resistance to the victory of the socialist principle over the capitalist principle of society's organisation. One of the chief weapons of such struggle against the Soviets and against socialism

on the part of the wealthy and propertied classes was their possession of considerable hoards of currency notes. The propertied classes in capitalist society derived most of their wealth from the land and other means of production, such as factories, mills, etc., which they owned. The Soviet government had no difficulty, thanks to the support of the workers and the great majority of the peasants, in abolishing the right of the landowners and the bourgeoisie to these basic items of the country's wealth. It was not difficult to decree the abolition of private property in land. It was not difficult to nationalise most of the factories and mills. There is no doubt that the nationalisation of other big industrial enterprises and transport facilities is a problem that will easily be dealt with in the very near future.

Capitalist society, however, has created another form of wealth, which is by no means so easy for the Soviet government to deal with. This is wealth in the form of money, or rather, currency notes. Currency notes during the war were issued in very great numbers. Russia was cut off by a wall of military operations from commerce with a number of countries who had been her largest importers and exporters. The amassment of currency notes in the hands of the wealthy and propertied classes, practically all of whom, directly or indirectly, had speculated on the high prices for military contracts and supplies, is one of the chief means by which the propertied classes amassed wealth and accumulated power over the working people. Today the economic position of Russia, as probably of every capitalist country that has gone through three years of war, is characterised by the fact that enormous amounts of paper money are concentrated in the hands of and hoarded by a comparatively small minority, the bourgeoisie and propertied classes, and this paper money, though greatly depreciated through massive emission, still represents a claim to levy tribute on the working population.

During the transition from capitalist to socialist society it is absolutely impossible to do without currency notes or to replace them with new ones in a short space of time. The Soviet government is now confronted with a difficult task, which nevertheless has to be dealt with at all costs—the task of combating the resistance of the wealthy, a resistance

that takes the form of hoarding and concealing the proofs of their claim to levy tribute on the working people. These proofs are currency notes. Naturally, while these currency notes previously gave the right to acquire and purchase the means of production, such as land, factories, mills, etc., their significance today has diminished and even been reduced to naught. The purchase of land has become impossible in Russia after promulgation of the law on the socialisation of the land, while the purchase of factories and mills and similar large-scale means of production and transport has become practically impossible owing to the rapid process of nationalisation and confiscation of all such large enterprises. And so, it becomes more and more difficult and almost impossible for members of the bourgeoisie and propertied classes (including the peasant bourgeoisie) to acquire money for the purchase of the means of production. But in defending their old privileges and trying to retard and obstruct as much as they can the business of socialist reforms within the country, the bourgeoisie are hoarding and concealing the proofs of their claim to a share in the social wealth, their claim to levy tribute on the working people, hoarding and concealing currency notes in order to have a chance, however slender, of maintaining their position and recovering their old privileges in the event of difficulties or crises of a military or commercial nature that might yet beset Russia.

As regards consumer goods, the possibility of buying them with the sums of paper money they have accumulated through speculations during the war remains almost fully with the bourgeoisie and propertied classes, since the problem of proper rationing and distribution of these goods in a country like Russia, with her huge population of small peasants, petty artisans or handicraftsmen, presents tremendous difficulties, and in the prevailing state of economic chaos caused by the war this problem still remains practically unsolved. Thus, the Soviet government is obliged to start the business of accounting and control over production and distribution by an organised struggle against the wealthy and propertied classes who are hoarding vast sums in currency notes and evading state control.

It is estimated that currency notes to the value of about thirty thousand million rubles have been issued in Russia

to date. Of this sum probably no less than twenty thousand million, or maybe considerably more, are excess hoards unneeded for trade turnover, which are kept hidden away by members of the bourgeoisie and propertied classes for motives of self-interest—or class self-interest.

The Soviet government will have to combine the introduction of labour conscription with the registration, in the first place, of people belonging to the bourgeoisie and propertied classes; it will have to demand truthful statements (declarations) concerning the amount of currency notes available; it will have to take a number of measures to make sure that this demand will not remain on paper; it will have to consider transitional measures for concentrating all stocks of currency notes in the State Bank or its branches. Unless these measures are taken, the business of accounting and control over production and distribution cannot be effectively carried through.

CHAPTER VIII

The introduction of labour conscription, however, cannot be confined to accounting and control over the sums of currency notes concentrated in the hands of the propertied classes. The Soviet government will have to apply the principles of labour conscription also to the direct activities of the bourgeoisie and propertied classes in the sphere of factory management and the servicing of enterprises by all kinds of subsidiary labour such as book-keeping, accountancy, clerical work, technical, administrative and other jobs. In this respect, too, the task of the Soviet government is now shifting from the sphere of direct struggle against sabotage to the sphere of business organisation in the new conditions, since after the victories won by the Soviets in the civil war, beginning with October and ending February, a breach has virtually been made in the passive forms of resistance, namely, in the sabotage by the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intellectuals. It is no accident that at the present time we are witnessing a sweeping, one might say widespread, change of sentiment and political behaviour in the camp of the former saboteurs, i.e., the capitalists and bourgeois intellectuals. In all spheres of economic and political life

we now find a great number of bourgeois intellectuals and capitalist businessmen offering their services to the Soviet power. And it is up to the Soviet power now to make use of these services, which are definitely necessary for the transition to socialism, especially in a peasant country like Russia, and should be utilised on condition that the Soviet government has complete ascendancy, direction and control over its new assistants and co-operators (who had often acted in defiance of this same Soviet power in the secret hope of protesting it).

To show how necessary it is for the Soviet government to make use of the services of bourgeois intellectuals for the transition to socialism, we venture to use an expression that may at first glance seem paradoxical: we must to a considerable extent, take a lesson in socialism from the trust managers, we must take a lesson in socialism from capitalism's big organisers. That this is no paradox anyone can easily see who realises that it is the big factories, big machine industry, which developed exploitation of the working people to an unheard-of degree, that it is precisely the big factories that are the centres of concentration of that class which alone has been able to destroy the rule of capital and begin the transition to socialism. It is not surprising, therefore, that in order to solve the practical problems of socialism, when the organisational aspects of it are pushed to the fore, we must enlist to the service of the Soviet power a great number of bourgeois intellectuals, especially from among those who were engaged in the practical work of organising large-scale capitalist production, that is to say, first and foremost, those engaged in organising syndicates, cartels and trusts. Tackling this problem will require of the Soviet government an exertion of energy and initiative by the working masses in all fields of the national economy, since the old position held by the so-called captains of industry—the old position of the masters and exploiters—this old position the Soviet government will never let them have. The former captains of industry, the former masters and exploiters, must be employed as technical experts, managers, consultants, advisers. A new, difficult, but extremely gratifying problem must be solved, that of combining all the experience and knowledge which these

members of the exploiting classes have accumulated, with the initiative, energy and work of the broad masses of the working people. For only by this combination is it possible to build the bridge leading from the old capitalist to the new socialist society.

If the socialist revolution had won simultaneously throughout the world or, at least, in a number of advanced countries, then the task of enlisting the services of the best technician specialists from among the leaders of old capitalism to the process of the new organisation of production would have been made considerably easier. Backward Russia would not have to wrestle with this problem on her own, as the advanced workers of the West-European countries would have come to her help and relieved her of most of the complexities involved in that most difficult of all tasks arising in the period of transition to socialism known as the organisational task. In the present situation, when the socialist revolution in the West is slow and late in coming, and Russia has to speed up measures for her reorganisation, if only in order to save the population from starvation and afterwards the whole country from a possible foreign military invasion—in the present situation we have to borrow from the advanced countries, not their help in socialist organisation and the support of the workers, but the help of their bourgeoisie and capitalist intellectuals.

Things have so shaped themselves that we are able to get this help by organising the assistance of the bourgeois intellectuals in solving the new organisational problems of the Soviet power. This assistance can be secured by paying high salaries to the best specialists in every field of knowledge, both to the citizens of this country and to those invited from abroad. Naturally, in a developed socialist society it would appear quite unfair and incorrect for members of the bourgeois intelligentsia to receive considerably higher pay than that received by the best sections of the working class. Under the conditions of practical reality, however...* we must solve this pressing problem by means of this (unfair) remuneration for bourgeois specialists at much higher rates.

* Part of the sentence illegible and has been omitted.—Ed.

If, for example, we found that in order to organise production in Russia on new lines, in order to raise the productivity of labour and train our people in the art of working in better conditions—if we had to employ for this purpose, say two thousand big specialists in different fields of knowledge, specialists from among Russian and still more from among foreign, let us say, American sources—if we had to pay them fifty or a hundred million rubles a year, such an expense, from the point of view of the interests of the national economy, and generally from the point of view of abandoning out-worn methods of production for newer and more up-to-date methods, would be fully warranted. Such a sum is worth paying to have our people trained in better methods and techniques of production, and we shall have to pay it because, short of the victory of the socialist revolution in other countries, there is no other possibility of getting this leadership.

Of course, employment of the labour and guidance of the bourgeois intellectuals in combination with proper control by the democratic organisations of the working people and the Soviets, will create a number of new problems, but these problems will be quite solvable. No difficulties can stop us from solving these problems, as we have no other way out towards a higher organisation of production under the present situation.

I shall go further. Big capitalism has created systems of work organisation, which, under the prevailing conditions of exploitation of the masses, represent the harshest form of enslavement by which the minority, the propertied classes, wring out of the working people surplus amounts of labour, strength, blood and nerves. At the same time they are the last word in the scientific organisation of production, and as such, have to be adopted by the Socialist Soviet Republic and readjusted to serve the interests of our accounting and control over production on the one hand, and raising the productivity of labour, on the other. For instance, the famous Taylor system, which is so widespread in America, is famous precisely because it is the last word in reckless capitalist exploitation. One can understand why this system met with such an intense hatred and protest on the part of the workers. At the same time, we must not for a moment

forget that the Taylor system represents the tremendous progress of science, which systematically analyses the process of production and points the way towards an immense increase in the efficiency of human labour. The scientific researches which the introduction of the Taylor system started in America, notably that of motion study, as the Americans call it, yielded important data allowing the working population to be trained in incomparably higher methods of labour in general and of work organisation in particular.

The negative aspect of Taylorism was that it was applied in conditions of capitalist slavery and served as a means of squeezing double and triple the amount of labour out of the workers at the old rates of pay regardless of whether the hired workers were capable of giving this double and triple amount of labour in the same number of working hours without detriment to the human organism. The Socialist Soviet Republic is faced with a task which can be briefly formulated thus: we must introduce the Taylor system and scientific American efficiency of labour throughout Russia by combining this system with a reduction in working time, with the application of new methods of production and work organisation undetrimental to the labour power of the working population. On the contrary, the Taylor system, properly controlled and intelligently applied by the working people themselves, will serve as a reliable means of further greatly reducing the obligatory working day for the entire working population, will serve as an effective means of dealing, in a fairly short space of time, with a task that could roughly be expressed as follows: six hours of physical work daily for every adult citizen and four hours of work in running the state.

The adoption of such a system would call for very many new skills and new organisational bodies. Without doubt, this will create for us many difficulties, and the posing of such a task will even evoke perplexity if not resistance among certain sections of the working people themselves. We may be sure, however, that the progressive elements among the working class will understand the need for such a transition, and that the appalling extent of the economic chaos witnessed in the towns and villages by millions of men returning from the front who had been torn away from it all

and now saw the full extent of the ravages caused by the war—all this, without doubt, has prepared the ground for shaping public opinion in this direction, and we may be sure that the transition which we have roughly outlined above will be accepted as a practical task by all elements among the working classes who have now consciously sided with the Soviet government.

CHAPTER IX

An economic transition of the above nature calls also for a corresponding change in the functions of Soviet leadership. It is quite natural, in a situation under which the main task was to convince the majority of the nation or to win power and crush the resistance of the exploiters, that among the leaders, too, those who came to the fore should have been agitators in regard to the masses, with whom Soviet power was more closely connected than any other democratic form of government in the past. Naturally, winning over the majority of the population or drawing it into a hard and difficult armed struggle against the exploiters called above all for agitators of ability. Conversely, the tasks outlined above and aimed at establishing accounting and control over production and distribution, advance to the fore practical managers and organisers. Accordingly, a certain reappraisal of leaders, certain shifts among them, should be effected in cases where they are unable to adapt themselves to the new conditions and the new task. Naturally, the leadership of a past period accustomed chiefly to agitators' tasks, would find such a transition very difficult. Naturally, a number of mistakes because of this was unavoidable. Both the leaders and the Soviet electorate at large, that is, the working and exploited masses, must now be made to see the necessity for this change.

Among the working and exploited masses there is far more talent and ability as organisers than as agitators, for the entire work milieu of these classes demanded of them to a much greater extent the ability to organise joint work and a system of accounting and control over production and distribution. Their former conditions of life, on the contrary,

provided far less grounds for advancing from their midst leaders possessing the gift of agitators or propagandists. Perhaps that is why we so often see now agitators and propagandists by vocation or calling who are compelled to assume the tasks of organisers, and who have it brought home to them at every step that they are not quite fit for the job and that the workers and peasants are disappointed and dissatisfied with them. These mistakes and failures of the Soviet government often provoke malicious glee among classes that are hostile to the idea of a socialist remodelling of society, among members of the bourgeois parties or those who call themselves socialist parties but who actually serve the bourgeoisie with zeal—people like the Mensheviks and the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries. Clear as the historical inevitability of these mistakes is, it is equally clear that the shortcomings in this respect are merely the growing pains of the new socialist society. There can be no doubt that the representatives of Soviet power all over Russia can and will requalify without great difficulty, that the practical agitators will learn to occupy a befitting leading place. This, however, will take time, and only practical experience by trial and error is capable of bringing a clear realisation of the need for change, capable of bringing to the fore a number of people, or even a whole cross-section, fit to deal with the new tasks. There is probably more organising talent among the workers and peasants than the bourgeoisie imagine. The trouble is that these talents have no chance to develop, make good and win a place for themselves in the conditions of capitalist economy.

On the other hand, if we clearly recognise today the need for enlisting new organising talent on a broad scale to the business of running the state, if we—guided by the principles of Soviet power—start systematically promoting to leading positions people who have practical experience in this business, we shall succeed in a short time in building up a new stratum of practical organisers of production, who, on the basis of the principles evolved by Soviet power, principles cast among the masses and carried into practice by the masses under the control of Soviet bodies representing the mass membership, will win a position for themselves befitting their role of leadership.

CHAPTER X

Soviet government will have to pass over, or rather it will simultaneously have to deal with, the problem of applying corresponding principles to the bulk of the workers and peasants. Here the task of introducing labour conscription presents its other side to us. We must approach this problem differently and highlight different things to those that have to be applied in the case of the wealthy classes. We see no essential need for registering all the working people, for keeping an eye on their stocks of currency notes or their consumption, since all the conditions of life compel the vast majority of these sections of the population to work for their living and give them no chance to hoard anything but the most meagre stocks. Therefore, the task of introducing labour conscription in this field resolves itself into the task of establishing labour discipline and self-discipline.

In the old capitalist society discipline over the working people was enforced by capital through the constant threat of starvation. This threat being combined with excessively heavy toil and the workers' awareness that they were working, not for themselves, but for somebody else's benefit, the conditions of labour became a constant struggle of the great majority of the working people against the organisers of production. This inevitably created a psychology in which public opinion among the working people not only did not frown on poor work or shirkers, but, on the contrary, saw in this an inevitable and legitimate protest against or means of resistance to the excessive demands of the exploiters. If the bourgeois press and its echoers are now shouting so much about anarchy among the workers, about their lack of discipline and excessive demands, the vicious nature of this criticism is so obvious that it is not worth dwelling on. It is only natural that in a country like Russia, where the bulk of the population for the last three years has endured such appalling hunger and privations, there should have been a number of cases of utter despondency and a break-down of organisation. To demand a quick change in this connection or to expect such changes to be achieved by several decrees, would be as absurd as resorting to appeals in an attempt to restore good cheer and energy into a man who had been

beaten within an inch of his life. Only the Soviet government, created by the working people themselves, and taking into consideration the growing signs of recovery among them, is in a position to carry out radical changes in this respect.

The need for working out systematic measures to improve self-discipline among the working people has now been fully brought home to the representatives of Soviet power and its supporters—the political-minded trade union leaders, for instance. There is no doubt that in the environment of capitalist society in general, and still more, in the atmosphere of frenzied, unbridled speculation created by the war, there has seeped in among the working class an element of demoralisation that will seriously need coping with. All the more that, owing to the war, the composition of the working-class vanguard itself has not changed for the better either. Therefore, the maintenance of discipline among the working people, the organisation of control over the measure of labour and the intensity of labour, the introduction of special industrial courts for establishing the measure of labour, for prosecuting those guilty of flagrant violations of this measure, and for exercising systematic influence on the majority with the object of raising this measure—all this has now been brought to the fore as one of the most urgent tasks of the Soviet government.

The only thing is to bear in mind that in bourgeois society one of the principal instruments of social education, namely, the press, completely failed to discharge its task in this respect. And to this day our Soviet press, too, is still largely under the influence of the old habits and old traditions of bourgeois society. This is evidenced, among other things, by the fact that our press, like the old bourgeois press, continues to devote too much space and attention to political trivia, to those personal questions of political leadership by which the capitalists of all countries have striven to draw the attention of the masses away from the really important, profound and cardinal questions of their life.

Dictated between March 23
and 28, 1918

Printed from the shorthand record

THE STATE OF INLAND WATER TRANSPORT

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.⁶³

Having heard the report concerning the disastrous state of the inland water transport and acquainted itself with the draft decree drawn up by the Supreme Economic Council in agreement with the Central Committee of the Water Transport Workers' Union and the representatives of the Central Committee of the Volga Fleet,

the C.P.C. endorses this draft as a temporary measure;

—urgently asks the Nizhni-Novgorod Congress of Water Transport Employees to put this draft into effect immediately and without any deviations;

—should the congress consider it necessary in future to make any amendments to the decree, the C.P.C. asks the congress to send its authorised delegation to the C.P.C. to discuss and finally settle the question of such amendments.

The C.P.C. impresses upon the congress that the disastrous state of inland water transport precludes any possibility of delays and makes it absolutely necessary to strictly and conscientiously carry out all the orders of Kavomar.⁶³ Only on this condition will the C.P.C. be able to justify the allocation of immense sums on the national fleet in the eyes of the country.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written March 26, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON CONTROL OF S.E.C. EXPENDITURE⁶⁴

The C.P.C. instructs the representatives, one from the State Control and one from the Commissariat for Finance, to form a commission which, not later than tomorrow, shall start an inspection of the books of the accounting office

under the Fuel Department of the S.E.C. and also other accounting offices of the S.E.C.

Comrade Bogolepov is charged with summoning the commission.

The same commission is charged with: first, specially examining the question of forms of accountancy; second, demanding precise statements in writing signed by all the persons concerned certifying their participation in the allocation of money and the conduct of business operations of the various departments of the S.E.C.

The commission shall furthermore demand of the people in charge that they present in the near future the appropriate documents from all subordinate institutions and persons through whom expenditure of S.E.C. sums is effected.

The C.P.C. reprimands the S.E.C. and especially its Fuel Department for the extremely irregular manner in which they conduct business.

Written March 26, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

SPEECH AT A MEETING OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE S.E.C. APRIL 1, 1918

The question under discussion is a draft resolution concerning labour discipline drawn up by the All-Russia Council of Trade Unions. Comrade Lenin moves a number of amendments and more definite wordings of different points in the draft, which he suggests should be concretised. Piece wages should be fixed for all industries without exception, and in the case of trades where that is not possible, a system of bonuses should be introduced. To keep account of productivity and maintain discipline it is necessary to set up industrial courts, to form groups of controllers of various trades, not at the enterprise, but from outside,

and enlisting the co-operation of engineers, book-keepers and peasants. The decree should definitely provide for the introduction of the Taylor system, in other words, every use should be made of the scientific methods of work suggested by this system. Without it, productivity cannot be raised, without it we shall not be able to introduce socialism. In the application of this system American engineers are to be enlisted. Naturally, in introducing it, due consideration should be given to the poor nutrition. The rates of output, therefore, should make allowance for a low diet. Furthermore, it is necessary to organise output...* in the transition to socialism may enable us to reduce the working day. The decree should mention accountancy and the printing of reports concerning the productivity of the various enterprises. As to penal measures for breaches of labour discipline, these are to be stricter. Punishment should go to the length of imprisonment. Dismissal, too, may be applied, but this will be of an entirely different nature. Under the capitalist system dismissal was a breach of a civic agreement. Now, a breach of discipline, especially with the introduction of compulsory labour service, will be a criminal offence subject to a definite punishment.

Printed from the typewritten
copy of the minutes

ADDENDA TO THE DRAFT DECREE ON THE PROCEDURE FOR SENDING COMMISSARS OUT TO THE PROVINCES⁶⁵

3) The Soviets shall give every assistance to commissars invested with proper authority, within the limits of such authority.

4) The Soviets shall render unconditional assistance to all commissars extraordinary and other commissars who are

* An omission in the minutes.—*Ed.*

appointed by the Council of People's Commissars. Execution of the orders of these commissars is obligatory for all local and regional Soviets.

Written April 5, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

**SPEECH AT A JOINT MEETING
OF REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL COUNCIL
OF TRADE UNIONS,
THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE METALWORKERS' UNION
AND THE SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL
APRIL 11, 1918⁶⁶**

FROM A NEWSPAPER REPORT

Comrade Lenin urged the complete nationalisation of all trustified enterprises, with the group of capitalists who sponsored the project being enlisted in the service of the state.

Izvestia No. 72
April 12, 1918

Printed from the newspaper text

**TO THE PRESIDING COMMITTEE
OF THE FIRST CONGRESS
OF SOVIETS OF THE DON REPUBLIC⁶⁷**

Rostov-on-Don

With all my heart I greet the first Congress of Soviets of the Don Republic.

In particular I heartily subscribe to the words of the resolution concerning the necessity for carrying through to

victory the mounting struggle against the kulak elements of Cossackdom in the Don region. These words contain an accurate definition of the tasks of the revolution. This is the kind of struggle that now faces us throughout Russia.

Lenin

Written April 13, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

ADDENDUM TO THE DRAFT DECREE ON THE REGISTRATION OF SHARES, BONDS AND OTHER INTEREST-BEARING SECURITIES⁶⁸

The ban on the alienation of shares as set forth in the law of 29.XII.1917 shall remain in force pending the promulgation of a law introducing a permissive system for the alienation of shares. Only shareholders who have properly and timely registered their shares shall be entitled to receive compensation in the event of the enterprises being nationalised, the amount and conditions of such compensation to be determined by the law on nationalisation.

Similarly, only such shareholders shall be entitled to receive dividends when payment of same, suspended by the law of 29.XII.1917, will be permitted.

Written April 16, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

DECISION OF THE C.P.C. ON THE FINANCING OF SUGAR-BEET SOWING CAMPAIGN⁶⁹

Twenty million rubles is allocated to the Supreme Economic Council to be advanced to the peasants for sugar-beet sowing, the S.E.C. to take all the necessary steps

ensuring the proper expenditure of these sums and their timely repayment.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written April 17, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECREE ON THE INSTITUTION OF AN ALL-RUSSIA EVACUATION COMMISSION⁷⁰

An All-Russia Evacuation Commission shall be instituted to effect the speediest and planned evacuation of military and other freights to new points of destination (the general object of evacuation being the demobilisation of industry and satisfaction of the needs of the reorganised national economy, and by no means only military requirements).

The commission shall work according to a plan approved, amended and supplemented by the Council of People's Commissars. This plan determines the destination of the main classes of freight and the comparative urgency of their evacuation.

The commission shall be headed by an agent extraordinary invested with dictatorial powers. The members of the commission shall have a consultative voice and the right to introduce questions in the C.P.C. (if voted for by no less than one-third of the membership).

The members of the commission are: the deputy agent extraordinary with the post of chairman, and representatives of the Military, Naval, Railway, Food and Labour Commissariats and the Supreme Economic Council.

Written April, not
later than 19, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

**ADDENDUM TO THE DRAFT DECREE
FOR THE C.P.C. ON SUPPLYING AGRICULTURE WITH
IMPLEMENTS AND METALS⁷¹**

The basic principle to be applied in the distribution of agricultural machines, etc., should be, on the one hand and in the first place, due concern for agricultural production, for cultivation of all the land and for raising the productivity of agriculture, and, on the other, the supply of agricultural machines, etc., first of all to the working and poor sections of the rural population, with the common object of providing a proper and sufficient supply of breadstuff for the whole population.

Written April 23, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

**ADDENDUM
TO THE DRAFT DECREE FOR THE C.P.C.
ON A DEPARTMENT FOR ORGANISING
THE CULTIVATED AREA⁷²**

The Commissariats for Agriculture and for Food are directed to take urgent measures to reduce spring crop undersowing to a minimum, to develop market gardening, and to make preparations for winter crop sowing both on peasant lands and by means of organising crop cultivation by the state.

Written May 2, 1918

Published (in part)
May 10, 1918
in *Izvestia* No. 91

Printed from the manuscript

**DRAFT DECISION
FOR THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE
ON THE LEADERSHIP
OF THE COMMISSARIAT FOR AGRICULTURE⁷³**

The preliminary conference (on questions raised by Comrades Spiridonova and Karelin) of members of the Agricultural Board, Comrades Sereda and Meshcheryakov, and Lenin, have come to the conclusion that the questions raised must be regarded as serious political issues and should therefore be dealt with by the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party.

The conference considers it necessary that these questions be put before the C.C. urgently and without delay.

Written May 3, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

**ADDENDUM
TO THE DECREE ON THE FOOD DICTATORSHIP**

All owners of breadstuff who have surpluses and do not deliver them to the collecting stations, as well as those who use grain stocks wastefully for the distilling of illicit spirit, are to be proclaimed enemies of the people, put on trial before the Revolutionary Court and sentenced to not less than ten years imprisonment, and are to have all their property confiscated and they themselves to be banished for all time from their community, while the illicit distillers, in addition, are to be sentenced to compulsory social labour.

Written May 9, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

MOBILISATION OF THE WORKERS TO COMBAT FAMINE

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.⁷⁴

The Commissariat for Labour is authorised to take extraordinary measures in order, by agreement with the trade unions and under the indisputable control of the Commissariat for Food, to mobilise the greatest possible number of public-spirited, organised and class-conscious workers to help the rural poor in their struggle against the rich kulaks and to mercilessly suppress profiteering in grain and attempts to infringe the grain monopoly.

Written May 9, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON FUEL⁷⁵

The C.P.C. instructs the reporters to draft immediately detailed and concrete practical rules aimed at:

- 1) increasing fuel output,
- 2) economy in its consumption,
- 3) rational distribution of technical personnel in the fuel producing areas,
- 4) popular agitation and propaganda concerning the importance of saving fuel.

Written May 24, 1918.

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON MOTOR TRANSPORT⁷⁶

The drafts of the S.E.C. and Autocentre to be considered again by a commission of the S.E.C., the Military Department, the Railway, State Control, Labour and Food Commissariats and Autocentre.

V. I. LENIN

The commission to be given five days.

All departments, within the same period, to submit accurate information as to the number of motor lorries already handed over to the Commissariat for Food and the number that will be handed over in the immediate future (out of the total number of lorries).

Composition of the Motor Section of the S.E.C. to be ascertained in detail.

Written May 25, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

**DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.
ON PRIVATE PURVEYANCE OF FOOD⁷⁷**

All the various bodies serving the food organisations of different trades, such as Proput or Prodvod, etc., are asked to combine their efforts, their staffs, their agents and detachments with the main forces of the Commissariat for Food. Refusal to co-operate signifies or would signify a refusal to support the Soviet authorities, a refusal to assist in the fight against famine by all the workers and all the peasants. The only way to combat famine is to join forces.

Written May 29, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

MEASURES TO COMBAT FAMINE

1. To hoard surpluses of grain and other food products at a time when the people in Petrograd, in Moscow, and in dozens of non-agricultural uyezds are not only suffering from a shortage of bread, but are cruelly starving, is an enormous crime deserving the most ruthless punishment.

2. The task of fighting famine does not only consist in pumping grain out of the grain-producing areas, but in having all grain surpluses, as well as all foodstuffs in general, delivered to and collected by the state. Unless this is done, there can be no question of any socialist reforms or of our being able to wage an effective defensive war.

3. ...*

Written late in May
or early June 1918

Printed from the manuscript

ROUGH DRAFT OF AN AGREEMENT WITH THE S.E.C. AND THE COMMISSARIAT FOR TRADE AND INDUSTRY ON THE CONDITIONS OF BARTER BETWEEN TOWN AND COUNTRY

Agreement with the S.E.C. and the Commissariat
for Trade and Industry

Commodities shall be delivered, not to individuals, but to the volost, village or other associations of peasants strictly on condition that the peasant poor preponderate in those associations.

Commodities shall be delivered in exchange for grain on condition that 25 per cent of the sum is paid in goods and that grain is delivered to the full amount of the surplus over local consumption.

<p><i>Assessment:</i> 1 million households, 1000 rubles per house- hold</p>	<p>Organisation of the peasant poor for the systematic and rigid levying of a high tax on money hoarded by the peasant bour- geoisie.</p>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Military detachments shall be sent to the villages to collect the said taxes and break down the resistance of the rural bourgeoisie.

* Here the manuscript breaks off.—Ed.

Take from commissary stores: [Available]

Publish at least preliminary results of the Ministry for Food up to 25.X.1917.

Apparatus: food agents congress? Moscow regional apparatus...

(25 people with us; 2000 with them).

Written May or June 1918

Printed from the manuscript

COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT "REGULATIONS FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONALISED ENTERPRISES"⁷⁸

Communism requires and presupposes the greatest possible centralisation of large-scale production throughout the country. The all-Russia centre, therefore, should definitely be given the right of direct control over all the enterprises of the given branch of industry. The regional centres define their functions depending on local conditions of life, etc., in accordance with the general production directions and decisions of the centre.

To deprive the all-Russia centre of the right of direct control over all the enterprises of the given industry throughout the country, as follows from the commission's draft, would be regional anarcho-syndicalism, and not communism.

Written June 2, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

LIBRARY ORGANISATION

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.⁷⁹

The Council of People's Commissars reprimands the Commissariat for Public Education for its insufficient attention to library organisation in Russia, and direct

the Commissariat to take immediate and energetic measures, first, to centralise the library business in Russia, second, to introduce the Swiss-American system.

The Commissariat for Public Education is instructed to report to the C.P.C. twice a month on its practical steps in this field.

Written June 7, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

RE DRAFT DECREE ON THE ORGANISATION AND SUPPLY OF THE VILLAGE POOR⁸⁰

For the purpose of general guidance in the formation, composition and activities of the Committees of Poor Peasants a permanent council is instituted consisting of two representatives from the Commissariat for Food and one representative from the Commissariat for Agriculture.

All local Soviets, food supply agencies and Committees of Poor Peasants, as well as all other Soviet bodies obey the orders of this council on pertinent matters.

...shall be enjoyed by all without restriction, both by local villagers and newcomers, who do not have surpluses of grain or other food products, do not possess trade, industrial or other establishments and do not employ farmhands or day-labourers.⁸¹

Detailed rules on the relations between the Committees of Poor Peasants and the local Soviets and on the distribution of departmental functions between the two will be issued specially.

Written June 8, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

RE DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC WORKS⁸²

The C.P.C. instructs Comrade Rykov, or the Board of the S.E.C., to publish the fundamental principles of our policy in regard to enlisting the services of engineers both for work in the commissions of specialists and for administrative posts, the conditions of publicity, criticism on the part of the workers' organisations, and so on.

Written June 10, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

REHABILITATION OF RAILWAY TRANSPORT

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.⁸³

Following an exchange of views on the question of rehabilitating railway transport the Council of People's Commissars resolves: that Comrade Nevsky be instructed, on consultation with colleagues who strictly pursue a Soviet, truly socialist, and not syndicalist, policy, to submit to the C.P.C. in the near future practical proposals of measures for combating syndicalism and indiscipline, measures for disclosing and prosecuting those who contravene Soviet policies, measures defining the exact responsibility of every official in the effective discharge of his duties, and measures for enlisting the services of comrades capable of carrying out administrative work.

The appointment of a Board in the Commissariat for Railways to be postponed in view of non-publication of the decree.⁸⁴

Written June 14, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

**DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.
ON ADVANCING MONEY TO CENTROTEXTIL⁸⁵**

1) An advance of 50 million rubles shall be made to the Flax Department of Centrotexsil.

2) The Commissariat for Food and the Military Commissariat shall be obliged within 3 days to submit precise information concerning their debt to Centrotexsil.

3) The Flax Department shall be obliged, within the same period, to present its accounts to all the commissariats which are indebted to it. From these accounts currency notes shall be issued as and when calls are received from Centrotexsil for the purchase of raw material.

4) A commission shall be appointed to urgently examine the estimates, figures and office organisation of the Flax Department of Centrotexsil and submit a report to the C.P.C.

One representative each from the Commissariats for Finance, State Control and Food shall be appointed to the commission, the meeting of which is to be called by Comrade Lander. Deadline 3 days, as from Monday 17.VI.

Written June 15, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

**DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.
ON THE FINANCING OF THE CHIEF COMMITTEE
FOR THE TANNING INDUSTRY⁸⁶**

Ten million rubles shall be advanced immediately to the Chief Committee for the Tanning Industry pending final endorsement by the C.P.C. of the whole financial plan or the whole estimates for 37 million rubles.

A commission shall be appointed to immediately study this plan and these estimates consisting of

representatives of the Chief Committee for the Tanning Industry .

the Commissariat for Food Supply

" " " Finance
Control.

The meeting of the "commission" shall be called by Comrade Turkestanov, Chairman of the Board of the Chief Committee for the Tanning Industry, and the commission shall be required to finish its work within 5 days.

Written June 15, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

THE DEMOCRATISM AND SOCIALIST NATURE OF SOVIET POWER

The democratism of Soviet power and its socialist nature are expressed in the fact

that the supreme state authority is vested in the Soviets, which are made up of representatives of the working people (workers, soldiers and peasants), freely elected and removable at any time by the masses hitherto oppressed by capital;

that the local Soviets freely amalgamate on a basis of democratic centralism into a single federal union as represented by the Soviet state power of the Russian Soviet Republic;

that the Soviets concentrate in their hands not only the legislative power and supervision of law enforcement, but direct enforcement of the laws through all the members of the Soviets with a view to a gradual transition to the performance of legislative functions and state administration by the whole working population.

Taking, further, into consideration,

that any direct or indirect legalisation of the rights of ownership of the workers of any given factory or any given trade on their particular production, or of their right to weaken or impede the orders of the state authority, is

a flagrant distortion of the basic principles of Soviet power and a complete rejection of socialism....*

Written in the first half of 1918

Printed from the manuscript

**INTERVIEW GIVEN TO THE CORRESPONDENT
OF *FOLKETS DAGBLAD POLITIKEN*
JULY 1, 1918⁹⁷**

Your correspondent talked today with Lenin concerning the situation in Russia and the general situation in Europe. Lenin emphasised that a revolution is always born in travail. A country making a revolution on its own will always find itself in a serious position. But the situation is difficult everywhere, not only in Russia. There is said to be anarchy in Russia, but that is the fruit of four years of war, and not of the Bolshevik regime. The few remaining weeks until the new harvest will be the most difficult. The harvest promises to be a good one. The counter-revolution is trying its hardest to take advantage of the present situation. The counter-revolution consists of rich peasants and officers, but without foreign support they are powerless. In the towns where the counter-revolutionaries had won, they remained in power only a few days, if not a few hours. The assassination of Volodarsky, organised by the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, really reveals the weakness of the counter-revolutionaries. The history of the Russian revolution shows that a party always resorts to individual terror when it does not enjoy the support of the masses.

Opposition within the Bolshevik Party against the peace of Brest has subsided, says Lenin. Bukharin, Radek and the rest are taking part in the work again. Peace is necessary

*. Here the manuscript breaks off.—Ed.

in order to prevent the Germans from seizing the whole of Russia and strangling the revolution. As regards the measures taken against the anarchists, these are due to the fact that the anarchists had been arming and some of them had been joining up with patently bandit elements. The anarchists who are dedicated to an ideal have already been released and their big daily *Anarkhia* is coming out as usual.⁸⁸

Amid all these difficulties, industry is being organised. The owners of the enterprises are still sabotaging on a broad scale, but the workers are taking the management of the enterprises into their own hands.

Referring to the Czechoslovak revolt, Lenin expressed confidence that it would be suppressed by the Soviet troops, although it was dragging out.

* * *

The Germans in the Ukraine are in a very difficult plight. They are receiving no grain whatever from the peasants. The peasants are arming and attacking the German soldiers in large groups wherever they are met with. This movement is spreading. Owing to the German occupation Bolshevism in the Ukraine has become a sort of national movement. It is rallying around it people who would not hear of Bolshevism before that. If the Germans occupied Russia, the result would be the same. The Germans need peace. It is significant that in the Ukraine the Germans want peace more than the Ukrainians themselves do. The same applies to Turkey. The Germans have concluded an advantageous agreement with the Ukrainian Rada despite the fact that people in the Ukraine have always criticised the peace of Brest. Now the Germans are helping to fight the Bolsheviks in the Caucasus.

* * *

We in Russia now have to wait for the revolutionary movement to develop in Europe. The war party in Germany today is so strong that it speaks with contempt of the government in Berlin. Resistance to imperialism, however, is growing even in bourgeois circles. Sooner or later things

everywhere will lead to political and social collapse. The present situation is unstable, but a better order of things cannot be created merely with the aid of war and bloodshed.

Published in Swedish July 4, 1918,
in *Folhets Dagblad Politiken*
No. 152

Printed from the translated
newspaper text

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON SUPPLYING THE PEASANTS WITH AGRICULTURAL MACHINES⁸⁹

A commission to be set up of representatives of the Commissariat for Agriculture, the Agricultural Machine Department of the S.E.C. and the Commissariat for Food (Comrade Kozmin to be invited with a consultative voice) to consider measures of practical assistance to the peasants in the matter of supplying them with agricultural machines. The commission is to meet tomorrow morning (July 3) and the same day it is to get in touch with the delegates arriving to the Fifth Congress.⁹⁰ Comrade Kharlov is charged with calling the commission and reporting to the Council of People's Commissars. Comrade Sereda to check fulfilment.

Written July 2, 1918

Printed from the typewritten copy
of the minutes

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON NON-FULFILMENT OF THE "DECREE ON MONUMENTS OF THE REPUBLIC"⁹¹

The Council of People's Commissars draws the attention of the Commissariats for Public Education and State Properties, as well as of the Presidium of the Moscow

City Soviet to their impermissible inertness in the matter of carrying out the Decree of 14.IV.1918 (No. 416,* Collection of Statutes, No. 31) and orders them not later than tomorrow, 9.VII.1918, to arrange for a responsible person to exercise energetic supervision over the fulfilment and immediate enforcement of the decree and report progress to the Chairman of the C.P.C. twice a week.

Written July 8, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

ROUGH DRAFT OF ARTICLE 20, SECTION 2 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE R.S.F.S.R.⁹²

The R.S.F.S.R. acknowledges that foreigners engaged in productive work on the territory of the Republic shall enjoy full equality of civil and political rights with Russian citizens.

Written in July,
prior to 10th, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

SPEECH AT A MEETING IN PRESNYA DISTRICT JULY 26, 1918⁹³

(Lenin's appearance was greeted with a prolonged standing ovation. The "Internationale" was sung.) In his speech Lenin, in a clear and popular form, explained the essential features and basic points of the Soviet Constitution. The Soviets were the highest form of democratic government by the people. The Soviets were not something invented out of one's head, they were the product of living reality. They

Meaning Article 416.—*Ed.*

appeared and developed for the first time in history in our backward country, but objectively they should become the form of government by the working people all over the world.

All constitutions that had existed till now safeguarded the interests of the ruling classes. The Soviet Constitution was the only one that served and would constantly serve the working people and was a powerful weapon in the fight for socialism. Comrade Lenin very aptly pointed out the differences between the demands for "freedom of the press and assembly" in bourgeois constitutions and in the Soviet Constitution. There, freedom of the press and assembly was an exclusive monopoly of the bourgeoisie; there the bourgeoisie met in their saloons, issued their big dailies financed by the banks with the aim of sowing lies and slander and poisoning the minds of the masses; there the workers' press was strangled, not allowed to say what it thought about the predatory war; there, those opposed to the war were hounded and their meetings banned. Here in Soviet Russia, however, the workers' press existed and served the working people. In Russia we were taking the sumptuous houses and palaces away from the bourgeoisie and turning them over to the workers to be used by them as clubs, and that was freedom of assembly in practice. Religion was a private concern. Everyone could believe in what he wants or believe in nothing. The Soviet Republic united the working people of all nations and defended the interests of the working people without national discrimination. The Soviet Republic knew no religious distinctions. It stood above all religion and strove to separate religion from the Soviet state. Lenin went on to describe the Soviet Republic's difficult position, surrounded as it was on all sides by imperialist predators. Comrade Lenin expressed his confidence that the Red Army men would defend our Soviet Republic with all their might against all encroachments by international imperialism and would keep it safe until our ally—the international proletariat—came to our aid. *(Comrade Lenin's speech was greeted with prolonged and tumultuous applause. The "Internationale" was sung.)*

August 1918—October 1920

**DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.
ON POTATO PRICES⁹⁴**

1) Introduction of fixed prices for potatoes to be postponed until 1.X.

2) The Central Statistical Board to be directed: .
to immediately mobilise the entire statistical personnel for (α) taking stock of the potato harvest;

(β) taking stock of and registering the medium and big growers of potatoes
first in the chief potato-growing gubernias around Moscow;

then in the remaining potato-growing gubernias.

The Head of the Central Statistical Board to be required not later than tomorrow, Friday, and subsequently twice a week, to report what measures have been taken.

3) The Commissariat for Food (in co-operation with the Commissariat for Internal Affairs and the Moscow Soviet) to urgently consider introducing a demand for signed vouchers (from the owner of the potatoes who has sold them) as a condition for the free transportation of the potatoes by cartage, railway and waterway.

4) The Commissariat for Food to be directed immediately to mobilise all forces for organising by 25.VIII the urgent and mass purchase of not less than 40 million poods of potatoes at market prices and their delivery to government warehouses in the capital and to military bases.

5) Workers to be enlisted for this purpose *en masse* through the trade unions and the Soviets of the industrial gubernias.

6) A report on the progress of this operation and on the measures for its preparation (as well as recorded information

on it) to be made tomorrow, Friday, and subsequently twice a week, by the Commissariat for Food.

7) Five hundred million rubles to be assigned to the Commissariat for Food for the potato purchasing operation.

8) Point 1 of this decision to be published not later than tomorrow.⁹⁵

Written August 22, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

CONFISCATION OF SEEDS FROM THE KULAKS BY THE POOR PEASANTS' COMMITTEES

Ought we not add?

let the Committees of Poor Peasants *confiscate* seed grain from the kulaks, and in any case, if confiscation is now impossible, the rich farmers should subsequently be made to supply the seeds that will temporarily be taken for the poor out of the grain stocks of the former landed estates.⁹⁶

Written in August 1918

Printed from the manuscript

RE THE DECREE ON THE IMPOSITION OF A TAX IN KIND ON FARMERS⁹⁷

1

MAIN PROVISIONS OF THE DECREE

The draft to be revised in 4 days as follows:

- 1) A popular preamble
- (a) surpluses and equalisation

(articles 17, 12 and others of the law on the socialisation of the land⁸⁸)

- NB| (β) complete expropriation of the bourgeoisie
 (γ) the rich peasant not to be expropriated, but *taxed* equitably, heavily
 (δ) middle peasants to be taxed lightly
 (ε) poor peasants—not at all.
- 2) The division into poor (no taxes whatever), middle (very light taxes) and rich peasants to be incorporated in the law itself.
 - 3) % of poor to be fixed roughly at $< 40\%$, middle peasants at $< 20\%$.
 - 4) Taxes on middle peasants to be reduced *considerably*.
 - 5) Regional Soviet organisations shall be entitled to raise the question of changing the rates of taxation for the rich.
 - 6) The poor to have the right to receive part of the collected grain (for food and seed).

2

REMARKS ON THE DRAFT DECREE

NB

- (1) Not all the 2 million are kulaks.
- (2) A rich peasant may be very prosperous, but not an exploiter, etc.
- (3)] We expropriate and confiscate in the case of the capitalists, but *not* in the case of the rich peasant.
- (4) Confiscation to be applied to kulaks who revolt and offer resistance.

Written September 21, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

**RE DECISION OF THE C.P.C.
ALLOCATING FUNDS FOR THE UPKEEP
OF THE POOR PEASANTS' COMMITTEES**

$$2 \times 6\frac{1}{2} = 13$$

Within a week.

Temporarily and tentatively pending amalgamation with the Soviets or delimitation of jurisdiction.

Instructions on whom to be given to and on what conditions.

Fix the liability of the recipient and under no circumstances issue further sums unless the first is accounted for.

Payment through the Commissariat for Food.⁹⁹

Written October 15, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

RE DECISION OF THE C.P.C. ON LOGGING

Check delivery figures and results for 1917 and 1918.

What part of the logging organisations are united?

Exact information on the structure of the Logging Department in relation to other institutions.

Practical measures for combating profiteering.

Requisition of all stocks of firewood en route and in Moscow.

Effective measures to have grain* carted to the railway stations.¹⁰⁰

Written October 15, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

* Obviously a slip of the pen. The decision adopted by the C.P.C. dealt only with firewood transportation.—*Ed.*

ROUGH THESES OF A DECISION ON THE STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE LAWS

- I. Legality must be raised (or rigorously observed), since the basis of laws in the R.S.F.S.R. has been established.
- II. Emergency measures of *warfare* against counter-revolution should not be restricted by the laws, provided:
 - (α) that an exact and formal statement be made by the appropriate Soviet body or official to the effect that the special conditions of civil war and the fight against counter-revolution require that the limits of the law be exceeded;
 - (β) that such a statement in writing be forwarded immediately to the C.P.C. and copies sent to the local authorities concerned.
- III. In all conflicts, friction, misunderstandings or disputes as to the limits of jurisdiction, etc., between officials or Soviet government bodies—all such persons and bodies are obliged immediately to draw up the briefest of reports giving the date, place, and names of the officials or bodies and the bare gist of the matter (without details). A copy of the report must be handed to the other party.
- IV. Similar brief reports shall be drawn up by every official or Soviet body in the event of any citizen of the Republic complaining against any measure (or red tape, etc.) on the part of the said official or body. A copy must be sent to the citizen lodging the complaint, and another to the body higher up.
- V. Anyone making patently groundless statements in the report tantamount to gross abuse shall be liable to prosecution.
- VI. Refusal to hand over a report with the clearly written name of the official is a criminal breach of trust.

I propose that the C.C. approve *in principle* and instruct the People's Commissariat for Justice to word this as a decree.¹⁰¹

2/XI.1918

Lenin

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON CHILDREN'S HOMES¹⁰²

1) The draft decree of the Commissariat for Social Security shall be rejected.

2) The Commissariats for Social Security and Education shall be directed, in accordance with § 3 of the Decree of 5, VI.1918 (Article 507 of the Collection of Statutes, No. 39), to make arrangements as to the order and date of the turnover.¹⁰³

3) The two Commissariats shall be directed to collect and present to the C.P.C. within two months information concerning actual conditions at the orphanages and similar institutions, their number, and so on.

Written November 19, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

ADDENDUM TO THE DRAFT DECREE ON THE ORGANISATION OF SUPPLY FOR THE POPULATION

e) Co-operative warehouses and shops are not subject to municipalisation.*

* The text of the adopted decree reads "nationalisation".—*Ed.*

In places where co-operatives were nationalised or municipalised and stocks of goods in co-operative stores requisitioned or confiscated by the local Soviet authorities before publication of this decree, all such co-operatives shall be re-established, their stocks returned to them, the missing goods accounted for and no further obstructions raised to their legitimate activities.

Note:

In restoring the co-operatives measures must be taken to prevent counter-revolutionary or kulak distortion of their activities and to have strict and absolute control over them exercised by the Poor Peasants' Committees and the local Soviets.¹⁰⁴

Written November 21, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

THE TASKS AND ORGANISATION OF THE WORK OF THE COUNCIL OF DEFENCE¹⁰⁵

First Meeting of the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defence

1

1.XII.1918

- | | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>General review of tasks.</i> 2. <i>Add from trade unions.</i> 3. <i>Standing order</i> | <p>Subjects
<i>of general review:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <u>Food problem</u> 2. <u>Railway problem</u> 3. <u>Military supply</u> 4. Mobilisation of intelligentsia 5. " " technical personnel 6. Fuel 7. State Control & Supreme Military Inspection. |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

I. Task for the Food Commissariat—within 4 days present plan for speeding up and increasing purveyance, forward to *Council of Defence* } Militarisation

Set up in the Food Commissariat a Department for improving *distribution* of foodstuffs, for improving the *distributing apparatus*.

Merge Chief Economic Administration with the Food Commissariat + Prodnut. Instruct Food Commissariat to work up the question (a) of delivering foodstuffs to the 3rd shift of the Tula Cartridge Factory + Simbirsk Cartridge Factory

(b) of introducing Red Army rations for peat and coal workers near Moscow—*also those on firewood jobs*.

II. Bonuses Commission. On question II 3 commissions Collective Liability Commission. set up

State Control. Flying inspection.

III.

IV. & V. Krasin
Krasin + Nevsky + Gorbunov¹⁰⁶

VI. Fuel Commission: Lenin,
Rykov,
Volkovsky,
Nevsky,
Radchenko¹⁰⁷

Question of agents vs contractors.

VII. *Supreme Military Inspection.*

1) order the Food Commissariat in shortest possible time to submit a plan for greatly intensifying grain purveyance as well as fodder;

- 2) when increasing the number of trios, local food supply workers to be appointed to them;
- 3) direct Comrade Krasin to carry out an urgent investigation into the question of utilising the stocks of boots in Petrograd;
(Khodinsky warehouse ober Food Commissariat*)
- 4) brief demands or irregularities to be immediately reported to the chairman.

Written December 1, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE DEFENCE COUNCIL'S FUEL COMMISSION¹⁰⁸

- 1) Radchenko, as chairman of the 5-man Fuel Commission, devotes no more than 2 hours a day to the Peat Commission.
- 2) With regard to the red tape in issuing money¹⁰⁹ the Timber Board is to be ordered to lodge a formal complaint this very day.
- 1) The Timber Board to be directed within 2 days to make arrangements with the Military Department
 - a) for a law granting deferment of military service to woodcutters and wood transporters
 - b) for a law mobilising the population for logging work.
- 2) The Commissariat for Agriculture to be ordered immediately to carry out the instructions of the S.E.C. and, under the control of the Timber Board, to issue not later than tomorrow, 3.XII, regulations governing the assignment of cutting areas and the issue of felling licences.
- 3) The Central Forest Department of the Commissariat for Agriculture to be warned that in the event of further red tape or a single further complaint on the part of the Timber Board, the personnel of the Department will be arrested and prosecuted.

* This refers to the warehouse belonging directly to the People's Commissariat for Food of the R.S.F.S.R.—*Ed.*

- 4) The Timber Board to be given the right to inspect the stores of all departments for saws and axes (i.e., to be allowed to examine books and warehouses).

2/XII.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

Written December 2, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE WORK OF THE VECHEKA¹¹⁰

To be headed by Party members who have been in the Party for not less than two years.¹¹¹

Regulations on the Railways Cheka¹¹² to be revised.

Confirm the right of *trade union* and Party organisations to act as guarantors.

Stricter measures and capital punishment to be applied to informers giving false information.

The right to act as guarantors to be given to People's Commissars against the signatures of two Board members.

The right to take part in investigations to be granted¹¹³ etc.

In introducing the registration of technical personnel and of the intelligentsia in general, a warning should be issued that those who do not register lose the right to receive a certificate of guarantee.

The Vecheka department dealing with complaints and requests to expedite cases should be expanded immediately.

Written December 3, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

ROUGH DRAFT PROPOSALS FOR INTENSIFYING AND INCREASING FOOD PURVEYANCE¹¹⁴

- 1) food-armymen to be replaced
- 2) special commissars to be assigned to backward areas and other *organisers with special tasks and bonuses....*

3) Food Commissariat staff, reform and "shake up" of staff.

4) *workers' inspection....*

Drafting of concrete detailed tasks for various local economic councils, challenging to emulation....

Oblige local military authorities to give the food organisations *such-and-such* (define which) military units for "food-army" work.

Written December 4, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

RE DRAFT "REGULATIONS ON THE ORGANISATION OF A WORKERS' FOOD INSPECTION"¹¹⁵

1

DRAFT DECISION OF THE C.P.C.

Systematically

- 1) check concrete cases of urgent execution of definite, clearly defined tasks of the Food Commissariat and food organisations;
- 2) establish contact with workers and working masses and systematically enlist their co-operation in the work of delivering and distributing foodstuffs, first as witnesses, then as members of the inspection;
- 3) oblige *all* bodies of the workers' inspection to give weekly reports of their activities to the local and central trade union bodies;
- 4) a consultative voice....*

2

REMARKS ON THE DRAFT "REGULATIONS"

This draft to be revised in the direction of (1) making it the fixed definite task of the Workers' Food Inspection not only to examine the business correspondence of the food

* Here the manuscript breaks off.—*Ed.*

supply organisations, but chiefly to verify concrete instances of their activities in connection with the purveyance, delivery and distribution of food products;

—further (2) obliging the Workers' Food Inspection to establish contact between the food policy and the workers and working masses and enlist their services, one and all (through the participation of witnesses as a first step), to the business of food administration.

(3)—making it the duty of the Workers' Food Inspection to report weekly to the broad mass of the working class and the working population primarily through the trade unions.

Written December 5, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

NOTES AT A MEETING OF THE COMMISSION ON CARTRIDGES¹¹⁶

*First meeting of the Commission on Cartridges
December 5, 1918*

Tula Cartridge Factory.

Measures for increasing output:

New management.

Bonuses.

Third shift (+2000 people).

Emancipation from the (Tula) labour exchange.

Extra equipment (from remaining stocks in Petrograd).

Production records and statistics: weekly.

Foreign samples.

How to muster in Russia highly skilled workers?

Inviting specialists from abroad.

Task to the Science and Technical Department.

Keeping proper weekly records of production.

Cartridges per worker a day:

1916 : 240

1918 : 225

Factory's output

maximum 1916 : 35 million

1918: months XII—16—18—20
 (perhaps 25-27) million
 1919: I—16—20
 II—18—25
 III—20—27
 IV—22—29
 V—25—31
 VI—28—33
 VII—35

Within a month or two months introduce three shifts.

Written December 5, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

RE DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON AN ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF BANK EMPLOYEES

Immediate (within ten days) congress of bank employees (of both unions) with committees on a parity basis for convening the congress.¹¹⁷

Similar parity committees to verify, discover and expose sabotage.

Groups of leading members of Banktrud to be charged immediately with precise defined practical tasks in the field of bank nationalisation, with a short period set for their fulfilment.

Written in December,
not later than 6th, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

PROPOSALS ON THE QUESTION OF FINANCING CENTROTEXTIL¹¹⁸

Weekly account of the number of <i>cash-</i>	1) People's Bank controls deposits and payments—inte- grated cash-office,
-------------------------------------------------	---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

offices (departments or enterprises) integrated.

Weekly account of amount of produce shipped from each Board and from each big factory, and distributed among the population.

2) "Barter" control of produce shipped and delivered to consumer.

3) Personal responsibility of former capitalists or former owners of the enterprises in all boards and centres (under threat of imprisonment, execution of former capitalists, arrest of their families).¹¹⁹

4) Instruct the Food Commissariat, in the field of distribution, which is the weakest field, to give definite *practical* assignments to the *union* of Commercial and Industrial Employees under the collective responsibility of the whole union.

Written December 14, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

TO G. V. CHICHERIN¹²⁰

Comrade Chicherin,

We must *urgently* (to be endorsed in the C.C. before departure of the Spartacist¹²¹) prepare an international socialist conference for founding the Third International. (in Berlin (openly) or in Holland (secretly), say, for 1.II.1919)

[generally *very* soon]

For this we must

- (a) formulate platform *principles* (I think we could
- (α) take the theory and practice of *Bolshevism*—have *Bukharin* set this forth in theses, as briefly as possible,

Talk it over with Bukharin—perhaps *take part of them* from my draft programme*

- (β) then take "*Was will der Spartacusbund?*"). α + β give sufficiently clear *platform principles*;
- (b) define the *basis* (organisational) of the *Third International* (nothing in common with the social-patriots);
- (c) give a list of parties, roughly under three headings
- αα) parties and groups we have good reason to consider as *already* sharing the platform of the Third International and as being sufficiently unanimous on the question of *formally* founding the Third International;
- ββ) parties *close* to this, from whom we *expect* alignment and affiliation;
- γγ) *groups* and currents *within* the social-patriotic parties more or less close to *Bolshevism*.

I am offering a tentative list (p. 4)**; additions should be made with care.

Who are we *inviting* to our conference? Only αα + ββ + γγ and only those (1) who resolutely stand for a break with the social-patriots (i.e., the people who, directly or indirectly, supported the bourgeois governments during the imperialist war of 1914-18); 2) who are *for* a socialist revolution *now* and *for* the dictatorship of the proletariat; 3) who are *in principle* for "Soviet power" and against *limitation* of our work by bourgeois parliamentarism, against *subordination* to it, and who recognise the fact that the Soviet *type* of government is *higher* and *closer* to *socialism*.

Perhaps we should add that we do not suggest that the *whole* of the Third International immediately start calling itself "communist", but we *do place on the order of the day* (for discussion) the *question* of resolutely rejecting the names of "Social-Democratic" and "socialist" parties, and adopting that of "communist" parties.

Arguments *theoretical* Engels and Marx
historical breakdown of the Second
 International
 disgrace of social-patriotism

* Lenin is referring to the material for the draft of the Party's new programme (see Vol. 24, pp. 455-79 and Vol. 27, pp. 152-58 of this edition).—*Ed.*

** The list is given at the end of this letter.—*Ed.*

practical already accepted by
 Russia
 Finland
 German Austria
 Holland
 Hungary

Please tackle this job *urgently*, and together with Bukharin draw up a *draft* on all these points. *Answer me at once, if only briefly.*

Greetings! *Lenin*

On no account must the Zimmerwaldists be taken as a gauge.

(αα) *Spartacusbund* (Germany)

	The Communist Party of	Finland	
	"	"	German Austria
	"	"	Hungary
Social-	"	"	Holland
Democrats	"	"	Russia
αα of Poland	"	"	Ukraine
and	"	"	Estonia
Lithuania	"	"	Latvia

The Tesnyaki of Bulgaria

Rumanian Party?

γγ ((the Lefts and the young in
 (the Swiss Social-Democratic Party
 ββ The Socialist Party of Scotland
 αα the Left S.D. of Sweden
 ββ the Norwegian S.D. Party
 ββ the Danish S.D. group (Marie Nielsen)
 and the syndicalists, close to Bolshevism
 γγ Lorient's group in France
 ββ the "League" in the United States
 (or followers of Debs?)

We count on closer	{	the British	Socialist
alignment and		Party...	
affiliation with		the Italian	Socialist
		Party...	¹²²

Written December 27 or 28, 1918

Printed from the manuscript

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPILING A READING BOOK FOR WORKERS AND PEASANTS

Assignment: a reading book for workers and peasants to be compiled within a fortnight.

The book to consist of separate, complete, independent leaflets of two to four printed pages.

Wording must be very popular, designed for the ignorant peasant. Number of leaflets from 50 to 200; for the first issue—50.

Subjects: organisation of Soviet power, its home and foreign policies. For example: What is Soviet power? How to run the country. The law on land. The economic councils. Nationalisation of the factories. Labour discipline. Imperialism. The imperialist war. Secret treaties. How we offered peace. What we are fighting for now. What is communism? Separation of the church from the state. And so on.

Good old texts can and should be used, and old articles rewritten.

The reading book should provide material for public readings and home reading, for reprinting of separate texts and for translation (with slight additions) into other languages.

Written December 1918

Printed from the typewritten copy

NOTES ON HELP TO KHARKOV¹²³

- 1) Send maximum amount of money to Kharkov.
- 2) The S.E.C. to send textiles, etc., there in the most urgent manner....
- 3) Set up a Centre in Kharkov....

Send people
organisers, at least a few, familiar with food supply
business.¹²⁴

Written between January
3 and 17, 1919

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON THE CO-OPERATIVES¹²⁵

- I. Collect information on the actual implementation by the co-operatives of the basic line of Soviet policy, namely:
 - (1) not only co-operative organisation of the whole population, but the predominant role of the proletarian and semi-proletarian population in co-operative activities.
 - (2) such a system of supply and distribution as would really enable the poor (= proletarians + semi-proletarians) to derive benefit (goods, etc.) from the delivery of *all* surpluses of grain to the state.
- ad 1 direct the Co-operative Department of the Supreme Economic Council and the Commissariat for Food, together with the Central Statistical Board to collect this information. Report in a fortnight.
- II. Direct the Food Commissariat to draw up instructions concerning Soviet agents in the co-operatives and develop propaganda and organising work to this end.
- III. Direct the workers' co-operatives to elect a majority of their own representatives to the Board of *Centrosyuz* and make it possible to introduce *Communists* there experienced in practical work.
- IV. Krestinsky—draft decree on consumers' communes.

Written January 28, 1919

Printed from the manuscript

THE STATE OF LIBRARY SERVICE

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.¹²⁶

Direct the Library Department of the *People's Commissariat for Education* to publish monthly and forward to the C.P.C, brief factual information as to the implementation

of the C.P.C.'s decisions of 7.VI.1918 and 14.I.1919 and the actual increase in the number of libraries and reading-rooms, and the growth of book distribution among the population.

Written January 30, 1919

First published February 1,
1919
in *Izvestia* No. 23

Printed from the manuscript

A CONCESSION ON THE GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY¹²⁷

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.

1) The C.P.C. finds the direction of the railway and its general plan acceptable;

2) considers a concession to representatives of foreign capital generally, as a matter of principle, permissible in the interests of developing the country's productive forces;

3) considers the present concession to be desirable and its implementation a practical necessity;

4) to speed up a practical and final decision on this question, its sponsors to be asked to produce evidence of their declared contacts with solid capitalist firms capable of handling this job and shipping the materials;

5) an ad hoc commission to be directed to submit a final draft contract within a fortnight;

6) the Military Commissariat to be instructed within a fortnight to give its findings from the strategic and military point of view.

Written February 4, 1919

Printed from the manuscript

**DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.
ON THE QUESTION
OF ALLOTING FARMS
TO INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES**

The final decision on this question to be postponed until Tuesday.

The Commissariat for Agriculture to be asked to supply information on the following points by Saturday:

- 1) the number of state farms,
- 2) their organisation, and what has been done in this direction,
- 3) the number of agronomists,
- 4) actual sowing preparations,
- 5) the quantity of seeds actually available for sowing,
- 6) the number of agricultural machines.

The S.E.C. to be instructed to supply information 1) on the number of applications for land made by workers, 2) on the workers' experience in the organisation of agriculture.*

Written February 13, 1919

Printed from the typewritten text
supplemented by Lenin

**RE DRAFT RESOLUTION
FOR THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
ON THE FOOD SURPLUS-APPROPRIATION SYSTEM
IN THE UKRAINE¹²⁸**

In issuing this directive, the C.C., R.C.P. proposes that the following established principle be adhered to: from the poor peasants—nothing, the middle peasants—moderately, the rich peasants—heavily.

* Points 5 and 6 of the original from which this document is published are in Lenin's handwriting. Points 1, 3 and 4, as well as Points 1 and 2 of the last paragraph were written by Lenin on the agenda of the C.P.C. meeting of February 13, 1919; they were incorporated without alteration into the text of the decision.—Ed.

We advise fixing the maximum surplus, *for example*, 500 million poods for the whole of the Ukraine, of which one-fifth or one-tenth share be assessed for requisitioning.

Written February 19, 1919

Printed from the manuscript

ON THE APPEAL OF THE GERMAN INDEPENDENTS¹²⁹

We seldom have a chance now of receiving foreign newspapers in Russia: the blockade with which the "democratic capitalists" of the Entente have surrounded us is apparently operating effectively. They are afraid to acquaint the educated workers of America, Britain and France with ignorant and uncivilised Bolshevism, they are afraid lest people in this land of uncivilised Bolshevism get to know of its successes in the West.

But despite the zealous efforts of the gendarmery of the new Holy Alliance to suppress it, the truth will out!

The other day I happened to see several numbers of the Berlin newspaper *Die Freiheit*, the organ of the so-called "independent" German Social-Democrats. The front page of No. 74 (for 11.II.1919) carried a lengthy appeal "To the Revolutionary Proletariat of Germany" signed by the Central Committee of the party and its parliamentary group. The ideas, or rather the lack of ideas, underlying this appeal are so characteristic of not only the German, but of the world's labour movement, that they deserve to be dwelt upon.

But first I should like to make a digression connected with personal reminiscences. Among the signatures of the parliamentary group of Independents I came across the names of Seger and Laukant, and they reminded me of what happened three years ago. I had occasion to meet Laukant at a meeting of the Zimmerwaldists in Berne.¹³⁰ This seemingly influential Berlin worker produced a dual impression: on the one hand, serious revolutionary work among the masses, on the other, an astonishing lack of

theoretical* and appalling short-sightedness. Laukant did not like my sharp attacks on Kautsky (the ideological "leader" of the Independents, or rather leader of their non-ideology), but he did not refuse to help me when, doubtful of my unreliable German, I showed him the text of a short speech in German I had written,** in which I quoted the statement of the "American Bebel", Eugene Debs, to the effect that he would rather be shot than agree to vote for imperialist war loans, and that he would agree to fight only in a war of the workers against the capitalists. On the other hand, when, with furious indignation, I showed Laukant the passage from Kautsky's article in which that gentleman denounced the workers' street demonstrations as adventurism¹³¹ (and that under Wilhelm II) Laukant shrugged his shoulders and answered with exasperating coolness: "Our workers don't read this as attentively as all that! I'm not obliged to agree with every line of Kautsky's, am I?"

Written in the second
half of February 1919

Printed from the manuscript

**DRAFT DECISION
FOR THE COUNCIL OF DEFENCE
ON REGULATING RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE VECHEKA, THE RAILWAY CHEKA
AND THE COMMISSARIAT FOR RAILWAYS
AND A LETTER TO THE MEMBERS
OF THE COUNCIL OF DEFENCE**

Decision of the Council of Defence

28.II.1919

In order to regulate relations between the Vecheka, the Railway Cheka and the Commissariat for Railways the following provisions are laid down:

* Apparently the word "interests" or "knowledge" has been omitted in the manuscript.—*Ed.*

** See Vol. 22 of this edition, pp. 125-26.—*Ed.*

Comrade Belyakov, from the Commissariat for Railways, to be delegated to the Transport Department of the Vecheka for permanent liaison and work.

The Commissariat for Railways to issue orders down the line that all complaints against the Cheka be addressed *exclusively* to C.R. Board member Belyakov.

The Cheka to be charged with supervising timely unloading of freights by the organisations and bodies concerned, and in the event of unloading work not being fulfilled in the time set by the Cheka, the guilty parties are to be called to account.

Local sections of the Railway Cheka to be given the right to use the railway telegraph (for payment) and made to bear strict responsibility for using it without need. Detailed instructions on the use of the telegraph and method of payment to be issued by the People's Commissar for Railways and the Chairman of the Vecheka by agreement.

The former premises of the railway police to be turned over to the Railway Cheka, and a special order to this effect to be issued by the C.R. Comrades Dzerzhinsky and Sklyansky to issue joint instructions concerning the eviction of military guards from these premises.

Food rations to be issued in the usual way to the Railway Cheka from the supplies of the railway food organisations.

So long as martial law introduced on the railways by the Council of Defence continues, the district transport departments of the Cheka are to be given the right to apply capital punishment to persons found guilty of bribery, theft of freights and railway material, and systematic abuse on the part of officials.

To Members of the Council of Defence

28.II.1919

The points I propose have been approved at a meeting I had with Comrades Nevsky and Dzerzhinsky on 28/II.

Please have them signed by all the members of the Council of Defence, so that this *extremely important* agreement may be put into effect immediately.

In the event of serious differences please send me *the text of amendments* at once by phoned telegram.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)
Chairman, Council of Defence

Printed from the manuscript

**SPEECH AT AGITATORS' COURSES OF THE
MOTHER AND CHILD PROTECTION DEPARTMENT
OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT
FOR SOCIAL SECURITY**

MARCH 8, 1919

Comrade Lenin began his speech by quoting the closing passage of the women students' letter and said that they should keep their word and create a strong army of the home front.¹³² It was only with the help of the woman, her thoughtfulness and social awareness, that the new society could be consolidated. It was the lack of this social awareness among the mass of the women, he said, that had acted as a brake in previous revolutions.

Printed from the booklet text

**ROUGH DRAFT FOR A C.P.C. DECISION
ON THE PRINTING INDUSTRY DEPARTMENT
OF S.E.C.**

- 1) Commission for amalgamation and centralisation, and, in case of need, for drawing up a draft decree.
- 2) Statistical information, comparing printing-works
 - (1) nationalised, in charge of the Printing Industry Department

- (2) nationalised, in charge of various departments
- (3) private enterprises
- 3) Assignment: increase threefold, term?
- 4) Report within a month?
- 5) Work discipline
- 6) Piece work
- 7) Factory Committees' attitude to managements.¹³³

Written March 15, 1919

Printed from the manuscript

NOTES ON CO-OPERATION

Should not § 1 be thrown out?

Notes to § 2 and § 3 to be removed.

Not less than two-thirds of the membership of every co-operative should belong to the proletariat or semi-proletariat (i.e., to persons living solely or to the extent of not less than 50 per cent by the sale of their labour power).

Agencies of the workers' co-operatives send commissars to the co-operatives having over ten per cent of their members belonging to the propertied classes. The commissars have the right of supervision and control, as well as the right of veto, decisions thus vetoed being submitted for final settlement to the agencies of the S.E.C.

What form of expression may practical co-operation of the commercial and industrial employees' unions take?

What about introducing a number of substantial bonuses and benefits for co-operatives that have embraced the whole population?

Municipalities uniting the whole population around municipal shops.

Written in March, not later
than 16, 1919

Printed from the manuscript

**DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
ON SENDING GROUPS OF WORKERS OUT
ON FOOD TRANSPORTATION JOBS**

In view of the extreme danger threatening the Republic as a result of the aggravation of the food and transport crises, the C.C., R.C.P. resolves:

to charge Comrades Kamenev
Zinoviev
and Stalin

with organising groups of influential workers and forming trains by arrangement with the People's Commissariats for Food and Railways as well as with the Central Executive Committee, and sending them out on food transportation jobs.¹³⁴

Lenin

Written in the second half
of March, not later than 28, 1919

Printed from the manuscript

**DRAFT DECISION
FOR THE COUNCIL OF DEFENCE
ON SUPPLYING BREADSTUFFS TO THE RAILWAYMEN**

The Commissariat for Railways makes known to the workers that receipt of 25 pounds, according to exact calculations, is fully guaranteed in the event of six million poods a month being transported. Much more than this can be transported. A strong effort must be made to increase the number of locomotives repaired. Over and above this *bonuses* will be issued for increased labour productivity in accordance with norms laid down by the All-Russia Trade Union Council.

Written March 31, 1919

Printed from the manuscript

ON THE QUESTION OF RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE PEASANTS

Re *plan* of urgent measures in favour
of the middle peasant:

- 1) Special tax on *middle peasants* to be relaxed at once.
- 2) Party people to be sent out (3 from each gubernia committee) specially to work for *the middle peasants*.
- 3) Commissions to be set up in the centre (a number of them) and sent out to the local areas to *defend* the middle peasant.
- 4) Draw up and endorse plan for Kalinin's tours. Publish dates, places, reception of visitors, etc.
- 5) Participation in these tours (Points 4 and 5) by the People's Commissariats for *Justice, Internal Affairs, Agriculture*, and others.
- 6) Press campaign.
- 7) "Manifesto" in defence of the middle peasant.
- 8) Verification (and cancellation) of *coercive* measures for joining the communes.
- 9) Verification of *food* measures in the direction of relaxing requisitions, exactions, etc., from the *middle peasants*.
- 10) Amnesty.
- 11) "Identification of the kulak."
- 12) Surplus appropriation of grain and fodder.
- 13) Handicraftsmen and artisans recognised.

Written late March-early April, 1919 .

Printed from the manuscript

**DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE REPORT
ON THE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN SITUATION
OF THE SOVIET REPUBLIC
AT THE EXTRAORDINARY PLENARY MEETING
OF THE MOSCOW SOVIET OF WORKERS'
AND RED ARMY DEPUTIES
APRIL 3, 1919¹³⁵**

This meeting of representatives of the working class and peasantry of the R.S.F.S.R. declares that the Soviet Republic has entered its most difficult month. The Allies are making their last desperate effort to crush us by force of arms. The food situation in the spring is the most difficult. The transport system is utterly disrupted.

Only the greatest effort can save us. Victory is possible. The revolution in Hungary has proved conclusively that the Soviet movement in Western Europe is growing and its victory is not far off. We have many allies all over the world, more than we imagine. We must hold on for another four or five difficult months in order to beat our enemies.

This meeting harshly condemns the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries,* the Mensheviks and the Right S.R.s who, while paying lip-service to Soviet power or protesting in word against the armed intervention of the Allies, are *in fact helping the whiteguards* when they agitate for strikes or for cessation of the civil war (although we offered peace to all¹³⁶) or for concessions to freedom of trade, and so on.

This meeting declares that all those Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries who are prepared to help us in our difficult struggle shall be ensured full liberty as citizens of the Soviet Republic.

This meeting, however, declares relentless war upon those Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries who, like the literary and political groups *Vsegda Vperyod!*¹³⁷ and

* The first sheet of the manuscript is missing. The text up to the words "Left Socialist-Revolutionaries" is printed from the typewritten copy.—Ed.

Dyelo Naroda,¹³⁶ are actually impeding our struggle, actually assisting the whiteguards.

This meeting calls upon all workers, all workers' organisations and all working peasants to exert every effort to repel the enemies of Soviet power, to defend that power and improve the food supply and transport systems.

1. To enlist members of the middle section—i.e., people who are less experienced than the advanced workers and peasants—to replace the overworked advanced section.

2. To send more and more contingents of the advanced and rank-and-file workers out on food supply, transport and army work.

3. To enlist the largest possible number of politically conscious workers and peasants for work at the People's Commissariat for Railways and the State Control, in order to improve the functioning of these bodies and to eliminate bureaucracy and red tape.

4. To transfer as many people as possible from the starving cities to agricultural work, to vegetable gardening, to the rural districts, to the Ukraine, to the Don region, and so forth, in order to increase grain production.

All efforts to be exerted to assist the middle peasants, to put a stop to the abuses from which they so often suffer, and to render them comradely help. Those Soviet officials who refuse to carry out this policy—which is the only correct one—or who fail to understand it, must be immediately dismissed.

5. To combat all signs of weariness, faint-heartedness and vacillation, to enhearten in every way those who show such signs, strengthen their spirit, consciousness and comradely discipline. The working class and the peasantry of Russia have borne incredible burdens. The last few months have been incredibly difficult. But this meeting declares that the workers have not lost heart, that the working class remains at its post, that it will overcome all difficulties and maintain at all costs the victory of the Soviet Socialist Republic in Russia and throughout the world.

Written in April,
not later than 3rd, 1919

Printed from the manuscript
collated with the typewritten
copy

**MOTION TO ENDORSE THE DRAFT RESOLUTION
OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
CONTAINING DIRECTIVES
FOR THE C.C. OF THE C.P.(B.) OF THE UKRAINE**

I propose that the signatures of the C.C. Politbureau members be collected and these directives to the Ukrainian Communist Party and its C.C. for the Ukraine be endorsed.
*Extremely urgent.*¹³⁹

8/IV. *Lenin*

To the C.C. O r g b u r e a u. Forward urgently to the Ukrainian C.C.*

Written April 8, 1919

Printed from the manuscript

**RE DECISION OF THE COUNCIL OF DEFENCE
ON STEPPING UP WORK IN THE FIELD
OF MILITARY DEFENCE**¹⁴⁰

Suspend for 3 months or substantially cut down those departments in the central and local commissariats that are not absolutely essential and that may provide useful workers for the army and the home front for the conduct of war, for food collection, agitation and so on.

Written in April,
not later than 21, 1919

Printed from the manuscript

**POSTSCRIPT TO THE APPEAL
TO HUNGARIAN INTERNATIONALISTS**¹⁴¹

I fully subscribe to the text of the appeal and believe that the Hungarian proletarians at the fronts will bear in mind that another few months of struggle for the interests

* Marginal note added to the draft, apparently after it was endorsed.—*Ed.*

of the international proletariat will bring us victory—
a victory that will be decisive and real.

Lenin

Written April 23, 1919

Printed from the text
of leaflet
Russian translation from
the Hungarian

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.'S ECONOMIC COMMISSION ON ALLEVIATING THE POSITION OF THE WORKERS¹⁴²

- 1) More aid in kind to be rendered to workers' children.
- 2) Definite warehouses to be earmarked for *quick* registration and distribution of goods at a *moderate* price to the most needy workers *who do not receive* the minimum in money payment.
- 3) Ditto as regards rent.

Written May 2, 1919

Printed from the manuscript

SALARIES FOR SPECIALISTS

DRAFT DECISION

May 23, 1919

*Decisions Adopted by the C.P.C. Commission
at Its Meeting on 23.V.1919:*

1. Salaries over 3,000 rubles shall be appointed by the Board of each Commissariat, reported to the People's Commissariats for Labour and for State Control, and submitted to the Council of People's Commissars for endorsement.

2. Each People's Commissariat is obliged within a week to present a list of all employees who receive over 3,000 rubles a month.

3. Each Commissariat is obliged within a week to present a list of leading specialists and outstanding organisers who have to be paid over 3,000 rubles.

The Board of each Commissariat must declare in the case of each person 1) its assurance that he is an outstanding specialist in such-and-such a field; 2) exactly what outstanding organising job he is doing or is capable of doing.

4. On June 15 only those whose salaries have been endorsed by the Council of People's Commissars shall receive pay at the rate of 3,000 rubles and more.

5. The term within which salaries shall be endorsed by the Council of People's Commissars is to be fixed at not more than one week from the date of presentation.

6. Reports to be delivered by Lenin and Krasin.

7. Avanesov is directed not later than tomorrow, May 24, to submit theses or principles concerning salaries of over 3,000 rubles to non-outstanding specialists.

Please type 6—7 copies.

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE COUNCIL OF DEFENCE ON THE MOBILISATION OF SOVIET EMPLOYEES¹⁴³

§ 1. All male employees of Soviet institutions between the ages of 18 and 45 [better more, as some will be exempted] to be mobilised for 4 months (from 15.VI to 15.X) and to be replaced by women or part of the work to be temporarily reduced.

Note to § 1. Only people who are ill or absolutely indispensable, but not more than 10 per cent, shall be exempted with the permission of a special commission.

§ 2. The mobilised men to be placed at the disposal of the military authorities. To present themselves (date).

§ 3. The mobilised men to answer for each other by collective liability and their families to be considered hostages in the event of their deserting to the enemy or failing to carry out assignments, etc.

§ 4. The mobilised men to form small groups, preferably of different professions, so that each group may take upon itself, in the rear and at the front, various tasks in connection with troop formation, ferrying, maintenance and so on.

§ 5. Each mobilised person is obliged to form for himself out of supplies received from C.E.C. and other stores a small collection of the most needful propaganda booklets and leaflets, with which he is duty bound to familiarise the soldiers and population and report every week on how he performs these duties.

§ 6. Each mobilised person, immediately on being mobilised, but not later than within ... days, is obliged to give detailed information as to his education, previous employment or occupation, places of former residence, knowledge of foreign languages, etc., in accordance with a programme to be specially drawn up.

Written not later
than May 31, 1919

Printed from the manuscript

**DECREE OF THE COUNCIL
OF WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' DEFENCE
ON CALLING UP FOR MILITARY SERVICE
TRADE, INDUSTRIAL AND TRANSPORT WORKERS
AND OTHER EMPLOYEES**

The call-up, by way of extra mobilisation, is announced for trade, industrial and transport workers and other employees. The order and date of the call-up as well as the number of persons to be drafted for military service are to be fixed

by arrangement between the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, the Board of the Supreme Economic Council and the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions.*

Written May 31, 1919

Printed from the manuscript

ORDER TO THE C.P.C. SECRETARIAT

19.VII.1919

The delay in endorsing the instructions concerning food parcels from the army¹⁴⁴ is an outrageous and intolerable piece of red tape.

It is necessary to ascertain who the culprits are and generally have this case investigated, first, in order to establish responsibility, second—and most important of all—in order to work out *practical* measures to make a repetition of this impossible.

I therefore order the institutions listed below, who were to have taken care of the speedy enforcement of the law on food parcels,

to immediately, rigorously and carefully investigate the cause of this red tape by collecting *all* relevant documents and questioning all persons concerned

and *submit to the C.P.C.* on Tuesday their reports together with their proposal of *practical* measures for eliminating red tape.

The institutions are:

Secretariat of the C.P.C. and Council of Defence
Central Committee of the Food Army
Food Commissariat
Military Commissariat
Commissariat for Post and Telegraph.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Printed from the manuscript

* The top of the typed text of the decree signed by Lenin bears a note by him: "Off the record".—*Ed.*

DIRECTIVES TO THE COMMISSARIAT FOR AGRICULTURE RE MODIFICATION OF INSTRUCTIONS

The instructions of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture* are to be modified and effective control is to be exercised through all Soviet agencies in the spirit of the following propositions:

1) Landowners or estate managers to be positively prohibited from occupying posts in state farms of the same or neighbouring uyezds in which these persons resided during the rule of the landowners.

2) Lists to be kept of estate managers and employees at state farms and surveillance to be kept over them as strictly as over military experts in respect of their counter-revolutionary bent.

3) The number of representatives of uyezd and gubernia land departments in state farms to be increased and greater control exercised over them by these departments.

4) Greater attention to the workers' committees and their activities to be demanded of the trade union council.

5) Metayage and similar work in the state farms to be prohibited.

6) All state farm personnel to be prosecuted immediately in the event of their being unable to prove fulfilment by them of Article 59 of the Statute on Socialist Land Settlement, providing for *assistance* to be rendered to the local peasantry.

7) Forms of reporting and informing the local peasant population to be worked out for the state farms and workers' committees.

8) Monthly reports to the C.P.C. on fulfilment of the present rules to be demanded of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture and of the workers' committee in addition to those of 1 or 2 gubernia land departments of the most important gubernias.

* Here the following text was inserted in the manuscript by Lydia Fotieva, Secretary of the C.P.C.: "concerning the organisation and activities of the gubernia and district state farm administrations."—*Ed.*

9) The Central Statistical Board to extend its monographic description of the state farms by the inclusion of questions necessary for checking fulfilment of the above points.

10) Allocation of land to the state farms to be rechecked for possible excessive allotment of land or its seizure by non-proletarian organisations.

11) Nomination of candidates to the state farms by the gubernia and uyezd land departments to be made a general rule.

12) Instructions and measures to be submitted to the C.P.C. after preliminary consideration by a commission* Sereda, Sapronov, Vladimirsky, Tsyurupa, Milyutin and Golubev.**

Written in August,
not later than 5, 1919

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISIONS FOR THE C.C. POLITBUREAU ON MEASURES TO FIGHT MAMONTOV

1

Draft Resolution of the C.C. Politbureau

Attaching serious importance to Mamontov's¹⁴⁵ operations and considering the *speedy* destruction of his detachment an *urgent* matter, the Politbureau of the C.C. resolves:

1) once more to draw the attention of the People's Commissars for Post and Telegraph and for Railways to the necessity of exerting every effort to *improve post and telegraph connections in the area of Mamontov's operations and speed up the transportation of troops* in that area.

* Following this are the words "composed of" written in the manuscript by L. A. Fotieva.—*Ed.*

** Here the following text is inserted in the manuscript in Fotieva's handwriting: "The commission to be given a week. Its summoning and report to be entrusted to Sereda."—*Ed.*

- 2) Comrade Trotsky to be charged with
 - (a) drawing up a draft appeal by telegraph to the Party organisations of the given area with a *repeat appeal* for more energetic actions;
 - (b) taking part together with Comrade Lashevich (Lashevich retaining personal command) in all operations for routing Mamontov, to the extent of his complete liquidation, in order that the authority of the C.C. and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic may be displayed in all these operations with greater speed and determination¹⁴⁶;
 - (c) calling in volunteers against Mamontov from the gubernias of Tver, Kostroma, Yaroslavl and Ivanovo-Voznesensk.

2

Draft directives of the C.C. Politbureau to be drawn up at once.

It is considered politically essential

1) to speed up transportation of the Belebei Bashkir Division to Petrograd and effect this movement as energetically as possible;

2) Tula and the defence of the north generally against Mamontov being sufficiently covered, the 21st Division, in its known and greater part, is to be transferred to the Southern Front with the double objective of catching Mamontov from the south and taking part in the fighting on the Southern Front.

3

I propose the following addenda to the decision of the Politbureau (measures against Mamontov):

1) appointment of *chiefs of every section* (10 to 30 versts, etc.) in case of encirclement, of whom 1-2 to be Communists.

2) those refusing to leave the railway cars to be shot on the spot;

3) further draconian measures to tighten discipline.

The right of decision to *introduce* these measures to be given to *Lashevich + Trotsky*.

((Redirect before reaching Moscow.))

+3) *Speed up* dispatch of *each troop train* of the 21st Division to go into immediate action against Mamontov with the addition (*if necessary*) of Communists.

Written at the end
of August 1919

Printed from the manuscript

INTRODUCTION OF ONE-MAN MANAGEMENT IN LIEU OF BOARD MANAGEMENT IN CENTROTEXTIL

DRAFT DECISION
FOR THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS¹⁴⁷

1) The S.E.C. to be instructed to gradually reduce the number of Board members, and in particular to study the experience of one-man management either by Communists or by specialists with Communist commissars attached to them.

2) Side by side with Board discussion and decision, steps to be taken to gradually introduce personal responsibility for the performance of both definite kinds of work and separate operations.

3) The S.E.C. and other commissariats having industrial enterprises to report within 2 months on the *actual* fulfilment of these tasks (especially as regards the number of workers who are being taught practical management and their record of experience in this connection).

Written September 4, 1919

Printed from the manuscript

**NOTE TO G. V. CHICHERIN
AND DECISION OF THE POLITBUREAU
OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
ON RELATIONS WITH THE ENTENTE COUNTRIES**

Comrade Chicherin,

I am sending you the decision of the Politbureau.¹⁴⁸

Yours,
Lenin

- (1) **Certainly.**
- (2) *Not* in the name of the Government.
- (3) Hasten Litvinov's departure.
- (4) Confine ourselves to Gorky's letter, *but not* allow him to use the argument about the struggle being turned into annihilation.

Members of the Politbureau: *Lenin**

Written in September,
not before 26, 1919

Printed from the manuscript

**DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.
ON THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE S.E.C.
AND THE COMMISSARIAT FOR STATE CONTROL¹⁴⁹**

The C.P.C. considers:

- 1) that the State Control should have recommended the S.E.C. to close its legal departments, but should not have applied a proscriptive order;
- 2) that the Board of the S.E.C. should immediately take energetic measures to close its legal departments,

* The decision was signed also by Kamenev, Trotsky and Krestinsky (the latter with the stipulation "I agree reservedly").—*Ed.*

most of which are parasitical, and to prohibit members of these departments from being hidden away in other departments. Fulfilment to be reported to the Narrow C.P.C.¹⁵⁰ within a week;

3) the Commissariat for Justice to take legal action against members of the legal departments of the Food Commissariat and the S.E.C. for red tape. Fulfilment to be reported to the Narrow Council within a week.

Written September 30, 1919

Printed from the manuscript

SUGGESTIONS ON THE QUESTION OF CO-OPERATION¹⁵¹

Suggestions

1) that Soltz should devote himself entirely to non-commercial activities (literary, instructor's work, and so forth) in the co-operatives,

2) that if this cannot be published as a separate edition, it should be published, i.e., printed, in *Izvestia*, *Pravda* and *Bednota*,¹⁵²

3) that *factual* information be quickly collected, from at least small districts, concerning the extent to which the decree¹⁵³ is being carried out in general (in all its parts) and particularly concerning the methods of purveyance and distribution (bodies, forms, conditions, exceptions to the rule and so on), and the transformation, or beginning of the transformation, of bourgeois co-operation into communist co-operation, etc.

Written October 9, 1919

Printed from the manuscript

**INTERVIEW WITH MOHAMMAD WALI-KHAN
AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY OF AFGHANISTAN
OCTOBER 14, 1919¹⁵⁴**

NEWSPAPER REPORT

Comrade Lenin met the Ambassador in his private office with the words, "I am very glad to see in the red capital of the worker and peasant government the representative of the friendly Afghan people, who are suffering and fighting against imperialist oppression." To which the Ambassador replied: "I proffer you a friendly hand and hope that you will help the whole of the East to free itself from the yoke of European imperialism." During the talk that followed, Lenin said that Soviet power, the power of the working people and the oppressed, was striving towards the very goal the Afghan Ambassador Extraordinary had spoken about, but that it was necessary that the Moslem East should realise this and help Soviet Russia in her great war of liberation. To this the Ambassador replied that he could assert that the Moslem East realised this and the hour was not far off when the world would see that there was no room for European imperialism in the East.

Afterwards the Ambassador stood up and with the words: "I have the honour of presenting my Sovereign's letter to the Head of the free Russian proletarian Government and hope that the Soviet Government will give due consideration to what the Afghan Government is writing about," he handed Lenin the Amir's letter. Comrade Lenin answered that he accepted the letter with the greatest pleasure and promised shortly to give a reply to all the questions Afghanistan was interested in.¹⁵⁵

Printed from the Pravda text

**SPEECH TO IVANOV-VOZNESENSK
COMMUNIST WORKERS
LEAVING FOR THE FRONT
OCTOBER 24, 1919¹⁵⁸**

REPORTER'S NOTES

In his speech Comrade Lenin described the general situation at our fronts and pointed out that it was the duty of every intelligent worker to render the greatest possible assistance to our fronts in the matter of proper supply of munitions, food, clothing, etc.

He expressed his conviction that the communist workers of Ivanovo-Voznesensk would be able to exercise a beneficial influence on the peasants in the front-line area and be a great help in conducting political work among the Cossacks.

Pravda No. 239,
October 25, 1919

Printed from the *Pravda* text

**SPEECH TO ADULT-EDUCATION COURSE STUDENTS
LEAVING FOR THE FRONT
OCTOBER 28, 1919**

The conference opened with a speech by Lenin. He greeted the students of the courses, who had resolved to go out to the front to help the Red Army, and gave a vivid description of the present situation on all the fronts and in the enemy's rear.

The bourgeoisie, both of Russia and the West, had begun to celebrate victory prematurely. The Red troops were driving Kolchak before them. Denikin was retreating from Orel. There was demoralisation among the White troops. In Denikin's rear there were uninterrupted uprisings. Today even the prosperous Cossacks were going against him.

Yudenich had scant forces, consisting mainly of Englishmen. Britain had given him a large fleet. Yudenich's offensive was intended to save Denikin, draw our forces off, but his plan failed—the workers of Petrograd had displayed

examples of heroism. Europe was tensely watching the outcome of the struggle. The workers of France and Britain had already registered their protest against the attack upon Russia. Bolshevism in these countries was gaining ground. The elections in France were very significant in this respect.¹⁵⁷ Our chief attention was now directed to the Southern Front, where indescribably furious and sanguinary battles were raging, and where the fate of the revolution in the West as well as in Russia was being decided....

Denikin's officer corps was well armed. In view of the uprisings in their rear, they were putting up a desperate fight. But the worker and peasant masses were beginning to see things clearer and there was a strong upsurge among them. Our weakness was that we had too few knowledgeable organisers among the peasants and workers. That was why we had so many old officials, saboteurs, etc., in our institutions. It was necessary to advance the best workers from among the people, and give them knowledge....

It was important to have social-minded people capable of talking to the peasants, people who would raise the morale of the army, and therefore everyone going to the front should show an example of bravery and selfless dedication. Victory then will be ours. We shall put transport in order and bring in grain....

Printed from the handwritten
copy of the minutes

MOTION ON THE QUESTION OF A SINGLE FORESTRY BODY¹⁵⁸

- (1) Mutual control of institutions*
- (2) speed up assignment of lots
- (3) employing the labour force of forestry specialists
- (4) other measures to expedite and increase fuel supply
- (5) should they be merged?*

Written November 11, 1919

Printed from the manuscript

* Implying forestry institutions.—*Ed.*

** This refers to the setting up of a single forestry body.—*Ed.*

**DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.
ON POTATO PURCHASES¹⁵⁹**

The draft of the Food Commissariat and § 4 of the S.E.C. draft¹⁶⁰ shall be accepted as a basis.

A commission to be set up to work out the whole draft in detail in order to establish with absolute accuracy both the separate districts (in Food Commissariat's §§) and the concrete measures to reinforce the Food Army at definite centres, enlist the co-operation of the workers, determine the amount of necessary and possible deliveries of spirit and starch, and so on.

The commission shall precisely formulate the Food Commissariat's responsibility for fulfilment of all emergency measures and their enforcement in a revolutionary manner so that this responsibility can be taken into account in the C.P.C.'s future policy.

The commission to consist of Scheinman (+2 F.C.*)

Rykov

Schmidt

Kamenev

Avanesov (or a Vechekaman)

Markov

The commission to be given 2 days and the C.P.C. to meet on Friday.¹⁶¹

Written November 18, 1919

Printed from the manuscript

* Meaning two representatives from the Food Commissariat,—*Ed.*

**NOTES AT A MEETING OF DELEGATES
TO THE SECOND ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS
OF COMMUNIST ORGANISATIONS
OF THE PEOPLES OF THE EAST¹⁶²**

Meeting 21/XI.1919

- | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | A) Basic tasks: fundamental significance of the communist organisations and parties of the East. |
| | B) Party-organisational questions. |
| Combine territorial principle with extraterritorial | C) State-administrative questions. |
| + Exterritoriality? | D) <i>Concrete questions of each nation, according to the extent of its development, its special features, etc.</i> |
| + Closest alliance with the Russian working masses. | E) Methods and measures of contact <i>with the poor, with the working people, with the exploited of every nation against its bureaucrats, feudalists, bourgeoisie.</i> |

Printed from the manuscript

**DRAFT RESOLUTION
FOR THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) PLENUM**

Decision of C.C. (29.XI.1919)

Most Urgent

Chicherin to draw up detailed theses for a brief report to the Congress of Soviets on peace and the text of a declaration by the congress.¹⁶³ This text to contain a direct proposal of peace and peace negotiations without mention-

ing terms (such a variant to be submitted as will confirm all previous peace proposals, but without committing us).

Printed from the manuscript

**RE DRAFT RESOLUTION
FOR THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) PLENUM
ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE ALL-RUSSIA
CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE¹⁶⁴**

- 1) Do not include all the People's Commissars (as well as the Chairman of the C.P.C.) and deputy commissars.
- 2) Reduce the number of intellectuals and Soviet officials of the centre.
- 3) Considerably increase the number of workers and working peasants who are definitely in close touch with the non-Party mass of workers and peasants.
- 6) Keep strictly in line with the decision of the Party congress¹⁶⁵

Written November 29, 1919

Printed from the manuscript

**ON IMPROVING THE MANAGEMENT
OF RAILWAY TRANSPORT**

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS¹⁶⁶

The C.P.C. directs the Commissariat for Railways to draw up within a week a detailed decree (or instructions) concerning the participation of workers and workers' organisations, especially the trade unions, in the management of the railways, in training workers for management, etc.

Written December 2, 1919

Printed from the manuscript

REMARKS ON DRAFT REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE BUREAU OF THE R.C.P.(B.) GROUP AT THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL COUNCIL OF TRADE UNIONS¹⁶⁷

- 1) Both Comrade Tomskey and the whole Bureau of the All-Russia C.C.T.U. group (this Bureau must be endorsed by the Central Committee of the R.C.P.) are to be invited without fail to the meetings of the Organising Bureau of the C.C., R.C.P. when any question concerning the trade union movement is under discussion.
- 2) The bureau of the A.C.C.T.U. group works out a detailed charter of its relationships with the Orgbureau of the C.C. This charter to be endorsed by the Orgbureau.
- 3) The "Regulations on the R.C.P. Group of the A.C.C.T.U." to be amended as follows
 - in § 1 the word "guiding" to be thrown out¹⁶⁸
 - in §§ 3¹⁶⁹ and? the word "C.C." (of the unions) to be inserted.

Revise everything relating to the wording of the different paragraphs*

revise in the above order, accepting the draft as a basis, and making only editorial corrections.

Written December,
not before 4, 1919

Printed from the manuscript

THE WORK OF THE FOOD SUPPLY AGENCIES

DRAFT RESOLUTION

A commission to be elected to consider the question.

The chief and most pressing task to be dealt with is, first, renewal and reorganisation of the staffs of the food

* The text from the word "amended" was crossed out in the manuscript by Lenin.—*Ed.*

supply agencies; second, injecting a spirit of initiative into the work of these organisations.

Practical steps for carrying out these tasks to be outlined as follows:

enlisting the participation of the workers' co-operatives on the broadest basis;

ditto the bourgeois co-operatives, though on a narrower basis;

developing the workers' food inspection more rapidly into an organisation of workers' co-operation in all fields of food supply work;

introducing a bonus system for different groups of office employees, workers and specially recommended persons from among all groups of the population, whose participation in the work should be permitted and encouraged.

The commission is not to be limited to these tasks, which are to be accepted by it as an approximate definition of its general line of work.

Non-food-supply staff workers
to be elected to the commission.

I suggest for the commission

Kamenev

V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich

Schmidt

Enlist without fail,
not as a member of
the commission

Orlov, author of the book
*The Food Supply Work of the
Soviet Government*

Yakovleva
Sosnovsky.

Written December 6, 1919

Printed from the manuscript

ROUGH DRAFT FOR THE C.P.C. DECISION ON MOSCOW'S FOOD SUPPLY¹⁷⁰

("Statement of facts")

- | | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Labour rations? { | { 1) Agreement to be formally signed ¹⁷¹ |
| exact information
re grain-collecting
places and state
of transport | { 2) Daily reports to be reintroduced ¹⁷² |
| | 3) Workers to be mobilised on
transport |
| | { task to be entrusted to Moscow
Trade Union Council + Commis-
sariat for Railways |
| { { | 4) Specially urgent: consider meas-
ures for transporting potatoes
and controlling deliveries |
| | 5) Emergency issue (meat?) to be
approved. |

Written December 6, 1919

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT C.P.C. DECISION ON GRAIN CONSIGNMENTS TO MOSCOW BY THROUGH TRAINS¹⁷³

1) The Food Commissariat shall be found guilty of gross negligence in the performance of an extremely important assignment.

2) A complaint against the Commissariat for Post and Telegraph shall be formally lodged with the Chairman of the C.P.C. *within an hour* of complete failure to obtain a direct line and an answer by it.¹⁷⁴

3) Inquiries shall be instituted into the conduct of the gubernia food commissars for non-fulfilment of or failure through bad organisation to fulfil the order of the People's Commissariat for Food.¹⁷⁵

4) An official to be attached to the Food Commissariat to take proper charge of lines.

5) The C.P.C. to meet on Saturday* to check fulfilment and discuss a decision on delivery orders.

6) An explanation in writing to be demanded of the Post and Telegraph Commissariat in regard to the delay in delivering Food Commissariat telegrams, and an indication of measures or law amendments necessary to ensure the urgent transmission of the Food Commissariat's orders.

Written December 23, 1919

Printed from the manuscript

LETTER TO P. I. POPOV

(RE CONSUMPTION BY THE POPULATION OF THE R.S.F.S.R.
BEFORE AND AFTER THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION) ¹⁷⁶

1

Comrade Popov,

Will you please—if it is not too much trouble to you—return the enclosed table to me with your remarks:

on the basis of statistical science and its modern data on Russia

(aa) could such a table be drawn up or not (on the strength, at least, of insufficient data)?

(bb) if it could, what would be the chief corrections?

(cc) would any of your specialists undertake to draw up such a table (even if with a wider amplitude of fluctuations)?

Yours,
Lenin

2

Assuming (in a round figure, for the sake of simplification and easy memorising) that the population of the R.S.F.S.R. = 50 million

* December 27, 1919.—*Ed.*

How do they eat? (today)	% of the popu- lation	How did they eat be- fore the war (before 1914-1917)? on the average, say, for 10 or 15 years before the war
a) 10 mill. workers = 50- 60% of norm	20%	70-80% of norm
b) 20 mill. poor peasants = 70-80% of norm	40%	50-60% of norm
c) 15 mill. middle peas- ants = 90-100% of norm	30%	60-70% of norm [or 90%?]
d) 4 mill. rich peasants = = 120-150% of norm	8%	100% of norm [or 110-120%?]
e) 1 mill. former land- owners, capitalists, high officials, etc. = 60-70% of norm	2% <u>100%</u>	150-200% of norm

{ The norm to be considered the amount of bread, meat, }
 { milk, eggs, and so on, a person needs according to science, }
 i.e., the norm is not the amount of calories, but the
 amount of food of a definite quality.

By workers is to be understood industrial workers,
 the non-worker urban population coming under the
 corresponding groups c and d.

Social types:

- proletarian and semi-proletarian urban population
- ditto—rural
- middle peasantry and generally petty-bourgeois popu-
lation nearest to it
- rich peasants and urban middle bourgeoisie
- higher classes.

**DRAFT DECISION
FOR THE C.P.C. ON THE QUESTION OF SUPPLYING
THE WORKERS WITH CLOTHES AND FOOTWEAR¹⁷⁷**

The Narrow Council to be instructed immediately, but not later than Saturday,* to revise its decision, leaving its basic and general parts intact, but changing the figures of issue to the workers in accordance with the new military plans of army increase. Comrade Rykov to issue an exactly worded mandate to his representative and only he is to be admitted.¹⁷⁸

Written December 30, 1919

Printed from the manuscript

**DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.
ON INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING PURVEYANCE
OF RAW MATERIALS¹⁷⁹**

The Board of the S.E.C. to be directed, not later than Saturday,* to revise the instructions in such a manner as to ensure that the decision of the Seventh Congress of the Soviets will be fully carried out, in particular

- 1) on the question of the right of objection,¹⁸⁰
- 2) the surplus-appropriation principle to be more fully and strictly applied;
- 3) rights and conditions for the display of local initiative and its stimulation to be worked out in detail;
- 4) methods for combating red tape to be worked out.

The full draft instructions mentioned in the decision of the Seventh Congress of the Soviets to be presented within a week.¹⁸¹

Written December 30, 1919

Printed from the manuscript

* January 3, 1920.—*Ed.*

RE TRANSPORT DEPARTMENT OF VECHEKA**DRAFT DECISION FOR THE COUNCIL OF DEFENCE 182**

16.I.1920

The Vecheka is to issue within three weeks detailed instructions not only governing the activities of the Transport Dept. of the Vecheka, but establishing strict responsibility of the Department's agents for oversight and failure to report cases of sabotage or profiteering.

In particular the agents of the T.D. of the Vecheka must be in contact with the communist and trade union cells of the truly proletarian section of the railwaymen who do not abuse their position for the purpose of systematic black-marketing.

Printed from the manuscript

**DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU
OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)**

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs is to adopt a policy of extreme restraint and mistrust towards the Azerbaijan Government in view of the latter's refusal to accept our offer of joint military operations against Denikin and the services it is rendering to the military forces of Britain operating against us in the Caspian Sea. While emphatically stressing our undeviating recognition of the right of the working masses of every nation to self-determination, the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs should vigorously protest against such conduct on the part of the Azerbaijan Government.¹⁸³

Written in January, not
before 17, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

**DECISION OF THE POLITBUREAU
OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
IN CONNECTION WITH THE ENTENTE'S ATTEMPT
TO START TRADE RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA
THROUGH THE RUSSIAN CO-OPERATIVES**

In view of the Entente's intention to effect an exchange of commodities through the co-operatives with the patent design of using the co-operatives as an instrument for restoring capitalism, the C.C. instructs the Chairman of Centrosoyuz, the People's Commissariat for Food, the Chairman of the S.E.C. and the People's Commissariat for Trade to consider the question of the co-operatives very carefully from this angle and immediately work out measures ensuring full control on our part of the co-operative machinery primarily at all the points where such trade may be arranged (the Ukraine, the Soviet Far East).

Written January 17 or 18,
1920

Printed from the typewritten
copy of the minutes

**DRAFT DECISION
FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
ON THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S PROTEST
CONCERNING THE ORDER TO THE COMMANDER
OF THE TURKESTAN FRONT¹⁶⁴**

- 1) The order by Lenin and Trotsky given by telegram is found to be correct.
- 2) Exception taken to the form of this order is considered a case of undesirable military bureaucratism.
- 3) The Commander-in-Chief is to be notified that his verbal protest made through Comrade Smilga has been considered

and found incorrect. When an opinion is asked for, it should be given.

Written January 17 or 18,
1920

Printed from the manuscript

POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) DIRECTIVES ON A WORKERS' INSPECTION¹⁸⁵

The Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the State Control Commissariat to be asked to be guided by the following directives of the C.C., R.C.P.:

1. No new bodies to be set up in any field of state administration, and the existing commissariats to be improved.
2. The Workers' and Peasants' Inspection to be developed, strengthened and extended in every way, all work being directed towards ensuring complete numerical predominance of workers and peasants in State Control.
3. No skilled workers, only unskilled workers, mainly women, to be enlisted in the Workers' Inspection.
4. A new draft of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection under the State Control Commissariat to be drawn up immediately with the co-operation of Avanesov and submitted to the Politbureau not later than 28.I.1920.

Written January 23, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

DIRECTIONS CONCERNING THE WORK OF THE PROPAGANDA-INSTRUCTOR TRAINS AND STEAMERS¹⁸⁶

1. Specifically:

- 1) Step up economic and practical aspects of the work of the trains and steamers by including agronomists and technicians in their political departments, by selecting technical literature, films on appropriate subjects, etc.

2) Production films (showing various branches of production), agricultural, industrial, anti-religious and scientific films to be made through the Film Committee, the film material to be ordered immediately from abroad through Comrade Litvinov. Telegraphic order to be given over Lenin's signature.

3) A large-scale volost map to be drawn up demonstrating all the work done and indicating the districts. This map to be exhibited to the public in open places.

4) Material received during trips to be worked up and diagrams, charts, etc., to be published.

5) Attention to be given to the need for a careful selection of films with due consideration of the effect of every film on the population during its demonstration.

6) The work of the trains and steamers to be extended beyond range of the tracks and riverbanks by making wider use of auxiliary forms of transport (motorcycles, motor-cars, bicycles) carried in the trains and steamers, as well by the use of local conveyances.

7) Agencies to be organised abroad for purchasing and shipping films, camera film and all kinds of photographic supplies.

8) Attention to be paid to the staffing of the trains and steamers.

9) Comrade Burov to be given the right in urgent cases where the activities of the All-Russia C.E.C.'s instructor trains and steamers are concerned to apply to Comrade Lenin directly and in less urgent cases to apply to Comrade Lenin through his secretary.

2. Generally:

1) A meeting of representatives of the All-Russia C.E.C., the C.C., the People's Commissariats and the political workers on the trains and steamers to be called immediately through the C.C. of the Party. This meeting is to consider the results of the work done by the trains and steamers and draw up regulations governing trips on behalf of the All-Russia C.E.C., the C.C. and the C.P.C.

2) These regulations to be put through the C.C. and the C.P.C. by Comrade Lenin.

3) A Special Standing Commission under the C.P.C. is to be summoned to take charge of trips in accordance with the drafted regulations.

Written January 25, 1920

Published in part in 1920

in the symposium

Agittrains and Steamers

of All-Russia C.E.C. *Their History,*

Apparatus, Methods and Forms,

Moscow

Printed from the text of the book

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON UNLOADING POTATOES AND SNOW CLEARING OF MOSCOW'S STREETS AND RAILWAY TRACKS¹⁸⁷

1. The People's Commissariat for Food to be instructed within three days to draft a decision for resumption of the potato campaign and submit it to the C.P.C.¹⁸⁸

2. Burdukov + Kamenev, Dzerzhinsky and Kursky to be instructed to present information concerning the number of adult and healthy men, their off-work hours and their possible employment for urgent jobs in the city, and a draft decision on their employment.

3. The Vecheka to be instructed to appoint a responsible and experienced investigator belonging to the Party to study the material relating to the unsatisfactory state of labour service organisation in Moscow both among the workers and office staffs.

Report to the C.P.C. to be made by Dzerzhinsky or his deputy within four days.

4. The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs to be instructed to take more energetic steps to implement snow-clearing compulsory service and to report on this to the C.P.C. within three days.¹⁸⁹

Written January 27, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

NOTES CONCERNING THE DRAFT REGULATIONS ON BONUSES FOR WORKERS AND OFFICE EMPLOYEES

1.II.1920

Regarding bonuses, I have strong doubts.

§ 4—absolutely arbitrary fixing of the standard (50%—exactly 50%—from “the best”, i.e., given the best machines, etc. This is quite arbitrary. Can’t we have it more exact? Publish standards for control? Or collect them for the scientific-technical department, etc., and publish in a bulletin?).

Account of results: top limit of bonuses. Accounts on this not provided for. Will this not virtually legalise gross abuses?

Consumers should be enlisted for standard control. Are there any examples of this? Among the co-operatives? and so on.

The draft is too sweeping, abstract, unbusiness-like; promises everything, verifies nothing.¹⁹⁰

Lenin

Printed from the manuscript

SPEECH AT A CONFERENCE OF CHAIRMEN OF GUBERNIA AND UYEZD EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES FEBRUARY 1, 1920

At a meeting of executive committee chairmen preceding the opening of the session,¹⁹¹ Lenin said, in dealing with the current situation:

In so far as the international situation stays as it is, and the whole course of events points to its stability, the tasks of economic activities should be advanced by us to the fore. As regards transport, we not only have to bring

this to the fore, but simply drag this transport out by the ears, save it from imminent disaster. Trains carrying grain are stopping, we have more grain than we can transport. Military operations are often impeded through lack of transport. February is the most difficult month for transport, and we are simply heading for disaster.

We are threatened by a danger of transport dislocation more serious than in October, when Yudenich and Denikin were winning their biggest victories. More energy must be applied to save transport. We must carry out mobilisations here again and again. We shall have to rob a number of institutions of their workers and keep on robbing them to combat the chaos in transport.

The whole art of government and policy-making consists in being able to assess and know in good time where to concentrate your main forces and attention. We must now extricate transport in the course of two months. Unless we work the same miracle in two months with transport as we have done with Kolchak, disaster threatens us.

A number of vigorous and revolutionary measures are needed. This is a military and combat task and calls for combat action in military style.

Krasnaya Gazeta (Petrograd)
No. 24, February 3, 1920

Printed from the newspaper text

DRAFT DECISIONS FOR THE COUNCIL OF DEFENCE ON THE STATE OF TRANSPORT

Meeting of 2/II.1920¹⁹²

- (1) 50 → 100 % express goods trains.
- (2) Kazan Railway.
- (3) Samara-Zlatoust-Chelyabinsk
?
 - {speed up food trains.
- (4) Step up loading of food in Chelyabinsk district.
- (5) Send top-level men out to the repair shops (of Petrograd and Moscow).

- (6) Bonuses in the form of clothing outfits.
- (7) Repair trains at the Western Front.
- + (8) Sending Arzhanov out.
- + (9) Military aides for railway superintendents.
- (10) 1 railway to be given to the army.
- (11) Vecheka workers to be transferred to transport jobs.
- (12) Repair works to be placed on same footing as transport works.
- (13) Chuso* stocks handed over to the Food Commissariat are to be given to the transport workmen.
- (14) Railway specialists from the C.P.W.** } mobi-
and other departments of S.E.C. and other } lisa-
bodies to be transferred to transport jobs. } tion
- (15) Military forces to fight snowdrifts to be increased (40,000).
- (16) ad 5 + members of the All-Russia C.E.C.
- (17) Step up repair subbotniks.
- (18) Martial law 30-50 versts.
- (19) More personnel in volosts near the railway lines.
- (20) Specially step up fuel work.
- (21) Ask Orgbureau of C.C. to issue a Party circular and step up work in this direction.
- (22) Revise rail freightage plan for increased food and fuel freights.
- (23) Close some factories and switch them over for repairs.
- (24) Prepare spades and mittens.
- (25) Snowploughs and their distribution.
- (26) Briefing of track maintenance agents.

POSTSCRIPT TO DECISIONS OF THE COUNCIL OF DEFENCE ON THE STATE OF TRANSPORT

I draw the particular attention of all leading Soviet workers to these decisions. The state of transport is

* Chuso (Chusosnabarm)—Extraordinary Representative of the Council of Defence for Army Supply.—*Ed.*

** C.P.W.—Committee of Public Works.—*Ed.*

desperate. Truly heroic and revolutionary measures are needed to save it.

2/II.1920

Lenin

Printed from the manuscript

PRIVILEGES FOR LOCOMOTIVE REPAIR WORKERS

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.¹⁹³

1) Publish reports about goods trains as a reward for repairs.

2) Instruct the Commissariat for Railways to draw up such a plan of rewards as would provide only for essential repairs being made on goods trains, and not special repairs.

3) All data concerning goods train repairs to be collected and supplemented, and passed on to the Central Statistical Board to be worked up.

4) The A.C.C.T.U. and the Moscow, Petrograd, Ivanovo and Tver trade union councils to be charged with working up the question of using the best workshops for repairs all 24 hours of the day.¹⁹⁴

Written February 5, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

SPEECH AT THE FOURTH CONFERENCE OF GUBERNIA EXTRAORDINARY COMMISSIONS¹⁹⁵ FEBRUARY 6, 1920

Comrades, you will now have to carry on your work under conditions when Soviet Russia is passing to a new phase of activities. You all know, of course, that these conditions of the transition period are due both to international and internal conditions, or rather to the changed

situation both on the international and home fronts that has taken place recently.

The fundamental change is that the main forces of the whiteguard counter-revolution have been smashed after the defeat of Yudenich and Kolchak and after the victory over Denikin. We have to be cautious, though, since a hitch has recently occurred near Rostov and at Novocherkassk, and there is a danger that Denikin may recover. Nevertheless, the main victories create a new situation. Obviously, the bourgeoisie cannot seriously count on things taking a turn in their favour, all the more as the international situation, too, has changed greatly, changed to such an extent that the Entente has been obliged to lift the blockade. We have been able to conclude peace with Estonia. In this respect we have achieved a basic success which has greatly strengthened our position, and we shall probably secure peace with all the other border states, and then an invasion by the Entente will practically be ruled out.

Thus, the first acute moment of our struggle with the counter-revolution, with the whiteguard armed force, both overt and covert—this first acute period is apparently passing. It is more than likely, however, that attempts at one or another counter-revolutionary movement and revolt will be repeated, and, besides, the experience of the Russian revolutionary movement shows that attempts of a purely terrorist nature are often accompanied by a mass armed struggle, and therefore it is natural to expect that the counter-revolutionary armed officer force—an element probably most accustomed to handling and using arms—will not miss a chance to make use of these arms for their own ends.

So though the death sentence, after the capture of Rostov, has been abolished on Comrade Dzerzhinsky's initiative, a reservation was made at the very beginning that we do not by any means close our eyes to the possibility of restoring capital punishment. With us this is a matter of expediency. It goes without saying that the Soviet government will not keep the death penalty longer than is absolutely necessary, and by doing away with it, has taken a step that no democratic government of any bourgeois republic has ever taken.

You are aware that the great majority of the workers and peasants in all the outlying districts, who were under the yoke of the whiteguards, have come over to our side. The longer they were under that yoke the more strongly have they sided with us. And so we know that all the attempts of the bourgeoisie are doomed to failure. But that these attempts are possible, we know only too well from the two years' experience of Soviet power. We have seen tens of thousands of officers, landowner elements, stopping at no crimes, concluding agreements with the agents of imperialist foreign powers to blow up bridges. And we say that attempts like these will go on. With due consideration for the new general position of the state, we must nevertheless remain alert and remember that though the period of armed struggle on a big historical scale is coming to end, we must on no account exclude the possibility of our having to keep in a state of preparedness.

The problem set before the agencies of suppression of the counter-revolution, before the agencies of the Cheka, and still facing them today, is a complex and difficult one. On the one hand, they must realise and make allowance for the transition from war to peace, and, on the other, they must be on guard all the time, since we do not know how long it will take to secure a lasting peace; we must take into account what effect this new approach will have on the bourgeois sections of the population, we must bear in mind, test in practice what these changes will yield, and only after all this has been taken into consideration, introduce one or another modification on the basis of such practical experience.

In a word, we must continue to keep fighting fit to be able to repulse the enemy. There may possibly be attempts at invasion, Denikin may possibly fortify his position to continue the civil war, there may possibly be attempts at terror on the part of groups of counter-revolutionaries, and it is our duty to be always in fighting trim. While keeping in fighting trim, keeping the apparatus for suppressing the resistance of the exploiters alerted, we must take into account the new transition from war to peace and gradually change our tactics, change the nature of repressive measures.

This question, I believe, played no small part in your discussions, and you, of course, have much more to go on than I have in the matter of practical concrete decisions. I have no doubt that you will try to study this material in a concrete, practical way. You must work out in what direction the agencies for suppressing the counter-revolution are to modify their activities in the recently liberated parts of Russia, in Siberia and the Ukraine, how, in keeping with this, we are to change our activities. I shall not go into details or enlarge on this, because I have not had a chance to study the factual material, but I repeat—the important thing is to take into account the concrete facts that have come to light in the work of every Cheka. Moreover, the aim of such conferences is to enable you to discuss the factual material in greatest possible detail, so that local workers should not shut themselves up in their own narrow circle, but should be able, as a result of such an exchange of opinions, to devise more durable and lasting tactics.

I should like in particular to draw attention to a question that now confronts the agencies of suppression of the counter-revolution, the agencies combating espionage and profiteering, namely, to the bloodless front of labour, a question that is now becoming a key issue in the building up of Soviet power, in the strengthening of the workers' and peasants' rule and the revival of the ruined economy.

You know that the task of fighting Kolchak, Yudenich and Denikin, who have been supported by the Entente, the task of fighting the counter-revolutionary landowners and capitalists who were convinced up till now that their victory was secure, since the wealthiest Powers in the world were on their side—this task called for an exertion of all the country's strength, because the very existence of the Soviet Republic was at stake.

During these two years Soviet power can be said to have accomplished what is nothing short of a miracle, for in the struggle against international capital we have succeeded in winning such an incredible, such an amazing victory as the world has never known. This has happened because all our forces were closely united, because we had a real dictatorship of the proletariat in action in the sense that the vanguard, the best advance guard of the working class

during these two years of Soviet government displayed unheard-of heroism and determination, while all the vacillating elements among the less developed section of the working class and the peasantry, who went through a long range of fluctuations, found themselves leaning more and more to our side. The more trials they went through, the sooner did they side with us.

To achieve such a concentration of forces we had to resort to measures of coercion in face of all the lamentations, regrets and complaints. Both before and after the October Revolution we held the view that the birth of a new order was impossible without revolutionary coercion, that all the regrets and complaints that we hear from non-Party petty-bourgeois intellectuals are simply reactionary. History, which is propelled by a fierce class struggle, has shown that when the landowners and capitalists felt that it was a question of the last decisive fight, they stopped at nothing.

History has shown that without revolutionary coercion victory cannot be achieved. Without revolutionary coercion directed against the avowed enemies of the workers and peasants, it is impossible to break down the resistance of these exploiters. On the other hand, revolutionary coercion is bound to be employed towards the wavering and unstable elements among the masses themselves.

Today we are witnessing the tremendous victory of the Red Army, but if we look back over the last two years of Soviet government and think of how we advanced towards these victories, we are bound to remember that the October Revolution started when the army was completely demoralised and there was a complete absence of any military organisation. We had no army, and were obliged to scrape one together, to weld, muster and build this army up anew by long hard work. And in building up this new disciplined Red Army we had to resort to revolutionary coercion. And this revolutionary coercion was quite rightly applied to self-seeking elements. At a time when the advanced section of the population were giving all their strength to the fight against the counter-revolution, at a time when thousands of them, with the greatest self-sacrifice, were laying down their lives on the fields of battle, the backward elements among the peasantry, who had received land, and the

backward elements among the workers, were working only for themselves. At that time the advanced elements had to build up and strengthen the new discipline, which was maintained by revolutionary coercion and which could be so maintained only because the public-spirited section of the workers and peasants, of all the working masses, sympathised with this coercion, realised that without this iron discipline we could not have built up the Red Army, could not have held our own in the two years of struggle and generally could not have stood up against organised and united capital. In this respect, the tasks of cultivating discipline, maintaining discipline and rallying our forces to face the coming struggle—these tasks are now gradually being modified. At first we gave all our forces to the war, all the forces of the ruined country. This condemned the country to still greater ruin.

No one believed two years ago that Russia, a country ravaged by four years of imperialist war, could withstand another two years of civil war. In fact, if we were asked at the end of October 1917 whether we would survive two years of civil war against the world's bourgeoisie, I doubt whether many of us would have answered in the affirmative. Events, however, have shown that the energy which the worker and peasant masses developed proved to be greater than the people who had made the October Revolution believed. As a result, we have received—and the home fronts have shown us—a source of new strength considerably greater than anything we had counted on. At the same time this source has shown that the Red Army, which is capable of winning victories on the war fronts, is meeting with new obstacles on the home fronts—this is particularly the case in transport. Of course, things are bad with us as regards food, too, cold and hunger are worse than ever now, but with the liberation of the richest grain-producing gubernias the food situation is improving, and our chief crisis now is transport. It should be said that the same crisis exists in all the richest countries, who have never experienced such a long war. Even these countries are suffering from a shortage of railway cars. So you can imagine what is happening with us in Russia, who has been at war six years and had had her bridges and locomotives deliberately destroyed.

Our position, in this respect, is a very difficult one, of course, and the task of the Cheka's transport departments, of their whole organism, the efforts of all the revolutionary social-minded masses, are aimed at helping the country to extricate itself from this critical plight, which without exaggeration can be said to verge on catastrophe. Another thing to be borne in mind is that the state of the railways in February, what with the winter snowdrifts, is always worse, even during ordinary times, than at any other season. At present our transport crisis has reached a stage when the railways are threatened with a complete stoppage. Lately, Moscow has had only a three-day supply of bread, while dozens of trains have been held up through lack of fuel.

We are well aware of the methods for coping with this disastrous situation, which we have been using during two years of war. These methods are—raising the social consciousness of the masses and appealing directly to them. In every such crisis we deemed it our duty to appeal to the worker and peasant masses and describe to them the difficult situation that had arisen. We appealed to them and pointed out on whom the salvation of Soviet Russia depended and what effort was needed to concentrate on a single definite task. These tasks often changed while Soviet power was engaged in fighting its enemies, and a proper understanding of the state's position depends upon the ability to grasp what tasks have to be tackled in order to cope with the economic chaos and pass on to the normal work of economic organisation. Now, too, you know that most attention was given to explaining the critical position of the railways to the workers and peasants. A tremendous effort is needed here on the part of the proletariat and the peasantry. Such a thing as the delivery of fuel is a difficult problem, which cannot possibly be coped with unless the worker and peasant population give themselves to the task with enthusiasm, unless there is a spurt of collective mass effort such as we witnessed during the best period of the Red Army's victories. Today, for example, the delivery of fuel and the clearing of railway tracks meets with difficulties arising from the fact that the peasants were given a number of promises to compensate them for their food products. Naturally,

deliveries require draft horses, and the peasants out there are unable to provide these, they are very unwilling and unfriendly, as they do not receive compensation in the way of a definite amount of goods; and we, owing to the almost complete stoppage of transport, are not in a position to give them any commodities worth speaking of. We say that the peasants should do this as a loan to their workers' and peasants' state in order to save the starving workers and put industry on its feet. The peasants should give this loan, because, for instance, in some places the peasantry are suffering terribly from a shortage of salt, while we have enormous stocks of this salt which we are unable to deliver since the railways do not cope with the task of transporting the absolutely essential amount of breadstuffs.

We have here a situation that calls for still greater discipline, for propaganda and agitation to educate and unite all the workers and peasants. The use of revolutionary coercion turns this discipline into something real and definite, showing that the class-conscious working class has set itself a definite practical task, which we shall see through to its conclusion. Just as in the period of our most difficult struggle against Yudenich, Kolchak and Denikin, when we advanced Communists, leading workers, to the front ranks, made great sacrifices, giving the lives of our best fighters and at the same time building up discipline and punishing self-seekers—we achieved the maximum exertion of the people's energy, and we won; so today, too, we must set ourselves the same aim and achieve it at all costs by the same methods if we are to save transport.

We have grain, salt, we have sufficient quantities of raw materials and fuel, we can put industry back on its feet, but this will take months of hard efforts, and in these efforts the agencies of the Cheka must become an instrument for carrying out the centralised will of the proletariat, an instrument of discipline such as we succeeded in creating in the Red Army.

And I am sure that after this meeting, in the practical work of your agencies, and here, too, you will come to an understanding of the role the uyezd transport departments of the Cheka are to play, of the way they should organise their work, how they should advance new people from their

midst in order to fight the profiteers and saboteurs, who are more numerous among the railwaymen than anywhere else. This is a task of your practical experience, a task you will have to carry out by way of an exchange of opinions. The railways are notable in that we have there a majority of workers on a working-class level and a minority who engage in profiteering, and here it is the task of the Transport Cheka to secure a correct division of labour, responsibility for economising labour power, and secure all this through the efforts of the communist elements among the railwaymen. Only by relying on these best masses shall we be able to create a force that will cope with profiteers and gain the upper hand over these elements, recruited during the worst days of tsarism. To overcome this force inherited by us from capitalism we have one means—that of tightening discipline and developing revolutionary energy to the utmost. The Cheka should rely on the communist groups, on the trade unions—combine its work with propaganda and agitation, evoke among the bulk of the railwaymen a conscious attitude towards this struggle.

And I am sure that by strict organisation and with our previous experience to go on, we shall achieve in our work results as good as those we achieved in the armed struggle. (*Loud, continuous applause.*)

Printed from the shorthand
report

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE UKRAINIAN BOROTBIST PARTY¹⁹⁶

The Borotbists shall be qualified as a party, which, by its propaganda aimed at splitting the military forces and supporting banditism, is violating the basic principles of communism, thereby playing directly into the hands of the Whites and of international imperialism.

Also opposed to the interests of the proletariat is their struggle against the slogan calling for a close alliance with the R.S.F.S.R.

The whole policy must be systematically and steadily aimed at the dissolution of the Borotbists in the near future. To this end, not a single misdeed on the part of the Borotbists should be allowed to pass without being immediately and strictly punished. In particular, information should be collected concerning the non-proletarian and most disloyal nature of the majority of their party members.

The moment for their dissolution shall be determined within a short time by the Politbureau and communicated to the Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee.¹⁹⁷

Written February 6, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

INTERVIEW WITH LINCOLN EYRE, CORRESPONDENT OF THE AMERICAN NEWSPAPER *THE WORLD*¹⁹⁸

ALLIES PLAYING "CHESS GAME"

Of the Allies' reported decision to lift the blockade Lenin said:

"It is hard to see sincerity behind so vague a proposal, coupled as it seems to be with preparations to attack us afresh through Poland. At first glance the Supreme Council's proposition looks plausible enough—the resumption of commercial relations through the medium of the Russian co-operatives. But the co-operatives do not any longer exist, having been assimilated into our Soviet distribution organs. Therefore what is meant when the Allies talk of dealing with the co-operatives? Certainly it is not clear.

"Therefore I say that closer examination convinces us that this Paris decision is simply a move in the Allied chess game the motives of which are still obscure."

Lenin paused a moment, then added with a broad grin:

"Far obscurer, for instance, than Marshal Foch's intended visit to Warsaw."

I asked if he deemed the probability of a Polish offensive serious (it must be recalled that in Russia the talk was of a drive by the Poles against the Bolsheviks, not vice versa).

"Beyond doubt," Lenin replied, "Clemenceau and Foch are very, very serious gentlemen, and the one originated and the other is going to carry out this offensive scheme. It is a grave menace, of course, but we have faced graver ones. It does not cause us fear so much as disappointment that the Allies should still pursue the impossible. For a Polish offensive can no more settle the Russian problem for them than did Kolchak's and Denikin's. Poland has many troubles of her own, remember. And it is obvious that she can get no help from any of her neighbours, including Roumania."

"Yet peace seems nearer than before," I suggested.

"Yes, that's true. If peace is a corollary of trade with us, the Allies cannot avoid it much longer. I have heard that Millerand, Clemenceau's successor, expresses willingness to envisage commercial relations with the Russian people. Perhaps this heralds a change of front among the French capitalists. But Churchill is still strong in England, and Lloyd George, who probably wants to do business with us, dare not risk an open rupture with the political and financial interests supporting the Churchill policy."

UNITED STATES OPPRESSES SOCIALISTS

"And America?"

"It is hard to see clearly what is going on there. Your bankers seem to fear us more than ever. At any rate, your Government is instituting more violently repressive measures not only against the socialists but against the working class in general than any other government, even the reactionary French. Apparently it is persecuting foreigners. And yet, what would America be without her foreign workers? They are an absolute necessity to your economic development.

"Still, some American manufacturers appear to have begun to realise that making money in Russia is wiser than making war against Russia, which is a good sign. We shall need American manufactures—locomotives, automobiles, etc.—more than those of any other country."

"And your peace terms?"

"It is idle to talk further about them," Lenin returned emphatically. "All the world knows that we are prepared to make peace on terms the fairness of which even the most imperialistic capitalists could not dispute. We have reiterated and reiterated our desire for peace, our need for peace and our readiness to give foreign capital the most generous concessions and guarantees. But we do not propose to be strangled to death for the sake of peace.

"I know of no reason why a socialistic commonwealth like ours cannot do business indefinitely with capitalistic countries. We don't mind taking their capitalistic locomotives and farming machinery, so why should they mind taking our socialistic wheat, flax and platinum. Socialistic corn tastes the same as any other corn, does it not? Of course, they will have to have business relations with the dreadful Bolsheviks—that is, the Soviet Government. But it should not be harder for American steel manufacturers, for instance, to deal with the Soviets than it was for them to deal with Entente governments in their war-time munition deals."

EUROPE DEPENDENT ON RUSSIA

"That is why this talk of reopening trade with Russia through co-operatives seems to us insincere, or at least, obscure—a move in a game of chess rather than a frank, straightforward proposition that would be immediately grasped and acted upon. Moreover, if the Supreme Council really means to lift the blockade, why doesn't it tell us of its intentions? We are without official word from Paris. What little we know is derived from newspaper despatches picked up by our wireless.

"The statesmen of the Entente and the United States do not seem to understand that Russia's present economic distress is simply a part of the world's economic distress. Until the economic problem is faced from a world standpoint and not merely from the standpoint of certain nations or group of nations, a solution is impossible. Without Russia, Europe cannot get on her feet. And with Europe prostrate, America's position becomes critical. What good is America's wealth if she cannot buy with it that which she needs?

America cannot eat or wear the gold she has accumulated, can she? She can't trade profitably, that is, on a basis that will be of real value to her, with Europe until Europe is able to give her the things she wants in exchange for that which she has to give. And Europe cannot give her those things until she is on her feet economically."

WORLD NEEDS RUSSIAN GOODS

"In Russia we have wheat, flax, platinum, potash and many minerals of which the whole world stands in desperate need. The world must come to us for them in the end, Bolshevism or no Bolshevism. There are signs that a realisation of this truth is gradually awakening. But meanwhile not only Russia but all Europe is going to pieces, and the Supreme Council still indulges in tergiversation. Russia can be saved from utter ruin and Europe too, but it must be done soon and quickly. And the Supreme Council is so slow, so very slow. In fact, it has already been dissolved, I believe, in favour of a Council of Ambassadors, leaving nothing settled and with only a League of Nations which is nonexistent, still-born, to take its place. How can the League of Nations possibly come to life without the United States to give it backbone!"

I inquired as to whether the Soviet Government was satisfied with the military situation.

"Very much so," Lenin replied promptly. "The only symptoms of further military aggression against us are those I spoke of in Poland. If Poland embarks on such an adventure there will be more suffering on both sides, more lives needlessly sacrificed. But even Foch could not give the Poles a victory. They could not defeat our Red Army even if Churchill himself fought with them."

Here Lenin threw back his head and laughed grimly. Then he went on in a graver vein:

"We can be crushed, of course, by any one of the big Allied Powers if they can send their own armies against us. But that they dare not do. The extraordinary paradox is that weak as Russia is compared with the Allies' boundless

resources she has not only been able to shatter every armed force, including British, American and French troops that they have managed to send against her, but to win diplomatic and moral victories as well over the cordon sanitaire countries. Finland refused to fight against us. We have peace with Estonia, and peace with Serbia* and Lithuania¹⁹⁹ is at hand. Despite material inducements offered to and sinister threats made against these small countries by the Entente, they preferred to establish pacific relations with us."

INTERNAL SITUATION HOPEFUL

"This assuredly demonstrates the tremendous moral force we hold. The Baltic states, our nearest neighbours, appreciate that we alone have no designs against their independence and well-being."

"And Russia's internal situation?"

"It is critical but hopeful. With spring the food shortage will be overcome to the extent at least of saving the cities from famine. There will be sufficient fuel then too. The reconstruction period is under way, thanks to the Red Army's stupendous performances. Now parts of that army are transformed into armies of labour, an extraordinary phenomenon only possible in a country struggling toward a high ideal. Certainly it could not be done in capitalist countries. We have sacrificed everything to victory over our armed antagonists in the past; and now we shall turn all our strength to economic rehabilitation. It will take years, but we shall win out in the end."

"When do you think Communism will be complete in Russia?" The question was a poser, I thought, but Lenin replied immediately:

"We mean to electrify our entire industrial system through power stations in the Urals and elsewhere. Our engineers tell us it will take ten years. When the electrification is accomplished it will be the first important stage on the road to the communistic administration of public

* This is a mistake on the part of the newspaper. Serbia was not at war with Soviet Russia. This obviously refers to Latvia.—*Ed.*

economic life. All our industries will receive their motive power from a common source, capable of supplying them all adequately. This will eliminate wasteful competition in the quest of fuel, and place manufacturing enterprise on a sound economic footing, without which we cannot hope to achieve a full measure of interchange of essential products in accordance with Communist principles.

"Incidentally, in three years we expect to have 50,000,000 incandescent lamps burning in Russia. There are 70,000,000 in the United States, I believe, but in a land where electricity is in its infancy more than two-thirds of that number is a very high figure to achieve. Electrification is to my mind the most momentous of the great tasks that confront us."

SCORES SOCIALIST LEADERS

At the close of our talk Lenin delivered himself, not for publication, however, of some cutting criticism of certain Socialist leaders in Europe and America which revealed his lack of faith in the ability or even desire of these gentry to promote world revolution effectively. He evidently feels that Bolshevism will come to pass in spite of, rather than because of, the "official" chieftains of Socialism.

Published in English
February 21, 1920
in the newspaper
The World No. 21368

Printed from the original
newspaper text

REMARKS ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE EXECUTIVE OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ON THE BOROTBISTS

1) I strongly urge that the Borotbists be accused *not* of nationalism, *but* of counter-revolutionary and petty-bourgeois tendencies.

2) An accusation should be definitely added that they *do not* treat their Spilka schoolteachers (do not wage an

implacable struggle against them) the way we do *our* petty-bourgeois A.T.U.²⁰⁰

22.II.

Lenin

Written February 22, 1920

Printed from the typewritten copy

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON STOCKS OF COMMODITIES²⁰¹

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade shall be instructed to make arrangements with the People's Commissariat for State Control and the Vecheka for combating hoarders of stocks and goods likely to serve, among other things, as exportable merchandise.

Written March 2, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

REMARKS ON TROTSKY'S DRAFT THESES "THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT"

Remarks on the Draft

Re § 1

a) Point 1 to be headed: *On Labour Enthusiasm*.²⁰² The words "raising the will to work" in the second line to be replaced by the words "*labour enthusiasm*".

b) Add

the principle establishing the strict responsibility of every staff worker (board member, manager, director, etc.) for the performance of a definite operation or job or task,

a principle generally recognised and endorsed by many economic council and other meetings, should be persistently applied in practice without fail. Up till now this is not by any means being sufficiently practised.

c) The consumers—through the consumers' societies, etc.—should be systematically enlisted for control over production.

d) The Workers' and Peasants' Inspection should be encouraged to greater participation in control over production and distribution.

e) The fight against profiteering and red tape, as well as against bureaucracy, should be highlighted.

f) Every effort must be made to organise competition. Measures aimed at improving discipline and raising labour efficiency should include cuts in rations for offenders, etc.

g) The end of § 4 of Trotsky's text (nine last lines) should be removed or toned down, or worded in a more general form.

(These are my rough preliminary remarks.)

Lenin

3/III.

Written March 3, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

THE PROSECUTION OF MINORS²⁰³

NOTES AND AMENDMENTS TO THE DRAFT DECREE

- 1) The theory of delimitation is *no good*.
- 2) Courts and prisons are *corrupting*.
- 3) *Who* knows the psychology of children? The judges or expert opinion?
- 4) Special establishments?
- 5) Profiteers, etc.? *Recidive?*

1) Instruct the Commissariat for Justice by arrangement with the Commissariat for Public Health, the Commissariat

for Education and the Central Statistical Board to draw up forms of report for each case of juvenile delinquency.

2) Instruct the Commissariat for Education and the Commissariat for Public Health to step up activities in the organisation of medical and educational institutions for defective juveniles.

Instruct the Commissariat for Justice to exercise stricter supervision over the membership of the juvenile commissions and the way they fulfil their duties.

Written March 4, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

MEASURES FOR IMPROVING THE ORGANISATION OF STATE FARMS²⁰⁴

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.

All work to improve the organisation and management of the state farms should be centred on strongly combating, first, the patently landowner-type abuses that have come to light in the application of money rent, métayage, and so on; secondly, the extremely low labour discipline and extremely low productivity of labour.

Exact information to be demanded of the gubernia land departments and state farms as to what measures they have taken in this direction and what practical results they have achieved. Responsible persons to be appointed answerable before a court of law for the carrying out of this decision and the elimination of abuses. If need be, the entire managing personnel of the worst farms should be replaced. Certain farms should be selected as specialised model farms of a producing or purely consuming type and data concerning the state of these farms to be recorded separately.

Written March 9, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

**RESOLUTIONS OF THE POLITBUREAU
OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
CONCERNING BREACH OF PARTY DISCIPLINE
BY MEMBERS OF THE A.C.C.T.U. PARTY
GROUP²⁰⁵**

The Politbureau, composed of Bukharin, Krestinsky and Lenin, discussed on 17.III.1920 the statement of the A.C.C.T.U. Party group signed by Tomsy and Lutovinov and found in their presence 1) that Comrade Krestinsky, in private conversations with Comrades Ishchenko, Glebov, Tomsy and Lutovinov, did not voice his misgivings about the awkwardness of the existing relations (namely, the sponsoring by members of the Party at non-Party congresses—and not at their communist groups—of resolutions that differ from the resolution of the C.C. of the Party) in respect of the decision passed by the C.C.

2) that Comrade Krestinsky had suggested that this question should not be dealt with by the Party group before its forthcoming discussion the next day at the Politbureau in the presence of members of the Party group's bureau;

3) that during these conversations Comrade Krestinsky had been rather hasty;

on the other hand,

that under the circumstances the discussion of this question at the Party group was highly out of place and bound to aggravate the conflict needlessly, or rather turn the difference of opinion between the C.C. and the Party group into a real conflict;

that the statement mentioned above is, in the eyes of every Party man, not only hastiness, but squabbling of a decidedly unsavoury nature;

therefore the Politbureau resolves that the members of the A.C.C.T.U. Party group bureau be asked

to have the Party group cancel its resolution and consider the incident closed.

The Politbureau, composed of comrades Bukharin, Lenin and Krestinsky, discussed on 17.III.1920 the abnormal

situation arising from the fact that Party members sponsor resolutions at non-Party congresses which run counter to the decisions of the Party's C.C.

The Politbureau resolves that from the point of view of Party discipline this is decidedly wrong and impermissible.

Considering the quite exceptional circumstances, however (namely, the very early date of the forthcoming Party congress, the publication of Comrade Tomsky's theses, and the comparatively minor importance of the still moot question of collective management with or without one-man management in separate cases) it is recognised as a politically lesser evil that members of the A.C.C.T.U. Party group be permitted, pending the decision of the Party congress, to sponsor the resolution of that group at current congresses of the various trade unions.

Written March 17, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

**PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION
OF THE PAMPHLET
*THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION
AND KAUTSKY THE RENEGADE*²⁰⁶**

Preface to the English Edition

The comrades who intend to publish my pamphlet against Kautsky in English, which has also been published in German,²⁰⁷ have asked me to write a preface to the English edition.

I would prefer, in lieu of a short preface, to give a detailed analysis of one of the writings of J. Ramsay Macdonald, who, as far as I know, is one of the most influential and widely read of English writers of practically the same Kautskyan trend. Unfortunately, I was unable to obtain Macdonald's book *Parliament and Revolution*²⁰⁸ which has short chapters on Soviet democracy and Soviet suffrage,

but the author's Kautskyan point of view is quite clear from his article "Socialist Review Outlook" published in *The Socialist Review*, October-December 1919, of which he is the editor. Macdonald is not a Marxist, and the Marxist-tinted opportunism characteristic of Kautsky is not typical of England.

As I have no time just now to give a detailed analysis of Macdonald's views, I shall confine myself to an attempt at briefly describing his views as known to us from his political activities, from the newspaper of his party (the "Independent" Labour Party—independent in word and fully dependent on bourgeois prejudices in deed), from his magazine and in particular from the article just mentioned.

I shall first quote some of the most characteristic passages from this article:

Describing the general political situation, Macdonald writes: "...Never was honest service and labour held in lower esteem" (p. 306). "...Our ships of war continuing the starvation of women and children. We are in every mean and wicked conspiracy to subvert democracy in Europe. Though the State is tottering on the verge of bankruptcy, a Minister to gratify his personal vanity, and a small class of financiers to secure personal profit in the future, can add what will probably amount to £ 100,000,000 further burden upon the British taxpayer, for a Russian venture ..." (p. 307). "The storm in the teacup inside the Parliamentary Labour Party, because Mr. Neil MacLean remained seated during a theatrical display when the Prime Minister was being welcomed for bringing in his pocket from Paris one of the worst instruments that ever terminated a war, shows this same proneness

in the Party to be stampeded by trivial fears." "The Labour Party has to save itself from chastisement; it cannot allow handbills to be issued against its candidates, headed: 'The Labour Party condones an insult to our Gracious Sovereign.'" "Such a state of things," declares brave Mr. Macdonald, "is not healthy; it contains no promise of great reform...."*

Written not later than
March 1920

Printed from the manuscript

* Here the manuscript breaks off,—Ed.

ADDENDUM TO THE DRAFT REGULATIONS ON SUBBOTNIKS²⁰⁹

I. AIMS AND PURPOSE OF SUBBOTNIKS

- 1) Subbotniks are a form of propaganda of the ideas of compulsory labour service and self-organisation of the working class.
 - 2) Subbotniks should be a laboratory of forms of communist labour.
 - 3) Subbotniks must be started primarily for important and urgent jobs.
 - 4) Subbotniks should yield results not below established output rates, but participants should try to exceed these rates.
- +a) Higher labour productivity
 - b) " work discipline
 - c) implementation of dictatorship of the proletariat
 - d) leadership of the peasantry
 - e) combating famine and economic chaos

Written not before the end
of March 1920

Printed from the manuscript

TO MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

To Members of the Politbureau:

Please read this. *Interesting.*

I am *for seeking* a compromise with them.²¹⁰

Lenin

Written between April 19
and May 6, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

NOTES CONCERNING THE DECREE ON WORK RATIONS²¹¹

1

- 1) Title to be changed.
- 2) General public norm to be abolished.
- 3) The *work* ration, i.e., *for number of days worked*, to be made the basic ration.
- 4) The work ration to be divided into categories according to the lightness or heaviness of the work.
- 5) 1st category: mental and office work
- 6) 2nd " manual work
- 7) 3rd " heavy work, etc.
- 8) "Shock groups" (i.e., trades and enterprises of special importance for production) transferable, by decision of the C.P.C. (sometimes by special rules) and the Council of Defence, to categories 2, 3, and so on.
- 9) A special low norm to be fixed for non-working people, unemployed, traders, etc. *Exemptions*.
- 10) Special exemptions for children and the sick.

Title suggestions:

"Decree on Greater Uniformity of Food Rations and Work Rations As the Basis of the Whole Food System".

What was formerly called "general public norm" to be *changed to*

"norm for unemployed and small proprietors" or: self-employed citizens, people not working, etc. (or "small proprietors"), "people not working in Soviet enterprises or offices".

Advantage: (1) simplifies things tremendously in capital cities and all non-farming, industrial towns (as the *bulk* there work in Soviet enterprises or Soviet offices).

(2) In *non-industrial* towns we *clearly* set apart the population that is not working in Soviet enterprises or Soviet offices, and *this population should gradually be taken off rations* (either start a vegetable garden of your own or go to work in Soviet enterprises or Soviet offices).

**We shall not feed those who do not work
in Soviet enterprises or Soviet offices.**

**Figure out under what system there will be less food
coupons and the system itself more simple.**

27/IV. 1920

Lenin

Printed from the manuscript

**SPEECH AT THE STONE-LAYING CEREMONY
FOR A MONUMENT TO KARL MARX
MAY 1, 1920**

NEWSPAPER REPORT

V. I. Lenin delivered a short but impressive speech on the significance of Karl Marx as a socialist leader.

"The working people were enslaved, despite political liberties. Now they are moving towards the workers' revolution, which will create a socialist society without landowners and capitalists. To Russia has fallen the great honour and joy of helping to establish this socialist society and a world Soviet Republic. Today, on this international festival of labour, when we wish to prove to everybody that we shall succeed in coping with the task of organising a socialist society of the working people, we honour the memory of Karl Marx. And I am confident that the laying of this monument to our great teacher will serve as a call impelling us to give all our attention to the need for working hard and long to create a society in which there will be no room for exploitation."

SPEECH AT THE OPENING CEREMONY OF THE ZAGORSKY WORKERS' PALACE

MAY 1, 1920

NEWSPAPER REPORT

Comrade Lenin devoted his short speech to reminiscences of Comrade Zagorsky, whom he had met abroad, where the deceased had lived as a political emigrant in 1907 and when Lenin visited the workers' circles of comrades living abroad and circles of Russian emigrants to read lectures and reports. Already in those days Comrade Zagorsky, who was secretary of the Geneva group of Bolsheviks, impressed one as being an energetic, clever man and a good organiser devoted heart and soul to the cause of the Party. When Zagorsky returned to Moscow in 1918 he threw himself into Party work and was shortly elected secretary of the Moscow organisation, at which honourable post he died during the explosion in Leontievsky Pereulok.²¹²

Izvestia No. 94,
May 4, 1920
and *Pravda* No. 95,
May 5, 1920

Printed from the text
of the newspaper *Pravda*

SPEECH AT THE ELEVENTH ISSUE OF RED COMMANDERS OF THE FIRST MOSCOW MACHINE-GUNNERS TRAINING COURSES

MAY 12, 1920

CHRONICLER'S RECORD

In a speech to the newly promoted Red commanders Lenin spoke about the things a Red commander should know when going out to the Western Front. A Red commander should remember that we were fighting, not the Polish workers and peasants, but the Polish bourgeoisie and landowners, as well as the capitalists of the Entente who

stood behind them and controlled the Polish landed gentry. You know, Comrade Lenin said, that this war has been forced on us against our desire, but we are not going to let ourselves be crushed: better death than defeat.

K Novoi Armii
(To a New Army)
No. 6
June 1, 1920

Printed from the text
of the magazine *K Novoi Armii*

**DRAFT DECISION
FOR THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS
ON THE PURVEYANCE OF RAW MATERIALS²¹³**

A commission to be set up, which shall, within a fortnight:

1) Devise measures for unifying all grain and raw material purveyance under a single department or by a sufficiently secure and expedient unification for this purpose of the respective departments. Use must be made of the co-operative machinery.

2) The commission, in particular, must examine the question of employing the Food Army and the internal security units for the purveyance of all kinds of raw materials; following this, the conditions and concrete dimensions for applying bonuses and exchange of commodities (as a rule, on a collective basis), in particular, returning to the peasants in the form of processed goods part of the raw materials delivered by them.

3) The application everywhere of the surplus-appropriation system in the purveyance of raw materials, as well as of fixed prices, is obligatory.

Written May 25, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

**REMARKS ON THE DRAFT DECREE
ON MEASURES FOR PROPER
DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSING
AMONG THE WORKING POPULATION²¹⁴**

In my opinion § 9 is unsuitable. People's Courts are weak.

The local sanitary departments (+labour commissariat) should be made:

- (a) to issue obligatory rules
- (b) *to punish*, without trial, by arrest up to 1 month and *compulsory labour* up to 2 months for uncleanness, etc.
- (c) to organise *mass* control of cleanliness (through special *squads* of Soviet Deputies).

Lenin

Written May 25, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

**ROUGH DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.
ON GRAIN RESOURCES²¹⁵**

26.V.1920

- 1) Express satisfaction at increased purveyance
- 2) monthly figures to be demanded
- 3) station deliveries to be kept separate from purveyances
- 4) help purveyors (§ 4)
- 5) step up deliveries (§ 5)
- 6) vegetable garden?

Printed from the manuscript

INTERVIEW WITH M. NAKAHIRA,
CORRESPONDENT
OF THE JAPANESE NEWSPAPER *OSAKA ASAHI*²¹⁶

He did not wait for our question, but started to speak of the relations between Japan and Russia—to the effect that it is regrettable that Japan does not seem willing to adopt an attitude of willingness to meet the Soviet Government's attitude of peace. The Soviet Government stands for peace, and therefore it recognises the neutral zone government.²¹⁷

He then asked: "Is there a powerful landowning class in Japan? Does the Japanese farmer own land freely? Do the Japanese people live on food produced in their own country, or do they import much food from foreign countries?" He asked many other questions, showing his deep interest in living conditions in Japan.

Mr. Lenin next asked whether Japanese parents beat their children, and said he had read of this in a book. "Tell me whether it is true or not," said he, "it is a very interesting subject." I answered that there may be exceptions, but as a rule parents do not beat their children in Japan. On hearing my answer he expressed satisfaction and said that the policy of the Soviet Government is to abolish this condition. After that we asked about the revolution and subsequent developments.

In giving a résumé of Russian revolutionary history, he said: "Before the revolution, the working and peasant classes of Russia were extremely oppressed—in fact, their oppression was without parallel in past history. As a result of this most severe oppression, the revolutionary spirit of the poorer class gradually increased until it broke out in the revolution. But the organising capacity of the lower strata of Russia is comparatively weak and the degree of education lower than in any other countries. In spite of all this they could not be suppressed. But now, after two and a half years of experience, the Russian working and peasant masses have obtained a great deal of political and social discipline. The experience of this two and a half years can truly be compared with the development of several centuries."

At this point we asked why the Soviet Republic, in spite of its having repudiated the national debts of czarism, had promised to give Esthonia vast amounts of gold, when concluding peace. Smiling, Mr. Lenin said: "Esthonia has shown her good will toward the Soviet Government and therefore the Soviet Government has promised to pay her this gold. Moreover," he continued, "to deal with the propertied class is really a very difficult matter. The propertied class cares for nothing but its own material interests. For instance, look at America. America proposed a peace treaty with Soviet Russia. When we examined the treaty, we could not accept it because it was based on exploitation. So we rejected it. Of course we do not consider ourselves incapable. The Allied nations, rejecting recognition, attempt to interfere with Russia. There is reason to think that if the intervention of the Allies should continue, it will be profitable to the Bolsheviki.

"All in all, considering the prospects of Russia's industries, the situation is promising. If our electrical programme is attained entire industries can be electrified. The creative capacity of communism will be increased and will exert the greatest influence in solving these problems, and the development will be equal to that of several decades."

Transmitted by telegraph June 6, 1920

Printed from the text in
Osaka Asahi
Translated from the Japanese

**INTERVIEW WITH K. FUSSE,
CORRESPONDENT OF THE JAPANESE NEWSPAPERS
OSAKA MAINICHI AND *TOKYO NICHU-NICHU***

Lenin said on meeting Fusse that he was very glad to see him and that despite everything that had taken place in recent years between Russia and Japan and the fact that

some people in Japan still took an uncompromising attitude towards Soviet Russia, he nevertheless took an optimistic view of future relations between the two countries. The Soviet Government had recognised the independence of the buffer state and "this, I hope," said Lenin, "would help restore peace in the Far East in the very near future."

Fusse started the interview by asking Lenin: "Last autumn you said the difficulties were over. Don't you foresee big difficulties ahead?"

I meant that our greatest difficulties were over; but, of course, there are still many difficulties confronting us.

Fusse: "You said it took capitalism many years to accomplish the transition from feudalism, therefore it would also take socialism many years to accomplish the transition from capitalism. Approximately how long do you think this will take?"

Generally, it is hard to fix dates; to overthrow the old order doesn't require much time, but you can't create the new order in a short time. We have launched our plan for the electrification of industry and agriculture; without electrification the communist order is impracticable, and our plan of electrification is designed for a period of ten years under the most favourable conditions. That's the shortest time we set for building up our new order.

Lenin then asked *Fusse* a number of questions concerning agrarian and class relations in Japan.

What kind of landowners does Japan have? What is the position of the landless peasant in Japan? Are there any peasant organisations? and so on. Lenin also showed an interest in the state of electrification and public education in Japan and how children were treated in Japan. When *Fusse* said that Japan took better care of her children than the West, Lenin remarked: "That's very important, in view of the fact that the practice of beating children in the schools has not yet been entirely eliminated in the so-called civilised countries of Europe, not even in a country like Switzerland."

After this *Fusse* again asked Lenin a number of political questions.

Fusse: "How do you visualise good-neighbourly relations between socialist and capitalist states?"

Our terms of coexistence with capitalist countries were set forth at length in the draft treaty which the American

representative, Mr. Bullitt, recently published in Washington. These terms were most unfavourable to us, and it was this that led the Allied governments to believe that our willingness to make concessions was a sign of weakness, and they started their intervention, as a result of which they suffered complete defeat. We routed Kolchak, Yudenich and Denikin.

Fusse: "Where does communism have more chance of success—in the West or in the East?"

So far, real communism can succeed only in the West, but it must be remembered that the West lives at the expense of the East; the imperialist powers of Europe grow rich chiefly at the expense of the eastern colonies, but at the same time they are arming their colonies and teaching them to fight, and by so doing the West is digging its own grave in the East.

Fusse: "What are the immediate tasks of the Soviet Government?"

First, to beat the Polish landowners, second, to secure a lasting peace, and then, third, to develop our economic life.

Transmitted by telegraph
June 4, 1920

Printed from the text of the book
collated with the typewritten
copy of K. *Fusse's* telegraphed
report

DECISION IMPOSING A PENALTY ON E. Y. VEVER, MANAGER OF "GORKI" SANATORIUM

In a statement signed by Comrades Belenky, Ivanichev and Gabalin it has been established that by order of the Manager of the Sanatorium, Comrade Vever, a perfectly sound fir-tree was cut down in the sanatorium's park on June 14, 1920.

For causing damage to Soviet property I order Comrade Vever, Manager of the Sanatorium at the Soviet Gorki Estate, to be placed under arrest for 1 month.

Sentence to be executed by the Podolsk Uyezd Executive Committee on the understanding that

(1) should it be discovered that Comrade Vever had had no penalties previously imposed upon him, his sentence shall be suspended after a week's detention and he shall be warned that in the event of wrongful felling in the park, walks or woods or any other damage to Soviet property being allowed, he will be liable to further punishment over and above 3 weeks' arrest and to dismissal.

(2) The date on which sentence is to be carried out shall be determined by the Uyezd Executive Committee by arrangement with the Uyezd Land Department or the Management of the State Farms to ensure that farm work will not suffer in any way.

I instruct Comrade Belenky to bring this decision to the notice of Comrade Vever and his assistants, who are to sign that it has been announced to them and that any further similar offence will incur punishment for all workers and office staff, and not the manager alone.

I instruct the Uyezd Executive Committee to report to me what date they have fixed for the arrest and how the sentence has been carried out.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

Chairman, Council of Labour and Defence

14.VI.1920

Printed from the manuscript

**SPEECH AT A MEETING
OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL**

JUNE 19, 1920

NEWSPAPER REPORT

Comrade Lenin put the question this way: what, in effect, does it mean to recognise the dictatorship of the proletariat. It means every day, in propaganda, agitation,

speeches and articles, to prepare the proletariat for the conquest of power, for the suppression of the exploiters, the suppression of all the proletariat's opponents. Comrade Lenin, on the basis of various documents and newspapers, showed what a *gulf* existed between the Third International and the entire policy of the French Party.²¹⁸ He revealed all the rottenness of the Turatian wing of the Italian Party, which was preventing the party from adopting a correct line.

Pravda No. 133,
June 20, 1920
Izvestia No. 134
June 22, 1920

Printed from the *Pravda* text

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE TASKS OF THE R.C.P.(B.) IN TURKESTAN²¹⁹

The theses and draft to be endorsed as a whole, but both to be amended in the direction of

(1) equalising land tenure of Russians and newcomers with that of local people;

(2) overcoming, ousting and subordinating Russian kulaks in the most energetic manner;

(3) not giving the Turkestan Commission²²⁰ the right to alter decrees without obtaining the consent of the Turkestan Central Executive Committee and the Turkestan Council of People's Commissars and without consulting the centre;

(4) systematically considering, preparing and carrying out the transfer of power—gradually but steadily—to the local *Soviets of working people*, under the control of reliable Communists;

(5) the question of dividing the Republic into 3 parts not to be decided beforehand;

(6) the general task to be, not communism, but the overthrow of feudalism.

Written June 22, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

MATERIAL FOR THE SECOND CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL²²¹

1

PLAN OF A RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE MEANING OF THE CONCEPT "DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT" AND THE FIGHT AGAINST THE "FASHIONABLE" DISTORTION OF THIS SLOGAN²²²

1. Precisely the revolutionary, and only the revolutionary part of the proletariat, to be organised into the party, and a similar part of the *party* promoted to its *leading* centres.

2. Systematic exposure to the masses of reformism and opportunism in the party and the labour movement.

3. Replacement of opportunist leaders in the party's sections, in the trade unions, in the co-operatives, in clubs, in cultural and educational and *all* other organisations of the proletariat by revolutionary leaders.

4. Formation of communist cells in all and every form of workers' and small-peasant organisations for systematic leadership of the entire labour movement (and part of the small-peasant movement) by the party.

5. Obligatory appointment of definitely revolutionary workers who are entirely free from traditions, habits and prejudices of peaceful work, parliamentarism and legalism, and who, even if extremely inexperienced, are (1) capable of fighting reformism and opportunism (2) and are in close touch with the rank and file of the proletariat and with its most revolutionary section—

— their appointment to top posts in the party in sufficient numbers, especially in the Party's C.C. and the *parliamentary group*, and in all the most important (for the Party) bodies.

6. Especially detailed subordination of the parliamentary group to the Party's Central Committee and the latter's strict supervision over it.

7. The people who are to be considered collaborationists, advocates of a bloc between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie

and proprietors, are not only those who put this idea into practice directly, who stand for a bloc in the government, etc., but also those who put it into practice *indirectly*, for instance, those who stand for equality between the working class and the class of petty proprietors, for equality in their points of view, etc.

8. Press organs of the reformists (or conciliation with reformism)...* *L'Humanite*,²²³ should be closed down. The party should have 1 *central* organ of a definitely revolutionary trend—not like that of *Populaire*²²⁴ or *Freiheit*.²²⁵ The party's whole press is to be a single thought, a single trend, *preparation* for dictatorship.

9. Deeper into the masses. Not for the labour aristocracy, but for the untrained masses. Not only for the towns, but for the country. Agitation among the masses, not only propaganda (contra British Socialist Party).²²⁶

Free distribution of leaflets for the backward workers covered by contributions from the advanced.

Proletarians to go to the masses, to assist strikers and farm labourers.

10. Open analysis before the masses of mistakes and betrayals of the opportunist leaders (the strike of 20-21/VII. 1919, etc.).

Analysis in the press of *all* opportunist mistakes and weak speeches of parliamentarians, etc.

11. Systematic work on all occasions and in all respects in application to all spheres of life;

clarify *concrete* tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat, viz.:

(a) suppression of the resistance of the exploiters (including the kulaks and saboteurs among the intellectuals);

(b) confiscation, since redemption payment now, after 1914-18, is impossible;

(c) special supervision over the exploiters and bourgeois intellectuals;

(d) immediate revolutionary improvement of life for the workers

* A word in the manuscript illegible.—Ed,

2

RE JACK TANNER'S SPEECH
AT THE SECOND CONGRESS OF THE COMINTERN²²⁹

Tanner's speech (Shop Stewards²³⁰) has made it quite clear that:

- 1) a place should be made *within* the Third International for *sympathisers*;
- 2) a *special* reservation should be made for Britain and America to the effect that in spite of our contradictions on parliamentarism we propose that
 - (a) the mass movement in the form of the I.W.W. and the Shop Stewards should remain *affiliated* to the Third International; and
 - (b) the question should be threshed out once more and a practical *test* made to *improve* the socialist parties which had agitated among the masses *insufficiently* and *failed* to establish ties with them.

Lenin

Written July 23, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

3

REMARKS ON THE REPORT OF A. SULTAN-ZADE
CONCERNING THE PROSPECTS OF A SOCIAL REVOLUTION
IN THE EAST²³¹

- 1) Disintegration of the propertied exploiter classes
- 2) a large part of the population are *peasants* under *medieval exploitation*
- 3) *small* artisans—in industry
- 4) deduction: *adjust* both Soviet institutions and the Communist Party (its membership, special tasks) to the level of the *peasant* countries of the colonial East.

This is the crux of the matter. This needs thinking about and *seeking* concrete answers.

Written between July 24
and 29, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

NOTES FOR THE COMMITTEE ON THE NATIONAL
AND COLONIAL QUESTIONS

The use of *medieval particularism*? Too dangerous; not Marxist.

Modern national movements should be distinguished from "movements" (so-called *movements*) of a medieval nature.

Written in French in July,
not later than 28, 1920

Printed from the facsimile
Translated from the French

DRAFT DECISION
FOR THE PLENUM OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
ON THE CONFLICT BETWEEN
THE PETROGRAD COMMUNE
AND THE PETROGRAD SOVIET²³²

- 1) Badayev for M.C.S.*
- 2) *Badayev to be rehabilitated (through the Orgbureau).*
- 3) A number of Petrograd food workers to be transferred to Moscow.
- 4) Petrograd to be placed under very strict supervision.**
- 5) Petrograd, Moscow and all other food points to be put on an equal footing in the distribution of bread and norms of issue.²³³

Written July 16, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

* Moscow Consumers' Society.—*Ed.*

** Points 2 and 4 in the manuscript are crossed out. Point 4 was not included in the adopted decision.—*Ed.*

**ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
BY A. M. KRASNOSHCHOKOV,
FOREIGN MINISTER
OF THE FAR-EASTERN REPUBLIC²³⁴**

- | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1) Where to convene the congress? | Anywhere. |
| 2) Principles of elections (is the "four-pointer" permissible)? ²³⁵ | It is. |
| 3) Principles of constitution and economic policy? | Democracy permissible with slight privileges for Communists. ²³⁶ |
| 4) Definition of official relations between Soviet Russia and the F.-E. Republic? | Friendship. |
| 5) In view of non-compliance with C.C. directives by certain regions and the convocation in a few days' time of a preliminary conference, it is necessary to have a new exact formulation of the foundations of the Far-Eastern Republic and a definition of its authority. | ObeY the C.C., otherwise we'll sack you. |

Written in July, not before
17, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

**SPEECH AT A STONE-LAYING CEREMONY
FOR A MONUMENT TO KARL LIEBKNECHT
AND ROSA LUXEMBURG HELD IN PETROGRAD,
JULY 19, 1920²³⁷**

NEWSPAPER REPORT

Comrades, in all countries communist leaders are suffering unimaginable sacrifices. They are dying by the thousand in Finland and Hungary and other countries. But no persecutions can arrest the growth of communism,

and the heroism of fighters like Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg gives us courage and faith in the complete victory of communism. (*Comrade Lenin's speech was drowned in thunderous cheers. The "Internationale" was sung.*)

Petrogradskaya Pravda No. 159
July 21, 1920

Printed from the newspaper text

**DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU
OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
ON MAXIM GORKY'S ARTICLES IN THE JOURNAL
*THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL*²³⁸**

I move the following resolution by a *collection of signatures* in the Politbureau:

The Politbureau of the C.C. considers the publication in No. 12 of *the Communist International* of Gorky's articles extremely inappropriate, especially the editorial, as there is not only *nothing* communist about these articles, but a good deal that is *anti-communist* in them. In future *such* articles must *on no account* be published in *the Communist International*.

*Lenin**

Written July 31, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

PROPOSALS ON MILITARY QUESTIONS²³⁹

It having been certified that there remain (with Budyonny) not $< 10,000$,

- 1) I vote for taking the 6th Cavalry Division from Budyonny for the Wrangel front;

* The draft is signed also by L.D. Trotsky, N. N. Krestinsky and M.I. Kalinin.—*Ed.*

- 2) for reinforcing Budyonny's Mounted Army with those 3-4 thousand sabres which the Commander-in-Chief promises the South (*urgent*);
- + 4) more horses to be taken from the Byelorussian peasants to reinforce Budyonny's cavalry;
- 5) for replacing Gittis by Comrade Frunze *immediately* (see opinion of Commander-in-Chief and Tukhachevsky).

Lenin

Written in August,
not before 20, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

DECISIONS OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE ORDER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE WESTERN FRONT²⁴⁰

The Politbureau rules that the action of Comrades Tukhachevsky and Smilga be severely censured. They had no right to issue their worse than tactless order, which undermines the policy of the Party and the Government.*

The Politbureau directs the R.M.C. of the Republic to immediately rescind the order of the R.M.C. of the Western Front and to reprimand the latter for their irregular action.**²⁴¹

Written between August 20
and 24, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

* By a note written at the top of the document Lenin instructed his secretary to have this decision telegraphed to the R.M.C. of the Western Front: "Brichkina, send this off by wire." Under the text of the decision he wrote: "Copies for Comrades Chicherin and Danishevsky."—*Ed.*

** This text was marked off by Lenin with a pencil and a note added: "Sklyansky has already been told."—*Ed.*

**THE NINTH ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE
OF THE R.C.P.(B.)**

SEPTEMBER 22-25, 1920²⁴²

1

**SPEECH ON THE IMMEDIATE TASKS
OF PARTY DEVELOPMENT
SEPTEMBER 24**

Comrades, I think that certain statements made during the debates and even certain speeches are worth mentioning if only because they obviously express not just overstrain, but overstrain bordering on hysteria and therefore giving a misplaced emphasis. I would not call it demagogy. It is physical overstrain to the point of hysteria. This applies mainly to the speeches by Lutovinov and Bubnov, in which there was less of demagogy than of overstrain. To some extent I think there were signs of overstrain in Medvedev's statement too. He said: "Now you have all started speaking about unhealthy symptoms, but before you used to deny it, you weren't telling the truth." I think this explanation is not quite correct, in fact it is quite incorrect. That the unhealthy symptoms we are talking about really exist—was hardly a secret. Without a doubt, the general situation was so grave that we couldn't find time till now for the Party, we had no chance to raise this question specially in the Party. Even now we raise it with difficulty, because the chance we are discussing here in our political talk—the chance of our being able to avoid a winter campaign—is extremely slender. The general situation of the Republic, as I mentioned, has improved to such an extent that we are now able to discuss things more calmly: there is no longer any question of suspending the conference the way we did several times when Kolchak and Denikin were advancing. There were Party congresses from which a number of leading workers went straight off to the front without waiting for them to end. Mind you, we seldom convene congresses, we seldom have a chance of discussing important issues at congresses—yet before we couldn't even see a congress through to the end, rarely though it was convened.

Today at any rate we can and ought to thresh things out without restricting ourselves. I should also like to say a word about Kalinin's attempts to present the case in a Marxist way. It seems to me that his arguments were a long step away from Marxism, and the correct Marxist view I think was given in the resolution of the Moscow Committee—which you have all, of course, read and which has been put out in a small pamphlet and printed in *Pravda*—and the letter of the Central Committee.

I should like to read out several lines, which I would offer to the committee (if it be decided to set one up), not in lieu of the Moscow resolution and the C.C.'s letter, but as supplementary material to them.* The resolution of the Moscow Committee I think—and all are agreed on this—deals with the question correctly. Allow me to quote those few words and dwell on them briefly. Here is the addendum: "The indescribably grave position of the Soviet Republic in the early years of its existence, extreme devastation and grave military danger, made it necessary to designate special "shock" (and therefore virtually privileged) departments and groups of workers. This was unavoidable, since the ruined country could not be saved unless resources and energies were concentrated on such departments and such groups of workers, without the strengthening of which the imperialists of the whole world would have certainly crushed us and prevented the Soviet Republic from even starting on economic construction...."

As regards the old specialists we have heard some very heated attacks here. The truth came out in Comrade Kutuzov's speech when he said that the proletariat saw no improvement of its position from Soviet Russia—if anything, it was often worse. That's true. But one must sort out the facts—for instance, that in Vienna, where there is no Soviet government, you have the same deterioration, to which you can add a moral humiliation a hundred times worse. But the rank and file cannot get this straight. Understandably, we are asked: What did we get in the course of these two years? And obviously, dissatisfaction with the old

* See pp. 212-13 of this volume.—Ed.

specialists is widespread. Naturally, the question whether we need specialists or not was a salient issue. We shouldn't forget, however, that without them we would not have had our army. We would have found ourselves in the same position as Hungary and the Finnish workers. That is how the matter stands. Without these specialists—I spoke about this in my political report—we would not have been able to take those elementary steps that helped us rise to a definite level. If we had failed to cope with this specialist business, we would not have had this, we would not have been able to make further progress. But now, when we have taken them in hand and harnessed them, when we know that they will not run away from us, but, on the contrary, are all running to join us, we shall now be sure that democratisation in the Party and the army will rise. I shall read further (*reads the resolution*)....

Point one (*reads*).^{*} Here there is an addition. Comrade Tomsky said, referring to what we have often spoken about ourselves, that the rank and file should be brought to the fore, the leaders are tired, give the rank and file a chance. This could not be done at once, but it will be after another, maybe the twentieth, attempt. Failing this, Soviet Russia's cause would be hopeless. But we know that it is not hopeless, because we have new elements that are growing up. If the first attempts failed, we shall try and try again.

Point two (*reads*).^{*} Here a rather sarcastic question was asked as to whether freedom of criticism would correspond to freedom to eat peaches.²⁴³ I have one measure as a possible guarantee, on the basis of the proposals made by the committee. At moments when the country is in danger, when Kolchak reached the Volga and Denikin Orel, there can be no freedoms. There are other things than this to be regretted. But the military situation is bad now, too, we see how fickle the fortunes of war are. We must put this question on the order of the day. But we cannot, we must not, promise that at moments of military danger we shall not act differently. We shall have to make a tremendous

^{*} See p. 213 of this volume.—*Ed.*

effort again and no arguing about it, we shall have to stand firm, strain every nerve. We do not renounce this at all, and until we have an Italian victory we must not renounce it. And that's my reply to the peaches.

Point three (*reads*).^{*} Here Comrade Preobrazhensky raised a question which Zinoviev raised too: Is regulation appropriate here and what is to be understood by it? I shall leave this question open, as it will be detailed in the committee. We shall see whether regulation is to be understood as detailed points or as the setting up of special bodies.

Point four (*reads*).^{*} The speaker here said that this question had been raised by the committee but was rejected by its majority. I believe—I am putting this forward only in my own name—I believe that it should not be rejected, and if not accepted at once, at least it should first be considered. It has been pointed out here that 500 complaints have accumulated in the Orgbureau of the C.C. The Orgbureau has to distribute tens of thousands of people. Besides, there is not a single member of the Orgbureau who is not swamped with work, doing several jobs. Under these conditions one has to work with unknown quantities, and under such conditions you can only decide questions by intuition, a thing only experienced people can do, and even they often make mistakes. Taking into consideration these conditions, we want to find people with a length of Party membership of not less than fifteen years, who enjoy the Party's trust, who are unbiassed, and who would help in this business, while at the same time standing above the Orgbureau as regards independence, as they would be elected by the congress. I believe this step could be taken. To hamper the C.C.'s work or hold up the decision is impossible. There is no special provision for it, and we cannot offer it. There used to be a control commission in the German Workers' Party. How far that will be possible in our war situation—one cannot say. In any case we are in a position to take such a step, and the C.C. has taken that course.

The C.C.'s letter says: "Special Party commissions to handle relevant complaints should be organised at all

^{*} See p. 213 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Gubernia Party Committees and made up of the most dispassionate comrades enjoying the general trust of the organisation." It speaks here of dispassionate comrades. For real militant activities—military, economic and organisational—passionate people are very often absolutely necessary, because without high passion they will not be able to work at high pressure, they will not solve the urgent problem facing the exhausted country. On the contrary, what we need here are people, who though they may not possess conspicuous administrative abilities, have a good knowledge of life. I doubt whether we shall be able to find enough of them for the whole of Russia, for all gubernias, and if the commissions which are now going to be set up and which you will set up under the Gubernia Party Committees prove to be unsuccessful, don't draw the conclusion that the whole enterprise is a failure. We may not find a sufficient number of comrades in the gubernias capable of holding out from congress to congress. If we don't find them in the gubernias, we shall find staunch comrades with a knowledge of life in the centre. I think we should not give up the idea of forming these bodies.

It may be said: Where is the guarantee that these bodies can exist? We are in a state of desperate civil war, where, generally speaking, there can be no question of any freedom of broad criticism and so forth. We have other things to think of, we must strain every effort to end the war. If the conditions of war were not what they are, the position would be different. Under the present conditions we cannot provide for a good many things; and we say straight out that in order to settle this question in a practical manner we cannot rely on the C.C., because it is swamped with work as it is. I doubt whether you will find a single C.C. member—I judge from my own experience—who doesn't feel over head and heels in debt as regards unfinished or skimmed jobs. I can imagine no more effective guarantee of this plan being carried out than the creation of this commission, of a group of comrades capable of concentrating wholly on this job with the assurance that it will be entirely independent, handling affairs which no single member of the C.C., the Orgbureau, or the Politbureau is in a position to go into with any thoroughness. We may have a practical grasp of things, seeing

that we are making some progress, that we have increased our grain collections from 60 to 260 million poods—but this proved insufficient to give us a Red Army that was not overexhausted, to give us workers who did not say, “What good has the Red Army done us, we are starving”, and to give us a leadership that was not utterly worn out and does not stand in need of help from the rank and file. Nevertheless, we did make that progress, and that means that even in such a mass state of extreme fatigue the scale of this fatigue is beginning to diminish and we are entering a period when we can stop discussing the crust-of-bread question and pass on to weightier problems confronting us, which we all shall most certainly tackle.

Printed from the shorthand record

2

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE IMMEDIATE TASKS
OF PARTY DEVELOPMENT

Not in lieu of, but as supplementary *material* to the C.C.'s letter and the Moscow Committee's resolution:

The indescribably grave position of the Soviet Republic in the early years of its existence, extreme devastation and grave military danger, made it necessary to designate “shock” (and therefore virtually privileged) departments and groups of workers. This was unavoidable, since the ruined country could not be saved unless resources and energies were concentrated on such departments and groups of workers, without the strengthening of which the imperialists of the whole world would have certainly crushed us and prevented the Soviet Republic from even starting on economic construction.

This circumstance, coupled with the heritage of capitalist and proprietary habits and attitudes, which are so difficult to get rid of, explain the necessity for directing

the Party's attention again and again to the struggle for implementing ...*

...the need for practical guarantees that the decisions of the Party, which is unanimous on the above-mentioned questions of principle, should not remain on paper. The conference therefore directs the Central Committee immediately to resolve, carry out and furthermore propose to the next congress of the Party that it endorse the following:

(1) the absolute obligatoriness of more frequent and wider meetings of Party members parallel with other measures for developing activity among the Party membership;

(2) literary organs to be set up, capable of carrying out a more systematic and wider criticism of the Party's mistakes and generally of criticism within the Party (discussion leaflets, etc.);

(3) precise practical rules to be drawn up on measures for eliminating the existing inequality (in the conditions of life, size of salaries, and so forth) between specialists and executives, on the one hand, and the rank and file, on the other—an inequality that violates democracy, is a source of demoralisation within the Party and lowers the prestige of Communists;

(4) it shall be found necessary to set up a Control Commission parallel with the Central Committee consisting of the most experienced, unbiassed comrades having the longest Party training and capable of carrying out strict Party control. The Control Commission elected by the congress of the Party should have the right to receive all kinds of complaints and examine them by arrangement with the Central Committee and if necessary by holding joint meetings with it or by submitting the question to the Party congress.

Lenin

24.IX.1920

Printed from the manuscript

* One page of the manuscript is missing.—*Ed.*

3

PROPOSALS FOR THE RESOLUTION
ON THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF PARTY DEVELOPMENT²⁴⁴

Re the composition of the Control Commission.

Adopt resolution of the C.C.:

that we nominate C.C. members to the Control Commission *only* at the desire of the Party conferences, considering it generally incorrect that these C.C. members are *not bound* by the decisions of the C.C. in their work within the Control Commission;

that C.C. members of the Control Commission do not vote in the latter when the matter specially concerns *their* departments or field of work.

As regards *transference*, add:
without detriment to those being transferred familiarising themselves with the matter in hand and without detriment to the work, i.e., only in such a manner as ensures that the management of affairs remains *always* in the hands of fully competent workers who guarantee success.

- Lenin

Written September 29, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

**REPORT ON THE INTERNAL
AND EXTERNAL POSITION OF THE REPUBLIC
AT A MEETING OF ACTIVISTS
OF THE MOSCOW ORGANISATION OF THE R.C.P.(B.)
OCTOBER 9, 1920**

There is no need to speak of our internal position at this meeting, since all the comrades are sufficiently informed about this from our press and from work in the local areas. Food collections are much bigger than they were last year, so are fuel collections, and these are the foundations of our work. We are worse off as regards supply, though. Some

of the big factories can now be started, and the temper of the workers in them cannot be as hopeless as it was when the factories were at a standstill. Considering our economic situation, we can expect a change of heart.

I find it necessary to dwell on our external position, on the news of foreign policy. Poland is in the grip of a tremendous crisis: economically, Poland has suffered worse destruction than we have; politically, things have reached a point when even an opportunist party like the P.P.S.,²⁴⁵ which has always conducted a vicious smear campaign against the Bolsheviks, protests against the brutal manner in which the government deals with the workers. In the territory which we are ceding to them under the peace treaty Poland will be able to rule only by violence. Among the worker and peasant masses of Poland there is a tremendous desire for peace. In offering Poland peace and making tremendous concessions we shall make the political parties realise that we were right, make them realise that we did not want war with Poland. By taking indemnities from us, Poland gains nothing. She will not receive the money—France will take it. Up till now this fact has been concealed in Poland, but the position is gradually being brought home to the workers, and we must see to it that it is brought home to them still more clearly. Therefore it is necessary that we now conclude peace. Besides, we shall win time and use it to strengthen our army.

On the Wrangel front the odds are in our favour, but at one time there was a grave danger to the Donets coal-field. Wrangel is frustrating our plan of a general offensive by dealing separate blows in various directions.

An, at first glance insignificant, incident is characteristic politically. Germany has allowed entry to Comrades Zinoviev and Bukharin to attend the forthcoming congress of the Independent Party in Germany. Maybe this is sheer provocation, but, on the other hand, there is no doubt that Zinoviev's arrival will speed up and deepen the split that had already started among the "Independents". Part of the breakaway "Independents" and up to a million members of the Communist Party of Germany will constitute an imposing revolutionary force. What is more, it will serve as immense propaganda material for all Europe.

The crux of the matter is that the imperialist policy of France now stands revealed—of France, who has always upset our peace talks and is now putting spokes in our wheel again. We must make use of every hour of the armistice to strengthen ourselves. We must step up our supply activities, achieve quick successes on the Wrangel front, and then we can hope to tear the web of diplomatic intrigues against us.

The situation in the Far East is such that Japan is bound to withdraw, since she cannot possibly face a winter campaign. This strengthens us. At the present time there is an American multi-millionaire in Moscow, who is negotiating a concession on Kamchatka. By granting this concession we shall aggravate relations between Japan and America.

In Turkestan and the Caucasus the situation is more complicated. Recently the Turks have started to move on Armenia with the aim of seizing Batum, and afterwards, perhaps, Baku. Obviously we must show the greatest caution in this matter. So far we have no information about military complications.

However great the disagreements between France and Britain, we cannot work on them now so long as we are having defeat instead of victory. Apparently, disagreements do exist. Britain wants to trade with us and we are trying to achieve this.

As to how our army is equipped with weapons I cannot say in any detail. There was a shortage of cartridges until recently, but the difficulties now have lessened. The work is on a strong foundation, it only has to be intensified still more. The Party organisations must help in this by working in the Party cells and through the trade unions.

As to what the chances are for victory, I cannot say just now, as the general feeling is hard to define at the moment. The disappointment is too great; six weeks have already passed since we started to retreat and we are still retreating. The thing is we are late with winter supplies; this has coincided with the defeat. Without doubt, we must make use of every moment of the armistice to strengthen ourselves.

We cannot set the tone for agitation until we know something definite. This meeting is already setting the tone.

According to Comrade Trotsky the question of Makhno has been very seriously discussed in military circles and it has been ascertained that we can expect nothing but a winning hand here. The reason is that the elements grouped around Makhno have already had experience of Wrangel's regime, and were not satisfied with what he could give them. Our agreement with Makhno is hedged around with guarantees that he will not go against us. We have the same picture here as with Denikin and Kolchak: as soon as they infringed upon the interests of the kulaks and the peasantry as a whole, the latter sided with us.

Unquestionably, the Poles, too, will use the armistice to strengthen themselves; maybe they will bring up munitions during that period, but that does not mean that we should not do the same.

So long as there is war, secret diplomacy must exist as a means of warfare. We cannot renounce it. An assessment of this diplomacy depends on a general assessment of the war.

Printed from the shorthand record

ROUGH DRAFT OF A RESOLUTION ON PROLETARIAN CULTURE²⁴⁶

1. Not special ideas, but Marxism.
2. Not the *invention* of a new proletarian culture, but the *development* of the best models, traditions and results of the *existing* culture, *from the point of view* of the Marxist world outlook and the conditions of life and struggle of the proletariat in the period of its dictatorship.
3. Not apart from the People's Commissariat for Education, but as part of it, since the R.C.P. + Commissariat for Education = Σ Proletcult.
4. Proletcult's close link with and subordination to the Commissariat for Education.
5. No...*

Written October 9, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

* Here the manuscript breaks off.—Ed.

**DRAFT DECISION
FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
ON THE TASKS OF THE R.C.P.(B.)
IN LOCALITIES INHABITED
BY EASTERN PEOPLES²⁴⁷.**

Having discussed the reports and communications made at a meeting of the Politbureau of the Central Committee with 27 delegates from the Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East,²⁴⁸ on 13.X.1920, the Politbureau of the C.C. has decided:

1. To extend the work of the Council of Nationalities under the People's Commissariat for Nationalities; a report on this work to be made at the next meeting of the Council of People's Commissars.

2. To institute the strictest investigations into abuses and acts of violence committed by the local Russian population towards the Eastern peoples (especially the Kalmyks, Buryat-Mongols and so on) and to punish the offenders.

3. To issue in the name of the supreme Soviet authority a manifesto confirming the principles of the R.S.F.S.R.'s national policy and establishing more effective control over its full application.

4. To consider it necessary to carry out autonomy, in forms appropriate to the concrete conditions, for those Eastern nationalities which do not yet possess autonomous institutions, first and foremost for the Kalmyks and Buryat-Mongols. The Commissariat for Nationalities to be charged with this task.

5. On the agrarian question, to consider it necessary to restore to the mountaineers of the Northern Caucasus the lands they were deprived of by the Great Russians, at the expense of the kulak elements of the Cossack population, and to direct the C.P.C. immediately to prepare appropriate decrees.

6. To draw up instructions for all agents of the C.C. and the central Soviet authorities sent from Moscow to regions inhabited by Eastern peoples. The weight of emphasis

in these instructions to be made on clarifying the duty of the agents to act only through the local bodies consisting of representatives of the local working population, and to consider their chief task to be to fight against the bourgeois and pseudo-communist groups among the local population while at the same time giving support to the really communist groups and elements.

Written October 13 or 14, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

NOTES ON THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF THE PARTY

Principal questions after the termination of the war with Wrangel (and for the Party congress of 1921):

1) A drive against bureaucracy and red tape in Soviet institutions; checking real successes of this campaign;

2) Strengthening the socialist foundation: seven million trade union members. Equality in place of shock work.

Developing initiative on the part of seven million trade union members;

3) Links between the trade unions (A.C.C.T.U.) and the working, non-exploiting, non-profiteering peasantry. Forms and methods.

Strengthening connections between Soviet power and the peasantry.

Tractors and collective farms.

19.X.1920

Printed from the manuscript

**DRAFT DECISION
FOR THE COUNCIL OF LABOUR AND DEFENCE
ON THE QUESTION
OF RESTORATION OF THE BALTIC FLEET²⁴⁹**

The Petrograd Soviet and specifically the Petrograd Council of Defence in the person of its chairman Comrade Zinoviev to be directed to give special attention to accelerating restoration work on the Baltic Fleet and co-ordinating the activities of all institutions capable of assisting in this matter, while at the same time eliminating all red tape and establishing effective control over the speedy progress of this work.

The report of the Presidium of the Petrograd Soviet and of Comrade Raskolnikov on the measures taken by them and the method of work adopted to be submitted within a fortnight by Raskolnikov and Sudakov (this may be done in writing).

Written October 23, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

**DRAFT DECISION
FOR THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS
ON THE WORK AND FOOD RATIONS
FOR SOVIET EMPLOYEES²⁵⁰**

Direct a commission of comrades

Avanesov	+
Nogin	Holtzmann
Khalatov	
Gindin	
Fin	

a) to collect information on the food supply of Soviet office employees of different departments compared with that of the workers (including unlawful supply);

b) to discuss measures for establishing greater uniformity and order in this field;

c) to submit a draft of personnel and regulations governing a commission for determining staffs of various institutions and studying work norms of Soviet office employees, their numbers, the results of their work, and so forth.

Written October 23, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)²⁵¹

1. A very comprehensive and solemn printed statement concerning the Control Commission²⁵² to be issued within two days. Fulfilment by Bukharin and Dzerzhinsky.

2. Ask Dzerzhinsky and Preobrazhensky to work in the Control Commission not less than three hours a day in order to make it a really effective organ of Party and proletarian conscience.

3. "Discussion Leaflet" to be started immediately and given particular attention. Bukharin and Preobrazhensky to take special charge.

4. The Control Commission be recommended, as a special task, to adopt a careful and individualised attitude, often even in the form of a downright cure, towards representatives of the so-called opposition who have suffered a psychological crisis due to failures in their administrative or Party careers. We should try to calm them, explain things to them in a comradely manner, find them (without using the command method) suitable jobs congenial to their psychological nature, give them advice on this score, the directives of the C.C.'s Orgbureau, etc.

Written October 26, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

November 1920-march 1923

ESTABLISHING CONTACTS BETWEEN THE ECONOMIC COMMISSARIATS

1

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS²⁵³

A preliminary conference to be summoned to consider the question of linking the activities of all the economic commissariats.

All the economic commissariats, particularly the Commissariat for Food, the Supreme Economic Council, the Commissariat for Railways and the Commissariat for Agriculture, to be directed to submit to this conference by Monday, November 1, information concerning all existing inter-departmental economic commissions and a brief description of their work.

Written October 26, 1920

2

ROUGH DRAFT PROPOSALS

1) Direct the same trio (Avanesov + Larin + Popov)²⁵⁴ to make a more accurate study of all the commissions as to their composition, nature of their work, etc., to classify them and formulate conclusions as to their necessary unification and simplification, and report to us on Saturday, November 6.

- 2) Direct
- (1) the Central Production Commission
 - (2) the State Commission for Electrification
 - (3) the Utilisation Commission
 - (4) and the Commissariat for Agriculture

to prepare a report to our commission concerning the *nature and results* of their work *from the point of view of the general economic plan* of the whole R.S.F.S.R. and supply information at the *next sitting* (November 6) on the following points:

- (a) by what date the report will be ready
- (b) what are the main subjects (or the chief contents) of their report as far as the general economic plan of the R.S.F.S.R. is concerned (if possible, written theses of the report to be given).

Written November 1, 1920

Printed from the manuscripts

**DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU
OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
ON THE CHIEF COMMITTEE
FOR POLITICAL EDUCATION²⁵⁵**

The exact wording of the resolution of the Central Executive Committee speaks of "*unification of all work of political education in the R.S.F.S.R.*"²⁵⁶

While definitely recognising the need for such unification, the Politbureau of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) establishes, first of all, that this unification can only be understood in the sense of preserving, strengthening and extending not only the independence of the Party organisation but its leading, guiding and preponderant position in regard to all fields of work without exception under the auspices of the People's Commissariat for Education.

The implementation of the C.E.C.'s resolution should be divided into two parts: a motion should be tabled immediately in the Council of People's Commissars for the unification of the institutions exactly enumerated in the resolution of the C.E.C.

This motion to be drafted not later than tomorrow, 29.X., by two members of the C.C.—Bukharin and Preobrazhensky.

The latter part of the task will cover: further unification of all parallel bodies of an educational nature in all the people's commissariats and elaboration of the organisational relations between the agitation and propaganda bodies of the R.C.P. and the educational bodies of the Commissariat for Education which are subordinate to them.

A report on this latter part, giving an accurate list of all parallel bodies in all the commissariats, is to be submitted to the Politbureau by Comrades Preobrazhensky and Bukharin.

Written October 28, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

A LETTER TO MEMBERS OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

6/XI. 1920

To Members of the C.C., R.C.P.

Please consider and carry through at the plenum on 8.XI. a resolution that the report at the Congress of Soviets on 20/XII.20 on the second item of the agenda, namely, "The Basic Tasks of Economic Rehabilitation" be made by the Chairman of GOELRO (the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia), G. M. Krzhizhanovsky.²⁶⁷

We shall achieve effective implementation of the *general plan* of economic rehabilitation, which plan, without electrification, is nothing, and talk about "basic tasks" unrelated to this plan would not be serious.

For your preliminary information I enclose:

- 1) A copy of Krzhizhanovsky's memorandum "*Results of the Work of the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia*".
- 2) The booklet *Basis of Northern Region Electrification Project*, of which 3 copies for Trotsky, Rykov and Bukharin I can obtain tomorrow; the rest of the C.C. members should call up the switchboard, 2nd floor, if they wish to have copies.

- 3) Some electrification maps.
- 4) Proofs of the article: "Volga Area Electrification Plan" 1 copy to Comrade Trotsky to be handed to Comrade Rykov and then to the remaining C.C. members
- 5) Stunkel's theses.
- 6) Krug's theses.
- 7) List of GOELRO material (over 200 works).

The sum of these documents shows clearly that we are fully able (by timely correction of the theses and plan of Krzhizhanovsky's report submitted on behalf of the C.C.) to get at the Congress of Soviets exactly what the Party and the country need, namely, a report on the "Basic Tasks of Economic Rehabilitation", which is both business-like and which sets forth the plan of work in a broad and attractive manner.

V. Lenin
Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Printed from the typewritten
copy

**SPEECH AT AN ANNIVERSARY PLENARY MEETING
OF THE SOKOLNIKI DISTRICT SOVIET
HELD JOINTLY WITH REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE FACTORY COMMITTEES
AND INDUSTRIAL MANAGERMENTS OF MOSCOW
NOVEMBER 7, 1920**

Comrade Lenin said in his speech that the victory we had won was the most important of all. The international bourgeoisie had prevented us from engaging in productive labour, and all our energies in the course of three years had been engaged in war with them. Now we must win a victory on the home front. The bourgeoisie had diverted us from this work. Comrade Lenin spoke about the questions to be dealt with at the coming congress of Soviets—the

questions of transport, agriculture, and so on. He said that all enthusiasm and discipline were to be switched over to the work of peaceful construction and the participation of the rank and file in this job was to be secured.

In addition, red tape and officialism had to be combated. Here, too, we had to win a victory, and there was only one way of doing that—by developing the consciousness and activity of the working masses themselves. In conclusion Comrade Lenin expressed the conviction that we would win a victory over cold and hunger.

Brief newspaper report
published November 9, 1920
in *Pravda* No. 251

Printed from the typed copy
of the minutes

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE PLENUM OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON PROLET CULT²⁵⁸

Confirming the resolution of the Politbureau, the C.C. approves in the main of the draft instructions drawn up in pursuance thereof by the Chief Committee for Political Education²⁵⁹ and directs the Politbureau to edit it for a more exact expression of the main idea that the work of Proletcult in the field of scientific and political education merges with that of the People's Commissariat for Education and the Gubernia Education Departments, while in the artistic field (music, the theatre, fine arts and literature) it remains autonomous, and the leading role of the commissariat's organs, carefully screened by the R.C.P., is to be retained only for combating patently bourgeois deviations.

Written November 10, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE PLENUM OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)²⁶⁰

Zinoviev to be instructed to draw up detailed directives to Kopp and other comrades from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade and to the comrades working in Germany.

Mention to be made that we accept and highly appreciate the assistance of the rank-and-file workers in the execution of orders for Russia, including those workers who belong to the most reactionary of the trade unions.

At the same time we should expose the Legiens & Co., who want to make money out of this for themselves or their party, and give no money.

The text to be submitted to the Politbureau.

Written November 10, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON CONCESSIONS²⁶¹

A commission composed of Comrades Lenin, Milyutin, Kursky, Lezhava and Sereda to be directed within a week* to revise and edit that part of the draft on concessions which is suitable for publication abroad, namely, first, the general decision, as a matter of principle, to grant concessions; second, a brief outline of the general economic and legal conditions for concessions; third, a list of concession objects with a sufficiently clear description of the economic significance of each object.²⁶²

Written November 16, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

* The text from the word "composed" to the word "week" is in the handwriting of L. A. Fotieva.—*Ed.*

DRAFT DECISION OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)²⁶³

The Commissariat for Food to be directed, as a most important political and economic task, to regularly supply Baku with food to the extent of one hundred per cent of its requirements.

The food policy in Azerbaijan to be relaxed, namely, no grain at all to be taken from the peasants of Azerbaijan outside Mugan, and in Mugan itself with great care.

Frumkin to be directed immediately to report strict and punctilious execution of these directives twice a month to the Central Committee and the Council of Defence.²⁶⁴

A policy of utmost conciliation to be adopted towards Georgia, Armenia, Turkey and Persia, i.e., one directed most of all towards avoiding war.

We must not set ourselves the task of conducting any campaign against Georgia, or Armenia, or Persia.

The main task is to be that of guarding Azerbaijan and securing possession of the whole Caspian.

For this purpose the transference to Azerbaijan of no less than 7 divisions is to be speeded up in every possible way.

Propaganda, agitation, the development of the Committees of Poor Peasants,²⁶⁵ and general Soviet activities in Azerbaijan to be stepped up in every way; for this purpose Comrade Stalin to be directed through the Orgbureau to dig up from everywhere he can the greatest possible number of Moslem Communists for work in Azerbaijan.

The Commissariat for Railways and the S.C.T.²⁶⁶ to be directed to find means of transporting no less than 8 troop trains daily to Baku without affecting the supply of food to Russia.

Written November 27, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

**RE THESES OF A REPORT
AT THE EIGHTH ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS
OF SOVIETS
ON IMPROVING THE ACTIVITIES
OF THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES
IN COMBATING BUREAUCRATISM²⁶⁷**

Theses to be revised rather radically, on all points, in the direction of a very big reduction in the pledges, which are extremely vague, obscure and excessive

and the weight of emphasis to be placed on concrete, practical proposals realisable in a short time.

Supplementary to the theses, a draft resolution for the Eighth Congress of Soviets to be drawn up within a week.

Written November 27, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU

**(ON CHICHERIN'S MOTION THAT KRASIN BE
TEMPORARILY RECALLED AND KRASIN'S INVITED OPINION)**

In regard to the proposal of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs that Krasin's Mission be temporarily recalled from Britain²⁶⁸ as a means of bringing pressure to bear on the British Government, the Politbureau makes no immediate decision on this matter and invites Krasin to give his opinion urgently. There is no question of a break with Britain, but merely that of pressure, for it is clear that Churchill, Curzon & Co. are dragging their feet and deceiving us, therefore, a temporary departure may prove very useful and intensify agitation by the Councils of Action.²⁶⁹

Written November 29, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON DIRECT TAXES²⁷⁰

§ 1. 1) A commission to be instructed, within one week, to further examine the question of:

first, the possibility of repealing *local* monetary taxes and collecting accurate data both for the Petrograd and Moscow gubernias and, if possible, for other gubernias;

second, the necessity of preparing and carrying out simultaneously both the repeal of monetary taxes and the changeover from the surplus-appropriation system to the tax in kind.

§ 2. 2) The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs to be directed to apply to the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee requesting the latter to collect from all local executive committees information and material on all questions mentioned in § 1 for the Congress of Soviets.

§ 3. 3) The People's Commissariat for Finance to be instructed to submit to the Council of People's Commissars a draft decision on questions listed in § 1 depending on the decision of the commission.

Written November 30, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE ECONOMIC COMMISSION OF THE C.P.C.²⁷¹

Considering it necessary, in view of the improvement in the internal and external position of the R.S.F.S.R., to focus the activities of the Council of Labour and Defence more than hitherto on the problems of economic development, the C.P.C. asks the All-Russia Central Executive Committee to enact the following measures:

- a) 1. To add a new member to the Council of Labour and Defence in the person of the People's Commissar for Agriculture.

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2. To direct the Council of Labour and Defence to discuss the idea of dividing its meetings into ordinary and special economic ones.*
 - c) 3. To extend the jurisdiction of the C.L.D. by including the following functions:
 - 1) (a) co-ordination of all the work of the economic commissariats;
 - 2) (b) endorsement and realisation of an integrated economic plan of the R.S.F.S.R.;
 - 3) (c) directing the work of the economic commissariats in conformity with this plan, as well as establishing exemptions from this plan in case of need.

A subcommission to be directed to elaborate § 6 of its draft (in its final wording) and draw up an exact schedule of existing commissions which cover the work of the economic commissariats, showing their relations with and bearing on all the "special commissions" provided for in § 6.

Written December 1, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

RE THE DRAFTING OF A DECREE ON MEASURES FOR CONSOLIDATING AND DEVELOPING PEASANT FARMING

NOTES TO THE COMMISSION MEMBERS

1) Number of representatives from the Peasant Assistance Committees to be increased....

2) The Agriculture Commissariat's wording of § 6 to be taken as a basis in determining the participation of the Peasant Assistance Committees.

3) The rights of the Sowing Committees to issue compulsory regulations are to be restricted and such issue is to be made subject to a preliminary discussion of intended measures by conferences of Peasant Assistance Committees both at uyezd, gubernia and regional levels.

* Point 2 in the manuscript is crossed out by Lenin.—Ed.

4) The paragraph concerning the requisitioning of seeds to be thrown out, the local bodies to be set the task of devising a form of protection of seed funds.

5) Section VII concerning penalties to be thrown out....

6) The major part of the draft to be transferred to instructions.

Written December 4, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE TRADE AGREEMENT WITH BRITAIN²⁷²

The Politbureau approves the proposal of Comrade Chicherin on the question of the trade agreement with Britain and particularly emphasises:

that Krasin, without the special and explicit consent of the Central Committee, should on no account go beyond the text and letter of our Note of 29.VI on the questions of propaganda and debts²⁷³;

all details to be dealt with at special talks on a peace treaty.

In motivation, reference to be made to their aid to Wrangel.²⁷⁴

Written December 4, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

REPLY TO THE DEBATE ON CONCESSIONS AT A MEETING OF ACTIVISTS OF THE MOSCOW ORGANISATION OF THE R.C.P.(B.) DECEMBER 6, 1920

Comrades, so many notes have been sent up that I cannot possibly answer them all. On the other hand, most of the arguments have already been refuted in the debate, so

I shall first comment on the booklet *On Concessions*.²⁷⁵ I shall deal with this in greater detail. Comrade Lomov's one-and-a-half page preface deals with the subject all too briefly. Then there is the decree itself of November 23, which sets forth the idea of the interests of world economy. "The process of restoring the productive forces of Russia, and at the same time, of world economy as a whole, can be accelerated many times over by enlisting the co-operation of foreign state and municipal institutions, private enterprises, joint-stock companies, co-operative societies and workers' organisations of other countries in the extraction and processing of Russia's natural resources." Of course, this is merely of propaganda value, but it is economically indisputable. World economy has got to be restored. Capitalism acts in such and such a way, and we have our own proposals, but so far world economy remains capitalist.

We wanted to attract foreigners. Therefore the end of the decree lists these conditions:

Point One: "The concessionaire is to receive reward in the form of a share of the produce stipulated in the agreement with the right of exporting it abroad." Without this they won't go. The share is not specified. There will be a fight over this, we shall bargain and each of us will try to get the best of it. Comrades here said we shall have to keep our eyes skinned, and that's quite right.

Point Two: "In the event of special technical improvements being employed on a large scale the concessionaire will be granted trade priorities (such as the purchase of machinery, special agreements on large orders, etc.)." What do trade priorities mean? They mean we shall give this or that firm a priority agreement to the exclusion of another firm. And if the firm takes concessions, we can buy them out, we may pay them extra on the price. The main thing is that we shall be given machines. I think this consideration is clear enough, and here again we shall maintain elements of propaganda.

Point Three: "Depending on the nature and conditions of the concession prolonged concession terms will be granted to ensure full compensation for the concessionaire's risk and technical facilities invested in the concession." Here we have the duration of the concessions. It is quite an

indefinite period, and we couldn't give Kamchatka on any other conditions, and Comrades Fedotov and Skvortsov are right about this being a special concession, which we are granting for important political reasons. In granting them under such conditions we are willingly giving away what we do not need ourselves, and we shall be no worse off for the loss of it neither economically nor politically.

Point Four: "The Government of the R.S.F.S.R. guarantees that the concessionaire's property invested in the enterprise shall not be subject to nationalisation, confiscation or requisition." Haven't you forgotten that we still have the law court? This is a well-considered phrase with which we were deeply concerned. We wanted to mention it at first, then thought better of it and decided to say nothing. Speech is silver but silence is gold. There won't be confiscation or requisition, but there remains the law court, and that court is ours, and if I am not mistaken it is composed of people elected by the Soviets. Personally, I hold anything but a gloomy view about our court being a poor one. So we shall make use of it.

Point Five: "The concessionaire shall have the right to hire workers and other employees for his enterprises in the R.S.F.S.R. with due observance of the code of labour laws or a special agreement guaranteeing workers definite conditions of work that protect their lives and health." There is nothing cautious here. If the workers go on strike and that strike is a reasonable one, we shall then be able secretly to support the strikers. What threat do the capitalists use? "We'll throw you out into the street and you will starve." But here they may find themselves getting a ration from somewhere or other, it all depends on us. We can and shall give it to them. And if the strike is a silly one, unreasonable, we'll have them up on the Soviet carpet and tell them off good and proper. It speaks here of a special agreement, but it is worded very carefully. By way of exception, however, it will have to be applied to Kamchatka, as we are not in a position to set up any Soviet bodies there. This is where Vanderlip was to demand a special agreement. We haven't even started yet to apply our own laws to Kamchatka.

Point Six: "The Government of the R.S.F.S.R. guarantees the concessionaire against any unilateral change in the

terms of the concession agreement by any order or decree of the Government." We undertake not to change the terms of the agreement unilaterally, otherwise no one will sign it. This means there must be some go-betweens. Who? The neutral states are all capitalist states. Workers' organisations? We may have to invite Menshevik workers' organisations. In Western Europe they are in a majority. Maybe the Mensheviks will decide in turn—even number for the Bolsheviks, odd number for the capitalists. But if we don't come to terms, the agreement may be broken. That danger remains, but if it is a property agreement there is no harm in that. According to the basic principles of international law this is a private agreement, and you can break it, paying compensation, of course. If you broke it you've got to pay. There have been cases in the practice of international law when the ship of another country has been sunk by mistake during the war. It was taken for an enemy ship, but proved to be a neutral vessel. What is to be done? Pay up. The same here, as a last resort you buy yourself off. There still remains withdrawal from the war, though. War, of course, in the final analysis, is the ultimate argument. Of course, so long as there are capitalists in the world you must be prepared for war, once you have a socialist state. Further, we here are worrying now, but no one has taken a concession yet. When certain comrades say, "Ah well, this is the end, they'll all come crowding in now," I repeat, it's possible that no one will care to take it at all.

Section One: "Timber concessions in Western Siberia." The Northern Sea Passage is open for shipping, but we have no merchant fleet. A comrade says representatives have arrived, wishing to receive 6000 dessiatines in checkered order. The northern booklet says that if we take the extra electric stations of Petrograd we could use them for taking timber out of the northern districts and develop a production that would give us foreign currency to the value of five hundred thousand gold rubles a year. And total electrification, according to the estimate of the State Commission, will cost over a thousand million. It is a question whether we shall be able to do it. Concessions, however, will make this task easier. You don't go about offering concessions because you find life good, and when that life is a hungry

one, when you have to wangle things so as to give the people a respite, you have to argue differently.

Section Three: "Mining concessions in Siberia." Siberia is fabulously rich in copper. Copper has an extremely high value in world economy and is one of the principal metals used in electrification. We are offering a concession but do not know who will take it. America or the Germans. America will think that if she doesn't take it, Germany will.

When we carry through electrification we shall be a hundred times stronger economically. We shall then speak a different language. We shall speak about redemption. They know that the socialist society is not only quick at creating a Red Army, but can be quick in other things as well.

Further, separate concessions. Three million dessiatines in the European part of Russia alone. Of these, over 800,000 dessiatines in the former Don Cossack Region. There are no state farms or livestock. Whole stanitsas along the river Ural are ruined, splendid virgin lands are lying idle. Even if we give away three quarters of the wheat crop raised there, we shall receive one quarter. We must strengthen our transport and we can stipulate that tractors be delivered cheaper.

If we cannot put three million dessiatines of magnificent land to the plough, which will yield us 100 poods of wheat per dessiatine—then what sort of farming is it? What sort of policy is it?

The Italians are interested in this, and Italy is on the eve of a revolution. In Italy the main argument against a revolution is "We won't be able to feed ourselves, the capitalist powers won't give us any food". But the socialist power says, "I have three million dessiatines of land, I have oil and benzine". You must realise that you can agitate on various planes about capitalism being a dead thing, and that it must be strangled. We have seen a good deal. The European is living in the same conditions as the Russian did when he went towards revolution from the agonies of war. With them the war is over, they are living by robbing other peoples. All the more weight does this argument carry. They are unable to restore their economy, and we offer them to start restoring it now. We have here combined a political argument and socialist agitation, but

in a different form. You must learn to carry on agitation, otherwise your economic plans will come to nothing. And we are not only agitators, we are a Socialist Republic standing up to all the capitalist states in the world. You can't run your economy, but we can. There is a possibility of comparison here.

Printed from the shorthand
record

**DRAFT DECISION
FOR THE PLENUM OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
ON THE REORGANISATION
OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT
FOR EDUCATION²⁷⁶**

1. The post of Assistant People's Commissar to be instituted at the Commissariat for Education with all administrative functions concentrated in his hands.

3. General reorganisation of the Commissariat for Education is considered essential, but it should be more thoroughly prepared, particularly it should be discussed at a number of meetings in connection with the Congress of Soviets. Exact distribution of functions between the central and local bodies of the Commissariat for Education to be discussed and settled there.

4. It is considered necessary in principle to merge the secondary schools (or their higher forms) with technical vocational training under two indispensable conditions: 1) that general education subjects and communism in the technical vocational schools be extended; 2) that practical steps be taken immediately to pass over to polytechnical education, for which purpose use is to be made of every available electric station and suitable factory.

The implementation of this reform is to be deferred pending the general reorganisation.

5. Comrade Litkens to be appointed Assistant People's Commissar and made to devote no less than half his work

hours to the Chief Committee for Political Education until such time as this Committee is properly staffed.

6. The Orgbureau to be directed to speed up the staffing of the Chief Committee for Political Education and see to it that it is fully provided for in this respect.²⁷⁷

Written December 8, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

**DRAFT DECISION
FOR THE PLENUM OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
ON PRODUCTION PROPAGANDA**

1) An All-Russia Bureau of Production Propaganda shall be set up under the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions,

on which the Commissariat for Education is to be more widely represented; the latter's apparatus is not to be transferred, but brought entirely to joint subordination with the All-Russia Bureau of Production Propaganda.²⁷⁸

Written December 8, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

**ADDENDA TO DRAFT DECISION
FOR THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
PLENUM CONCERNING
THE ORGANISATION
OF A SPECIAL PRODUCTION ORGAN²⁷⁹**

1) Directives to be given to *Izvestia* and *Pravda* to become more of a *production* than a political organ and to teach *all* newspapers of the R.S.F.S.R. to do the same;

2) *Bednota* to be turned into a production newspaper featuring *concrete* material and aimed at bringing the peasants and workers, agriculture and industry, closer together.

Written December 20, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

THE EIGHTH ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF SOVIETS

DECEMBER 22-29, 1920²⁸⁰

1

REPLY TO THE DEBATE ON THE REPORT ON CONCESSIONS DELIVERED TO THE R.C.P.(B.) GROUP AT THE EIGHTH CONGRESS OF SOVIETS DECEMBER 21

Comrades, I have received quite a few notes and shall briefly answer those to which no replies have yet been given. But first let me read to you a note of an informative nature, which I think is characteristic:

At the Arzamas uyezd congress, Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia, a non-Party peasant declared the following concerning concessions, which we communicate to you as a characteristic sign: "Comrades, we are delegating you to the All-Russia Congress and declare that we, peasants, are prepared to endure hunger and cold and do our duty for another three years but don't sell Mother-Russia in the form of concessions!"

I think it would be very useful to quote this note in the official report to the Congress,* and it ought to be done because it shows a side of the question which the capitalists overlook, and in connection with which we have no need whatever to conceal the fact that there is a danger here, and we have to be on our guard against it. I have already mentioned that these reminders sharpen the attention of the workers and peasants. The fact that such reminders are coming from the midst of the illiterate peasantry is of special importance, as it stresses a task which is of excep-

* See Vol. 31 of this edition, p. 493.—*Ed.*

tional importance at the present time—I mean about your having to examine the bills tabled in the Council of People's Commissars for rendering assistance to peasant farming. We must learn to convince the non-Party peasants, win them over to our side and make them self-dependent. A note like this shows that we have every chance of achieving tremendous success here, and we shall achieve it.

Here is another note:

Won't the capitalist concessionaires set the proletarian masses against the Soviet government,¹ seeing that the economic crisis and chaos we are living through make it impossible for us to satisfy the needs of the workers the way the capitalists can?

I have said already that in the advanced countries, in most of them, the workers are better provided for than ours, yet the Russian workers in all the advanced countries are all eagerness to come to Soviet Russia, although they are well aware of the hardships the workers have to bear.

Won't the Russian Ryabushinskys and the rest of the pack put in an appearance together with the English and American capitalists?

This has a bearing on the note which asks whether the concessionaires will be exterritorial. Of course not, we shall never grant them exterritoriality. This is granted only to ambassadors, and even then on definite conditions. If Ryabushinsky banks on hiding himself from the proper authorities, I think he is mistaken.

Next, comrades, I want to tell you that Comrade Lezhava reports: "Vanderlip has presented a mandate from about a dozen big syndicates. This has been verified by our special authorities here. It has already been corroborated by Krasin in London, who has checked up on the seriousness of the groups for whom Vanderlip is acting."

For the benefit of those comrades who ask why the agreement has not been published, I repeat that its publication is not to our advantage, because the capitalists, who are fighting among themselves, think there are far worse things in that agreement. The hullabaloo about it in the press bears this out. Let them go on believing it, we have no intention whatever of disillusioning them. Those who wish to familiarise themselves with this agreement have every possibility of doing so. Besides, I mentioned that the agreement

will come into force after the new president of the United States of America has been sworn in. Our Party congress will be held in February.²⁸¹ Consequently, the Party will have every opportunity of controlling and deciding things.

Please explain, if you can, for how long Kamchatka has been let (or is proposed to be let) and is there an economic, apart from a political, advantage in this for the R.S.F.S.R. and in what form?

Kamchatka has not been let and cannot be let until March. The economic gain is that according to the draft agreement they are obliged to give us a share of the mineral wealth which they will extract.

In granting concessions do we not thereby admit the durability of the capitalist states and do we not consider our thesis concerning the earliness of a world revolution to be incorrect?

Bukharin has replied to this. It is not a question of our admitting their durability; the point is that gigantic forces are driving them to the brink. Our existence and speedy release from the critical situation and famine are a gigantic force and a factor of revolution more powerful than those farthings—a mere crumb from the point of view of world economy—which they will get from us. An extra hundred or thousand machines and locomotives are of tremendous importance to us, for it will mean that transport repairs, which Trotsky planned over a period of four and a half years and reduced to three and a half, will be reduced by another year. Reducing the economic chaos and famine by a year is of colossal importance to us.

What if Japan, to prevent us letting Kamchatka to America, goes and occupies it with her troops and declares it her own?

As a matter of fact she is in possession of Kamchatka right now, and if she could she would do it, but she can't because she is afraid of America.

Where will the capitalist get his labour force? Will he bring it with him? Hardly. If he is going to employ Russian workers, not only will these be under the thumb of the capitalist, but it will upset our labour market, and this, in turn, will upset our integrated economic plan.

I can't see how our economic plan will be upset by our workers going there to work. They won't be able to go there

apart from the trade unions, apart from our economic organisations and our Party. The workers at the advanced capitalist enterprises will train our workers in the best methods of production. In submitting to capitalist conditions of work, our workers will subordinate them to our code of labour laws or to special restrictive agreements, and will not hesitate to quit if the conditions are bad. If the conditions are unfavourable, the workers will quit. Some comrades are afraid that the conditions will be good, others, that they will be bad. We shall look out, just like our workers and peasants, and take proper measures.

In granting concessions, when the concessionaires start working, will the activities of the R.C.P. in organising communist cells among those employed on the concession territory be open or only illegal?

Here is a wrong idea of concessions and concessionaires. The concessionaire is not an authority. He does not get any territory other than that to be used for economic exploitation. All government bodies and all courts of law remain only in the hands of the R.S.F.S.R.

Should unemployment in America force a revolution, won't our concessions be helping America to cope with this crisis, that is, hold up the revolution.

That argument has been disproved by Comrade Bukharin.

If the international bourgeoisie gets to know of the Soviet government's tactics in concessions, what will the position of the Soviet government be? Won't this be bad for us?

On the contrary, everyone in Europe has heard about the concessions, and the hullabaloo about it there only goes to show that the bourgeoisie is worried. They are anxious not to be late. All those capitalists who do not want to risk having dealings with Russia are now beginning to realise that they are lagging behind while the more enterprising people are getting in. And we are taking advantage of the contradictions among the capitalists.

Are there any plans or projects for concessions on large industrial enterprises in Moscow and in the centre generally? There is talk about three such concessions in Moscow, Yaroslavl and Lubertsy.

I know nothing about such concessions. There is an American factory in Lubertsy which has not been nationalised

and never was, but there is no concession there. The only concession in the centre, which the S.E.C. comrades have spoken of as being possible, is a concession to the German chemists for developing dye works and letting one factory to them. In the Council of People's Commissars all were agreed it was possible, but this talk has had no practical consequences.

Germany is so far ahead of our country that during the imperialist war even the advanced countries found themselves in difficulties when the German chemical industry stopped supplying them. To get our chemical industry going we must be prepared to pay the German chemists well. The best way to learn is to grant the Germans a concession on one of our factories. No schools or lectures will help as much as practical work at a factory, where the workers can be trained in six months and then made to build another factory like it next door. To fear that the Germans of a single factory will do something to us, considering their international situation, is ridiculous. There were no differences of opinion in the C.P.C. In point of principle it is acceptable. Unfortunately, this question has not had practical results. I must stress the fact that we talk a great deal about concessions, but so far we have not succeeded in granting a single one. We shall consider it a great success if we manage to grant at least one, and you will see the concrete conditions of the concession.

Further.

What countries can be granted concessions? Can we give a concession to Poland?

We believe they can be granted to all countries, Poland included.

Couldn't the capitalists use the concessions to avert crises at home and thus stave off a social revolution?

If the capitalists could avert crises at home, then capitalism would be everlasting. They are decidedly blind pawns in the general mechanism—the imperialist war has shown that. Every month proves that the crisis of capitalism is deepening, disintegration throughout the world is spreading farther and farther, and Russia is the only country where

an upswing towards a durable and serious improvement has started.

To sow dissension among the workers the concessionaires may place their workers in better conditions.

This won't increase dissension among our people, we have grown much stronger.

Will trade union groups be organised on the concessionaire's territory?

The concessionaires get economic exploitation, the authorities and laws remain Soviet ones.

Can you outline the conditions guaranteeing us against the danger of the Soviet state system being distorted and a capitalist set-up being introduced?

These conditions are the laws of the R.S.F.S.R. If a contracting party breaks them we have the right to cancel the agreement.

What is the gist of the tentative draft agreement with the American imperialists covering a concession on Kamchatka?

I said that the term of the concession is 50-60 years. We get a share of the produce, they the right to set up a military and naval base at the inlet near which there is an oil deposit.

You say that granting concessions to the capitalists of oppressed countries like Germany is more important than for other countries. But if the capitalists of oppressed countries use the concessions to improve their country's economic position, don't you think this will stave off the revolution in that country?

The international situation as regards revolution revolves around Soviet Russia's struggle against the rest of the world, the capitalist countries. To strengthen Soviet Russia and make her invincible—that is what matters most as far as the struggle of the oppressed and colonial countries is concerned.

What role in concessions does Turkestan cotton play?

So far there is no question of granting a concession on Turkestan cotton. This question was not discussed.

Will concessions be granted for the rehabilitation of industrial enterprises and for taking over railways?

Such exigencies are ruled out. The railways are a single integrated enterprise.

Has there been any question of concessions on slaughter-houses?

Not that I have heard of.

The protests against concessions in the local areas stand clearly revealed, not as healthy sentiments at all, but as patriotic feeling among a strong petty-bourgeois section of the countryside and among the urban middle classes.

The patriotism of a person who is prepared to go hungry for three years rather than surrender Russia to foreigners is genuine patriotism, without which we could not hold out for three years. Without this patriotism we would not have succeeded in defending the Soviet Republic, in doing away with private property and now getting as much as 300 million poods by means of the food surplus-appropriation system. This is the finest revolutionary patriotism. As for the kulaks being prepared to go hungry for three years to keep out the foreign capitalists, from whom they have something to gain—that is untrue. It is not the kulaks who are concerned, it is the non-Party middle peasant.

Isn't there a risk that in view of a possible war between America and Japan there is a likelihood of a serious attack on Soviet Russia by Japan? What shall we do then? Shall we fight off Japan in alliance with imperialist America, using her assistance as a real force?

Of course we shall—we have often said that an alliance with one imperialist state against another to consolidate the socialist republic is not objectionable in point of principle. An attack by Japan on Soviet Russia is much more difficult now than it was a year ago.

Please explain the Allies' policy towards Turkey and our relations.

It is rather awkward, of course, to deal openly with this question in an official speech, as relations here are extremely confused. Everything here depends on the intricate play of relations in bourgeois Georgia, which is on the verge of catastrophe. The comrades who are interested in this will, I am sure, derive great benefit from the report by Comrade Meshcheryakov, Editor of *Pravda*, who has returned from Georgia, where he spent several weeks, if not

months, and has collected highly interesting material on this Menshevik realm. Georgia is on the verge of disaster. The Turkish attack was planned against us. The Allies were making a pitfall for us, but fell into it themselves, because we have received Soviet Armenia.

The men at the top in Turkey are Cadets, Octobrists, Nationalists, who are prepared to sell us to the Allies. But that is an extremely difficult thing to do, because feeling among the Turkish people against the savage oppression by the Allies is running very high, and sympathy towards Soviet Russia is growing in proportion as we help the independent Azerbaijan Republic to carry out proper liberation of the Moslem peasants, who have driven out the landowners, but are afraid to take the land, and will shortly stop being afraid; when they do take the land the Turkish landowner won't last long.

We personally have been and will be peaceful in the extreme in the Caucasus, and for the information of our Caucasian comrades, we shall be very careful to avoid anything that may involve us in war. Our peaceful policy so far has been so felicitous, that the Allies are getting nervous, have started taking decisive steps against us, but are only getting them against themselves.

What is going to happen next to Georgia?

Even the Mohammedan Allah doesn't know that, but if we show self-restraint we have something to gain without running any risk.

We are asked whether there were any other concession objects besides Kamchatka. There have been no other concessions with Vanderlip.

Regarding press hand-outs. We can't do that, first because the printing-works are busy, and secondly so as not to make this material available to people abroad, where there is a desire to torpedo this undertaking of ours. So far we haven't got a single concession, a single agreement, and we must first get an agreement before speaking about dangers. We have nothing so far and are acting semi-legally.

How will things stand with concessions and with works and buildings erected by concessionaires in the event of a) their violating the laws of the R.S.F.S.R. b) war breaking out with a country of which the concessionaire is a subject, and c) with others?

In the event of an agreement being violated the concessionaire will be prosecuted under the laws of the R.S.F.S.R. In the event of war the concession agreement is broken and the property passes into the possession of the R.S.F.S.R. in accordance with military procedure.

The Russian bourgeoisie, who have escaped abroad, will be able to take part in the exploitation of concessions with their capital. Won't this lead to the old bosses coming back under the guise of foreign capital?

If an old boss takes a ride through the northern forests of European Russia under the guise of foreign capital we have nothing to fear. You will find many an old boss in the centre of Moscow. We have a thousand times less reason to fear a situation in which we shall have a list of all visiting foreigners, than those bosses who are operating at our enterprises and who, unfortunately, have not been registered yet.

You have pointed out and underlined the political significance of concessions. That is understandable. But what the provinces are most worried about is this: with concessions there will be trade relations. What threats and dangers to the Republic does this imply in the sense of disintegration and the blowing up of the Soviet system from within (perhaps increased profiteering, etc.) and what precautions can we take against it?

I have already spoken about that. We had a tremendous threat of profiteering in the shape of Sukharevka,²⁸² with which we waged a constant struggle. We understand, of course, that with the abolition of Sukharevka profiteering still remains, it remains wherever there is a small proprietor, and we have tens of millions of such proprietors. That is where the real danger lies, and not in big capital, which will be hedged around on all sides with special supervisions. It should not be forgotten that we shall have an agreement which we can always cancel at the risk—our greatest danger—of having to pay damages.

What is the position with regard to tsarist debts? Will the Allies agree to any transactions unless these debts are paid?

England already agrees not to demand the debts from us, since we have proposed the draft of a trade agreement to them. Under that draft trade deals are now starting and under it we are not obliged to repay debts. I say, England agrees, but France does not. And so we tell France that in

principle we do not refuse. The exact amounts of payments will be discussed at a conference, at which we intend to say: you, too, are responsible for the losses you have caused us by your intervention. An ad hoc commission is working on this question, and an initial estimate puts the figure at ten thousand million in gold.

Printed from the shorthand
record

SPEECH TO THE R.C.P.(B.) GROUP
AT THE EIGHTH CONGRESS OF SOVIETS
DURING THE DEBATE
ON THE REPORT
OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
AND THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS
CONCERNING HOME AND FOREIGN POLICIES
DECEMBER 22

Comrades, allow me to begin by touching on certain remarks made by speakers and answering notes, at least the more important ones. From Comrade Korzinov's criticism I have picked out the idea concerning engineers and agronomists. We must push forward with the training of engineers and agronomists from among the workers and peasants. This is beyond all question, and the Soviet government is taking steps in this direction, but we cannot count on very quick results; it may not take as long as electrification, but it will take at least several years; so it is wrong of Comrade Korzinov to suggest that all other matters be set aside until we have our own agronomists. Right now we have got to find and get the best agronomists, call them to our meetings, demand from them an account and thus single out the industrious and educated men from the rest.

Comrade Korzinov has landed in the opposition for opposition's sake when he says that the decree on concessions should have been published earlier. But our work at the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labour and Defence is such that we have to react at once, and the

position with us is such that, given no differences of opinion in the C.C. and C.P.C., decisions are taken at once. If the decree on concessions is wrong,²⁶³ then we should propose its repeal, because the chief concession with Vanderlip will not become a formal agreement until next March.

At the time we published this decree our main purpose was, and still remains, to conclude a trade agreement as quickly as possible and offer the bait of concessions to the capitalists. I dealt with this political aspect of the case in my report to the R.C.P. group and heard no objections at the time. I was therefore surprised when Comrade Ignatov, bent on being opposition-minded, said that we had slipped up on Vanderlip, that we hadn't found out who he was. I read the statement by the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade that all inquiries concerning the group Vanderlip represented had been made, had been confirmed abroad and remained unrefuted. Vanderlip himself had pointed out that no agreement could be concluded until after the presidential elections, when the Republican candidate would take office, since such an agreement would have to be sanctioned by the American Government.

This is an agreement under which the American Government is to receive a naval base. Consequently, even if this Washington Vanderlip, about whom Comrade Ryazanov went into such irrelevant details—as often happens with him—even if he did represent nobody and was just a swindler and the proposed agreement was to provide for the Government of the United States receiving a naval base aimed against Japan, there could be no question of our being swindled, as the President of the United States would really be a member of the Republican Party. After Vanderlip we shall be in a position to form a conclusive opinion about this trade agreement. Ignatov's entire criticism falls to the ground; he simply did not pay attention to what was said at our meeting.

Comrade Korzinov said that in the matter of Poland we should have given warning earlier. We have here an extremely difficult situation, and there was a moment when our troops were on the move and the Central Committee had reason to believe that despite the complicated situation we could achieve much by launching an offensive.

At such a time when, after Curzon's Note of July 11,²⁸⁴ we had to give a reply within a few days, how could we be expected to call Party meetings to discuss the matter? Besides, every comrade knows that if we could have passed over to an offensive war at the right moment we would have done so without hesitation. And there would never have been any opposition to it anywhere. What we did see was an opposition in reverse, when we were accused of not pursuing a sufficiently active foreign policy. That there have been mistakes here, there is no doubt, but neither is there any doubt that arguing about them would be a sheer waste of time, as we have other things to think of besides our old activities. When time has receded, when all the documents and material will have been collected, we shall be able to fully appreciate our mistake. Therefore, I see nothing, absolutely nothing, in Comrade Korzinov's speech other than a desire to seek opposition. At another time, when we are in more favourable conditions, we shall make the same use of our successes. And so long as the Party does not forbid it, we shall always assume the offensive. I don't think that the Party or any of its members will propose a reverse policy at any meeting.

In regard to Comrade Gusev's remark, I must say that I made a mistake in introducing polemics in an official report, and therefore I have already suggested that this part of the report be deleted from the official text and greetings to Soviet Armenia added—through an unforgivable oversight on my part this was omitted in the report.

Comrade Gusev is wrong in saying that I boasted of my modesty—the point is that in passing over to a more serious practical integration of the economic commissariats and the implementation of a single economic plan, the thing we had to be afraid of was project-mongering.

Comrade Gusev says that I did not criticise his booklet²⁸⁵ as a whole. But that is the central point: Comrade Trotsky and Comrade Rykov are invited to drop the departments and join the Council of Defence, which, not being a departmental body, will set up a new apparatus of its own. I cannot understand how, after three years of Soviet rule, one can raise and support such a question here. I am at a loss for words to express my perplexity. It is so ill-advised, it

means knocking down the department in one place and setting it up in another. It means failure to understand what our apparatus is. I don't know whether Comrade Popov has managed to print the leaflet he gave me. It contains an extract from the 1920 census results. You know that this census has been satisfactorily carried out and has yielded a mass of valuable information concerning the number of Soviet office employees in Moscow. We took a similar census before this in 1919, but now we have a fuller one. It shows that we have no less than 230,000 office employees, of which 30,000, or even more, are in the most important commissariats, and 70,000 in the Moscow Soviet.²⁸⁶ Try to imagine these figures, ponder over them, and then you will say to yourself—well, if you take an influential man, one who enjoys the greatest authority and has created a certain style of work in his department, take him out of that department and put him in charge of several united departments, you can expect nothing but chaos. Is that the way to fight bureaucratism? It is simply a frivolous attitude towards the work, absolutely unrealistic. I understand what a serious thing bureaucratism is, but no provision for its abolition is made in the Party Programme. It is not a problem for a congress, it is a problem for a whole epoch, and you have a special report devoted to this question.

Does anyone really believe that by a mere stroke of the pen, by taking comrades, who have created the best form of organisation in one or another of the most important departments, and transferring them to the Council of Labour and Defence, you will be getting a new department with indefinite powers that will not perform economically unifying functions. When the practical question arose in the Council of Labour and Defence as to what was economic and what was not, not only the Foreign Trade Commissariat, but the Finance Commissariat as well claimed that it was an economic commissariat. And can you conduct any economic work without the Commissariat for Public Health. Of course, when we shall have made big progress in economic reconstruction the relation of economic commissariats to non-economic ones may become different after we have achieved important successes in the work of changing our economic foundations. At present we have nothing of

the kind. Therefore, to treat the departmental question as lightly as Gusev does—in other parts of the booklet, by the way, he repeats some of the excellent ideas expressed in his previous booklet²⁸⁷—is absolutely wrong.

I shall say nothing about Ryazanov's speech, which has been sufficiently refuted by Kamenev. I shall merely mention that both Ryazanov and Gusev, who has followed his bad example, have been talking about having heard, perhaps from me in the Council of People's Commissars, that I wanted to, one said drown myself, the other said shoot myself. If comrades are going to take a man at his angry word, uttered when he is very tired, and make him speak about it before an audience of a thousand, I don't think these people can expect their speeches to be taken seriously. (*Applause.*)

It's quite possible that we have a lot of vermicelli affairs in the Council of People's Commissars—that's true. If Maximovsky has made this an object on which to display his oppositionist bent and made a special point of it, I must say there is not and cannot be any government institution which does not have to deal with vermicelli affairs. You omitted to mention that the C.C. dealt with questions involving policy. So long as the ruling Party governs, so long as this Party has to decide all questions concerned with various appointments, you will not allow important state appointments to be made by anyone but the ruling party. When all is said and done, the question of who is to make this or that policy is of secondary importance. Hasn't the C.C. vermicelli affairs? Plenty of them. Aren't there agendas, on completing which and running through a dozen items of business, you would not only say you'd be glad to drown yourself, but something worse still. I repeat, to catch me at this sort of statement is not very difficult, but to come out here and make it an object for an oppositionist stand and speak against vermicellism is frivolous.

If, in a body which in general establishes only principles, we attempted to set up a separate body to deal with petty, practical, vermicelli affairs, we would only make things worse. Because we would be tearing generalisation away from the facts of life, and such a break would be sheer day-dreaming and frivolity. Questions in the Central Committee

cannot be divided into questions of principle and trivial questions, because in every trifle a principle may be involved.

It is not a question of Ivan or Sidor. It is not a question of putting Sidor in Ivan's place or vice versa. What if they refuse? What if this Ivan and Sidor are both people's commissars—what's to be done then? The C.C. has a Secretariat, an Orgbureau, a Politbureau, finally, plenums of the Central Committee are held, and very often questions come before the Central Committee Plenum that are as trivial and tedious as anything, and some that you sit over for several hours until you feel like drowning yourself. But to draw a line between trivial questions and questions of principle is to undermine the very foundation of democratic centralism. At the same time it cannot be said that the Central Committee dumps its vermicelli onto other institutions. So far we have not been able to alter the Constitution and have been working autonomously. The fact that on some questions we have arrived at an agreement and on others there have been debates is only natural and inevitable, considering the apparatus we have. The fact that the C.C. is becoming an organ of control, and that in the general distribution of work it has fallen to Comrade Kalinin to supervise agitation and verification, and that he is required to give his personal impressions obtained during his trips and at work—this gives no grounds for shouting about the Council of People's Commissars referring all questions to the C.C. and vice versa. It means introducing further confusion and turmoil while things remain essentially unchanged. The higher bodies are needed for the purpose of control and for turning down certain questions.

People here have spoken and complained about the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee being swamped with business, and though it is our highest body, it is swamped with purely vermicelli affairs. But I would ask all those present here, how many of you have read a dozen reports of our proceedings? Who has read them from beginning to end? Probably no one, because they are dull, you can't wade through them. I must say that every member of our Party and every citizen of the Republic has a right to bring any question, any circumstance, however trivial, before the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. This

question will go through the whole ladder, through the bureau, etc. till it gets to the C.E.C. Presidium, where it will be examined. And so it will be until the complete communist re-education of the working people, which will come within several decades after electrification has been finally completed. In this respect we are not afraid of changes.

I shall now deal with some of the notes. Comrade Minkin writes:

Did Comrade Shlyapnikov inform the Council of People's Commissars of the disgraceful goings on at the Commissariat for Foreign Trade, or was this being kept for announcement at the Congress? If he did make such a statement, what has been done to eliminate them?

To answer this question I consulted Comrade Serebryakov who is better informed than I am. He was appointed by the Central Committee to the commission, the other members of which were Dzerzhinsky, Krestinsky and Lezhava, set up to take steps towards improving the relations between the Commissariat for Foreign Trade and the Commissariat for Internal Affairs, since our representatives abroad had information that these relations were anything but satisfactory. At my request Serebryakov gives the following answer to the note of delegate Minkin: "Comrade Minkin states ..." (*reads*).

After this commission a subcommission was set up. It is very easy to play at opposition, since there are disgraceful goings on with us in every commissariat, and the infelicitous mention of guarantees and 30,000 employees in the commissariat's technical publishing house is very characteristic in the sense that you can always find scandalously disgraceful things here. You will find the same thing in any division of the Red Army. Nevertheless our Red Army has been winning victories all the time.

The thing is to apply in good time to the institution that has to remedy matters, and not talk about it here, where we cannot collect accurate information about what Comrade Ryazanov has heard of this or that person and has not checked it or discovered the true facts. Is that democratic centralism? It is not at all democratic, and not at all centralism, but disorder and the introduction of chaos. Complaints should be lodged with Party bodies. If that

body does not fulfil its duty it should be made to give a strict account of itself.

Among the notes that have been sent up there is the question of reducing the army. On this subject Comrade Trotsky will make a special statement, and you will decide whether this question should be dealt with today or at the next special meeting of the R.C.P. group. I can tell you that after an ad hoc commission on demobilisation headed by Trotsky and Dzerzhinsky was set up, the C.C. decided to start demobilisation, and this is now going on. It is being dealt with by the military department, and you will receive an exact report.

Is the Council of Labour and Defence regarded as an interim body called upon to unite the economic commissariats and then to be abolished, or is it the basis of a future integrated economic plan? Also, on what apparatus does the Council rely locally?

This question has not been settled, and we believe that to raise it now would be a waste of time. The order of the day now is a check-up of the organisation of the commissariats. The Council of People's Commissars has set up an organisational body which is to revise the apparatus of the People's Commissariats with a view to the tasks confronting them, and in this connection, to examine the question of staffs. To busy ourselves at the present time with setting up another apparatus in place of the Council of Labour and Defence is impossible until the question of electrification is settled. Various material on electrification will soon be handed out to you, and the Council of Labour and Defence will have to reckon with what the verification of this material and the reports will have to say. We now have an organ that we need, and, good or bad, we have in any case been working with it and coping with the tasks confronting us. We have no intention of embarking on reforms until we have practically tested how the integrated economic plan will be carried out. This is definitely a case of look before you leap.

Who is going to conclude concession contracts in the Far East, we or the buffer state, in either case—why?

This, comrades, is a delicate question. Buffer state²⁸⁸—it is such an embarrassing definition when we are asked:

You or the buffer? On the one hand we have the buffer, on the other, the corresponding Party Bureau of the R.C.P. The buffer's a buffer, it's to enable us to win time and then beat the Japanese. I don't know whom Kamchatka belongs to. Actually the Japanese are in possession, and they do not relish the idea of our giving it away to the Americans. We are consulted, our directives are complied with, and nobody has protested against our negotiations with Vanderlip, no single group of Party comrades has considered the question important enough to demand its being discussed at the plenum of the Central Executive Committee and examined in the Control Commission. This is the right of every Party member, and no one has used this right. The person who has learned the facts which led to the postponement of an agreement till March will not try to make use of this right.

What is your view of the trade unions at the present moment in connection with the concessions? Is it true that you stand for the organisation of a trade union of peasants?

I must say that the Party's Programme mentions the necessity of seeking new forms of trade unions that would unite the poor sections of the peasantry.²⁸⁹ This task has been posed in the Party's Programme and I have often pointed out that although we are not in a position at present to solve this problem, we must not give it up. We must not confine ourselves to the work of Vserabotzem,²⁹⁰ which is so weak, and which cannot give us outstanding workers. So long as we have a levelling process taking place among the peasantry, a levelling and unification of the working peasants, the non-kulak section of the peasantry, this problem cannot be removed from the order of the day of socialist construction. To strengthen the work of the trade unions we must extend them not only to the rural proletariat, but to all the working peasantry. How this is to be done we do not know yet. We have set this task in the Party's Programme, we shall return to it many times and get it settled in a practical manner from different aspects. That is all I can say now on this question.

With the granting of concessions, the trade unions, naturally, will have important tasks imposed upon them—those

of checking, supervising, and maintaining contact with the workers who will be employed in these concessions. How this task will be handled in practice, I cannot say at the moment. To raise this question at the present time would be inadvisable, as the trade unions have more important tasks facing them.

In our fight against bureaucratism we certainly need the help of the trade unions. We must rely on them. This is basically provided for in the Party's Programme.²⁹¹ This shows what a long struggle is needed and what systematic work faces us. When we shall have data that in such-and-such a workmen's settlement the business of supervision is organised in such-and-such a way and definite results have been achieved, while in such-and-such a block, uyezd, etc. things are different—then we shall be able to weigh things, get them moving, and there will not only be talk about the "agitpotato" but we shall be in a position to check what steps have been taken in practice and on this ground apply practical measures that have already yielded results.

Printed from the shorthand
record

3

SPEECH ON ADDENDA TO THE BILL OF THE C.P.C.
"ON MEASURES TO CONSOLIDATE AND DEVELOP
PEASANT FARMING"
DELIVERED TO THE R.C.P. GROUP
OF THE EIGHTH CONGRESS OF SOVIETS
DECEMBER 27

Comrades, the Central Committee today has examined the decision adopted by the group concerning the deletion of the words "individual householders" from the point of the resolution on agriculture which deals with improvement and premiums. The C.C. has passed the following resolution and authorised me to defend it.²⁹² (*Reads.*) There, comrades, you have the text of the C.C.'s decision. Allow me now to

give the reasons why we simply could not agree with the group's decision. We had no doubts, and this was particularly stressed at the C.C. meeting, that the principal reasons the group was guided by in its decision to reject the idea of premiums for individual householders were the fear that we would give premiums to the kulak, and the desire to give priority to the village commune, the volost, the collective unit—to common labour, not the individual. With this we are in perfect agreement. We consider, however, that it would be wrong to let ourselves reject altogether the idea of premiums for individual farmers for reasons, which in themselves are quite correct, fundamentally indisputable to any Marxist and especially valuable from the point of view of the peasantry.

Allow me to give you some information from the history of the origin of this bill. I have been following its progress through the Council of People's Commissars fairly closely and must say that in the first draft, tabled by the Food Commissariat, the main accent, generally speaking, was on the hardworking farmer. The gist of Comrade Sereda's proposals was that it would be wrong to stake on the hardworking farmer, and that we should stake on the village commune, the collective body. The Council's attitude on this question—at least, mine—was that we had to weigh all the pros and cons and consult the local people. Indeed, it seemed wrong to me to reject premiums for individual farmers, but that the village commune had to be given priority—this might be all right if the local people with practical experience confirmed that it could and should be done. From this conflict of two points of view there emerged the formulation that was adopted for the bill of the Council of People's Commissars, namely, that both be retained and a ratio established between the two kinds of premiums. The details, as defined in the Council, were to be covered by instructions. In fact the decision of the Council says that the instructions are to be drawn up within a definite stated period by the Commissariat for Agriculture, co-ordinated with the Commissariat for Food and endorsed by the Council of People's Commissars. As an exception to the general procedure, when instructions are endorsed by a single order of the People's Commissar concerned,

we arranged not only for verification—the participation of two People's Commissars—but specially added that the Council of People's Commissars demanded that the instructions be submitted to it for endorsement. Obviously, a great deal depended on the instructions.

After certain explanations given by comrades your decision not to give premiums to individual farms became clear to us. The Central Committee saw the point. The point is fear of unfair premiums, the giving of premiums to kulaks. Obviously, the best-run farms are those of the well-to-do peasants and the kulaks, and there are still plenty of these in the villages, on that score we haven't the slightest doubt. If we, in paying a premium for an efficient farm, did not take care to find out how that efficiency was achieved, then, naturally, the kulak would prove to have the best-run farm. And if we ignore the question as to how, at what price, economic improvement is achieved, we shall find the kulak receiving unfair privileges. If we reward him with the means of production, that is, with things that make for farm expansion, we shall find ourselves indirectly, and perhaps even not quite indirectly, boosting the kulaks, because, in rewarding an industrious farmer without considering whether or not he achieved his good results by kulak practices, and what is more, rewarding him with things like the means of production, that is to say, things he can use to strengthen his influence with, we shall, of course, be running counter to the basic provisions of not only the agrarian, but of all Soviet policy, and infringing the basic principle—that of supporting the interests of the working people against those of the kulaks. In doing so we shall really be seriously undermining the principles and foundations of all Soviet policy in general, and not only of agrarian policy.

But if we are to draw from this the conclusion that individual farmers should not be rewarded, then take the following example: we give bonuses to individual workers at factories and mills, where collective, socialised, labour has reached an incomparably higher level than in agriculture. What is to be done about the peasantry then? In a peasant country, where individual peasant labour predominates to the extent of nine-tenths, probably ninety-nine per cent, where

we have twenty million peasant farms, we want to promote these farms and we must do so come what may. We know that their efficiency can be raised only after several long years of radical technical reform. We have learned something in our three years of practical work. We know how to build up the foundations of communism in agriculture—this can be done at the cost of a tremendous technical evolution. We clearly visualise that elaborated plan with located electric stations, we know the minimum-programme, the programme for the next ten years, but in this book on electrification we also have a maximum-programme, in which gigantic work is planned for years ahead. But now we have twenty million separate farms, which are run separately and cannot be run in any other way; and if we don't encourage them to raise productivity this would be grossly wrong, it would be clearly overdoing it, it means a refusal to see facts of reality that strike the eye, facts that we have to reckon with and be guided by. It would be desirable, of course, to have these farms rise through collectivism, by whole volosts, communes, etc. But how far that is possible at present is a thing we have to reckon with. If you, working in the local areas, support progress in this direction and raise a whole commune or a whole volost—all the better; in that case give them all that is best in premium payments. But are you sure that you will manage it, that it is not sheer fantasy, which in the practical work will lead to the greatest blunders?

That is why we propose to you the last part of the C.C.'s resolution reworded or amended as the practical workers may deem fit for inclusion in the resolution of the Congress of Soviets, so that this question should be decided by you and you should say here: premiums and rewards for individual farmers are acceptable under three known conditions. First, premiums for rural communes first and foremost, with householders coming second and receiving what remains—to this we agree. The second point says individual farmers who have achieved economic success by kulak practices should not be rewarded; it should not be a case of—you have made a go of it economically, you are to be rewarded. If anyone has achieved economic success, but employed a kulak method in doing so, whether in the form

of a loan, the hiring of labourers, or profiteering—kulak practices sometimes dodge the law—if anyone has employed the slightest kulak method to achieve success, he is to forfeit reward of any kind. This is the second restriction which goes still further to meet your principled point of view as to combating the kulaks and supporting the working middle peasants and poor peasants. The third restriction—what is to be issued as premiums. They may be given in the form of means of production—things like implements and machines that serve to expand and improve the farm; articles of consumption may be issued, household articles of adornment, things that make the home brighter and life more beautiful. We say: “Give the individual farmers only consumer and household goods, and, of course, medals.” You have already accepted the Order of the Red Banner.²⁹³ As to the means of production, these may be given to individual farmers, but of such a type and on such conditions that they should not be usable for kulak purposes. No machines should be given, not even to the most hardworking farmer, not even if he has achieved success without the least resort to kulak practices. Machines should not be given, because by the very nature of their employment they require collective labour, and a farmer who receives a machine will not be able to use it by himself.

These are the considerations the C.C. was guided by and on the basis of which we have asked you to reconsider your decision, exchange opinions, and alter your decision if you deem it possible so as to allow individual farmers to be rewarded on the three conditions set forth above. If we do not accept this, we may not achieve needed results, since farm improvements cannot be carried out in a tired and ruined country without a special effort, and the hardworking farmers have to be rewarded. All hard work that contains no element of kulak practices should be rewarded. That is why we think that on considering these reasons you will agree to premiums subject to the three restrictive conditions mentioned above, which we think are really necessary in the interests of our economic development.

4

REPLY TO QUESTIONS AT THE MEETING
OF THE R.C.P. GROUP
OF THE EIGHTH CONGRESS OF SOVIETS
DECEMBER 27

Before answering the notes it must be stated definitely whether a formal difference of opinion exists between the congress group and the Central Committee. Dealing with what the first speakers have said here: we adopted a definite decision, intending to fight the kulaks, but at that time you did not have the methods of struggle outlined by us in the three addenda. What did the comrades who opposed these addenda say here? As a matter of fact they said nothing. The peasant Red Armyman who spoke here²⁹⁴ said that the kulaks exist and they are growing, but we say definitely: if they are kulaks they will receive no reward. You are being asked to make that a law. Moreover, if the middle peasant achieves betterment individually, but may use it to become a kulak, he is not to receive a premium. What argument, then, has been advanced here against our reasons? None at all. It is reiterated that the kulak should not be rewarded. But we agree to that.

I shall deal now with the notes that have been sent up. The first one:

1) What will be the criterion for a "hardworking kulak" and a "hardworking middle peasant"?

2) If we do find that criterion here and work out a plan, how are we going to carry it out locally, all the more in places where the kulaks are still playing the leading role?

3) Where is the line to be drawn between rewarding a whole collective body and an individual farmer, or are both of them to be rewarded?

For one thing, the peasants know this better than we do. If the law bans any reward for people employing kulak practices, then this is broader than the notion of the kulak. The kulak is a man who generally uses kulak methods, and one or another kulak method is used by almost every middle peasant. That means we not only forbid premiums being given to kulaks but to any middle peasant as well, if he uses kulak methods, and these methods are endless

in their variety. That crude method by which an extra horse was bought for five poods is not the only one.²⁹⁵ Would a premium be given to a kulak like that? What makes you think that people in the country will close their eyes to this? As to the criterion for a hardworking kulak and a hardworking middle peasant, the local people know this perfectly well. We have no intention of writing a law about this, as it would mean writing a whole volume describing kulak practices, and people locally know this perfectly well.

Secondly, haven't we got uyezdz committees of the Party, won't this thing be handled by the rural commune, by the volost land departments, by the Party cell? How can we speak about fighting the kulaks in the local areas if there are no fighting cells there? This argument is beyond me.

Thirdly, the law says that priority is given to the collective body with the individual farmer coming second. The differentiation will be made in greater detail by the Uyezdz Party Committee and all the other bodies that exist locally.

The second note:

In introducing its amendment does the C.C. regard it as a political act, an incentive to the "hardworking peasants" to improve farming and industry in general so as to make it easier in the course of time to introduce collective cultivation? Will you please answer this?

In the first place, here is proof that there is nothing specially political in this question, something that should be kept from the non-Party peasants. Therefore I consider it quite right and think it should be made a custom to invite non-Party people to our group meetings on such questions. They will have no right of decision at the group meetings, but why not consult them? Our economic practice has shown that it is advisable to go over from individual to collective labour, but having experienced what this going means, we should not try to take it in our stride, but try to understand the need for doing it, the slower the going the better.

The third note:

I think the advocates of commune premiums ought to be asked whether they have enough ploughs and other implements to reward the commune with or not. If not, it's not worth talking about.

This argument is incorrect. Generally speaking, we have few articles usable as premiums, and so few ploughs that,

as means of production, we shall not give them to individuals, but only to whole communes. But why should we not, if we can, give a plough to a peasant who has worked hard to raise productivity? And who is to decide whether he is a kulak element or not? We must lend an ear to what people say lower down.

The next note:

Will you please, if possible, answer the following question right now on the back of this note. The Svyatiye Kresty Uyezd, Stavropol Gubernia, where I work, has had 10,000,000 poods of grain imposed on it for delivery by December 1, 1920. We have delivered 3,200,000 poods. Owing to poor fulfilment we are widely practising confiscation of property from kulak elements, and so I ask you again, will you please tell us what we are to do? Should we carry out confiscation, or do it only as a last resort, so as not to ruin the farm?

This has no relation to the law we are discussing. Go on acting the way you have been doing. In strict conformity with the decree of the Soviet government and your own communist conscience go on freely acting the way you have been doing till now.

The next note:

How is the "hardworking kulak" to be distinguished from the concept of "hardworking peasant"?

Our bill covers all that, and your asking this is an abuse of question time.

Next we are asked:

Who can define a hardworking peasant and how, say in any village? If this is to be done by elected or authorised persons in the village, it will mean an abuse of elected and authorised persons.

I have already said that we must make use of our Party. We have the Committees of Poor Peasants, and in the Ukraine we have their counterpart.

1) Please consider this. Peasant farmers were given a premium for delivering hemp in 1920. They received 100 arshins of textiles each, but the village poor haven't received an arshin yet for 1920.

2) Is the fact taken into consideration that the system of premiums to individual farmers is an obstacle in the way of setting up collective farms and partly bolsters up the shaken foundations of capitalism in agriculture?

Comrades, you know that individual peasant farms with us are the foundations of capitalism, in a manner of speaking.

There is no doubt about that, and I pointed this out in my report, when I said straight out that the "Sukharevka" we had to fear was not the one that existed on Sukharevka Square or existed secretly on any other square, but the one that sits in the breast of every individual peasant farmer.* Can we get away from this in a year or two years? We cannot. But farming has to be improved right now. You are guided by excellent communist motives, but you want to jump from this floor to that top, and we say—it won't work, act more carefully and gradually.

Further:

Why don't the Food Commissariat and other institutions give food products for bonuses to workers of Group 3?

I don't know why, but I should imagine it's because we have terribly little food products available for bonus payments.

Will you kindly answer this question: What does the C.C. of the R.C.P. think of the idea of rewarding the more well-to-do peasants, i.e., those who have large allotments which they work themselves? And at the same time, how do the land-poor peasants stand who have no chance of giving a good account of themselves because they have so little land?

Why does he have a large allotment? If it is unfair, why does the commune or the Land Department let him keep it? Because others are not able to cultivate it. So why punish him, if he works hard on it? If he uses kulak methods, don't let him do it, if he holds the allotment unfairly, take it away from him and give it to others, to those who will work it, but don't blame a man for having a lot of land. In Russia there is no private property, the land is distributed by you yourselves and by the commune. In Russia there are people who have large amounts of land. If the Party committee and the Soviet bodies see this and do nothing about it, they should be given the sack, but people should not be deprived of their premiums.

Two more notes. The first:

Will this point of the bill apply to the Ukraine?

* See p. 247 of this volume.—*Ed.*

I think it will, and I very much regret that not a single one of the comrades working in the Ukrainian Poor Peasants' Committees has spoken here. I think the premature closing of the debate a great mistake.

The second one:

If the R.C.P. congress group rejects the resolution of the C.C. shall we be worthy members of the R.C.P. or just showing our obstinacy?

My answer to this note is a document called "Rules of the Russian Communist Party". In Clause 62 of this document we read: "On matters relating to its inner life and current work the group is autonomous."²⁹⁶ This means that all members of the group have the right and are bound to vote according to their conscience and not on the instructions of the C.C. If, in voting according to your conscience, you pass a second decision against the C.C.'s proposal, we are obliged, on the basis of Clause 62, to summon the Central Committee, and we shall do so at once, and you will send your representatives to attend its meeting. A serious question like this were best discussed two or three times to iron out serious differences of opinion between us. That is how matters stand, that is how we have to act. You have to vote now, not because the higher Party body has issued directives, but because you have either been persuaded or you have not.

Comrades here were wrong to say that things must have been in a poor way if Lenin has been sent to speak up for them. This is not true. The Party Rules define your rights exactly. That's one thing. Secondly, it isn't true because there was not a single difference of opinion on this question in the Central Committee, which said outright: We have been carried away by our struggle against the kulaks and have forgotten measure. Let us remind people about measure.

The C.C. appointed two comrades because these two members of the C.C. had occasion, during the discussion of the bill, to take a more active part in it than others and spoke in the debates. I handled all the drafts, and so did Preobrazhensky. That's why the two of us were appointed.

ADDENDA TO THE RESOLUTION
ON THE AGRARIAN QUESTION

Premiums to individual householders should,
first, come second compared with premiums to whole
communes and collective bodies generally:

second, individual householders should be given premiums
and generally rewarded only on the strict condition that the
individual farmers have achieved their economic successes
without the slightest use of kulak methods;

third, that individual householders receive premiums in
the shape of medals, consumer goods, household goods, and
so on; premiums in the shape of means of production are
permissible for individual householders strictly on condition
that only such means of production are issued as could under
no circumstance be instrumental in turning the farmer
into a kulak.²⁹⁷

Written December 27, 1920

Printed from the manuscript

TO N. N. KRESTINSKY
FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

Comrade Krestinsky

I propose:

1) that Kamenev and his commission (+ Stalin)²⁹⁸ be
given a *formal* assignment from the Politbureau, this *to be*
entered in the minutes.

2) that Chervyakov be instructed to *urgently* draft
a *detailed* letter of the C.C., R.C.P. on Byelorussia and
a *decree* of the C.P.C. on the same subject (confidential).²⁹⁹

Lenin

Written December 30 or 31,
1920

Printed from the manuscript

**DRAFT RESOLUTION
FOR THE PLENUM OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
ON THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT
FOR AGRICULTURE³⁰⁰**

Comrade Osinsky shall be authorised, together with the entire Board of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture, to draft and submit to the Council of People's Commissars and the next session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee regulations governing both the commissariat in general and providing specially for broader and more systematic co-operation in the work by agricultural experts.³⁰¹

Written January 4, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

**DRAFT RESOLUTION
FOR THE PLENUM OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
ON GEORGIA³⁰²**

To Point 3

1) The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to be directed to defer a break with Georgia, to systematically collect material concerning her violations of the agreement and to press our demands for transit of supplies to Armenia.

2) The Caucasian Front to be asked for information as to the state of preparedness of our available armed forces in the event of an immediate or imminent war with Georgia, this inquiry, mentioning Georgia's growing insolence, to be drafted by a committee consisting of Comrades Trotsky, Chicherin and Stalin.

3) Directives to be issued to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and the Caucasian Front to be prepared for an emergency involving war with Georgia. The S.C.R.F.* to report as soon as possible to the Council

* The Supreme Council for Rail Freightage under the C.P.C.—Ed.

of Labour and Defence on the possibility of increasing troop transportation to and within the Caucasus.³⁰³

Written January 26, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

**DRAFT RESOLUTION
FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
ON THE LETTER OF TSEKTRAN OFFICIALS³⁰⁴**

The question being quite clear, I propose that we confine ourselves to questioning of members of the C.C. I move the following resolution:

"That at such short notice on the eve of the congress (both the congress of Tsektran and the congress of the R.C.P.) it is absolutely impossible and inadmissible to release anyone from work. The slightest instance of any "persecution", i.e., any polemics detrimental to the work of transport, which *develop* into attacks *destructive of discipline* will be severely punished by the C.C, which asks that all such instances be brought to its notice."

31.I.

Lenin

Written January 31, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

**ROUGH DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR THE C.P.C.
ON OIL CONCESSIONS**

1) To be approved in principle (*both* in Grozny *and* Baku) and negotiations to be started....

2) A highly competent commission to be sent to Baku and Grozny and report back at the earliest moment.

1) Gubkin

2) Tikhvinsky³⁰⁵

Written February 1, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

**DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR THE C.P.C.
ON CHECKING FULFILMENT
BY THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIATS
OF THE DECISIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS
OF THE C.L.D. AND THE C.P.C.**

The Narrow Council to be directed to give greater attention to checking fulfilment by the People's Commissariats of the decisions and assignments of the C.L.D. and the C.P.C. in order that questions of special importance in point of practice and principle be referred to the Large Council.³⁰⁶

Written February 1, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

**AMENDMENTS AND ADDENDA
TO THE DECISION OF THE C.L.D. ON COPING
WITH THE FUEL CRISIS³⁰⁷**

- (1) *interim* commission
- (2) speed up and co-ordinate work
- (3) relieve all members of this commission of all non-fuel work
- (4) Form of brief accounts to be established in 2 days and submitted for endorsement to the Chairman of the C.L.D. on Monday,* the information in them to answer the following questions:
 - α) felling out-turn
 - β) haulage
 - γ) floatage
 - δ) loading
 - e) receipts

Written February 11, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

* Monday, February 14, 1921.—*Ed.*

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON THE IMPORT PLAN³⁰⁸

1) The C.P.C. does not endorse the plan of imports submitted to it, as this plan is exaggerated at least fivefold.*

2) The C.P.C. directs the Council of Labour and Defence immediately to set up a General Planning Commission with the participation of experts and charge it (or its subcommission) with cutting down this plan and revising it with an eye to the practical use to which the purchases can be put under our present economic conditions. Final approval of the plan by the C.L.D.

3) Pending revision of this plan the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade must restrict itself to one-fifth of this plan on each of the 71 main orders; to one-tenth in the case of the military department; with the indispensable condition that priority be given to the requirements of the fuel extracting and metallurgical industries. Exceptions with the permission of the C.L.D.

Written February 15, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT OF THE MAIN POINT OF THE C.L.D. DECISION ON THE GENERAL PLANNING COMMISSION³⁰⁹

*Personally to the Members of the C.L.D. from
Comrade Lenin*

As I am submitting to the C.L.D. tomorrow (18/II.) a draft decision concerning a General Planning Commission, I herewith present to you, for your information, a draft of the main point of this decision and a preliminary list of members

* Lenin crossed out Point 1 in the manuscript and wrote over it "Krasin's".—Ed.

(drawn up after consultation with Comrades Rykov and Krzhizhanovsky).^{*} Please prepare your amendments or counter-proposals for the meeting of the C.L.D. on 18/II.

A General Planning Commission is being set up under the C.L.D. to work out an integrated state economic plan on the basis of the electrification plan approved by the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets and to effect general supervision of this plan's realisation.

The primary economic tasks, especially those which have to be carried out in the near future, in the course of 1921, are to be elaborated by the General Planning Commission or its subcommission in the greatest possible detail, full account being taken of prevailing economic conditions.

Written February 17, 1921

Printed from the typed copy

SPEECH AT A MEETING OF MOSCOW PARTY ACTIVISTS FEBRUARY 24, 1921³¹⁰

I am rather surprised at the nature of today's talk. I don't think this is the right political moment for it. We have to cope with the present situation, which has deteriorated both internally and internationally. Peace with Poland has not yet been concluded, and at home we have a growth of banditism and kulak revolts. As for food and fuel, things have gone from bad to worse. Last year we consumed 15 million poods of grain during the first half-year and 8 million in the second; this year we have used 25 million poods in the first half-year and are now obliged to cut the bread rations and are not even sure we shall be able to issue them regularly. Obviously our mistake was that we wrongly distributed the grain in the first half-year; we should not have increased its consumption to 25 million poods. There are no deliveries from Siberia now, because the kulak rebels have cut off the railway. Our Siberian comrades spoke of the possibility of

^{*} See *Lenin Miscellany* XX, p. 24.—Ed.

a kulak uprising, but it is very difficult to determine the extent of it. It is not a war, in which one can weigh the forces engaged in it. The Siberian peasantry are not yet used to privations, although they are bearing less than the peasantry of European Russia, and there is now a break off in communications with Siberia and stoppage of deliveries. Between March 1 and 10, approximately, there will be no improvement in the food situation. We have left ourselves no stocks. The thing now is to hold out, to bear the present situation with the greatest possible firmness. There is a certain improvement in deliveries from the Caucasus, but there is a likelihood that things may get worse. Apparently the uprising in Armenia will quieten down,³¹¹ but deliveries from the Caucasus can in no way compensate us for non-deliveries from Siberia, although pressure is being put on the South-Eastern Railway to make up the losses. This is sad news, but it can't be helped.

In the banditism one feels the influence of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Their main forces are abroad; every spring they dream of overthrowing Soviet power. Chernov wrote about this recently in a Russian newspaper abroad. The S.R.s are connected with the local instigators. This connection is to be seen in the fact that the uprisings take place in the very districts from which we take grain. The surplus-appropriation system here met with tremendous difficulties. The same system is being applied in Siberia, but there they still have stocks left over from previous years.

The deterioration has spread to fuel as well. We have no exact figures, so no clear deductions can be made, nor can we determine the causes of the fuel crisis.

We have come to the conclusion that there exists discontent of a general nature. This discontent has to be caught from below, directly through the Party apparatus if it cannot be caught quickly through the administrative apparatus.

In addition to signs of bureaucratism, there are mistakes in the plan. The plan should be checked when it is drawn up by being discussed in the press and at meetings. We are obliged to stop enterprises and thereby upset the work of factories which do have fuel. What is the matter? Clearly, besides mistakes, the plan contains material for legal proceedings. Proletarian elements should be sent into the offices.

Undoubtedly, until the floating season is over, we shall not emerge from the fuel crisis. We must make the best possible use of sleighing and floating. The fuel crisis has affected the textile mills, too, and they are unable to fulfil even a minimum programme.

There are the difficulties arising from banditism and interrupted communication with Siberia. Smirnov's³¹² report says they are coping with banditism out there but cannot promise an improvement in grain deliveries. Therefore, we should not disperse our attention in talk about the general situation, but concentrate our efforts on finding a way out of this situation.

A word or two about the situation in the Moscow organisation. Some comrades try to shift the blame for the squabbling on the majority of the Moscow Committee. If the minority are dissatisfied they can appeal against the conference decision to the Central Committee. I don't know how the C.C. will decide the question, but my own opinion is that the minority is to blame. The resolution of the All-Russia Conference says that the opinion of the minority is to be reckoned with and that a discussion and debate is necessary within the Party.³¹³ At the gubernia conference in November elections to the Moscow Committee took place on this platform.³¹⁴ A two-room system was applied, and that is already a rift; such a state of affairs, though, can no longer be tolerated. We permitted criticism not for the sake of criticism, but to get a correct decision passed. Moscow has broken the record in discussions. In November there was talk about the Moscow Committee's wrong line, and 120 votes were given for it. During the discussion, when everyone put forward his own platform, the votes against the Moscow Committee were already less. What democracy is it, if a conference cannot elect the M.C.? After a three-month discussion the blame for the squabbling falls on those who are dissatisfied. Of course, there is the formal right to appeal against a decision, but it is the duty of revolutionaries to rally more closely at difficult moments and not abuse the formal right of appeal.

Sixty-seven Russian newspapers abroad tell us that the S.R.s and others count on setting us at odds in the spring at non-Party conferences. And at such a moment people talk

about appealing against the decision of the conference. You have got to understand what you can appeal for, when and to what extent. We gave everyone a chance to have his say, we held a discussion—and the congress will decide, but now we are at our fighting posts. We have to rally and realise that one more step in the discussion and we are no longer a Party. While not for a moment denying the right to appeal, I say that we performed our duty even without the discussion and should do our duty now. We must send Communists to all the non-Party organisations and explain this difficult situation to them.

Printed from the typewritten
copy of the minutes

NOTES ON THE QUESTION OF MOBILISING RAW MATERIAL RESOURCES³¹⁵

Meeting 26.II.1921

Raw Materials

	<i>Previously</i>		<i>1920</i>		<i>Yield was</i>	
Fibre						
cotton	725	thous.	100	thous.	12 m. poods	up to 22
		dessiatines		dessiatines		
flax	1.1	"	0.3	"	25.6	"
hemp	485	"	238	"	20	"
w o o l					6	" (5)

	<i>1920</i>		<i>Yield</i>	
fibre				1920
cotton	1.5	m. poods	0.9	m. poods
flax	2.9	"	2.0	"
hemp	4.5	"	1.3	"
w o o l	2.5	"	1.5	"

Hides	don't know... <i>there was?</i>	28.5 m. poods	1920-21 assessment
		8.8 (30%)	collected up to 1.II.1921

Furs 40 m. pelts—17.5 assessment
 (70 % from Siberia (quota)
 incl. 30 % nomads)—0.6 collected
 (=4%)

Turned over to the Food Commissariat in IX.1920, but it is messing up the business, unable to organise an exchange of goods with the nomads.

	Needed:
cotton	20-24 m. poods
wool	5 " "
flax	12 " "
hemp	15 " "
<hr/>	
$\Sigma = 56$ m. p. of all textile raw materials	
$\Sigma = 56$ m. p.	

our crops can cover 21% of requirements

Stocks 14.8 m. poods in warehouses (now II.1921)

*Measures (remedies)**

- 1) freedom of local exchange of grain for flax, etc.;
- 2) principle of assessment stimulating the cultivator to increase his crops;
- 3) prohibit textile seeds from being processed for oil (now banned);
- 4) procure seeds from the population to increase cultivation {they are to be guaranteed a certain part of the yield;
- 5) premiums for improved processing;
- 6) ((organisational measure))
 secure widest possible co-operation of the population in improving raw material (artels, *associations*, etc.);
- 7) stimulation for small processing factories.
 wool:
- 8) premiums to Kirghizes, at least 1 arshin of textiles per pood of wool
 { 1.X.1920 it was handed over } **
 { to Food Commissariat, which messed it up }

First published in 1932
 in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

Printed from the manuscript

* The English word "remedies" is used by Lenin.—*Ed.*

** Lenin's pencilled note in the margin says: "Re raw material show it to me at the C.P.C. when the question comes up."—*Ed.*

**DECISION OF THE COUNCIL OF LABOUR
AND DEFENCE
ON IMPROVING THE SUPPLY OF THE WORKERS³¹⁶**

28.II.1921

The Council of Labour and Defence resolves to take immediate and urgent steps to improve the supply of the needy workers in food and other necessities, allocate funds for this purpose to the amount of up to *ten million gold rubles* and send a delegation abroad to purchase the necessary articles at once—the delegation to include representatives of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.L.D.

Printed from the manuscript

PLAN OF A LETTER TO THE BAKU COMRADES³¹⁷

Confidential

A Letter to the Baku Comrades

(On the question of concessions)

Preliminary plan:

1. Differences are beginning to arise on an extremely important question. (*Decision of the C.P.C.* 1921, its text.)
2. Concessions in Baku? example and crux of all differences, their "focus".
- 3-8. Counter-arguments (*A 1 — a 6*).
+ 8 *bts*.
9. Examine and refute them.
10. Economic crux of the matter.
11. Gigantic political mistake.
12. Issue of principle.
13. Suggested agreement.
14. Conclusion.

NB

- { (a I Chief phases of chief) }
 { II "arguments" (and chief) }
 { III errors) of opponent }
 { IV opponent's "retreat" }
 { V "line of trenches behind }
 { VI which prejudice is trying to hide" }

3. (a I) "Will not want to work for the capitalists, when others next door are working for themselves."
 4. (a II) "Krasin is backed by Bogdatyan."

Krasin: What, in point of principle, is the gist of the disputes concerning Krasin's personality?
 Simply "a bourgeois specialist"!

Specialists' deceit

(question of the significance
 of specialists and the attitude
 towards them)

- 4 a. "Bourgeois specialist"? Out with him!
 We must learn to use the "bourgeois specialist", learn to demand of him, to understand where his "strength" lies.
- 4 b. "Well-behaved communist musicians", who, may be a bit out of tune, but don't touch a drop.³¹⁸
5. (a III) "Private capitalism is a predator, only state power (nationalisation) is *capable* of running things rationally."
6. (a IV) "It isn't proved that we shall not be able to obtain equipment ourselves."
 (= we'll cope ourselves).
7. (a V) Won't be able to control foreigners.
8. (a VI) Our specialists say: "problematical" (what exactly is problematical and what must we be able to demand of the specialist).
- 8 bis (a VII) { *Baku*: catastrophe. }
 { *Grozny*: Variant. }
- ¹/₄ of oil wells, gear, etc.—the "rear" of advanced capitalism.

10. Economic question: is advanced capitalism superior to us now in techniques and organisation?

10 a. Can we now set ourselves the task of coping on our own, or is this Left-wing childishness, or stupid doctrinairism?

10 b. Should the problem necessarily be put this way: in view of the gigantic danger of Soviet power's break-down as a result of economic chaos and backwardness, the danger of *falling behind, not catching up*, the problem must be put only this way—to *catch up* by means of an alliance with foreign capital?

"If we give up $\frac{1}{4}$ and keep up with two-quarters—that is the *ideal*, which we shall not attain in a year, and if we do it in five years it will be a great victory."

This is a business-like, not infantile, way of putting the question.

11. Why does Σ mean a gigantic *political* error?

Wrong evaluation of perspectives, *relations of classes* both in Russia (proletariat, peasantry, bourgeoisie) and throughout the world.

12. Economic significance = (α) bloc with *advanced state* capitalism against *petty-bourgeois* and *backward* element = (β) bloc with one *imperialist* trust against another.

"Won't be able to control?" Who? Tsarist and bourgeois officials? We.

Give up $\frac{1}{4}$? Training ideal. Give up $\frac{1}{4}$, catch up with two-quarters (three-quarters unattainable ideal). Then in 30 years (average concession term) we shall have a peaceful victory, and in 15 probably buy it back.

Etwa:

13. § 1. Observation of up-to-date engineering rules.

§ 2. Import of breadstuff, clothes, and other consumer goods (for the workers of "their" enterprises).

§ 3. Import of machinery.

§ 4. All imports from abroad (§ 2 and § 3) give us one-quarter—one-third of the same product. (One "case" out of three falls to our lot.)

§ 5. We give a minimum (timber, for example) and for special payment.

- § 6. Our laws are compulsory.
- § 7. We give "him" 50-75% of oil.
- § 8. We feed up our workers and specialists in relays.
- § 9. We learn in earnest, and don't shout about "winning an easy victory".

14. Should we try to find such concessionaires on such conditions?

This is the only right way of putting the question.

Written late February 1921

Printed from the manuscript

NOTES ON ELECTRIFICATION

1

Significance of Electrification

1. Modern technics.
2. Restoration of productive forces. Increasing them.
3. Centralisation—maximum.
4. Communism = Soviet power + electrification.
5. General integrated plan: focussing the people's attention and energies.
6. Raising culture (of the working people).
6. Not simple literacy.

2

Towards Electrification

- 1) Decree endorsing the plan....
- 2) Mobilisation of technical forces.
 - (Assembling both electrical engineering and labour forces.
 - Utilisation of stations.
 - Agitation and propaganda.
 - (Teaching of theoretical and practical knowledge about electricity.
- 3) Decree on GOELRO.

- 4) Decree on Engineering Department....
- 5) Decree on All-Russia Electrical Engineering Congress.
- 6) Petrograd. Coal from abroad via Murmansk.

Written in February 1921

Printed from the manuscript

**ADDENDUM TO THE DRAFT DECISION ·
FOR THE C.P.C. ON AN OBLIGATORY
SCIENCE MINIMUM IN THE HIGHER SCHOOLS³¹⁹**

The following should be added, on the basis of the resolution of the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets,

{ *electrification plan*,
 its economic foundations,
 the economic geography of Russia,
 significance of and conditions for the plan's imple-
 mentation.

Lenin

Written March 5, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

THE TENTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.)

MARCH 8-16, 1921³²⁰

OUTLINE OF A SPEECH AT A MEETING OF SUPPORTERS
OF THE "PLATFORM OF TEN"³²¹

- 1) Top strata (bureaucratic) in the Workers' Opposition....
- 2) bottom strata, actually linked with the rank and file,
 really proletarian...

- 3) most resolute ideological struggle against the syndicalist and Makhayev deviation (at the top) of the Workers' Opposition
- 4) congress decision condemning in principle the syndicalist, anarchist, Makhayev deviation of the Workers' Opposition
- 5) congress decision (by roll-call vote) against leaving any faction or trace of factionalism
- 6) threat of expulsion from the Party and transference from the C.C. to alternate membership ((by decision of C.C. + Control Commission + all alternate members + two-thirds??))³²²
- 7) take really proletarian elements into the C.C.
- 8) penetrate, study, investigate, explore...
- 9) a number of speakers (at the congress) to put this line through should be elected **immediately**
- 10) *elect* a bureau of the "platform of Ten"...
- 11) resolution on the report of the C.C. (α) on greater unity and discipline generally, and in the C.C.; (β) on less bureaucratism in the Orgbureau
- 12) next meeting on the day of (or day after) arrival of the Petrograders (and Zinoviev)
- + 13) congress decision on press *reporting* of the Party congress: tone down factional disputes, demonstrate unity.

Written in March,
not later than 9, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

2

REMARK ON THE AMENDMENT OF RAFAIL (R. B. FARBMAN) TO THE RESOLUTION ON PARTY UNITY MARCH 16³²³

I don't think this amendment ought to be adopted. When this discussion started we did not keep to the division in *Pravda*—political articles got mixed up with discussion

articles. We say here in an emphasised but not ultimatum form that these should not be dragged into the press.

Printed from the text of the book,
collated with the shorthand report

3

REMARK ON KISELYOV'S SPEECH
CONCERNING THE RESOLUTION ON PARTY UNITY
MARCH 16²²⁴

Comrades, I am very sorry that I used the word "machine-gun" and hereby give a solemn promise never to use such words again even figuratively, for they only scare people and afterwards you can't make out what they want. (*Applause.*) Nobody intends to shoot at anybody with a machine-gun and we are sure that neither Comrade Kiselyov nor anybody else will have cause to do so.

Printed from the text of the book,
collated with the shorthand report

4

REMARK ON MARCHENKO'S AMENDMENT
TO THE RESOLUTION
ON THE ANARCHIST AND SYNDICALIST DEVIATION
MARCH 16 ²²⁵

To say this in the name of the congress is far too prohibitive. I move that this amendment should not be adopted, without, of course, depriving the C.C. of the right to recommend, and in case of need, to concentrate all this in C.C.

publications: but I think it would be too much to have a congress ban on the issue of such publications locally.

First published in 1921
in the book *The Tenth Congress
of the Russian Communist Party.
Verbatim Report*
(March 8-16, 1921), Moscow

Printed from the text of the book,
collated with the shorthand report

**MOTION AT THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
CONCERNING THE DRAFT DECISION
FOR THE
ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
ON THE ABOLITION OF MONETARY TAXES**

I move that this be *withdrawn* (in view of the *introduction* of a tax in kind *and preparations* for a silver currency).³²⁶

16/III. *Lenin*

Written March 16, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

**DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU
OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
ON PURVEYANCE IN TAMBOV GUBERNIA**

19/III.

To be referred to members of the Politbureau

In reversal of the C.C.'s decision to suspend all purveyance in Tambov Gubernia, it is herewith resolved:

to allow purveyance in Tambov Gubernia only of bulky feed and only for the needs of the military forces operating there against the local bandits.³²⁷

Lenin

Written March 19, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

**MEETING OF THE COMMUNIST GROUP
OF THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL COUNCIL
OF TRADE UNIONS**

APRIL 11, 1921¹⁹²⁸

1

REJOINDER DURING THE DEBATE

We have just heard exceedingly diplomatic speeches on the part of Comrade Shlyapnikov and Comrade Ryazanov, who although they are now protesting very loudly, are nevertheless protesting so diplomatically that they would make highly satisfactory negotiators with concessionaires and with bourgeois states. We have come to a meeting at which I report on the disagreements that arose in the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars. The same disagreements will emerge here during the discussion.... These differences were resolved by the decision of the Tenth Congress, which says: "The decree of the C.P.C. shall be approved and a concession shall be granted in Baku and Grozny." We want to discuss this question here, that is why I asked that Shlyapnikov's and Ryazanov's proposal should be rejected, and they should have their inquisitiveness, not to say curiosity, gratified by the results of the ensuing debate.

Printed from the shorthand
record

2

REPLY TO THE DEBATE ON THE REPORT
ON CONCESSIONS

Comrades, the question was raised here from the very outset whether our differences in regard to concessions were serious or not, and the desire was expressed, incidentally, by Comrade Shlyapnikov that more systematic information be given on each agreement. I'm afraid this is impracticable, if only for technical reasons. For instance, take the case

of peace treaties with different countries. After the general directives, which at first were drafted in great detail, it so fell out that a certain type of treaty with bourgeois countries was adopted by tacit consent, the mass of details being left to the representatives authorised to sign the treaty. And most of these details are probably unknown to the majority of the members of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee. The same here: we were dealing with a question of principle and we thought there was a danger of disagreements arising. Therefore the Party congress had to step in, and therefore the present meeting, in which only members of the Party are taking part, was a meeting called for the purpose of mutual information. We have read out to you what the Council of People's Commissars has adopted.³²⁹

The C.P.C.'s decision was adopted in spite of the motion by two very prominent trade unionists. What other method of information do the majority of the communist group members have if not through such a meeting as this one? It works out that there were less disagreements than we thought. This is the most desirable thing for us. No minutes of this meeting are being kept and we do not intend to have a press discussion on it. Our purpose has been achieved.

In informing you of the decision of the Council of People's Commissars, we are letting you know how we have accepted the decision of the Party congress. The remaining differences of opinion do not exceed those which arise from day to day on various questions and are decided by a simple vote, without becoming a hindrance to the work. Submission to the majority in that case is not only a matter of form, but an act that does not hinder further work. I think we have achieved here a result in that no serious differences have come to light, and partial differences will be ironed out in the course of the work itself.

Comrade Ryazanov, characteristically, has tried to drag in disagreements with the Workers' Opposition. He specially chose a formulation that was intended to be a teaser, but he failed in this, and none of the speakers fell for it.

One comrade sent in a note saying that we here are concluding a second Treaty of Brest. The first one had turned out well, as to the second one, he has his doubts. This is partly true, but the present agreement, in the field of economy

is something between the Brest Treaty and an agreement with any bourgeois state. We have already signed several such agreements, including a trade agreement with Britain. The one on concessions will be something between the Brest Treaty and such agreements with bourgeois states.

Comrade Ryazanov then passed a remark, quite correctly, which I should like to underline at the very outset. He said that if we want to grant a concession it was not meant to improve the position of the workers, but to raise the productive forces. Quite right! As to improving the position of the workers, we always stand by this. I have here a draft agreement with a Swedish corporation of ball-bearing plants written by the staff of the Supreme Economic Council³³⁰ (*reads*).

This agreement does not stipulate any improvement in the condition of the workers. True, it is so worded that the Russian Government undertakes to supply the workers with everything they need, and if it fails to do this, the capitalists have the right to bring in workers from abroad. As to the ability of the Russian Government to fulfil everything the plan calls for as far as the workers are concerned, I think that neither we, nor the Supreme Economic Council, nor the Swedes can have any illusions on this score. At any rate, in this Comrade Ryazanov is quite right, for the main thing in concessions is not improvement of the workers' condition, but the raising of the productive forces and such a transaction under which we are making great sacrifices in order to increase output. But what are these sacrifices? I have been told that I gloss over these sacrifices, play them down. Comrade Ryazanov even tried to crack a joke on this score. I did not play down the sacrifices, I only said that we may have to give the capitalists not only hundreds, but thousands of per cent in profits. That's the whole gist of it!

If, as I assumed, on the basis of calculations by our specialists, we take 30-40 per cent of the oil, for instance, for ourselves, if the capitalist, out of every 100 million poods of oil which he produces, takes 50-60 million poods for himself, and possessing the transport, sells them at a profit of perhaps 1000 per cent, or maybe more, then the position is clear. And when I tried to find out from Krasin the terms of his agreement on the basis of his preliminary talks with

the businessmen and tycoons, I asked: "Can one conceive of a type of agreement under which we stipulate a definite percentage of profit for the capitalist, say up to 80 per cent." He said: "It is not a question of the size of the profits, because these robbers now make as much as 1000 per cent, not 80."

To my mind, the sacrifices will be very heavy. We shall probably have to make great sacrifices if we are going to give concessions on ores or timber, if we are going to give away raw materials which they are so desperately in need of abroad, such as manganese ore, for example. Georgia has now become Soviet. The thing is to unite the Caucasian Republics into a single economic centre: the Georgian, Azerbaijan and Armenian Republics. Azerbaijan produces oil; it has to be transported via Batum through Georgian territory, so there will be a single economic centre.

According to one report, the Georgian Menshevik government had concluded a concession agreement, which, on the whole, is acceptable to us. Preliminarily, I could only get in touch with Georgian comrades and ascertain from a talk with Comrade Yenukidze, the Secretary of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, who is himself a Georgian, that he had been there and concluded an agreement—true, not a concession agreement—with the Menshevik Georgian government granting us without resistance one-sixth of Georgia while retaining a guarantee of inviolability.³³¹

After this agreement, to the signing of which Comrade Yenukidze was a party, they preferred nevertheless, despite the guarantee of inviolability, to quit Batum for Constantinople, so that we have gained by this in two ways, positively and negatively—in that we have acquired territory, not for Russia, but for Soviet Georgia—Batum and its environs—and in that we have lost a good many Mensheviks, who have left for Constantinople.

It appears that the Georgian Revolutionary Committee is inclined to confirm the concession on unworked coal-mines, which it considers a very important one. Two representatives of foreign powers were in Georgia and did not leave at the time of the Soviet coup—the Italian and the German—a most important circumstance, as it is desirable to develop relations with these countries, by means, among others, of concessions. Italy even had a concession agreement with

Georgia, while in Germany the situation is that some German capitalists own a tremendous per cent of the Chiatura manganese mines. The thing is to transfer the right of ownership to a lease or a concession, that is, to grant on lease to the German capitalists the very mines which they owned as property. Owing to the change in the political situation in the Caucasus, the circumstances are favourable for concession relations. The important thing for us is to force windows open one after another. The agreement with Britain³³² was that of a Socialist Republic with a bourgeois state, an agreement that imposed upon us a certain burden.

To the first state with whom we concluded an agreement we gave a much greater part of our gold fund than we have given to others. But the consequences have shown that thanks to this agreement we have forced open a window of sorts. It is from this point of view that we should judge every concession.

Germany and Italy, owing to their economic position, are obliged to seek an alliance with Russia. For Russia, an alliance with Germany opens up vast economic prospects, irrespective of whether or not the German revolution will soon win a victory there. We can come to terms even with a bourgeois government in Germany, because the Versailles Treaty has made Germany's position impossible, whereas an alliance with Russia opens up entirely different possibilities. Since Italy has no fuel resources of her own, they have taken a coal-mining concession in the Caucasus at coal-fields that have never been worked before. I should not be surprised to see the Germans hankering after oil concessions, as Germany has no fuel at all.

One of the comrades here said that the Kamchatka concession would not improve the condition of the workers. That is absolutely wrong. And Comrade Ryazanov was quite wrong when he tried to crack a joke about our dealings with Vanderlip turning out to be a Vander-slip. True, we made one mistake—our telegram to Harding. But since we have had no agreements or relations with America till now, there was no mistake on our part, and we only found out that Vanderlip had been boasting of his connections with the American Administration. Now it is quite possible that in sending our representatives to Canada, where we are to buy

locomotives, that through this side door we may gain some access to the American market.

Negotiations for Kamchatka concessions are beginning to stir now, and it is quite wrong to say that these concessions will not improve the condition of the workers. If these concessions materialise, there will be an undoubted improvement in the condition of the workers, because we shall be receiving a certain deduction share, 2 per cent I believe, and when we have nothing at all, even 2 per cent is something. If we get 20,000 out of one million and use it for an exchange with the peasants, this will give us some of the products the workers need.

Further I wanted to point out that some of the remarks you have made here show that there are disagreements among the trade unionists, or rather perplexities, which are the only real danger and which we, among ourselves, perhaps by further discussions among the Party members, have to eliminate. For example, Comrade Marshev spoke about payment having to be made in cash, and not by coupons. As to the Amsterdamists³³³ and whether they will attack us, we must come to an arrangement about this.

I recently re-read my pamphlet written in May 1918.* I quoted in it the Menshevik newspaper *Vperyod*³³⁴ in which the Menshevik Isuv accused the Soviet government of agreeing to concessions, of having deals with bourgeois states. It is an old trick of the Mensheviks to blame us for granting concessions. Quite a few groups have already taken shape in this connection in Western Europe. The Communists understand that concessions are a treaty of Brest, which we are obliged to put up with because of the ruined state of a country with a predominantly peasant population. Everyone understands that regeneration of the country without a big industry is unthinkable.

The Communists of Germany understand why we have to give ground, but the Scheidemanns and the II¹/₂ International say that these concessions are proof of our complete failure, and I remember at a meeting last year I mentioned the American chauvinist Spargo,** who specialised in

* See Vol. 27 of this edition, pp. 323-54.—*Ed.*

** See Vol. 31 of this edition, pp. 414, 430.—*Ed.*

writing a heap of books about the Bolsheviks in the vein of our Alexinsky, and in connection with the concessions he all but performed a dance of triumph. I mentioned at the time that this was an utter distortion. Yesterday international capital was out to strangle us, and today we have a number of agreements with this international capital.

We are making sacrifices in giving away to foreign capital millions' worth of valuable materials from which they can make profits running into hundreds of per cent. These are sacrifices which we are making deliberately and consciously. But at the same time we should note that while allowing them to make any profit they like, we are receiving the advantages we need ourselves, i.e., increased output, and as far as possible an improvement in the condition of our workers, both those employed at the concession enterprises and those not so employed.

Comrade Shlyapnikov said here that it would be a good thing to grant a concession to Russian workers. The idea is absurd. We would then have to guarantee fuel, etc., a thing which we can't guarantee even to our most essential enterprises. We are bad off for fuel. The idea of a concession agreement with Russian workers, generally speaking, is permissible in principle, but such a solution of the problem for our big industry is not serious, since we cannot guarantee them anything, whereas foreign concessionaires can bring in supplies from abroad. That is what distinguishes the agreement with foreign capitalists. They have the world market, we have no secure economic base and would have to spend ten years creating it. This is what we must soberly take into account. All our people engaged in this problem have proved this situation.

We know that the electrification plan is the most economical one. We cannot lease our big factories to the Russian workers. We must stake here on small industry, develop it and not rail at our tax-in-kind measures the way Comrade Ryazanov does, or the author of that pamphlet which says that we are putting through anarcho-syndicalist laws.

As regards the development of small industry, we must take several steps, as we can get something out of it right now without state guarantees, and since we cannot guarantee

even our most essential factories, we must do everything we can to develop small industry, which will give us a certain amount of produce which the peasants need.

On the question of cash or coupons I would say this: it would be something to fear if the capitalists had the power, but we have nothing to fear, since all the factories and enterprises are in our hands, and we haven't leased a tenth part of them to the capitalists. I repeat, we have nothing to fear from coupons, as the capitalists will be obliged to stock the goods we tell them to, not just salted fish, as was mentioned here, but such-and-such products. Since we are taking the norm of a foreign worker, we know that under this norm he gets even more and better products than the Russian worker does.

Comrade Shlyapnikov here said: "We have seen concessions." Both Comrade Shlyapnikov and many practical workers make this mistake. I have heard people say: "Your idea of concessions is schematic. The capitalist has always tricked the most experienced Russian lawyers." To be sure he did, when state power was in the capitalist's hands and he was all-powerful. What was that state power? A committee for the affairs of the propertied master class—that's what it was. A committee for the affairs of the landowners and capitalists—that was what the capitalist government was. But if we, having in our hands most of the factories, mills and railways, with our Party standing at the head—with communist cells below and Communists on top—if we do not hold our own in such conditions, then we might as well commit suicide. And that is panic!

We are not that bad though, I think, to allow ourselves to be tricked, and if we have already concluded several agreements in which the governments in France and Britain had the services of first-class bourgeois diplomats, and if even under these conditions we have not once been tricked, then why should we panic at the idea of being tricked by coupons? Let me remind you of the treaty of Brest. In what way was this treaty difficult? What were the difficulties of defence? When I was asked whether I had any hopes of our being able to fool the Germans, I was obliged, in my official capacity, to say that I did not. But now the treaty of Brest is past history.

I don't know whether the pamphlet Comrade Kamenev was preparing has come out (it deals there with Ludendorf), but I do know that Ludendorf has written a brilliant volume of memoirs in which ten pages are devoted to the Brest negotiations. When Kamenev and I read that chapter we said: "This is the best justification of the Brest Treaty." He tells how Trotsky and the others had driven them into a corner during the talks, how they were outwitted, and so on. We decided there and then that these pages had to be translated and published with a short preface by Comrade Kamenev, and the fact that this hasn't been done yet is a specimen of Soviet ineptitude. Or take a fact like this. We know that Comrade Joffe, our Ambassador to the German Government, was expelled from Germany on the eve of the revolution there. After this, don't try to guess who is going to trick whom. Don't let us lay down how many days will pass between the conclusion of the first concession agreement and the first big European revolution. That is why, on the question of agreements, I maintain that the comrades are absolutely wrong. There's nothing to worry about.

The agreements will say what goods they are to have and at what price. We can agree to any coupons or ration books. If they break the agreement we have the right to cancel it immediately. The agreement is a civil contract. I haven't gone into the question of what arbitration there is to be and who is to settle disputes, but I shall run through the initial draft of the agreement with the Swedish corporation. It says here: "Differences are settled...."

People here have brought academicians into play, and these will try to bring the lawyers into play. I remember Bebel saying that lawyers were the most reactionary and at the same time bourgeois, people. Of course, we can mend this somehow, but there is nothing at all to worry about. If the concessionaires were to lay down this condition we could accept it. Once the agreement stipulates precisely that there are to be such-and-such goods and payment on the ration book is to be made in such-and-such a way, we can agree to this, and the Socialist Republic has nothing to fear from coupons or ration books. It was further stated that Point 9 was bad because we would be drawing away from the international T.U.C.³³⁵ Lozovsky threatened that the

Amsterdam people would slam us, but they will slam us all the same on all other points, and end up, as always, with slamming themselves.

You remember how the Mensheviks intended slamming us for having made the slightest concessions to the capitalists. When we wanted to overthrow capitalism, they said we would overthrow it only for a few days, but when we have overthrown it for a few years, they are trying to set another trap for us. They are trying to lure the enemy into a spot where he is sure to be beaten.

First they called us utopians, then invited us to jump from the fifth floor. We know that we have many small businesses. Petty proprietors are our opponents. The petty-bourgeois element is our most dangerous enemy. Brokers and leaseholders are the lesser enemy. Bureaucracy, too, and bureaucratic abuses are our enemy.

In regard to the point Comrade Lozovsky spoke about, I will say this—listen to it carefully. It says: "The trade unions shall not have the right to demand application of Russian pay rates or of Russian rules of employment to that category of workers." It speaks here of the Russian trade unions, and I am told about the international unions. Naturally, when the capitalists see the Russian terms, they say they are communist terms, ridiculous terms, and that the Russian trade unions have no right to demand Russian terms of employment, which are likely to be pretty stiff and far-fetched, but they do have a full right to apply international trade union agreements. This is good enough. Nothing is mentioned here about strikes, about their being banned. The thing is to be able not to mention everything before its time.

As to improving the condition of the Russian worker, Comrade Marshev and Tartakovsky have made an attack here, saying you won't be able to cope with the workers, you won't be able to make them work, because if you provide for one-fifth of them, the other four-fifths won't want to work under worse conditions. Do you mean to say we are dealing with workers who are so foolish, uncultivated and undisciplined? If so, then the only thing is to panic and commit suicide. If a hundred workers are underfed and we tell them that we can feed twenty, and no more, do you mean to say they

will refuse it? So far we have not come up against anything like it. We have managed somehow to feed workers in certain branches of industry, but not all of them, yet the workers didn't all run away from these enterprises, whereas they all did from other enterprises. Can the Russian worker be so spoiled by the mistakes of Soviet power that he cannot figure out that it were better to feed at least 20 people than to make the whole hundred go hungry? There is a good deal here that ought not to be spoken about before its time. Why can't it be arranged for people to take turns in working for the capitalists? The workers would work six months, get working clothes, then give others a chance to feed up. Of course, we shall have to break down prejudices here.

When concessionaires come here, we must restrain our trade unions from making excessive demands. You know that the usual term of an agreement is a short one. In Europe there are no long-term agreements. The usual term is six months. In this way the workers will be able to feed up, get boots and clothes, then quit and make way for others.

Is it so impossible to arrange things so that a man works six months, feeds up, gets American boots and clothes, and makes room for the next man? It will be difficult, of course. It will demand a higher degree of organisation and discipline than we have, but it is not impossible. If we have contrived to keep a hold on the workers against an invasion of foreign capital during three years of terrible famine, do you mean to say we won't manage it this time? I realise only too well what difficulties confront us here. And therefore I say that concessions do not signify the advent of peace among the classes. Concessions are a continuation of the war among the classes.

If previously the war could be expressed in—I'll get you through starvation and you'll get nothing, now I say that I want to give the workers a pair of boots each, but I want them to work six months. And we'll fight for all the workers getting boots. We do not reject strikes, all this remains in our hands, if only we are reasonable and try to put the accent now on what we can do to attract the capitalists.

People here have talked about what a great danger this is, saying that the capitalist will come and trick us, but I assert that there is no danger, and that in the interests of raising

productivity it is desirable that he should come, because he has a splendidly organised base and splendidly equipped factories, where we can order the necessary parts without having to buy them on the open market, where there is only junk. The first-class factories have their orders booked up for several years ahead. Even if we paid in gold we would not receive anything, whereas a member of the syndicate would get everything he wanted. We wouldn't mind paying him extra if it meant improving the condition of at least a small section of the workers and peasants, because each extra product will go to the peasants in exchange for grain, and that will create stable relations between the working class and the peasantry.

Winding up, I would ask the trade unionists to waive questions of principle and disputes. All these are idle disputes, sheer scholasticism. They should be dropped. Attention should be wholly directed to those practical terms of concession agreements from which we, if we are sensible, may derive benefit for ourselves. The trade unionists and Party leaders should display here their inventiveness and practical knowledge of conditions, of which we cannot and shall not speak about in the press, because the Russian press is being followed by the capitalists, just as during the Brest talks we did not speak about the instructions that had been given to Comrade Joffe. We shall give practical attention to the practical methods by which we can derive benefit in the way of improving the condition of the workers and peasants. Every such improvement is of tremendous importance to us. This is where the trade unionists should give their attention. All trace of friction and prejudice should be eliminated. It is a difficult business. So far no one has been willing to conclude a concession agreement with us. They are all expecting us to present impracticable demands.

We, therefore, on our part must use every effort to conclude several such agreements. Of course, we shall make a number of mistakes. It is a new business. So far no socialist republic has ever granted concessions to capitalists. But we want the trade unionists to help us. There is vast scope here for interpretations and pressure, including strikes, which remain in our hands.

APPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN TRADE ORDERS**DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR THE C.P.C.³³⁶**

The State Planning Commission shall be directed to revise both the applications for orders to the amount of 38.9 million gold rubles and the remaining applications for foreign trade orders to allow only for such purchases in 1921-22 as are necessary for purveyance of essential minimum quantities of food and fuel based on the assumption of a worst possible harvest and worst possible conditions of fuel supply.

Written April 12, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

**DRAFT DECISION FOR THE COUNCIL OF LABOUR
AND DEFENCE ON "ALGEMBA"³³⁷**

Set up a Commission of

2 State Planning Commission 2 oilmen or fuel men

2 Chief Oil Board 2 railway engineers

ascertain within 2 weeks

- 1) what part of the Algemba railway work has been carried out;
- 2) ditto the pipeline;
- 3) in particular, present provision of rails and pipes, and the prospects of full provision;
- 4) the possibility of supplying fresh water to the Emba oilfields and other conditions for ensuring work on the Emba;
- 5) check comparative cost of delivering oil to the centre via Rakushi-Astrakhan by waterway and via Saratov by railway and pipeline;
- 6) possible and probable terminal date of Algemba railway and pipeline construction;
- 7) possibility, probability and cost of acquiring and delivering extra river and sea craft for the transportation of oil from the Emba via Rakushi-Astrakhan;
- 8) go into other aspects of the problem.

Written April 15, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

ADDENDUM TO THE DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. "ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL MACHINES"³³⁸

No agricultural machines or implements are to be supplied unless there is effective control on the part of the Food Commissariat over receipt by the state of farm produce in exchange for such machines and implements.

The forms of control are to be laid down in special instructions by arrangement between the Agriculture and Food Commissariats.

The Agriculture and Food Commissariats shall be directed to consider and submit a plan for the most simple and economical way of delivering machines to the consumers.*

Written April 26, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT OF A LETTER OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE ATTITUDE TO NON-PARTY WORKERS³³⁹

A circular to the gubernia committees to be drawn up and forwarded in cipher.

Contents:

the experience of non-Party conferences has fully proved that they have become an arena for agitation** by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries;

therefore, the greatest care must be taken in organising non-Party conferences, by no means allowing them to be held without thorough preparation at each respective factory. The Gubernia Party Committees should be answerable to the Party for the success of every non-Party conference.

Every Gubernia Party Committee is obliged to report to the Central Committee not only on the success of every non-

* The last paragraph is in the handwriting of L. A. Fotieva, apparently from Lenin's dictation.—*Ed.*

** The word "organisation" is written above the word "agitation" in the manuscript.—*Ed.*

Party conference, but prior to every non-Party conference, setting forth its conditions and preparedness.

At the same time it is absolutely essential to step up the work of preserving and developing the Communists' ties with the non-Party masses. For this purpose it is necessary:

not only to regularly hold general meetings for the rank-and-file workers and peasants, but arrange business reports to the rank-and-file workers and peasants by officials holding key posts. Such reports must be delivered at least once a month in order that the non-Party rank-and-file be given an opportunity to criticise the Soviet institutions and their work. Reports are to be made not only by Communists, but by all officials in top posts, first and foremost those of the food supply and economic council agencies.

Every gubernia committee is obliged to forward exact information monthly to the Central Committee about the number and progress of all these reports, as well as the demands made by the non-Party people at these meetings.

The C.C. will draw up more detailed instructions on the organisation of such reports, on the measures for checking ties with the masses, on the progress of the work for improving their condition, and on fighting the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who are acting under the guise of non-Party people, etc.³⁴⁰

Written in April,
not later than 27, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

SPEECH AT A MEETING OF COMMUNISTS AND CANDIDATE MEMBERS OF THE R.C.P.(B.) OF THE KREMLIN AREA

MAY 9, 1921

(FROM THE MINUTES)

Comrade Lenin said in his report: You, as members of the Party, should read my pamphlet concerning the tax in kind,* which has now come off the press and is being dis-

* See Vol. 32 of this edition, pp. 329-65.—*Ed.*

tributed. He also pointed out that every member of the Party should not lose touch with the non-Party masses, as often happens with us. Each one of us, therefore, must keep closer to the non-Party masses and carry on more propaganda. In conclusion he said: All of you, who often read the newspapers and attend meetings and lectures, being more developed people, should do more work among the peasants, carry on agitation among them to explain the significance of the tax in kind. We shall then achieve better results.

in the Fifth Russian Edition
of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 43

Printed from the typed copy
of the minutes

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)³⁴¹

The C.C. of the R.C.P., having discussed Svanidze's telegram to Stalin No. 2031 dated 8/V, finds that the Georgian comrades are making a serious political mistake in not using an iron hand to put a stop to requisitions, confiscations, thefts and evictions of foreigners from their houses.

The C.C. resolves:

1) that the Georgian Revolutionary Committee be directed to issue immediately an order strictly prohibiting all such acts on pain of arrest and prosecution. A copy of this order to be sent to the C.C.

2) that the Georgian Revolutionary Committee immediately institute investigations, first, into the breaking open of the Germano-Caucasian Bank's store-room and the removal of documents. The guilty parties to be arrested. Documents to be returned. Secondly, ditto in regard to the goods of the Italo-Caucasian Bank. Thirdly, ditto in regard to the carload of textiles seized at Kutaisi.

3) that the Georgian Revolutionary Committee, by arrangement with the Command of the Caucasian Front, shall without delay appoint two of the most energetic, firm and resourceful Communists, one from the Caucasian Front, and one from the Georgian Revolutionary Committee, to supervise the cessation of requisitions, thefts, confiscations and evictions in regard to foreigners. The names of the

appointed men to be communicated to us by telegraph. The C.C. places responsibility for the enforcement of these measures upon Makharadze and Gittis. The two controllers to be invested with special powers and the right to make arrests for the slightest infringements. The two controllers to wire brief reports here weekly.

The C.C. draws the attention of the Georgian comrades to the extremely important significance of Georgia and her trade with Italy and Germany for the whole R.S.F.S.R., especially in view of America's and France's attempts to obstruct all our trade relations with foreign countries. Negligence in carrying out these directives will be regarded by the C.C. as a crime against Soviet power.

Written May 9, or 10, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON MEASURES FOR ACHIEVING CONCENTRATION OF PRODUCTION³⁴²

1) The C.C. of the Metalworkers' Union and the All-Russia C.C.T.U. shall be directed to pay special attention to the swift implementation of the plan for closing down the greatest possible number of inefficient establishments with the aim of concentrating production in a small number of better organised enterprises.

The report on the exact plan, the closing down schedule and actual fulfilment to be made by Shlyapnikov and Medvedev or their deputies
by Kubyako
and by Holtzmann
by Andreyev
to the Council of Labour and Defence
within a month

2) Shlyapnikov shall be directed to elaborate more concretely the most important and quickly realisable proposals of his draft.

Written May 11, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

In *Lenin's Miscellany XXXVI*

PLAN OF A SPEECH AT A MEETING OF THE COMMUNIST GROUP OF THE FOURTH ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF TRADE UNIONS³⁴³

PLAN OF A SPEECH 18/V

1. Rules of the R.C.P.: the Party and groups.
2. C.C. resolution—and its CONCEALMENT.
3. Ryazanov and his role. (Ryazanov's anti-Party resolution.)...
4. Tomskey and his *mistake or crime?*... ((*Composition of the Four.*))
5. The workers' extremely nervy, wrought up state, discontent:

{	{	Burden on the workers.	}
	{	1920 surplus appropriation—on the peasants.	}
	{	Alleviation for the peasants: still depends on the harvest.	}
	{	For the workers: profound resentment at the spectacle of "lighters", ³⁴⁴ theft, and so on.	}

Written May 18, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

PROPOSALS TO THE DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) PLENUM ON CLAUSE 13 OF THE PARTY PROGRAMME³⁴⁵

Yaroslavsky and Bukharin to be instructed to revise the draft so as not to over-emphasise the question of combating religion (by throwing out § 7, for instance³⁴⁶) and to allow,

under definite restrictive conditions, for religious, but honest and devoted Communists, to remain in the Party.

The fight against religion to be put on a more scientific footing.

(§ 10—out.³⁴⁷)

Get it endorsed by the Politbureau.

Start the campaign after thorough preparation.

Written May 18, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

in the Fifth Russian Edition
of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 54

**DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.L.D.
ON LOCAL ECONOMIC CONFERENCES,
ON REPORTING AND ON COMPLYING WITH
THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE C.L.D.**

1. Gubernia and uyezd economic conferences are to be organised everywhere, standing in the same relation to the gubernia and uyezd executive committees as the Council of Labour and Defence to the Council of People's Commissars. Managing offices or secretariats must be common ones. All the work is to be done through the apparatus of the corresponding departments without creating a special apparatus.

2. The village committees and village Soviets are to act as the local, lower bodies of the C.L.D., and in factory and urban communities these functions are to be assumed by the district Soviets, the district economic conferences and the factory committees. The volost executive committees either completely fulfil the duties of volost economic conference or assign several of their members to form the volost economic conferences.

3. It is the obligatory duty of all the economic conferences to report on their activities to the C.L.D., such activities to be guided by the Instructions of the C.L.D. which are to be issued simultaneously with this decision.

The reports of the regional economic conferences, the gubernia and uyezd economic conferences must be printed in

no less than 100 copies (three of which are to be sent to the C.L.D., one copy each to the leading public libraries, the Rumyantsev Library in Moscow and the Public Library in Petrograd, and one copy to the library of each gubernia economic conference). Reports are to be submitted every two months (three or four months?).

The reports of the lower bodies are to be in writing, one copy for the gubernia economic conference and one for the C.L.D.; to be submitted not less than twice a year.

The report to the C.L.D. must be accompanied by systematically selected issues of the local newspapers or cuttings from them devoted to questions of local economic life, as well as all publications on these questions.

The co-operation of the local staff of the Central Statistical Board and the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection should be enlisted in compiling these reports.

Each local body is obliged immediately to appoint and communicate to the C.L.D. the names of persons responsible for the timely drawing up of the report in each of its subsections and general collation, as well as the names of their deputies.

4. The newspaper *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*³⁴⁸ is to become the organ of the C.L.D.

Following the same Instructions, it should regularly publish summaries of local economic work alongside its present coverage. The recording and study of practical experience in all economic work in the R.S.F.S.R. and the working out of general guidelines on the basis of such experience must become the chief task of *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*.

The editors must select and widen the circle of local correspondents, both Party and non-Party, for the purpose of information on the work done in the local areas.

It shall be the duty of the Central Distributing Agency to accurately deliver two copies of *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* to every gubernia, uyezd and volost library, and the duty of these libraries to keep newspaper files of both copies available for the whole population.

Written May 19-20, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)³⁴⁹

Decision of the C.C. (Politbureau) 22/V. 1921 on the
Decisions of the R.C.P. Group
of the Trade Union Congress

The Central Committee approves Comrade Chubar's theses (adopted by the group's bureau) and rejects Comrade Holtzmann's theses in view of the fact that the former far more correctly take into consideration the actual state of our resources, capabilities and means, which entail the necessity of planning slower realisation of our immediate aims.

The latter theses, those of Comrade Holtzmann, on the other hand, verge on the fantastic in many ways, they are out of touch with reality, which is also one of the failings of Comrade Larin, who zealously supports these theses.

The only important similarity between the two theses, practically speaking, is the idea expressed in the note to Point 3 of Chubar's theses* and in Point 6** of Holtzmann's theses, both comrades confirming here, and not disputing, the decision passed by the C.C. on 10.V.1921 in connection with the motion of Comrade Larin and the A.C.C.T.U.***

* Here is the text of this note:

"The whole above-mentioned system of distribution should be effected by way of experiment at several enterprises, where, in place of individual rationing issues, a system of collective supply should be introduced for the personnel of the enterprises on condition that they raise labour productivity."

** Here is the text of this 6th Point:

"Pending the formation of a wages food fund, the afore-mentioned system of distribution should be applied by way of experiment at several enterprises, where, in place of individual rationing issues a system of collective supply should be introduced for the workers of the enterprises, on condition that they raise labour productivity."

*** Here is the text of this decision.³⁵⁰

"The motion of Comrade Larin and the A.C.C.T.U. in the part relating to tariff policy shall be rejected and its authors asked to go into the matter more thoroughly with an eye, especially, to the possibility of ensuring a minimum of real food supply to a minimum of workers. Upon revision, the motion is to be submitted to the C.P.C. for the purpose of introducing at several enterprises, by way of experiment and in place of individual rationing issues, a system of collective supply on condition that labour productivity is raised."

The R.C.P. group of the Trade Union Congress, despite the recommendations of the Party's C.C., approved Holtzmann's theses by 567 votes, and rejected Chubar's theses, which collected 317 votes.

Not wishing to revoke the decision of the group on an issue that does not immediately affect the Government's policy—since this policy is predetermined by the decision of the C.C. of 10.V.1921, which, as pointed out above, is approved, and not disputed, by both Comrade Holtzmann and Comrade Chubar—the Central Committee in this particular case waives its right of interference in the proceedings and decisions of the congress.

The C.C. confines itself to prescribing that this decision be announced at the group meeting and that the attention of the delegates be strongly drawn to the obligation they are taking upon themselves in adopting Holtzmann's resolution, namely, to display not only extraordinary heroism, but a degree of persistence, firmness and pertinacity in the fight against all habits, customs and conditions of life among the working-class masses far in excess of what is customary even in revolutionary times. It is now incumbent on the trade unions, on the strength of the decision they have made, to achieve an unusually rapid reduction in the number of enterprises and workers by concentrating the latter in a minimum of the best and biggest enterprises.

Written between May 17 and 22,
1921

Published in part in August 1921
in *Izvestia C.C., R.C.P.(B.)* No. 32

Printed from the manuscript

in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

REMARKS CONCERNING THE WORK PLAN OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)³⁵¹

It should be made the chief task of the All-Russia Conference³⁵² in May to prepare and collect material on the question of

- 1) closer contact between the Party organisations and the non-Party masses.

- 2) drawing non-Party employees into the work more widely and systematically.
- 3) reorganising the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection for combating bureaucratism and red tape, improving the condition of the workers and peasants and drawing non-Party people into Soviet work.

On all these points the conference should not only collect and study all the material of practical experience, but work out practical proposals for the C.C.

Reports at the plenary meeting

- (α) 2-3 reports on the present (actual) work of the C.C. and the Party
- (β) ditto on the plan of its reorganisation to meet the new tasks.

Written May 24, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

in *Lenin Miscellany XX*

PLAN OF A SPEECH AT THE TRADE UNION CONGRESS³⁵³

1. Passing examination from 3rd to 4th course.
2. From *Narodnaya Volya*³⁵⁴ to Social-Democracy in Russia, from the Second to the Third International in the world.
3. 1st course: 1886-1903. ((17))
4. 2nd course: 1903-1917. ((14))
5. 3rd course: 1917-1921. ((4))
6. 4th course: 1921-? (1931)
7. "Not" our last and decisive fight. But ... near (years).
8. Victory on world scale difficult (bis. ter), but a dead certainty.
9. For capitalism, the capitalists—checkmate.
10. *Alias**: the cause of communism in Russia will be *secure*.
11. Discord arising from *private* property. Labour united against property.
12. India "does not count" Doch!
13. "Treaty of Versailles"?³⁵⁵

—Otherwise.—*Ed.*

13. *b i s*. International trade.
14. Difficulties *on economic front*.
15. Proletariat becoming declassed? Yes! Inferences?
Ideology of small property owners.
16. Large-scale production and machines—proletariat's
material and *psychological* base. Inde* *declassing*.
17. Politics plus, economics minus.
18. Self-discipline, partyism.
19. Economic front.
Passing examinations: grain, fuel. 1917
(tax in kind) 1918 }
1919 }
1920
 versus 1921
20. We already have economic experience—go on building
systematically, steadily, firmly.
21. Work discipline, higher labour productivity, work
organisation, increased output, relentless fight against
slipshod work and red tape.
22. By this sign shall ye conquer.

Written in May,
not later than 25th, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

in *Lenin Miscellany XXXV*

TO THE MINER COMRADES OF THE PETROVSKOYE INDUSTRIAL GROUP³⁵⁸

Comrade Mezhlauk has told me of the great success in your work during April 1921: 294 poods per hewer compared with 291 poods in 1914. I congratulate our miner comrades on this outstanding success and send my best greetings. At this rate we shall overcome all difficulties and electrify the Donbas and Krivoi-Rog district, and that means everything.

With communist greetings,

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

Written May 25, 1921

First published July 1921
in the journal
Vestnik Rabochego Pravlenia
No. 9-10

Printed from the journal text

* — Hence.—*Ed.*

**TENTH ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE
OF THE R.C.P.(B.)³⁵⁷**

MAY 26-28, 1921

1

STATEMENT CONCERNING THE AGENDA
MAY 26

Comrades, as I have already told you, we intended to have a single item on the agenda in keeping with the nature of this conference, namely, the question of economic policy. The remaining reports were to be informational, so I did not prepare a political report, but I think this report will have to be dealt with on an economic plane. Therefore, in order to satisfy everybody, I suggest that supplementary questions be put to me after the report and I shall answer them in my summing-up speech. I repeat, I have made no preparations whatever on this question and cannot imagine what I would speak about if I had to apart from the question of the tax in kind.

in the Fifth Russian Edition
of the *Collected Works*, Vol. 43

Printed from the shorthand
record

SPEECHES DURING THE DEBATE OF THE MOTION
ON QUESTIONS OF THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY
MAY 28

1

I believe this amendment³⁵⁸ should not be adopted, because an explanation to the amendment would then be needed. Naturally, if there is a revolution in Europe we shall change our policy. Civil war, which such a revolution always involves, as you know, may in fact render our position even worse. Of course, this will be a short time, it is difficult, of course, to determine how long civil war in other republics

will last, but when it is over and won we shall change our policy in the sense that we may say: we shall take nothing in taxes, and only by commodity exchange. This has to be made clear to the peasants, otherwise they will think: what's this, back again to the surplus-appropriation system? I believe, therefore, that it were best not to add anything of this kind. Long years of revolution in Europe and civil war will lead to commodity exchange without any tax at all. This is stated in the resolution before the congress, which says that the tax will gradually be reduced. This is the point the forthcoming victorious revolution applies to, a revolution which a long period of years turns into a short one.

2359

Comrades, it was on this point that we had discussions in the committee, where opinion was divided. At first Milyutin objected to the words "anarchic commodity exchange to be combated" on the grounds that this would be construed as cavilling, and freedom to trade would, in practice, be done away with. When this point was drawn up in its present wording, which said: "anarchic commodity exchange to be combated" since "it eludes all control and supervision"—by this is meant the black-market "bagmen", and you know that illicit trade is punishable in all countries where there is freedom of trading, even in capitalist countries; on this point we see eye to eye. In what way is it to be combated? By having commodity exchange concentrated chiefly in the hands of the co-operatives, to which is added: "without, however, any restrictions on regular free market operations." When this wording was adopted the committee unanimously agreed that there was still a danger of free market operations being restricted. This is a delicate matter, of course. We don't want this ruling to restrict freedom to trade, but we can't do without measures against illicit trade, specifically against black-market bagmen and transport dislocation. The committee thought of using a milder word than "combating", but then agreed that the target was only anarchic commodity exchange that eluded all control on the part of the state, all the more as this was qualified by the added

proviso, saying "without, however, any restrictions on regular free market operations". With this addition, the word "combat" is not too strong an expression. The amendment which the comrade here proposes is risky in the sense that we shall be defeating our own purpose. He throws out the words "without, however, any restrictions on regular market operations...."

3860

I think the state farms are not equal to this, they are still very weak. Let them improve a bit for another year, and the next year we shall see whether we can expand their initiative or not.

The last amendment is an unhappy one,³⁶¹ since the question of material resources is covered by Point 5: "Revision of (certain sections of) production programmes for large-scale industry with a view to increasing the manufacture of consumer goods and peasant household articles.

"Extension of the independence and initiative of each large establishment in the matter of disposing of financial and material resources. A precise decision to that effect to be submitted for approval to the Council of People's Commissars." Therefore, we shall not repeat this here. The question of material distribution, that of food, for example, is stated here quite definitely, without prejudice, of course, to the centre, because without it being gathered in the centre there can be no question of industry. As regards the first remark of the comrade who said that it was inappropriate just now to consider the question of the local economic conferences settled, as these might upset things—I have not heard anything about this. On the contrary, there have been demands to introduce economic conferences everywhere, acting as commissions of the C.P.C. Every member of the C.P.C., every representative of the C.L.D. has the right of appeal to the C.P.C. Because we select the members of the C.L.D. from among the members of the C.P.C. itself, and locally, too, there are to be no special staffs, no special

bodies, but the same offices and departments. The gubernia economic conference is a perfectly suitable form, which does not hamper, but facilitates the conference. As the Instructions say: "with leeway in modifying the main type, that is, the executive committees may assume all the functions and duties of the economic conferences..." (*reads*), so that there is no ruling prescribing an absolutely hard-and-fast and single course of action. Besides, the resolution proposed by the commission says: "Adopt in principle." The commission³⁶² is meeting and functioning, its Chairman Osinsky tells us they have reviewed quite a number of points and already submitted them in writing. The work is of a difficult nature, and it will require another special commission. The fear that we shall be tying our hands by declaring that it is adopted in principle is therefore groundless.

5363

We have no objection; judging by the subject, however, it does not belong here, but to Point 6.³⁶⁴ I propose that it be adopted in principle and placed under Point 6.

6365

These are mere details. The question should be raised at the session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and discussed with the people concerned. There can be no objection in principle, but generally speaking this is a detail.

7366

This fear is excessive here.

Point 7 of our resolution says "The need to maintain and enforce the apparatus for the full and expeditious collection of the tax in kind". Naturally, the tax in kind will be collected not by persuasion, it can be collected only by compulsion, and that is what the apparatus stands for. Today several important decisions and instructions have

been signed, all aimed at preserving and strengthening the apparatus, from which we shall demand expeditious collection of the tax in kind. It is pointed out that we say here: "commodity exchange is brought to the fore" and the fear is expressed that the peasants will understand this as priority for commodity exchange. In that case we shall write: "holds a specially important place."

Printed from the shorthand
record

TO ALL PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS AND TO THE CHIEF OF THE CENTRAL STATISTICAL BOARD

*Copies to the Chairman and Secretary
of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee*

28/V.1921

All People's Commissars should have printed copies of the circulated and distributed

Draft Instructions of the Council of Labour and Defence

signed by Lenin and Chairman of the C.L.D. Commission Comrade Obolensky (Osinsky).

This draft is being submitted to the session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee opening at 1 p.m. on 30.V.1921.

All People's Commissars are obliged

1) by 2 p.m. on Monday, 30.V.1921, to prepare in writing their amendments and addenda to the Instructions on all points, items and subitems directly or indirectly applying to the commissariats concerned;

2) within the same time, to prepare an initial draft of items (for reporting) and subitems (i.e., a more detailed list of particular questions to be reported on). This applies to all commissariats without exception, to each People's Commissar on behalf of his respective commissariat.

This is obligatory, since the All-Russia C.E.C. will endorse the general Instructions consisting of two parts: a) the Instructions of the C.L.D. covering reports by the economic commissariats; b) Instructions of the C.P.C. covering reports of all commissariats without exception, economic and non-economic.

The latter reports will form the last, additional "Fifth Group of Questions". Each commissariat is to draw up a list of the most important questions for the report on the same pattern as the questions Nos. 1 to 27 contained in the draft Instructions of the C.L.D.

The reports will be printed in about 1000 copies by each Gubernia Executive Committee and each Uyezd Executive Committee (the technical possibilities of printing no less than 1 sheet a month by each uyezd have been ascertained by me and arranged with the Paper Industry Board. Printing and presentation of reports are planned for from 6 to 4 times a year, to be finally decided upon by the All-Russia C.E.C. simultaneously with the endorsement of these Instructions.

Each People's Commissar is obliged, by the above date (by 2 p.m. on 30.V.1924), to submit in writing, in 3-5 copies, a short list of the most important questions to be included in the report of the respective commissariat.

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
Chairman, C.P.C.

To be communicated immediately, in writing or by telephone, with the commissar's signature of receipt, and in his absence, with that of his deputy, reporter or Board member.

Printed from the manuscript

BRIEF MONTHLY EXTRACTS FROM REPORTS

Current reports, which are to be practised in all departments, institutions, central boards, enterprises (including non-state enterprises), are to be submitted at least once a month.

2. These reports must be forwarded regularly and in good time to *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*, the *State Planning Commission* and the *Central Statistical Board* (apart from the higher administrative bodies, whose demands are to be met in any case).
3. Brief extracts from the reports (volume of output; number of workers; number of enterprises and similar essential information) are to be forwarded to *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*, the *Central Statistical Board* and the *State Planning Commission* (one copy to each).
4. *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* is to publish them immediately.
5. An analysis of these reports by essential industries is to be made by members of the editorial board of *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* (each member handling one industry), and by the S.P.C. and the C.S.B. (according to § 6 at present).
6. Periodical summarised reviews to be published by *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* at periods to be fixed by the editors, but not less than twice a year.
7. Simple diagrams to be made up monthly by the C.S.B., the form to be worked out within a week. These diagrams according to the approved forms to be made up within a week of the forms' approval.

Written late May or
early June 1921

Printed from the manuscript

PROPOSALS ON A CHECK-UP AND PURGE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) MEMBERSHIP³⁶⁷

The chief group responsible for registration should be made up of old Party members (not less than 5-7 years in the Party), necessarily workers.

All members of the R.C.P. who are in any way dubious, unreliable, or who have failed to prove their stability, should be removed from the Party, with the right of re-admission upon further verification and test.

- 1) People who joined from other parties after X.1917;
- 2) members from among officials and functionaries who had

held office under the old governments; 3) people who had held posts involving any privileges; 4) state employees—these categories should all be subject to a thorough check-up, and workers, both Party and non-Party, who have had contact with the given member of the R.C.P. at his work, should be questioned.

Recommending members should be required to give an accurate written testimonial and should have among them several workers with a length of Party membership of 5-7 years.

Formalities should be reduced to a minimum in the case of real workers, actually working at their factory, and in the case of peasants engaged on their allotments; such people should not be troubled with reregistration.

Written in June,
not later than 21, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

JUNE 22-JULY 12, 1921³⁶⁸

1

LETTER TO O. W. KUUSINEN
AND REMARKS ON THE DRAFT
"THESES ON THE ORGANISATIONAL ACTIVITIES
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES, ON THE METHODS
AND CONTENT OF THEIR WORK"

To Comrade *Kuusinen*

Urgent.

Address: from Finnish comrades
or at the Comintern.

10/VI.

Comrade Kuusinen,

I have read your article (3 chapters) and the theses with great pleasure.

I enclose my remarks in connection with the theses.

I advise you to immediately find a *German* comrade (a real German) to *improve* the German text (of the article and the theses). Perhaps this comrade, on your behalf, would read your article *as a report* at the Third Congress (it would be much more convenient for the German delegates to hear a *German*.³⁶⁹

My advice is—cross out the end (of the theses).

Re propaganda and agitation—much greater detail—especially on the press, but also on verbal propaganda.

I think you should definitely *take upon yourself* the report at *this* congress. I shall write to Zinoviev about this today.

Best regards,

Yours,

Lenin

Theses

(Thesis 6 or) § 6, 2nd par., last sentence
should read:

“... will inevitably inherit this tendency to a certain extent from ... environment...”

And the next sentence should read:

“... the Communist Party *should overcome* this tendency by systematic and persistent organisational work and *repeated* improvements and corrections...”

(Thesis 7 or) § 7:

It should be stated at greater length that this is exactly what is lacking in most of the legal parties of the West. There is no *everyday* work (*revolutionary* work) by *every* member of the Party.

This is the chief drawback.

To change this is the most difficult job of all.

But this is the most important.

§ 10.

This needs amplifying.

More details.

Examples.

The role of the newspaper.

“Our” newspaper compared with the *usual* capitalist newspaper.

Work for “our” newspaper.

Example: Russian newspapers of 1912-13.

The fight against the bourgeois papers. Exposure of their venality, their lies, etc.

Distribution of leaflets.

Home agitation.

Sunday outings, etc.

Far more details.

§ 11—far more details here too.

§ 13. Presenting reports and *discussion* of reports in the "cells".

Reports on hostile and *especially on petty-bourgeois* organisations (the Labour Party, the Socialist parties, etc.).

Greater detail about duties *among the mass* of the unorganised proletariat and of the proletariat organised in the yellow trade unions (including the II and II $\frac{1}{2}$ Internationals) and the non-proletarian sections of the *working people*.

§§ 26 and 27.

This is irrelevant.

This is not an "organisational question".

This subject had better be dealt with in a special article for the *Communist International*, say: "Organisational Questions in Revolutionary Periods" and so forth.

Or: "On the Question of Mounting Revolution and Our Corresponding Tasks" (on the basis of Russian and Finnish experience).

Written June 10, 1921

Printed from the manuscript
Translated from the German

2

LETTER TO O. W. KUUSINEN AND W. KOENEN³⁷⁰

To Comrades Kuusinen and Koenen

9/VII.1921

Dear Comrades,

I read your draft theses on the organisational question with great pleasure. I think you have done a very good job. May I suggest just two addenda:

1) advice—control commissions consisting of the best, tried and experienced workers to be formed in all parties;

2) re spies—a special point in connection with the question of illegal work. Contents roughly as follows: the bourgeoisie is bound to infiltrate spies and provocateurs into the illegal organisations. A thoroughgoing and unremitting struggle should be waged against this, and a method of struggle to be specially recommended is a skilful combination of *legal* work with illegal, verification (of fitness for illegal work) *by means* of prolonged *legal* work.³⁷¹

With communist greetings,

Yours,

Lenin

Printed from the manuscript
Translated from the German

3

REMARKS ON THE DRAFT THESES ON TACTICS FOR THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

LETTER TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV³⁷²

The crux of the matter is that Levi in very many respects is *right politically*. Unfortunately, he is guilty of a number of breaches of discipline for which the Party has expelled him.

Thalheimer's and Béla Kun's theses are politically utterly fallacious. Mere phrases and playing at Leftism.

Radek is vacillating and has spoilt his original draft by a number of concessions to "Leftist" silliness. His first "concession" is highly characteristic: in § 1 of his theses "*Umgrenzung der Fragen*" he first had "winning the majority of the working class (*to the principles of communism*)" (mark this). Amended (verballhornt) to: "winning the *socially decisive sections* of the working class."

A gem! To weaken here, in such a context, the necessity of winning precisely the *majority* of the working class "to the principles of communism," is the height of absurdity.

To win power, you need, *under certain conditions* (even when the *majority* of the working class have already been won over *to the principles of communism*) a blow dealt at the decisive place by the majority of the socially decisive sections of the working class.

To modify, verbalhorne, this truth in such a way that § 1 of the general tasks of the Communist International about winning the working class *to the principles of communism weakens* the idea about the necessity of winning the *majority* of the working class, is a classic example of Béla Kun's and Thalheimer's ineptitude (it looks all right, dammit, but it's all damn'd wrong) and of Radek's... *hasty complaisance*.

Radek's theses were much too long and boneless, and lacked a political central point. And Radek diluted them *still* more, spoilt them hopelessly.

What's to be done? I don't know. So much time and effort wasted.

If you don't want an open fight at the congress, then I propose:

1) that Thalheimer's and B. Kun's theses be rejected by exact voting this very day (since Bukharin assures me that the basic points have to be settled not later than today: they were better postponed) as being basically erroneous. Have this recorded. You will spoil everything if you don't do this and show indulgence.

2) that Radek's first draft, "unimproved" by any corrections, one specimen of which I have quoted, should be adopted as a basis.

3) that 1-3 persons be entrusted with cutting down the text and improving it so that it is no longer boneless (if that is possible!) and clearly, precisely and unequivocally puts into focus as the central ideas the following:

None of the Communist Parties anywhere have yet won the majority (of the working class), not only as regards organisational leadership, but to the principles of communism as well. This is the basis of everything. To "weaken" this foundation of the only reasonable tactic is *criminal irresponsibility*.

Hence: revolutionary explosions are possible nevertheless very soon considering the abundance of inflammable material

in Europe; an easy victory of the working class—in exceptionable cases—is also possible. But it would be absurd now to base the tactics of the Communist International on this possibility; it is absurd and harmful to write and think that the propaganda period has ended and the period of action has started.

The tactics of the Communist International should be based on a steady and systematic drive to win the *majority of the working class*, first and foremost *within the old trade unions*. Then we shall win for certain, whatever the course of events. As for “winning” for a short time in an exceptionally happy turn of events—any fool can do that.

Hence: the tactic of the Open Letter³⁷³ should definitely be applied everywhere. This should be said straight out, clearly and exactly, because waverings in regard to the “Open Letter” are extremely harmful, extremely shameful and extremely widespread. We may as well admit this. All those who have failed to grasp the necessity of the Open Letter tactic should be *expelled* from the Communist International within a month after its Third Congress. I clearly see my mistake in voting for the admission of KAPD.³⁷⁴ It will have to be rectified as quickly and fully as possible.

Instead of spinning a long yarn like Radek, we had better have the whole text of the Open Letter translated (and in German quoted in full), its significance properly brought home and adopted as a model.

I would confine the *general* resolution on tactics to this.

Only then will the *tone* be set. The central idea will be clear. There will be no woolliness. No possibility of everyone reading his own meaning into it (like in Radek’s).

Radek’s original draft would then be cut down to a quarter, at least.

It is time we stopped writing and voting *brochures* instead of theses. Under this system partial mistakes are inevitable with any of us, even when the matter is indisputable. And when we have something boneless and disputable we are bound to make *b i g* mistakes and spoil the whole thing.

And then, if you have the itch for it, you can add a supplement: on the basis of such a tactic, specifically by way of example, precisely as an example and not as a principle, we add so-and-so and so-and-so.

Further.

To generalise Serrati and Levi into the same "opportunism" is stupid. Serrati is guilty; of what? It should be said clearly and precisely—on the *Italian* question, and not on the question of general tactics. Of having split with the Communists and not having expelled the reformists, Turati & Co. Until you have carried this out, Italian comrades, you are *outside* the Communist International. We are expelling you.³⁷⁵

And to the Italian Communists—serious advice and the *demand*: so long as you have not been able by persistence, patience and skill to **convince** and win over the majority of the Serratian *workers*, don't swagger, don't play at Leftism. "Fall Levi"* is not in general tactics, but in the appraisal of Märzaktion,** on the German question. Brandler says: there was a defensive. The government provoked it.

Assuming this is true, that it is a fact.

What deduction is to be drawn from this?

1) That all the shouting about an offensive—and there was any amount of it—was erroneous and absurd;

2) that it was a tactical *error* to call for a *general* strike once there was provocation on the part of the government, who *wanted* to draw the *small fortress* of communism into the struggle (the district in the centre where the Communists already had a majority).

3) Mistakes like this must be avoided in future, as the situation in *Germany* is a special one after the killing of 20,000 workers in the civil war through the skilful manoeuvres of the Right.

4) To call the defensive of hundreds of thousands of workers (Brandler says *a million*. Isn't he mistaken? Isn't he *exaggerating*? Why are there no figures by regions and cities???) a "putsch", and a "Bakuninist putsch" at that, is worse than a mistake, it is a breach of revolutionary discipline. Since Levi added to this a number of other breaches (list them very carefully and exactly) he deserves his punishment and has earned his expulsion.

The *term* of expulsion should be fixed, say, at six months at least. He should then be *permitted* to seek readmission

* The Levi case.—*Ed.*

** The March action.—*Ed.*

to the Party, and the Communist International advises that he be readmitted *provided* he has acted loyally during that time.

I have not yet read anything, apart from Brandler's pamphlet, and am writing this on the basis of Levi's and Brandler's pamphlets. Brandler has proved one thing—if he has proved anything—that the Märzaktion was not a "Bakuninist putsch" [for such *abusive language* Levi ought to be expelled] but a heroic defence by revolutionary workers, hundreds of thousands of them; but however heroic it was, *in future* such a challenge, provoked by the government, which, since 1.1919, has already killed by provocations 20,000 workers *should not* be accepted until the Communists have the majority behind them all over the country, and not just in one small district.

((The July days of 1917 were not a Bakuninist putsch. For such an appraisal we would have expelled a person from the Party. The July days were an heroic *offensive*. And the deduction we drew was that we would not launch the next heroic offensive *prematurely*. Premature acceptance of a general battle—that is what the Märzaktion really was. Not a putsch, but a *mistake*, mitigated by the heroism of a defensive by hundreds of thousands.))

Concerning Šmeral. Can't we have at least 2 or 3 *documents*?

There would be no harm in having at least 2 documents (2-4 pages each) on each country printed for the Comintern.

What are the facts about Šmeral? about Strasser?

Do not forget one of the chief things—to delete from Radek's first theses everything relating to the "waiting party", to its censure. It must all come out.³⁷⁶

Regarding Bulgaria, Serbia (Yugoslavia?) and Czechoslovakia, the question of *these* countries must be put concretely, specially, clearly, and precisely.

If opinion is divided on this, I suggest convening the Politbureau.

10/VI.1921 *Lenin*

4

MOTION ON THE DRAFT THESES ON TACTICS

1) That Šmeral's designation and the whole end of the paragraph be crossed out;

2) That a Committee (or the Executive) be directed to draw up a detailed *letter* to the Czech Party containing a practical, lucid and *documented* criticism of what is *incorrect* in Šmeral's stand and what the editors of the Reichenberger *Vorwärts*³⁷⁷ have to be more careful of.

Written in July,
not later than 9, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

5

SPEECHES AT A MEETING
OF MEMBERS OF THE GERMAN, POLISH,
CZECHOSLOVAK, HUNGARIAN AND ITALIAN
DELEGATIONS
JULY 11

1

I read certain reports yesterday in *Pravda* which have persuaded me that the moment for an offensive is perhaps nearer than we thought at the congress, and for which the young comrades attacked us. I shall deal with these reports later, however. Just now I want to say that the nearer the general offensive is, the more "opportunistically" must we act. You will now all return home and tell the workers that we have become more reasonable than we were before the Third Congress. You should not be put out by this; you will say that we made mistakes and now wish to act more carefully; by doing so we shall win the masses over from the Social-Democratic and Independent Social-Democratic parties, masses, who, objectively, by the whole course of events, are being pushed towards us, but who are afraid of us. I want

to cite our own example to show you that we must act more carefully.

At the beginning of the war we Bolsheviks adhered to a single slogan—that of civil war, and a ruthless one at that. We branded as a traitor everyone who did not support the idea of civil war. But when we came back to Russia in March 1917 we changed our position entirely. When we returned to Russia and spoke to the peasants and workers, we saw that they all stood for defence of the homeland, of course in quite a different sense from the Mensheviks, and we could not call these ordinary workers and peasants scoundrels and traitors. We described this as “honest defenceism”. I intend to write a big article about this and publish all the material. On April 7 I published my theses, in which I called for caution and patience.* Our original stand at the beginning of the war was correct: it was important then to form a definite and resolute core. Our subsequent stand was correct too. It proceeded from the assumption that the masses had to be won over. At that time we already rejected the idea of the immediate overthrow of the Provisional Government. I wrote: “It should be overthrown, for it is an oligarchic, and not a people’s government, and is unable to provide peace or bread. But it cannot be overthrown just now, for it is being kept in power by the workers’ Soviets and so far enjoys the confidence of the workers. We are not Blanquists, we do not want to rule with a minority of the working class against the majority.”** The Cadets, who are shrewd politicians, immediately noticed the contradiction between our former position and the new one, and called us hypocrites. But as, in the same breath, they had called us spies, traitors, scoundrels and German agents, the former appellation made no impression. The first crisis occurred on April 20. Milyukov’s Note on the Dardanelles showed the government up for what it was—an imperialist government. After this the armed masses of the soldiery moved against the building of the government and overthrew Milyukov. They were led by a non-Party man named Linde. This movement had not been organised

* See Vol. 24 of this edition, pp. 19-26.—*Ed.*

** *Ibid.*, p. 40.—*Ed.*

by the Party. We characterised that movement at the time as follows: something more than an armed demonstration, and something less than an armed uprising. At our conference on April 22 the Left trend demanded the immediate overthrow of the Government. The Central Committee, on the contrary, declared against the slogan of civil war, and we instructed all agitators in the provinces to deny the outrageous lie about the Bolsheviks wanting civil war. On April 22 I wrote that the slogan "Down with the Provisional Government" was incorrect, since if we did not have the majority of the people behind us this slogan would be either an empty phrase or adventurism.*

We did not hesitate in face of our enemies to call our Leftists "adventurists". The Mensheviks crowed over this and talked about our bankruptcy. But we said that any attempt to be slightly, if only a wee bit, left of the C.C. was folly, and those who stood left of the C.C. had lost ordinary common sense. We refuse to be intimidated by the fact that our enemies rejoice at our slips.

Our sole strategy now is to become stronger, hence cleverer, more sensible, more "opportunistic", and that is what we must tell the masses. But after we shall have won over the masses by our reasonableness, we shall use the tactic of offensive in the strictest sense of that word.

Now about the three reports:

1) The strike of Berlin's municipal workers. Municipal workers are mostly conservative people, who belong to the Social-Democrats of the majority and to the Independent Social-Democratic Party; they are well off, but are compelled to strike.³⁷⁸

2) The strike of the textile workers in Lille.³⁷⁹

3) The third fact is the most important. A meeting was held in Rome to organise the struggle against the fascists, in which 50,000 workers took part—representing all parties—Communists, socialists and also republicans. Five thousand ex-servicemen came to the meeting in their uniforms and not a single fascist dared to appear on the street.³⁸⁰ This shows that there is more inflammable material in Europe than we thought. Lazzari praised our resolution on tactics. It is an

* See Vol. 24 of this edition, pp. 210-11.—*Ed.*

important achievement of our congress. If Lazzari admits it, then the thousands of workers who back him are bound to come to us, and their leaders will not be able to scare them away from us. "Il faut reculer, pour mieux sauter" (you have to step back to make a better jump). This jump is inevitable, since the situation, objectively, is becoming insufferable.

So we are beginning to apply our new tactic. We mustn't get nervy, we cannot be late, rather we may start too early, and when you ask whether Russia will be able to hold out so long, we answer that we are now fighting a war with the petty bourgeoisie, with the peasantry, an economic war, which is much more dangerous for us than the last war. But as Clausewitz said, the element of war is a danger and we have never been out of that danger for a moment. I am sure that if we act more cautiously, if we make concessions in time, we shall win this war too, even if it lasts over three years.

Summing up:

1) All of us, unanimously throughout Europe, shall say that we are applying the new tactic, and in this way we shall win the masses.

2) Co-ordination of the offensive in the most important countries: Germany, Czechoslovakia, Italy. We need here preparation, constant co-ordination. Europe is pregnant with revolution, but it is impossible to make up a calendar of revolution beforehand. We in Russia will hold out, not only five years, but more. The only correct strategy is the one we have adopted. I am confident that we shall win positions for the revolution which the Entente will have nothing to put up against, and that will be the beginning of victory on a world scale.

2

Šmeral seemed to be pleased with my speech, but he interprets it one-sidedly. I said in the committee that in order to find the correct line Šmeral had to make three steps to the left, and Kreibich one step to the right. Šmeral, unfortunately, said nothing about taking these steps. Nor did he say anything about his views on the situation. Concerning the

difficulties, Šmeral merely repeated the old arguments and said nothing new. Šmeral said that I had dispelled his fears. In the spring he was afraid that the communist leadership would demand of him untimely action, but events dispelled these fears. But what worries us now is this: will things really come to the stage of preparation for the offensive in Czechoslovakia, or will they be confined merely to talk about difficulties. The Left mistake is simply a mistake, it isn't big and is easily rectified. But if the mistake pertains to the resolution to act, then this is by no means a small mistake, it is a betrayal. These mistakes do not bear comparison. The theory that we shall make a revolution, but only after others have acted first, is utterly fallacious.

3

The retreat made at this congress can, I think, be compared with our actions in 1917 in Russia, and therefore prove that this retreat must serve as preparation for the offensive. Our opponents will say that we are not saying today what we said before. It will do them little good, but the working-class masses will understand us if we tell them in what sense the March action is to be considered a success and why we criticise its mistakes and say that we should make better preparations in future. I agree with Terracini when he says that the interpretations of Šmeral and Burian are wrong. If co-ordination is to be understood as our having to wait until another country has started, a country that is richer and has a bigger population, then this is not a communist interpretation, but downright deception. Co-ordination should consist in comrades from other countries knowing exactly what moments are significant. The really important interpretation of co-ordination is this: the best and quickest imitation of a good example. That of the workers of *Rome* is a good example.

ADDENDA TO THE DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C. ON COLLECTIVE PAY FOR EMPLOYEES OF STATE INSTITUTIONS³⁸¹

POINT "A"

A five-man commission to be charged with collecting the fullest possible material for an estimation of both payments in kind and actual money payments, embracing all and every form of such payment without exception, including cab fares, etc., which are now being applied in Moscow's central institutions.

POINT "D"

Collective supply both for workers and office employees is to be introduced subject to the following rules:

1) each enterprise where collective supply is introduced concludes a special agreement with the Government;

2) under this agreement, the enterprise (in the person of its management and specially elected representatives) undertakes to steadily reduce the number of workers and office employees and raise their productivity, as well as work discipline to a normal level. An enterprise in industry corresponds to a department or subdepartment, etc., for state employees;

3) non-fulfilment of the agreement entails a penalty, including total loss of supply.

Written June 28, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

MOTION TO THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON BONUSES FOR ENTERPRISES³⁸²

I propose to the Politbureau

Bonuses of up to 10,000 gold rubles be paid for the efficient organisation on commercial lines of a group of enterprises, departments and institutions.

8.VII.1921

Lenin

Printed from the manuscript

NOTES ON MEASURES FOR COMBATING FAMINE AND STEPPING UP ECONOMIC WORK³⁸³

If an area affected by crop failure and famine embraces a territory with a population of twenty-five million, should we not, by a number of revolutionary measures, take young men into the army from *this* particular area to the number of about 500,000 (or even perhaps up to 1 million?).

Purpose: to help out the famine-stricken population to some extent, as we shall feed some of them and perhaps help others by means of parcels which the men will send home. That is one thing. Secondly: locate these half a million in the Ukraine, where they can help to step up food supply work, in which they are deeply concerned, keenly aware as they are of the injustice of the gluttony practised by the rich peasants in the Ukraine.

The harvest in the Ukraine is estimated roughly (Rakovsky) at 550-650 million poods. Deducting 150 million poods for sowing and 300 ($15 \times 20 = 300$) for feeding the family and the farm animals, we get a balance ($550 - 450 = 100$; $650 - 450 = 200$) at an average of about 150 million poods. If we post an army from the famine-stricken gubernias in the Ukraine this balance (tax + barter + special requisitions from the rich to help the starving) could be collected *in full*.

Measures should immediately be stepped up in the famine-stricken gubernias to collect raw materials (hides, hoofs, horns, bristles, etc., etc.) and it should be made a rule, incidentally, that not a pood of relief should be rendered either for seed or food unless payment is made in one or another form of raw materials or fallen wood fuel or similar stuff.*

To revive the work of the gubernia, uyezd and district economic conferences of Petrograd, Moscow, Ivanovo-Voznesensk and a few principal industrial centres not far from the two capital cities, could not 2-4 top-level workers of the

* In the manuscript this paragraph has been crossed out by Lenin.—*Ed.*

central departments be assigned to each of these economic conferences? These groups of, say, four people, could work together as a team, being selected from among the staff of one and the same central institution or being well acquainted with each other, and they could do regular work in these economic councils, say, an hour a day each, making 3-4 hours a day together?

The complete or partial transfer of workers of the non-economic commissariats to economic work could be arranged in this way: their work at the commissariat could be shifted to the extent of three-fourths or nine-tenths to third-rate assistants, whom they could supervise.

In Moscow (and afterwards in other places) *all* top-level Party workers should be mobilised for *economic* work in this way:

every top-level Party worker of a *non-economic* commissariat takes a *low-level economic* job, for which purpose he joins some factory committee (or house or block committee)—*no* organisation *higher* than that (in order to work at low-level)—and undertakes to devote no less than two hours a day to this work. Priority is to be given to the work of distributing foodstuffs, raising the level of the economic branch concerned, and fuel supply.

It is important that *each* worker's assignment should be precisely defined.

Should we not, simultaneously with the registration of top-level Party workers on 1.VII.1921, organise the registration of all members of the R.C.P. in Moscow (and perhaps in Petrograd as well)? Enlist for this the services of the Gubernia Statistical Bureau. Obtain exact figures on the Party.*

Written in July,
not later than 9, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

* This paragraph in the manuscript has been crossed out by Lenin.—*Ed.*

**RE DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.P.C.
ON THE ORGANISATION
OF COMMODITY EXCHANGE BY CENTROSOYUZ³⁸⁴**

- 1) The next report to be made in a month's time.
- 2) The form of accountancy and its proper distribution to the local bodies, as well as fulfilment by the latter of their duties in making up these accounts, to be verified through the agent of the *Central Statistical Board*.

Term: 1 week.

- 3) Charge Centrosoyuz with submitting to the C.P.C. a number of decisions for more energetic action against anarchic commodity exchange.

Term: 1 week.

- 4) In the matter of equivalents, Centrosoyuz and its local agencies down to the rural commodity exchange stations should be allowed to conduct the business with greater freedom and introduce a system of high premiums for the amount and rate of turnover.

Term: 1 week for submitting to the Narrow C.P.C.

Written July 15, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

MOTION FOR THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)³⁸⁵

I move:

- 1) that the matter be temporarily decided (today, 28/VII.) in favour of the Siberian Bureau;

2) that a resolution of censure be passed on the Siberian Bureau for patent breach of Party duty in not simultaneously forwarding the text of the motions tabled by the two other trends: the Siberian Bureau should have asked the two other trends officially and in good time for the texts of their proposals for submission to the C.C.;

- 3) that Omsk be asked to wire a brief formulation of the motions of the two trends by their spokesmen;

- 4) that the Party conference be postponed till 15/8;

5) that a C.C. member be found to sit in on the conference on 15/8.

28/7.

Written July 28, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

**PROPOSALS
TO F. E. DZERZHINSKY'S CONCLUSIONS
ON THE STATE OF TRANSPORT³⁸⁶**

- § 1. Greater attention to be paid to devising measures, etc.
- 2—4 The Orgbureau in co-operation with Comrade Rudzutak to deal with these questions urgently.
- 5— Elaborate and carry out administratively.
- 6— Measures for improving transport and ensuring closer contact between the Party apparatus and the railways.

Written August 8, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

**LETTER TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV
AND INSTRUCTIONS TO THE SECRETARY**

- | | |
|---------------|---------------|
| | 1) Radek |
| | 2) me |
| Type 6 copies | 3) Trotsky |
| and send to | 4) Kamenev |
| | 5) Stalin |
| | 6) extra copy |

To Comrade Zinoviev

13/VIII-1921

Obviously, we cannot properly organise in Russia a bureau for properly summarising and selecting information on the international labour movement. We haven't the people for it, nor the libraries, etc.

I suggest that such a bureau be set up in Germany. Employ one manager (a non-work-fit Communist, better still a *non-Communist*) plus 2 assistants (+ 2—3 typists).

A definite monthly sum should be earmarked for this purpose. We should try to arrange *legally*, under some trade name, something like *Zeitungskorrespondenz*, a supply of articles and copy to the newspapers.

Three Germans (knowing English, French, Italian and Czech—enough to start with) could of course be found. Radek, if I am not mistaken, even had someone in mind.

This bureau, if we could find efficient men to run it under contract (intellectuals in Germany are hard up, and we could select a good staff), would carry on systematic research work for us in *collecting* literary and special newspaper material and *working it up* on two cardinal and main points:

- A) *international imperialism*;
- B) *the international labour movement*.

We could (with Radek and with his help) probably find 2-3 dozen Communists doing journalistic work in all countries to act as contributors (and writer-consultants) to this bureau.

Such a bureau would work for a start in German (for the continent of Europe now undoubtedly the most international language); and at the first opportunity it would add to its publications translations into French and English. Russian translations could easily be arranged: we would simply give the job through official state channels to 2-3 bourgeois professors, so as not to divert communist forces on purely technical work.

On both these questions (*A* and *B*) the bureau should systematically keep abreast of the international literature, especially newspaper literature, and compile *lists of valuable books and newspaper articles* on these questions.

The most important thing here would be to detail and arrange these questions correctly—to compile a *rational* and classified *list* of these questions and supplement it in good time according to the needs of the moment.

And then—commentaries of not more than 3-10 lines on books and on very rare and specially important newspaper articles (1 out of 100, or maybe 1 out of 500), so that you can tell at once what to look for and what the respective book or article deals with.

The writer-consultants could write these commentaries (or rather a statement of the contents) easily, if the German centre organised this work and paid them for it.

Further, the bureau should run

a summary of important items of information from the newspapers and press-cuttings (at least 3-4 sets to begin with: one for the files, one for Moscow, and one extra set to meet any contingency).

With the help of *consultants* and Radek at their head, we could make up a list of subjects, for example:

- — shadings and controversial issues within communism;
- — " " " and on the *fringe* of communism ($II^{1/2}$ * and anarchists);
- — " " " also within the trade union movement;
- — elections and their statistics (or results) to judge the strength of the trends in the labour movement;
- — the history of outstanding strikes and "incidents" (demonstrations, actions, etc.) and so on.

I believe that, properly organised, this bureau would bring in a certain income, as its bulletins would be purchased by certain newspapers and libraries as important information material.

But this income, of course, would at best cover only a small part of the expenses. We can and should bear these expenses. All the material, as far as we are concerned, will serve the cause of public education and the work of propaganda and agitation.

Such a bureau can and should be organised. It can be very useful. Without it we have no eyes, ears or hands for participation in the international movement—and we do it casually, always *dependent* (for information) on someone who is closer, near at hand, who has happened to read about it, who has just dropped in, happened to mention it, and so on.

I propose that the Politbureau discuss this plan and set up a small commission for its *preliminary* drafting, say:

Radek
Trotsky
+ ?

* Meaning the Centrist $II^{1/2}$ International.—Ed.

Perhaps only two would be better to start with. They *can enlist* the co-operation of Steklov and Béla Kun (and many others), *invite* to Moscow a candidate for the post of *bureau manager*, and then be able to make up *an estimate* and submit the whole *elaborated* plan to the Politbureau for consideration.³⁸⁷

16/VIII.

Lenin

Printed from the manuscript

**DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU
OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
ON AN INSPECTION
OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT
FOR FOREIGN TRADE³⁸⁸**

I move that the Politbureau resolve:

- 1) That the report be made.
- 2) That Unsicht be appointed to make it.
- 3) That the report's *conclusions* serve as the Politbureau's decisions on its findings.
- 4) That the secret part be dealt with separately at a closed meeting.

23/VIII. Lenin

Printed from the manuscript

**MOTION TO THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C.,
R.C.P.(B.) ON BRINGING UNGERN TO TRIAL³⁸⁹**

I advise that greater attention be given to this case and the gravity of the charges be checked, and in the event of their being incontrovertibly proved, of which there seems to be no doubt, a public trial should be held with the greatest speed and the death penalty imposed.

Dictated over the telephone
August 28, 1921

Printed from the typed copy

**A NOTE TO E. VARGA
AND THESES ON THE ORGANISATION
OF AN INFORMATION INSTITUTE
ON QUESTIONS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR MOVEMENT**

Dear Comrade Varga,

I enclose my remarks. If you think it necessary, we can talk things over on the telephone.

Best regards,
Lenin
31/8

Tentative Amendments or Theses

To Comrade E. Varga's Project
for the Organisation of an Information Institute

1. Absolute and strict legality of the Institute for Berlin or Vienna conditions and for the whole of Western Europe, Britain and America.

2. Headquarters of the Institute—Berlin or Vienna or Copenhagen or Christiania.

3. No more than 20% of the Institute's working time and publications should be devoted to economic and social questions (both together 20%). 80% to political questions.

4. As far as political questions are concerned, the task of the Institute is only to collect objective data on questions that are legal and open to discussion.

5. The Institute must be completely independent of the respective Communist Parties.

6. The official name of the Institute should be, tentatively: Institute for the Study of Forms of Social Movement.

7. Instructions of a principle nature are to be given to the head (or to three heads, not more) of the Institute.

8. On the basis of verbal instructions of a principle nature the head is to work out detailed and absolutely legal instructions and submit them here in Moscow for endorsement by the Comintern Executive.

9. Reports to be submitted weekly or twice a week. Socio-economic appendixes monthly or tri-monthly.

10. The Institute must have no contacts whatever with the Russian embassies.

11. The Institute must begin in a small way. For the German-speaking countries, Scandinavia and the Slav countries—only the German language.

Activities may be extended to Anglo-Saxon and Romance countries only on the basis of a special agreement with a representative of each group of these countries. Agreement only here in Moscow.

12. The reports, or rather, publications, or correspondence of the Institute should be paid for by subscribers (newspapers libraries, etc.).

The basic principle should be—such an organisation of the Institute and such operation as would *compel all* labour newspapers of *all* trends to subscribe to the Institute's publications and pay for them. If this does not happen, it will be proof that the Institute is worthless.

13. Comrade Varga's project³⁹⁰ should serve as initial draft instructions. In particular, two basic amendments to this project are needed: 1) § 3—*up*; 2) the political part should be considerably elaborated.

Some remarks to this Point 2:

(Appendix B.) §§ 3 and 4: Correspondence from factories?

+ money collected by the workers themselves?

+ questions of the *trade union movement* should be specially dealt with in detail from the political angle. Winning the trade unions is one of the most important political issues.

+ workers' co-operatives: *ditto* (to Section II, b)

+ all *transitional* political *formations* (like the workers' and farmers' party in the United States) are *especially* important.

+ Leaflets? Distribution? Circulation?

+ *attitude* to the 1914-18 war? *Extremely important.*

Section II, § a "revolutionary" (??) workers' parties like the Communist Workers' Party of Germany.

Name is wrong. They are *not* revolutionary. They should be called: semi-anarchist, anarchist or near-anarchist.

It is necessary to add: a split of anarchism all over the world in patriotic and internationalist questions; *for* the Soviet system; *against* the Soviet system.

(§ b). Parties of the II and II¹/₂ Internationals—*much more detailed*.

+ attitude to *own* colonies—and to *imperialism* in *practical* politics—*much, much more detailed*.

+ all pacifist and petty-bourgeois-democratic groups and trends—*much more detailed*.

And so on.

31/8.1921. *Lenin*

Printed from the manuscript
Translated from the German

TO E. VARGA

Dear Comrade Varga,

I consider it incorrect to put the question that way (supplying information to the Comintern Executive *or* to the labour press *or* to both?).

We need *full* and *truthful* information. And the truth should not depend upon whom it has to serve.

We can accept only the division into *unofficial* information (for the *Comintern Executive* only) and *official* information (for everybody).

The former already exists and must exist *separately*; it must be improved.

The latter, to become good, requires good organisation in the *selection of facts* without a declaration that "we" are Communists.

If the *selection of facts* is full, exact and good, then the yellow labour press, too (especially the local and trade union newspapers) will certainly *buy* and pay for our material. If that does not happen it will be evidence of our *poor* legal work.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

1/IX.1921

Printed from the manuscript
Translated from the German

**DECISION OF THE POLITBUREAU
OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON KEEPING
A RECORD OF WORKERS' DONATIONS IN EUROPE³⁹¹**

SEPTEMBER 2, 1921

a) The Russian members of the Executive shall be instructed to obtain a decision of the Comintern for organising accurate current statistics of workers' donations in Europe for sufferers of the famine in Russia and regularly publishing reports of such donations.

b) The Central Committee draws special attention to the need for stepping up agitation among the workers in Europe for contributing one-day's pay, as one of the most expedient forms of relief for the famine-stricken.

c) The Russian members of the Comintern shall be asked to submit a report on the progress of this propaganda to the Politbureau within a fortnight.

*Printed from the typed copy
of the minutes*

**A NOTE TO V. M. MOLOTOV
AND A DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU
OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON NOULENS' NOTE**

Comrade Molotov,

Noulens is insolent to a degree. On the back of this sheet I propose a draft decision. If there is no agreement on this among us I demand that the whole Politbureau be convened tomorrow; I shall come down then. There can be no question of yielding here.

Lenin

4/IX.

I propose
this text of a Politbureau decision:

"Chicherin shall be instructed to draw up in reply to Noulens a sharply worded note of refusal in the form of a proclamation against the bourgeoisie and imperialism with

special emphasis on the counter-revolutionary role of Noulens himself, with special mention of the cynically insolent nature of the proposal, before any agreement is reached, to send a commission of spies under the name of a commission of experts, specially ridiculing the idea of sending the commission question forms regarding winter crops by 4.IX., which we have already done ourselves on time, and specially ridiculing the 7 points and declaring that we shall either have dealings with governments à la Germany, or with persons—not those of the Noulens type, of course—on the basis of previous and clearly defined agreements. Special stress is to be laid on the fact that we cannot for a moment believe in the desire to help on the part of Messrs. Noulens *in view of such an approach to the matter as theirs.*³⁹²

Written September 4, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

**ADDENDUM TO THE DRAFT
DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU
OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON DIRECTIVES
TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOOD³⁹³**

Add:

(1) reduction of the number of recipient enterprises (receiving bread from the state);

(2) bread rationing not to be increased without special permission of the C.C.

Written September 5 or 6,
1921

Printed from the manuscript

**DRAFT DECISION
FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
ON SPENDINGS FROM THE GOLD FUND³⁹⁴**

I move that the Politbureau resolve:

To ask the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee:

1) To revoke the decision of the C.P.C. assigning 5 $\frac{1}{4}$ millions for orders to the firm of Armstrong.

2) To suspend the 10.9 million order for tank-cars, and instruct Kursky within a week to check this expenditure for conformity with all previous decisions of the Politbureau pertaining to the gold fund.

3) To instruct Kursky to carry out a similar check in regard to all allocations from the gold fund as from August 1921.

4) To instruct Alsky to devise a proper form of special accountancy covering spendings from the gold fund and special verification of each item of expenditure from the point of view of the decisions of the Politbureau (in co-operation with Molotov).

5) To instruct Kursky to personally ascertain from the documents whether allocations for Armstrong orders have been started, and if they have, what the legal position will be in connection with the annulment of the C.P.C.'s decision and the suspension of their fulfilment.

Lenin

Written September 7, 1921

Printed from the typed copy

**DRAFT DECISION
FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
ON THE FREE SALE OF BOOKS
FROM MOSCOW WAREHOUSE STOCKS³⁹⁵**

1) Stock-taking of books in Moscow warehouses to be carried out jointly by the Moscow Soviet and the Chief Committee for Political Education;

2) The C.C.P.E. to be allowed to take such books from store as are needed for libraries, Moscow's interests being fully observed in the distribution of these books; to ensure that these interests are duly observed, the C.C.P.E. is obliged to satisfy the requirements of the Moscow Gubernia Committee for Political Education, which has the right to appeal against its decisions in the course of three days.

3) Pornography and books on religious subjects shall not be released for free sale, and shall be turned over to the *Paper Industry Board* as wastepaper.

4) The sale of foreign books shall be freely permitted.

Written September 13, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)³⁹⁶

Comrade Bogdanov shall be directed immediately to form a state trust of Ridder and Ekibastuz works and mines and all others economically linked with them, based on the utmost financial and economic autonomy and independence of local, Siberian, Kirghiz and other authorities, and direct subordination to the Supreme Economic Council.

Written September 14, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

A NOTE TO V. M. MOLOTOV WITH A MOTION FOR THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

Comrade Molotov,

From all sides I hear that recommendations (in connection with the Party purge³⁹⁷) are being given right and left as a favour.

I propose that a circular be published by the C.C. (by arrangement with and over the signatures of the Central Control Commission and the Verification Commission):

"Recommendations may be given only by those who have personally observed the work of the person recommended for at least one year, and have worked together with him in one or another Party organisation."³⁹⁸

15/IX. .

Lenin

Written September 15, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

**A LETTER TO V. V. KUIBYSHEV
AND A DRAFT ENGAGEMENT FOR WORKERS
GOING TO RUSSIA FROM AMERICA³⁹⁹**

Comrade Kuibyshev,

I am sending you the draft of an undertaking which Rutgers and *all* his people down to each individual worker have to give (*in the event of* an agreement being signed).

If you are agreeable, put it to them.

Find a reliable *interpreter* (for all negotiations) who knows *both* languages *well*.

An agreement is essential, and it must be very precisely worded.

We must get *our own lawyer* (a Communist) to draw it up.

I suggest it be called an agreement for *handing over the management* of a number of factories, etc.

The technical examination results should be signed by *Stunkel* and several other experts of *repute*.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Do the leaders and organisers of the enterprise agree to sign the following engagement and obtain the signatures of all the other people going to Russia from America:

1. We undertake to see to it and *collectively* answer for it that only such people shall *go* to Russia as are capable and willing to face a number of severe hardships involved in the rehabilitation of industry in a very backward and utterly ruined country.

2. Those going to Russia undertake to work their hardest and with the greatest efficiency and discipline exceeding those of capitalist standards, as otherwise Russia will not be able to outstrip capitalism or even catch up with it.

3. We undertake, in the event of any conflicts whatsoever to submit them for settlement to the supreme Soviet authority of Russia and faithfully abide by its decisions.

4. We undertake not to forget the extremely nervous state of the starving and exhausted Russian workers and peasants involved in our business and to render them every assistance with a view to establishing friendly relations and overcoming any distrust or envy.

Written September 22, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

**DRAFT DECISION
FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
ON THE QUESTION
OF THE FAR-EASTERN REPUBLIC**

I move that we agree with Chicherin and authorise him to draw up *precise* and brief directives concerning the Far-Eastern Republic in the form of a *draft resolution*.⁴⁰⁰

Lenin

Written October 7 or 8, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

RE DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) PLENUM

Work up the question of studying the composition of communist executives with a view to determining their suitability for work of various scope and scale, if only in the city of Moscow and one of the gubernias to begin with.⁴⁰¹

Written October 8, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DIRECTIVES FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE ALLOTMENT OF LANDS FOR SUGAR-BEET CULTIVATION IN THE UKRAINE⁴⁰²

Directives

of the Politbureau on the allotment of lands in the Ukraine to the refineries for sugar-beet cultivation and on the compliance of the peasants on the lands adjoining the sugar refineries with compulsory crop rotation and fixed norms of culture.

1. This reform is to be carried out with the greatest care, no single step to be taken without practical verification that the business of beet cultivation is adequately provided for by a rational system of farming and by the peasant's own personal interest in the matter.

2. 400,000 dessiatines to be allotted to the refineries, this figure to be checked as to whether it is really necessary for ensuring properly organised large-scale factory farming.

The refineries to be made responsible for all the land allotted to them being rationally cultivated and utilised for the plants.

3. Compulsory crop rotation to be introduced on the peasant lands and obligatory norms of culture to be applied

to them only in those cases where beet crops have long been cultivated on these lands.

4. Strict care should be taken that the relations between the sugar refineries and the beet-cultivating peasants are based on a really voluntary agreement within the limits of an obligatory fixed beet-sowing area.

Written October 10, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON SOCIAL INSURANCE⁴⁰³

The Presidium of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions, jointly with the Supreme Economic Council, the People's Commissariats for Health and Social Security, shall be charged with working up the question of insurance for workers in connection with the new economic policy.

Written October 10, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

NOTES ON YUGOSTAL⁴⁰⁴

Number of workers at these 3 works (both mining and metallurgical) minimum (in summer) 21,000 (roughly).

1. X. about 30,000 |||

Communists about 500 |||

Monthly pay-roll now:	216,000
	+ 200,000 coal
	+ 200,000 overtime

per month (12...*) = 616,000 rubles

Undeciphered.—*Ed.*

Hewer = from 900,000 to $1\frac{1}{2}$ million
 specialist (maximum) = $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 million
 + stealing or tips up to 10 million.

1 gold ruble = 40,000
 75 gold rubles = 3 mill. Soviet rubles

Raise spec. pay by 1.I.1922:
 maximum 40 million
 = 1000 gold rubles a month.
 "Commercial director" =
 at *Head Office* of 3 works
 (Yugostal)
 = assistant manager...
 (big businessman)
 ((status of the highest,))
 ((top-level specialist))
 Marketing = his chief task.

Written in October,
 after the 11th, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

**A NOTE TO V. M. MOLOTOV
 WITH A DRAFT DECISION
 FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
 ON THE QUESTION OF AN AGREEMENT
 WITH THE RUTGERS GROUP⁴⁰⁵**

12.X.1921

Comrade Molotov,

I enclose material on the Rutgers business.

It is for the *Council of Labour and Defence* to decide.

I suggest that it *first* be decided in the C.C.—it is a political question. And the Politbureau *must* have its say, as it is a *gold* spending.

Please get the secretary to telephone *all* the members of the Politbureau who will each arrange for *one hour* in the course of which he will be able to familiarise himself with the material before Friday. Each one must look through it so that it can be settled on Friday.

Let the secretary make up a time-table and send the material round to each member of the Politbureau.

A difficult question:

for: *if* the Americans keep their word, it will be of tremendous benefit. In that case we shall not grudge *600,000* gold rubles.

against: will they keep their word? *Heywood* is half-anarchist. More sentimental than business-like. *Rutgers* may succumb to Leftism. *Calvert* is highly garrulous. We have no business guarantees whatever. Enthusiastic people, in an atmosphere of unemployment, may recruit a group of "adventurous spirits" who will end up in squabbles. We may then lose *part* of our 600,000 gold rubles (they will, of course, spoil and waste some of the property) and risk losing *up to 1 million gold rubles* more, because under § 8 (the end of it) we undertake

"to reimburse the equivalent of expenditures on machines and tools brought in by the said emigrant".

No small risk.

For: Smirnov I. N. and Maximov (of the Urals) are local people, and they are for it.

Against: Martens should know the Americans well, and he is against.

Lenin

Please arrange for all the members of the S.E.C. Presidium to be on phone call with the secretary of the C.C. on Friday from 12 to 4 p.m. in case they are called out to the C.C.

P.S. Please also send copies of this letter to all the members of the Politbureau.

**A LETTER TO POLITBUREAU MEMBERS
WITH A DRAFT DECISION
FOR THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
AND THE COUNCIL OF LABOUR AND DEFENCE
ON THE QUESTION OF RUTGERS' PROPOSALS**

In my opinion, Rutgers' proposals cannot be accepted now in their present form. But I should like to try a thing like this: to make him *modify the group* (Rutgers + Heywood + Calvert). And modify the financial terms, too. We could decide this way:

while rejecting the proposals of Comrade Rutgers in their present form, i.e., the motion of Comrade Bogdanov and the members of the S.E.C. Presidium who voted with him,

the C.C. (and then the *C.L.D.* in administrative order) expresses an earnest wish that Comrade Rutgers' group should not regard this refusal as a final one and should revise their proposals on the following lines: α) modification of the group, the main group of sponsors, by adding to it 5-8 prominent representatives of the American labour union movement or other labour organisations; β) reducing our Government's expenses to the sum of \$300,000 maximum; γ) cutting and specifying our expenses in the event of the agreement being cancelled.⁴⁰⁶

Lenin

Written between
October 12 and 15, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

**DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU
OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
ON ASSIGNING A. G. SHLYAPNIKOV
TO FOOD SUPPLY WORK⁴⁰⁷**

Confirm the decision of the Orgbureau; point out once more the absolutely wrong behaviour of Comrade Shlyapnikov, who declared in the Orgbureau that he would not

comply; inquire of the Central Verification Commission and the Central Control Commission for how long they consider it possible to release Comrade Shlyapnikov for food supply work without detriment to the work of the Central Verification Commission.

Written October 14, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION
FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)⁴⁰⁸

- 1) Guseinov and Akhundov to be called out *immediately*.
- 2) It be strictly demanded that factional strife in Baku and Azerbaijan cease completely.
- 3) It be confirmed that those engaging in factional strife will be expelled from the Party.
- 4) The comrades sent to Azerbaijan from the R.S.F.S.R. shall be directed to check fulfilment.
- 5) Stalin shall be instructed to draw up by Monday draft directives on the implementation of the Communist Party's national policy in Azerbaijan.
- 6) In regard to Persia the strictest confirmation to be made at once.

Written October 15, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION
FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
ON THE SETTING UP OF A SINGLE COMMISSION
ON CONCESSIONS

In view of offers from capitalists of neutral countries for concessions on some of the factories and branches of industry of the R.S.F.S.R., a committee of Comrades Trotsky, Bogdanov and Tsiperovich (with the right of the

Petrograd Gubernia Committee of the Party to replace him by another comrade) shall be directed to prepare a decision for the Politbureau abolishing all previous commissions on this matter and setting up a single directing commission to deal with these affairs in all their aspects.⁴⁰⁹

Written October 17, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

**A NOTE TO V. M. MIKHAILOV
WITH A DRAFT RESOLUTION
FOR THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
ON THE QUESTION OF AN AGREEMENT
WITH THE RUTGERS GROUP⁴¹⁰**

19.X.

Comrade Mikhailov,

I enclose the reply of the Rutgers group to the decision of the Council of Labour and Defence (i.e., the decision of the Central Committee).

I believe this is tantamount to an *acceptance* of our terms.

I am therefore enclosing a draft *decision for the C.C.* which please *circulate as quickly as possible* among the members of the Politbureau. *Very urgent.*

With communist greetings,
Lenin

In view of the fact that the group of sponsors (Comrades ,Rutgers, Heywood and Calvert) have accepted the terms proposed in the decision of *the C.L.D.* of 17.X., the Central Committee resolves and directs the C.L.D. to resolve:

The C.L.D. resolves:

1) that the agreement with the group be considered concluded;

2) that Comrade Bogdanov be directed to immediately draw up and submit to the chairman of the C.L.D. for signature telegrams giving the most urgent orders for laying in stocks of wood, timber, etc.;

3) that the Presidium of the S.E.C. be directed within two days to draw up the final text of a modified agreement for endorsement by the C.L.D. on Friday, 21.X.1921;

4) that \$5,000 be issued to Comrade Rutgers on Saturday, 22.X., according to the agreement, immediately after its endorsement by the C.L.D. on 21.X.

Further, without this being recorded as a decision of the C.L.D., the C.C. instructs Comrade Bogdanov, the Kuibyshev Commission, and the C.L.D. to modify the agreement in such a way that (1) *the C.L.D.* shall have the right to take part in the selection of extra candidates for the "Organising Committee" *before and for* the purpose of the final endorsement of this list; (2) the *total* sum of *all* the Soviet government's expenses *shall not exceed* \$300,000; (3) in the event of the agreement being cancelled the Soviet authorities *shall not* incur any financial liabilities (or only such as shall be recognised as lawful by a court of the R.S.F.S.R. or *by the Central Executive Committee* of the R.S.F.S.R.).

Lenin

Written October 19, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

PROPOSALS TO THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT WITH THE A.R.A. ON THE ORGANISATION OF FOOD PARCELS TO RUSSIA⁴¹¹

I agree. 19/X Lenin

(even if the aim is *trade*, we *should* make this experiment, as we are given a clear profit for the famine-stricken and the right of control; and the right of cancellation at 3 months' notice. Hence we should *not* charge for carriage and storage). A controller of ours (confirmed by the Politbureau) shall be appointed to the A.R.A. who combines reliability with an ability to control the *w h o l e* operation.

Written October 19, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

A LETTER TO THE POLISH COMMUNISTS

19.X.1921

Dear Comrades,

Judging by the scrappy information concerning the growth of the communist movement in Poland that reaches our newspapers, and judging (still more) by the reports of some very prominent Polish comrades, the revolution in Poland is coming to a head.

A workers' revolution is brewing: the complete collapse of the P.P.S.* (in Russian—S.R.s and Mensheviks; in European—the II and II¹/₂ Internationals). The trade unions, one after another, are joining the Communists. The growth of demonstrations, and so on. Imminent and inevitable financial collapse. The gigantic failure of bourgeois democracy (and of the petty bourgeoisie) in Poland with the agrarian reform, a failure that is foredoomed, inevitable, and bound to push the majority of the rural population—the whole poor section of the peasantry—towards the Communists.

Financial collapse and shameless plunder of Poland by Entente capital (France and other countries) are bringing with them a practical exposure of national and Great Power illusions, an exposure that is strikingly clear and tangible to the masses, to the rank-and-file worker, to the rank-and-file peasant.

If this is so, then the revolution (Soviet revolution) in Poland is bound to win, and win soon. That being the case, the Government and the bourgeoisie must be prevented from strangling the revolution by bloody suppression of a *premature* uprising. You must not be provoked. You must wait for the tide to rise to its highest: it will sweep everything away and give victory to the Communists.

If the bourgeoisie kills 100-300 people, this will not ruin the cause. But if it is able to provoke a massacre, to kill 10-30 *thousand* workers, this *may* delay the revolution *even for several years*.

If it is important for the Government to hold elections to the Seim, then an effort should be made for the *Seim* to

* P.P.S.—the Polish Socialist Party.—*Ed.*

be won by the wave of the workers' revolution and the peasants' discontent.

Do not yield to provocation.

The revolution must be allowed to *grow to full ripening* of the fruit. The victory of Soviet power *from within* Poland will be a *gigantic international* victory. If Soviet power has, in my opinion, now won an international victory to the extent of 20-30 per cent, then with the victory of Soviet power *from within* Poland, we shall have a 40-50, perhaps even 51 per cent *international* victory of the communist revolution. For Poland is next door to Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and a Soviet Poland will undermine the *whole* regime built up on the peace of Versailles.

That is why the Polish Communists bear a responsibility before the whole world—that of keeping a firm grip on the helm of their ship and steering clear of provocations.

Is it worth while retaliating for the beating up of Dąbal by Daszynski & Co.? Retaliation, if any, should be by beating up Daszynski, just like that, without any shooting or wounding. It may be worth while if it has the effect of teaching an insolent fellow a lesson at the hands of the workers, and stiffening the workers' spirit at the cost of a sacrifice of 5-10 of them (by imprisonment or execution). But maybe it is not worth while: would not the fact that *our* Dąbal had been brutally beaten up be *more useful* for the purpose of agitation among the *peasants*? Would it not be *more effective* in turning the sympathy of the *backward* peasants towards us than the thrashing of Daszynski? This should be weighed more carefully.

With communist greetings,

Lenin

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)⁴¹²

Re § 4:

The People's Commissariat for Finance and the Finance Commission, as well as all comrades handling questions of home trade, shall be directed to select within the shortest

possible time a group of people with long practical experience in capitalist trade for the purpose of consultation on currency questions. These comrades shall be asked, within two days, to report in writing whether they can fulfil this assignment and in what period of time.

Written October 20, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR C.L.D. ON FOWLER PLOUGHS⁴¹³

1. Comrade Martens, Manager of the Metal Department of the S.E.C. shall be made personally responsible for fulfilment of the decisions of the *C.L.D.* on Fowler ploughs.

2. Comrade Martens shall be directed, within a week, to submit to the *C.L.D.* a written proposal containing a plan of work and concrete measures for its effective implementation.

3. The special three-man commission shall be liquidated, made to hand over all business to Comrade Martens within a week and submit a written report on its work.

4. The People's Commissariat for Justice shall be instructed to investigate, within a week, the red tape, mismanagement and wrong attitude to this business on the part of the Metal Department, also, especially, on the part of the three-man commission and other institutions.

Its report to be presented to the *C.L.D.*

Written October 21, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

DECISION OF THE C.L.D. ON THE QUESTION OF REPORTS AND DIAGRAMMS FOR THE C.L.D.⁴¹⁴

OCTOBER 21, 1921

A commission consisting of comrades Gorbunov, Smolyaninov, Avanesov (with the right of replacement) and Krumin and with the co-operation of the Central Statistical

Board, the State Planning Commission and the appropriate departments, shall be directed

to submit to the C.L.D. within one week the draft of a decision calling for all departments to present statistical data and diagrams monthly to the C.L.D. pertaining especially to economic activities, their analysis, working up and formulation of practical conclusions.

Comrade Gorbunov or Smolyaninov to be charged with summoning the commission and reporting to the C.L.D.⁴¹⁵

Printed from the typewritten
copy of the minutes

**DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU
OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
ON THE MANAGEMENT
OF THE COTTON INDUSTRY⁴¹⁶**

Comrade Bogdanov jointly with Comrade Kamenev shall be charged with revising both drafts with a view to eliminating the red tape in both of them and establishing a system of efficient management on really commercial lines.

The two texts of the proposals to be juxtaposed and circulated among the members of the Politbureau.

Written October 27, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

**PLAN OF AN ARTICLE
"COMMERCIAL ORGANISATION"⁴¹⁷**

**Plan of an Article
"Commercial Organisation"**

Will this do for a slogan?

"Commerce"? = capitalism.

(α) "State capitalism". Its advantages.

(β) War conditions excluded "commerce".

(γ) The transition to "communism" was very often (both for war reasons and owing to almost absolute poverty and to mistakes, a number of mistakes) made without the intervening stages of socialism (communism *vs* socialism)

(δ) "Accounting and control"?

(ε) *Should pay for itself.*

$$\begin{array}{rcl}
 & c + v + s & \\
 & s - \text{accumulation} & \\
 & - \text{maintenance of the} & \\
 & \text{state} & \\
 \left. \begin{array}{l} \\ \\ \end{array} \right\} & & \left. \begin{array}{l} \text{Allgemein} \\ \text{Theoreti-} \\ \text{sches*} \end{array} \right\}
 \end{array}$$

"War" = dictatorship of the proletariat.

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| var-
 iety
 of
 forms | (α) Politics 25.X.1917—5.I.1918 |
| | (β) Weltpolitik. Brester Frieden.** |
| | (γ) Civil war. |
| | (δ) Fighting "economic crisis", <i>i.e.</i> , the petty-bourgeois elements? post-war indiscipline? disintegration? inefficiency? |

Condition for victory in war: supreme effort.

Commercial organisation =

= supreme effort

= reducing enterprises to a minimum, their concentration

= checking results

= "thrift".

Either—or:

aut 100,000 + 500,000

16...¹/₄ lb. for a peasant?***

aut supreme effort, reduction, "pressure" (?)

Had enough of indolence, slovenliness, petty profiteering, thieving, laxity.

{	Why not "thrift"? — freedom of trade
	— state capitalism
	— currency system.

Written in October
or November, 1921

First published in 1959
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXVI*

Printed from the manuscript

* General theoretical propositions.—*Ed.*

** World politics. The peace of Brest.—*Ed.*

*** These figures have not been deciphered.—*Ed.*

**DRAFT DECISIONS FOR THE C.P.C.
ON THE FINANCIAL PLAN
AND PLAN OF EMISSION FOR 1922**

1

1) The Finance Commission shall be directed to submit by Tuesday, 15.XI., an estimate in gold rubles covering all and every form of revenue, including the tax in kind, fuel, etc., etc.,

— to submit a calculation in gold rubles showing distribution of expenditure by commissariats (absolute figures)—in comparison with similar figures before the war (average for 5 or 10 years) and with approximate figures for 1919 and 1920.

2) To submit 2 variants: 240 and 300 million gold ruble volume of emission.

3) To compare quota distribution of the general budget (both material and monetary) with the distribution of rations under the food plan of the *C.L.D.*

4) Drawing up of the budget on the basis of the given plan (with an emission variant of 240 million gold rubles) to be started at once.

5) Assignment for the State Planning Commission? The Central Statistical Board? or an enlarged commission?

6) Time limit—20.XII.

7) Could we not publish some of the Finance Commission's *findings*?

especially calculation (in goods) of the pre-war ruble,

Written November 5, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

2

1) The Finance Commission and the State Planning Commission shall be directed to complete the estimate of revenue and expenditure on the broad terms at present accepted by the Finance Commission, as well as the comparison ordered by the C.P.C. in its decision of November 5.

2) These calculations to be presented in the form of summarised statements viewed as preliminary data for shaping the state budget for the year 1922.⁴¹⁹

Written November 18, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

TALK WITH A DELEGATION OF THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC⁴²⁰

NOVEMBER 5, 1921

1st question of the Mongolian delegation: "Comrade Lenin, what do you think about the establishment of a People's Revolutionary Party in our country and what is most important for us?"

Comrade Lenin outlined to our delegation our country's international situation and pointed out that owing to the M.P.R.'s geographical position the imperialist powers, in case of war, would try to seize our country and use it as a jumping-off ground for military operations against another country. Therefore, Lenin said, the only right way for every working person in your country was to fight for state and economic independence in alliance with the workers and peasants of Soviet Russia. This fight could not be carried on isolatedly, therefore the establishment of a party of Mongolian arats was a pledge of success in their struggle.

The Mongolian delegation's second question: "Will the national liberation struggle be victorious?"

Comrade Lenin's answer:

"I have been in the revolutionary movement myself for thirty years and I know by experience how difficult it is for any people to liberate themselves from their external and internal enslavers. Although Mongolia is a cattle-breeding country and the bulk of her population are nomad herdsmen, she has achieved great progress in her revolution, and most important of all, has made good these successes by creating a People's Revolutionary Party of her own, whose aim is to become a mass party uncluttered by alien elements."

The Mongolian delegation's third question: "Ought not the People's Revolutionary Party be transformed into a Communist Party?"

Comrade Lenin's reply:

"I should not recommend it, because one party cannot be 'transformed' into another." Comrade Lenin explained the essence of a Communist Party as a party of the proletariat, and said: "The revolutionaries will have to put in a good deal of work in developing state, economic and cultural activities before the herdsman elements become a proletarian mass, which may eventually help to 'transform' the People's Revolutionary Party into a Communist Party. A mere change of signboards is harmful and dangerous."

Comrade Lenin elaborated on the idea that it was possible and necessary for the M.P.R. to follow a non-capitalist path of development, the main condition for which was hard work on the part of the People's Revolutionary Party and the Government, so that this work and the increased influence of the Party and the authorities would result in a growth of the number of co-operatives, in the introduction of new forms of economic activity and national culture, and would rally the arats behind the Party and the Government in the interests of the country's economic and cultural development. It was only from the islets of the new economic way of life created by the efforts of the Party and the Government that the new non-capitalist economic system of arat Mongolia would take shape.

Printed from the text
of the book

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

It shall be recognised that the resolution of the First All-Russia Conference on the cultural and educational work of the trade unions is at variance with the resolution of the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P. on the Chief Committee for Political Education and its relations with the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions (§ 2).⁴²¹

The resolution of the Congress of Gubernia Political Education Departments⁴²² shall be confirmed as a whole and the Chief Committee for Political Education shall be directed, within a month and in agreement with the A.C.C.T.U. to draw up detailed practical instructions giving concrete definitions of the forms of "joint" work by both institutions and the forms in which the trade unions and their bodies are to "use" the "apparatus and staff" of the Chief Committee for Political Education.⁴²³

Written November 8, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

**A NOTE TO V. M. MIKHAILOV WITH
A DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU
OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)⁴²⁴**

Comrade *Mikhailov*,

Please have this sent round to the members of the Politbureau.

My personal opinion is that the whole of V. Milyutin's plan should be *rejected* as being worthless and absolutely unconsidered.

I propose it be *rejected*.

Lenin

9/XI.

Written November 9, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

**A NOTE TO V. M. MIKHAILOV WITH
A DRAFT DECISION
FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
ON FOOD SUPPLY-WORK IN THE UKRAINE⁴²⁵**

9/XI.

Comrade *Mikhailov*,

Please send this round to the members of the Politbureau and return to me.

I propose this decision for the Politbureau.

The Politbureau impresses upon the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine that full, 100%, food collections in the Ukraine are of absolutely paramount importance to the R.S.F.S.R. Similarly the delivery to us of 57 million poods. Immediate and energetic measures are to be worked out for achieving this aim and all decisions are to be reported.

Brief fortnightly reports by telephone are to be made on the progress of food collection and delivery to the R.S.F.S.R.

Lenin

Written November 9, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

RE DRAFT DECREE "ON PENALTIES FOR FALSE DENUNCIATIONS"⁴²⁶

I propose an addendum raising the penalty

- α) to not less than so many years
- β) for deliberately false evidence or a reply *in writing* (or evasion of a question under certain conditions) after the pattern of Meineid* in Germany, but without the

Eid.**

Lenin

Written between November
14 and 24, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

REMARKS ON THE DRAFT DECREE "ON THE INTRODUCTION OF PAYMENT FOR NEWSPAPERS"

Addendum necessary either in the form of a number of §§ on control (*strictest*) of circulation free of charge,

* —perjury.—*Ed.*

** —oath.—*Ed.*

or make this obligatory by special instructions (one § on this).⁴²⁷

15/XI.

Lenin

Written November 15, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

**A NOTE TO V. M. MOLOTOV
WITH A MOTION FOR THE POLITBUREAU
OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)**

Viva voce voting

26.XI.1921

Comrade Molotov,

Could you try to settle two questions in the Politbureau by telephone:

1) That Sokolnikov be appointed member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Finance and member of the Finance Commission *on condition* that he remains *Chairman of the Turkestan Bureau* and is obliged to *travel* to Turkestan when necessary until things there have been fully put in order. (If this does not get a majority, I shall have to put the matter for consideration to the whole Politbureau).

2) Today we rejected my motion offhand⁴²⁸ and I agreed to withdraw it. But I now see that I was too hasty and I renew it:

That 1) Pyatakov; 2) Rukhimovich; 3) Bogdanov (or his deputy Smilga) be directed to submit to the Politbureau within two weeks a plan (or regulations or theses) of relations between the gubernia economic conferences and the large enterprises located in the given gubernia and subordinated directly to the centre in Moscow.⁴²⁹

[We ourselves cannot draft it. It is a *universal* question. All the commissariats will have to be questioned. It must be worked up quickly. Start with the Donets Gubernia Economic Conference.]

Lenin.

Printed from the manuscript

**A LETTER TO A. D. TSYURUPA WITH
A DRAFT RESOLUTION
FOR THE ALL-RUSSIA CENTRAL
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
AND A NOTE TO THE MEMBERS
OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)**

28/XI.

Comrade Tsyurupa,

My plan has matured:

In addition to the post of Deputy Chairman of the Council of Labour and Defence held by Rykov (with the right of casting vote in the Council of People's Commissars) the post of second deputy chairman of the C.L.D. is instituted on equal terms. Tsyurupa is appointed to this post and released from the Food Commissariat.

The rights of these deputies: a casting vote in the C.P.C. and the *C.L.D.*; the chairing of the meetings in the absence of the chairman. *All* the rights of C.P.C. chairman as far as participation in all boards and institutions is concerned, and (inter alia) the right to give instructions in regard to the practical work (subject to immediate execution) to People's Commissars and to members of their boards, etc. (with the knowledge and consent of the commissars of the government departments concerned) *on questions pertaining to the integration and direction* of the economic commissariats' activities.

That is how I conceive the official decision of the *All-Russia Central Executive Committee*.⁴³⁰

The task is to integrate and improve the *economic work AS A WHOLE*, especially *in connection with and through the State Bank* (trade) and the *State Planning Commission*.

To make a *first-hand* study of the specific features and work of all the economic commissariats and an acquaintance with *all the members* of their boards and a number (10-100) of local and regional top workers in this field.

To *personally* attend *important* board meetings of the respective commissariats, the State Planning Commission, the State Bank, Centrosoyuz, etc. and check *personally*,

at the choice of the Deputy Chairmen of the C.L.D., those functions which are considered *most vital* or of special topicality.

For how long these posts will be, "we shall see": perhaps 3-4 years, perhaps 30 years.

One of the objects is to develop a highly trained type of instructor-inspector to check and *organise* all economic work at all economic institutions centrally and locally.

The deputy chairmen conduct their work *through the apparatus* of the existing commissariats, having only the *Managing Department of the C.L.D.* as *their own* body (4-5 C.L.D. business managers with 1-2 assistants and 1-2 secretaries to each assistant).

The business manager of the C.L.D., his assistants and secretaries form the *sole* single staff of the *C.L.D.* as a whole and of both its deputy chairmen.

Let me have your reply not later than **WEDNESDAY**.
Return this.

With communist greetings,
Lenin

To members of the Politbureau: I have received A.D. Tsyurupa's consent to this *tentative* plan and ask all the members of the Politbureau to read it. I want to put it before the Politbureau tomorrow, 1.XII.

30.XI. *Lenin*

Written November 28 and 30, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

**ROUGH DRAFT OF A DECISION
FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
ON THE VECHEKA**

1st: jurisdiction to be narrowed
2nd: right to arrest still narrower
3rd: term < 1 month

- 4th: more weight to courts or only through the courts
5th: name
6th: pass > radical relaxations⁴³¹ through the *All-Russia Central Executive Committee*.

Written December 1, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

**DRAFT DECISION
OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
ON THE TACTICS OF THE UNITED FRONT**

- a) That the line of joint action with the workers of the Second International proposed by a number of Communist Parties of the Communist International and introduced by Zinoviev, Radek and Bukharin be approved. The latter to be directed within two days to set forth this line clearly in a draft resolution to be circulated among the members of the Politbureau.
- b) That Comrade Bukharin be directed to write and show the Politbureau an article summing up the experience of the R.C.P. in the Bolsheviks' struggle against the Mensheviks and the blocs between them.⁴³²

Written December 1, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

**DRAFT DECISION OF THE C.L.D.
ON THE COMMISSION FOR THE UTILISATION
OF MATERIAL RESOURCES⁴³³**

- a) The draft of the State Planning Commission shall be adopted as a basis and the latter directed within a week to submit a revised draft with amendments to §§ 2 and 3, as well as results of the work called for in § 5.

Written December 2, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)⁴³⁴

The Food Commissariat shall be directed to preserve the main group of specialists (as indicated by the S.E.C.) in the flour mill administration and carry out the maintenance programme for large flour mills under the control of the S.E.C.

Written December 5, 1921

Printed from the manuscript

REMARKS TO THE THESES ON A UNITED FRONT

Comrade Zinoviev,

I have read the rough draft of the theses and have no objections.

The paragraph on the history of Bolshevism should be amplified and partly modified. It is incorrect to say there was a split only in 1910. It should be stated that the formal splits with the Mensheviks in the spring of 1905 and in January 1912 alternated with the semi-unity and unity of 1906 and 1907 followed by that of 1910 not only because of the vicissitudes of the struggle but also under pressure from the rank and file, who demanded check tests through their own experience.

I think this should be stated more explicitly and concretely on one page.⁴³⁵

6/XII.

Lenin

Written December 6, 1921

Printed from the typewritten
copy

**LETTER TO THE PROPAGANDA
AND ACTION COUNCIL
OF THE PEOPLES OF THE EAST⁴³⁶**

Dear Comrades,

I heartily welcome your forthcoming publication. I am very sorry that ill-health prevents me from contributing an article. I hope that the business of attracting the best representatives of the working people of the East will make faster and wider progress thanks to your newspaper. The destiny of all Western civilisation now largely depends on drawing the working masses of the East into political activities.

With best wishes and greetings,

Lenin

Chairman, Council of People's Commissars
of the R.S.F.S.R.

Dictated by telephone
not before
December 17, 1921

Printed from the secretary's
notes

**COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION
FOR THE ELEVENTH CONFERENCE
OF THE R.C.P.(B.)
ON THE PARTY PURGE**

With regard to Zalutsky's draft resolution on the Party purge I would like to make two remarks.

1) In section 3 §a Zalutsky proposes that enrolment into the Party be suspended for 6 months. I think this is wrong. I would propose, on my part, not to suspend enrolment, but to lay down stricter conditions, namely: a long term of probation. If an eighteen-month term for real workers is considered too long, it can be reduced, say, to nine, or even six months, as Trotsky proposes. In the case of such short terms, however, I think we should require a qualified

majority in the bodies making enrolment decisions, for instance, that it should require a majority of not less than four-fifths to have the term of enrolment reduced, this four-fifths majority to be demanded not only from one Party body (the local cell making the admission), but from several bodies for the sake of mutual control (for example, from the Gubernia Party Committee in addition to the local cell, and so on). I would have nothing whatever against admission into the Party being made easier for genuine workers, but unless very strict conditions are laid down for determining who is to be considered a worker of large industry, we shall immediately find a mass of riff-raff crawling through the hole again. As regards Red Army men, I think we should have stricter conditions, since, for one thing, most of them are not workers, but peasants, and secondly, these people are too young and need testing.

2) In Section 4 §a Zalutsky proposes a revision of the plans of work among the Young Communist League. I believe stricter conditions should be laid down on this point to make sure that the members of the Y.C.L. admitted to membership of the Party have, first, really studied seriously and learnt something, and secondly, that they have a long record of serious practical work (economic, cultural, etc.).⁴³⁷

Lenin

Dictated over the telephone
December 22, 1921

Printed from the secretary's
notes (typed copy)

**SPEECHES AT A MEETING
OF NON-PARTY DELEGATES TO THE NINTH
ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS OF SOVIETS
DECEMBER 26, 1921⁴³⁸**

1

Comrades, having decided to continue our talk—I think we have no doubts on this score—I just want to say that it is now about half past eight and we can sit on till half past nine or even later. We must pick a question which we

are most interested in. If, as one comrade said here, it is the agrarian question, then I say—let us distribute our time on those questions which are most important for you. My business here, as I understand it, is mainly to listen and make notes. What I wanted to tell you I have already told you at the congress. I am trying to take down notes as to what gubernia, what uyezds the complaints come from and what most of them are about. I think the time should be distributed in such a way that after the question of compulsory carting tax has been dealt with, we should figure out what questions seem most important, so that delegates from different gubernias can have time to have their say on them. My business here is to make as detailed notes as possible in order to know what the non-Party delegates have spoken about. In any case, it will be very difficult for me to answer some of the questions that will be put here, as I have no information at hand and cannot give an immediate reply. That is why I suggest choosing questions which are considered the most important and on which delegates will speak from the floor, the way the carting tax question has been raised, and I shall write down every statement made by local people.

2

Comrades, it is very difficult for me to say even a few words on this question, because all the questions that have been put here I am writing down with a note of what gubernia they come from, but without exact information from the institution concerned I am unable straight off to answer the questions that have been put here. The comrade from the Commissariat for Labour who has just spoken, found it much easier because he has before his eyes a published law and an explanation of what mitigations the enforcement of that law will yield. Without information from the commissariats concerned I can give no definite answers to some of the questions that have been put here.

A number of notes have been sent up. One of them is from a Ukrainian comrade from Kiev, who asks why I have never visited the Ukraine. It is a long journey to the Ukraine, and a difficult one to undertake.

One comrade asks, who is going to pay for the horses killed in the carting service. I have made a note of that question. The comrade has already answered in a general way.

Two notes have been handed up on the question of the tax in kind and about it being impossible for the needy peasant to buy textile goods. Naturally, the peasants in all gubernias these days have many difficulties like these to bear. Without information from the institution concerned I am unable to answer this sort of question just now.

Can we help and to what extent can we help? I repeat, that at the moment I can give no reply. It seems to me that the most important thing that has been said here on the question of carting service is—as far as I can gather from a glance at my notes (and I have written down briefly what each of the comrades has said here)—the most important thing, to my mind, are the instances of abuse and irregularities on the part of the Zheleskoms.⁴³⁹ Most of the complaints have been about the stints assigned by the Zheleskoms being heavy, about the hard time peasants are having, about there being far too many irregularities in the distribution and assignment of jobs, especially at a time when they are simply harmful to the peasants' farm work. I have made notes of all these remarks, and a note that when the last three-week campaign was held, all comrades from the centre were sent out to the local areas. I asked for exact information on all irregularities connected with fuel work, and on all abuses, as well as a number of reports to be collected. I have already begun to receive letters about this, but recently, owing to ill-health, which made me confine myself only to a general report at the congress, I have not been able to deal with these letters myself. This will be entrusted to another comrade, who is temporarily taking my place, but we shall definitely collect all the information that has come in during the last three-week campaign. The complaints about the irregularities and abuses of the Zheleskoms I consider, on the whole, undoubtedly correct. One of the principal reasons why it was decided to introduce the carting tax which the comrade from the Labour Commissariat has spoken about here is that, unless the amount of work to be done is properly determined (this attempt is being

made by the fixing of a six-day period of work in the law), unless this is properly determined in the law, abuses by the gubernia logging committees and the Zheleskoms are bound to take place and will be very difficult to combat. But when the law definitely declares, as it now does, how many work days are required and there will be a known set task fixing how much work is to be done in the given number of days, the abuses will be much easier to combat. Naturally, the fight against abuses by these bodies in the gubernias and uyezds is no easy job, especially when, as a comrade here pointed out, many of the old employees, the former land-owners and former timber contractors have wormed their way into these bodies. A stricter eye must be kept on this in the local areas and we must have more comrades from among the non-Party peasants in the Central Executive Committee, who could be applied to in the event of a complaint failing to reach its destination, and who would raise the question at a sitting of the C.E.C. and demand an investigation into the abuses. These measures will be put through at this congress in any case. The number of C.E.C. members from among the non-Party peasants, as comrades taking part in the congress have told me, will definitely be increased. By this means it will be possible to keep an eye on abuses by the Zheleskoms and easier to combat them when there will be more non-Party peasant members in the C.E.C. I repeat, I am making a note of all the remarks that are made here and shall write to the appropriate commissariat or economic council about each of them in order to have proper measures taken. I cannot of course give a reply offhand to each particular question without getting the information from the commissariat concerned.

3

I have asked Comrade Kalinin for two minutes to clear up any misunderstanding that his words may have caused.⁴⁴⁰ I am sure he did not intend to impute to me the idea that I ever suggested burning prayer-books. Needless to say, I never suggested such a thing and never could. You know that according to our Constitution, the fundamental law

of our Republic, freedom of conscience in respect of religion is fully guaranteed to every person.

Another word to the comrade who spoke about the very difficult situation in some of the uyezds of Vyatka Gubernia. These uyezds are in the famine-stricken area. Our main hope now will be in the agreement which the American Government has offered us. We shall conclude it within the next few days. Under this agreement the American Government offers twenty million dollars. We shall give ten million, making thirty million dollars altogether—that is, sixty million gold rubles. This is a sizable sum. Most of the spring crop area, if not all of it, will be sown. In addition we are sending men to Canada. I think we shall be able to spend an extra sum from the gold fund to buy a little more seed. The main problem now, of course, is the famine, the dearth of fodder. The sowing of spring crops must be done as fully as possible. Every effort in this direction will be made. (*Applause.*)

Printed from the shorthand
record

DRAFT THESES ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE TRADE UNIONS UNDER THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY⁴⁴¹

The Plenum of the C.C., R.C.P. on 28.XII.1921 considered the question of the role and functions of the trade unions under the New Economic Policy. The plenum heard the reports of Comrades Rudzutak, Andreyev and Shlyapnikov (the planned report by Comrade Lutovinov was not made owing to failure to call the reporter out in time). After an exchange of opinions it was decided to submit the original draft theses of Comrades Rudzutak and Andreyev to a committee of these two comrades with the addition of Lenin and to charge this committee with drafting theses for endorsement by the Politbureau.

(Several lines will be added to this *after* approval of the draft by the committee and then the Politbureau.)

DRAFT

1. THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY
AND THE TRADE UNIONS

The New Economic Policy introduces a number of important changes in the position of the proletariat and, consequently, in that of the trade unions. These changes are due to the fact that in their entire policy of transition from capitalism to socialism the Communist Party and the Soviet government are now adopting special methods to implement this transition and in many respects are operating differently from the way they operated before: they are capturing a number of positions by a "new flanking movement", so to speak; they are drawing back in order to make better preparations for a new offensive against capitalism. In particular, a free market and capitalism, both subject to state control, are now being permitted and are developing; on the other hand, the state enterprises are being put on what is called a profit basis, i.e., they are in effect being largely reorganised on commercial and capitalist lines.

2. STATE CAPITALISM IN THE PROLETARIAN STATE
AND THE TRADE UNIONS

The proletarian state may, without changing its own nature, permit freedom of trade and the development of capitalism only within certain bounds, and only on the condition that the state regulates (supervises, controls, determines the forms and methods of, etc.) private trade and private capitalism. The success of such regulation will depend not only on the state authorities, but also, and to a larger extent, on the degree of maturity of the proletariat and of the masses of the working people generally, on their cultural level, etc. But even if this regulation is completely successful, the antagonism of class interests between labour and capital will certainly remain. Consequently, one of the main tasks that will henceforth confront the trade unions is to protect in every way the class interests of the proletariat in its struggle against capital. This task should be openly put in the forefront, and the machinery

of the trade unions must be reorganised, modified or supplemented accordingly; strike funds, and so on should be formed, or rather, built up.

3. THE STATE ENTERPRISES THAT ARE BEING PUT ON A PROFIT BASIS AND THE TRADE UNIONS

The conversion of state enterprises to what is called the profit basis is inevitably and inseparably connected with the New Economic Policy; in the near future this is bound to become the predominant, if not the sole, form of state enterprise. Actually, this means that with the free market now permitted and developing, the state enterprises, will to a large extent be put on a commercial, capitalist basis. This circumstance, in view of the urgent need to increase the productivity of labour and make every state enterprise pay its way and show a profit, and in view of the inevitable rise of narrow departmental interests and excessive departmental zeal, is bound to create a certain conflict of interests between the masses of workers and the directors and managers of the state enterprises, or the government departments in charge of them. Therefore, it is undoubtedly the duty of the trade unions, in regard to the state enterprises as well, to protect the class interests of the proletariat and the working masses against their employers.

4. THE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CLASS STRUGGLE OF THE PROLETARIAT IN A STATE WHICH RECOGNISES PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND, FACTORIES, ETC., AND WHERE POLITICAL POWER IS IN THE HANDS OF THE CAPITALIST CLASS, AND THE CLASS STRUGGLE OF THE PROLETARIAT IN A STATE WHICH DOES NOT RECOGNISE PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND AND THE MAJORITY OF THE LARGE ENTERPRISES AND WHERE POLITICAL POWER IS IN THE HANDS OF THE PROLETARIAT

As long as classes exist, the class struggle is inevitable. In the period of transition from capitalism to socialism the existence of classes is inevitable; and the Programme of the

Russian Communist Party definitely states that we are taking only the first steps in the transition from capitalism to socialism. Hence, the Communist Party, the Soviet government and the trade unions must frankly admit the existence of a class struggle and its inevitability until the electrification of industry and agriculture is completed—at least in the main—and until small production and the supremacy of the market are thereby cut off at the roots. It follows from this that at the present moment we can under no circumstances abandon the idea of the strike struggle, we cannot, as a matter of principle, conceive the possibility of a law that makes compulsory state mediation take the place of strikes.

On the other hand, it is obvious that under capitalism the ultimate object of the strike struggle is to break up the state machine and to overthrow the given class state power. Under the transitional type of proletarian state such as ours, however, the ultimate object of the strike struggle can only be to fortify the proletarian state and the state power of the proletarian class by combating the bureaucratic distortions, mistakes and flaws in this state, and by curbing the class appetites of the capitalists who try to evade its control, etc. Hence, the Communist Party, the Soviet government and the trade unions must never forget and must never conceal from the workers and the mass of the working people that the strike struggle in a state where the proletariat holds political power can be explained and justified only by the bureaucratic distortions of the proletarian state and by all sorts of survivals of the old capitalist system in the government offices on the one hand, and by the political immaturity and cultural backwardness of the mass of the working people on the other. When the law courts and all other organs of the state are built on a class basis, by the working people themselves, with the bourgeoisie excluded from the electorate, the normal method of settling conflicts between labour and capital, between employed and employers, will more and more often find expression in the working people turning directly to the state authorities,

5. REVERSION TO VOLUNTARY TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP

The compulsory wholesale signing up of all workers for membership in the trade unions is no longer consistent with the present degree of socialisation achieved in industry or with the level of development of the masses. Compulsory membership has moreover introduced a certain degree of bureaucratic distortion into the trade unions themselves. It is absolutely essential to revert for a fairly considerable length of time to the practice of voluntary membership in the trade unions. Under no circumstances must trade union members be required to subscribe to any specific political views; in this respect, as well as in respect of religion, the trade unions must be non-partisan. All that must be required of trade union members in the proletarian state is that they should understand comradely discipline and the necessity of uniting the workers' forces for the purpose of protecting the interests of the working people, and that they should keep faith with the working people's government, i.e., the Soviet government. The proletarian state must encourage the workers to organise in trade unions both for legal and material reasons; but the trade unions can have no rights without duties.

6. THE TRADE UNIONS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF INDUSTRY

Following its seizure of political power, the principal and fundamental interest of the proletariat lies in securing an increase in output, an enormous increase in the productive forces of society. This task, which is clearly formulated in the Programme of the Russian Communist Party, is particularly urgent in our country today owing to post-war ruin, famine and economic dislocation. Hence, the speediest and most enduring success in restoring large-scale industry is a condition without which no success can be achieved in the general cause of emancipating labour from the yoke of capital and securing the victory of socialism. To achieve

this success in Russia, in the conditions at present obtaining in that country, it is absolutely essential that all authority in the factories be concentrated in the hands of the management. The factory management, usually built up on the principle of one-man responsibility, must have authority independently to fix and pay out wages, and also distribute rations, working clothes, and all other supplies; it must enjoy the utmost freedom to manoeuvre, exercise strict control of the actual successes achieved in increasing production, in making the factory pay its way and show a profit, and carefully select the most talented and capable administrative personnel, etc.

Under these circumstances, any direct interference by the trade unions in the management of the factories must be regarded as positively harmful and impermissible.

It would be absolutely wrong, however, to interpret this indisputable axiom to mean that the trade unions must play no part in the socialist organisation of industry and in the management of state industry. Their participation in this is necessary in the following strictly defined forms.

7. THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE TRADE UNIONS IN THE BUSINESS AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANISATIONS OF THE PROLETARIAN STATE

The proletariat is the class foundation of the state making the transition from capitalism to socialism. In a country where the small peasantry is overwhelmingly predominant the proletariat can successfully fulfil this function if it very skilfully, cautiously and gradually establishes an alliance with the vast majority of the peasantry. The trade unions must collaborate closely and constantly with the government, all the political and economic activities of which are guided by the class-conscious vanguard of the working class—the Communist Party. Being a school of communism in general, the trade unions must, in particular, be a school for training the whole mass of workers, and eventually all working people, in the art of managing socialist industry (and gradually also agriculture).

Proceeding from these principles, the trade unions' part in the activities connected with the business and administrative organisations of the proletarian state should take the following main forms:

(1) The trade unions should help staff all the business and administrative bodies connected with economics by nominating their candidates for them and casting a consultative vote; the trade unions take part in these bodies too, not directly, but through the members of the higher state bodies, the members of business boards, members of the factory managements (where collegiate management is practised), managers, their assistants, etc., nominated by them and endorsed by the Communist Party and the Soviet government.

(2) One of the most important functions of the trade unions is to promote and train factory managers from among the workers and the masses of the working people generally. At the present time we have scores of such factory managers who are quite satisfactory, and hundreds who are more or less satisfactory, but very soon, however, we must have hundreds of the former and thousands of the latter. The trade unions must much more carefully and persistently than hitherto keep a systematic register of all workers and peasants capable of holding posts of this kind, and thoroughly, efficiently and from every aspect verify the progress they make in learning the art of management.

(3) No less important is the participation of the trade unions in all the planning bodies of the proletarian state. In addition to participating in all cultural and educational activities and in production propaganda, the trade unions must also, on an increasing scale, enlist the working class and the masses of the working people generally for all branches of the work of building up the state economy; they must make them familiar with all aspects of economic life and with all details of industrial operations—from the procurement of raw materials to the marketing of the product; give them a more and more concrete understanding of the single state plan of socialist economy and the worker's and peasant's practical interest in its implementation.

(4) The drawing up of wage rates and scales of supplies, etc., is one of the essential functions of the trade unions in the building of socialism and in their participation in the management of industry. In particular, disciplinary courts should steadily improve labour discipline and proper ways of promoting it and achieving increased productivity; but they must not interfere with the functions of the People's Courts in general or with the functions of factory managements.

This list of the major functions of the trade unions in the work of building up socialist economy, should, of course, be drawn up in greater detail by the competent trade union and government bodies. The most important thing is that the trade unions should consciously and resolutely avoid direct, inept, incompetent and irresponsible interference in administrative matters, which has caused no little harm, and should start persistent, practical activities calculated to extend over a long period of years and designed to give the workers and all the working people generally *practical training* in the art of *managing* the economy of the whole country.

8. CONTACT WITH THE MASSES— THE FUNDAMENTAL CONDITION FOR ALL TRADE UNION ACTIVITY

Contact with the masses, i.e., with the overwhelming majority of the workers (and eventually of all the working people), is the most important and most fundamental condition for the success of all trade union activity. In all the trade union organisations and their machinery, from bottom up, there should be instituted, and tested in practice over a period of many years, a system of responsible comrades—who must not all be Communists—who should live right among the workers, study their lives in every detail, and be able unerringly, on any question, and at any time, to judge the mood, the real needs, aspirations, and thoughts of the masses. They must be able without a shadow of false idealisation to define the degree of their class-consciousness and the extent to which they are influenced by various prejudices and survivals of the past; and they must be able

to win the boundless confidence of the masses by a comradely attitude and concern for their needs. One of the greatest and most serious dangers that confront the numerically small Communist Party, which, as the vanguard of the working class, is guiding a vast country in the process of transition to socialism (for the time being without the direct support of the more advanced countries), is isolation from the masses, the danger that the vanguard may run too far ahead and fail to "straighten out the line", fail to maintain firm contact with the whole army of labour, i.e., with the overwhelming majority of workers and peasants. Just as the very best factory, with the very best motors and first-class machines, will be forced to remain idle if the transmission belts from the motors to the machines are damaged, so our work of socialist construction must meet with inevitable disaster if the trade unions—the transmission belts from the Communist Party to the masses—are badly fitted or function badly. It is not sufficient to explain, to reiterate and corroborate this truth; it must be backed up organisationally by the whole structure of the trade unions and by their everyday activities.

9. THE CONTRADICTIONS IN THE STATUS OF THE TRADE UNIONS UNDER THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

From all the foregoing it is evident that there are a number of contradictions in the various functions of the trade unions. On the one hand, their principal method of operation is that of persuasion and education; on the other hand, as participants in the exercise of state power they cannot refuse to share in coercion. On the one hand, their main function is to protect the interests of the masses of the working people in the most direct and immediate sense of the term; on the other hand, as participants in the exercise of state power and builders of the economy as a whole they cannot refuse to resort to pressure. On the one hand, they must operate in military fashion, for the dictatorship of the proletariat is the fiercest, most dogged and most desperate class war; on the other hand, specifically military methods of operation

are least of all applicable to the trade unions. On the one hand, they must be able to adapt themselves to the masses, to their level; on the other hand, they must never pander to the prejudices and backwardness of the masses, but steadily raise them to a higher and higher level, etc., etc.

These contradictions are no accident, and they will persist for several decades. For one thing, these contradictions are inherent in every school. And the trade unions are a school of communism. We cannot count, until the lapse of several decades, on the majority of the workers achieving the highest level of development and discarding all traces and memories of the "school" for adults. Secondly, as long as survivals of capitalism and small production remain, contradictions between them and the young shoots of socialism are inevitable throughout the social system.

Two practical conclusions must be drawn from this. First, for the successful conduct of trade union activities it is not enough to understand their functions correctly, it is not enough to organise them properly. In addition, special tact is required, ability to approach the masses in a special way in each individual case for the purpose of raising these masses to a higher cultural, economic and political stage with the minimum of friction.

Second, the aforementioned contradictions will inevitably give rise to disputes, disagreements, friction, etc. A higher body is required with sufficient authority to settle these at once. This higher body is the Communist Party and the international federation of the Communist Parties of all countries—the Communist International.

10. THE TRADE UNIONS AND THE SPECIALISTS

The main principles on this question are set forth in the Programme of the Russian Communist Party; but these will remain paper principles unless constant attention is paid to the facts which indicate the degree to which they are put into practice. Recent facts of this kind are: first, cases of the murder of engineers by workers in socialised mines not only in the Urals, but also in the Donets Basin;

second, the suicide of V. V. Oldenborger, chief engineer of the Moscow Waterworks.*

The Communist Party and the Soviet government as a whole bear a far greater share of the blame for cases of this kind than the trade unions. It is not a question now of establishing the degree of political guilt, but of drawing certain political conclusions. Unless our leading bodies, i.e., the Communist Party, the Soviet government and the trade unions, guard as the apple of their eye every specialist who does his work conscientiously and knows and loves it—even though the ideas of communism are totally alien to him—it will be useless to expect any serious progress in socialist construction. We may not be able to achieve it soon, but we must at all costs achieve a situation in which specialists—as a separate social stratum, which will persist until we have reached the highest stage of development of communist society—can enjoy better conditions of life under socialism than they enjoyed under capitalism insofar as concerns their material and legal status, comradely collaboration with the workers and peasants, and in the intellectual plane, i.e., finding satisfaction in their work, realising that it is socially useful and independent of the sordid interests of the capitalist class. Nobody will regard a government department as being tolerably well organised if it does not take systematic measures to provide for all the needs of the specialists, to reward the best of them, to safeguard and protect their interests, etc., and does not secure practical results in this. The trade unions must conduct all the activities of the type indicated (or systematically collaborate in the activities of all the government departments concerned) not from the point of view of the interests of the given department, but from the point of view of the interests of labour and of the economy as a whole. With regard to the specialists, on the trade unions devolves the very arduous duty of daily exercising influence on the broad masses of the working people in order to create proper relations between them and the specialists. Only such activities can produce really important practical results.

* Here is the report about this in *Pravda* for 3.I. 1922: ((quote the full text on p. 4)).⁴²²

11. THE TRADE UNIONS AND PETTY-BOURGEOIS INFLUENCES ON THE WORKING CLASS

Trade unions are really effective only when they unite very broad strata of the non-Party workers. This must give rise—particularly in a country in which the peasantry largely predominates—to relative stability, specifically among the trade unions, of those political influences that serve as the superstructure over the remnants of capitalism and over small production. These influences are petty-bourgeois, i.e., Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik (the Russian variety of the parties of the II and II $\frac{1}{2}$ Internationals) on the one hand, and anarchist on the other. Only among these trends has any considerable number of people remained who defend capitalism ideologically and not from selfish class motives, and continue to believe in the non-class nature of the “democracy”, “equality” and “liberty” in general that they preach.

It is to this socio-economic cause and not to the role of individual groups, still less of individual persons, that we must attribute the survivals (sometimes even the revival) in our country of such petty-bourgeois ideas among the trade unions. The Communist Party, the Soviet bodies that conduct cultural and educational activities and all Communist members of trade unions must therefore devote far more attention to the ideological struggle against petty-bourgeois influences, trends and deviations among the trade unions, especially because the New Economic Policy is bound to lead to a certain strengthening of capitalism. It is urgently necessary to counteract this by intensifying the struggle against petty-bourgeois influences upon the working class.

The End

Discuss together with the theses.

Give this to Comrade Molotov without rewriting.

This is the end of the publishable theses, i.e., the draft of them that is being submitted to the commission and then the Politbureau.

I suggest that the resolution contained in Comrade Rudzutak's draft be adopted by a special decision of the Politbureau in the following wording:

The Politbureau directs the Orgbureau to set up under the Orgbureau of the Central Committee a special commission to check and replace some of the leading officials (and if possible all communist functionaries) in the trade union movement for the purpose of intensifying the struggle against petty-bourgeois, S.R., Menshevik and anarchist influences and deviations. This commission to complete its work (or most of it) by the next, Eleventh, congress of the R.C.P. and submit its report to the Party congress.⁴⁴³

Not for
publica-
tion

4.1.1922

Lenin

Written December 30, 1921—
January 4, 1922

Printed from the manuscript

MEMO TO V. M. MOLOTOV FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) WITH DRAFT DECISIONS

To *Comrade Molotov* for the Politbureau

In view of the utter inadequacy (or reticence?) of the report in *Pravda* on 3.I.1922 concerning the suicide of *Oldenborger* and the investigations into this case

I propose the following decision for the Politbureau:

1) that the Moscow Soviet be asked to apply to the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee in order to have all those persons mentioned in the commission's findings brought to *trial*;

2) that the Presidium of the A.C.E.C. be asked to grant this request immediately and

3) — to give this wide publicity in the *whole* Soviet press;

4) that the People's Commissariat for Justice be directed (under the personal responsibility of Comrade Kursky and an appointed public prosecutor) to handle this case skilfully, impressively and with special care;

5) that the Orgbureau be directed to set up a special Party Court to try the whole *communist group* of the Waterworks. (Some to be expelled from the Party for good or for a time, some to be severely reprimanded, depending on the measure of their guilt.) The trial to be held in an impressive public manner.

+ 6) that *Izvestia* and *Pravda* be instructed to highlight this outrageous affair in a number of strong articles:

4.I.1922

Lenin

Another draft resolution:

All cases of the murder of engineers (and specialists) at Soviet enterprises shall be reported to the Politbureau together with the results of the investigations ((the Supreme Economic Council, the A.C.C.T.U., etc., through the C.L.D.)).⁴⁴⁴

P.S. This is scandalous: we should ring the tocsin.

Printed from the manuscript

**MOTION FOR THE POLITBUREAU
OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
ON ALLOCATION OF FUNDS
TO THE NIZHNI-NOVGOROD RADIO LABORATORY**

(Re the request of Dovgalevsky for 50,000 gold rubles to be allocated to the Nizhni-Novgorod Radio Laboratory)

I support the request and ask Comrade Molotov to put this to the vote of the Politbureau. I ask the Politbureau members to bear in mind the exceptional importance of

the Nizhni-Novgorod Radio Laboratory, the tremendous services it has already rendered and the great use it can be to us in the near future both in military matters and in propaganda work.⁴⁴⁵

Lenin

Dictated over the telephone
January 12, 1922

Printed from the secretary's notes
(typewritten copy)

DIRECTIVES ON THE FILM BUSINESS

The People's Commissariat for Education should organise the supervision of all film showings and systematise this business. All films shown in the R.S.F.S.R. should be registered and numbered at the Commissariat for Education. A definite proportion should be fixed for every film-showing programme:

a) entertainment films, specially for advertisement or income (of course, without obscenity and counter-revolution) and

b) under the heading "From the life of peoples of all countries"—pictures with a special propaganda message, such as: Britain's colonial policy in India, the work of the League of Nations, the starving Berliners, etc., etc. Besides films, photographs of propaganda interest should be shown with appropriate subtitles. The privately owned cinemas should be made to yield a sufficient return to the state in the form of rent, the owners to be allowed to increase the number of films and present new ones subject to censorship by the Commissariat for Education and provided the proper proportion is maintained between entertainment films and propaganda films coming under the heading of films "From the life of peoples of all countries", in order that film-makers should have an incentive for producing new pictures. They should be allowed wide initiative within these limits. Pictures of a propaganda and educative nature should be checked by old Marxists and writers, to avoid a repetition of the many sad instances when propaganda

with us defeated its own purpose. Special attention should be given to organising film showings in the villages and in the East, where they are novelties and where our propaganda, therefore, will be all the more effective.⁴⁴⁶

Dictated January 17, 1922

Printed from the notes of
N. P. Gorbunov
(typewritten copy)

**MOTION FOR THE POLITBUREAU
OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
ON M. I. KALININ'S TRIP TO THE UKRAINE⁴⁴⁷**

To Comrade Molotov for all the members
of the Politbureau

Please put to the vote of the Politbureau the following motion: that Comrade Kalinin be directed immediately to make a round of the richer grain gubernias of the Ukraine to collect aid for the victims of the famine. The expedition to be fitted out with great thoroughness to enable it to carry out effective agitation for relief collections by means of photographs, films, demonstration of witnesses and sufferers from the famine-stricken areas, etc. Personal responsibility for the practical organisation of the expedition to be imposed upon

1. Kalinin for the political side of the business
2. a specially appointed practical worker endorsed by the Politbureau who would really be capable of putting through and organising the business properly.

Kalinin together with the whole expedition shall leave within 3 days.

Lenin

Dictated over the telephone
January 27, 1922

Printed from the secretary's
notes

MOTION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

To Comrade Molotov for All Members
of the Politbureau

I think that "Bespartiiny" in today's *Pravda* is proposing a perfectly correct and timely plan.⁴⁴⁸

I move that a commission be set up to elaborate it immediately and put it into effect as quickly as possible, this commission to consist of Molotov (replaceable by somebody appointed by the Secretariat of the Central Committee or the Orgbureau), Yakovenko, Teodorovich and the "Bespartiiny" in question.

Lenin

Dictated over the telephone
January 27, 1922

Printed from the secretary's
notes

DRAFT DIRECTIVES TO THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE GENOA DELEGATION⁴⁴⁹

1.II.1922

To Comrade Molotov for members of the Politbureau

I propose that the following directives to the deputy chairman and all members of the Genoa delegation be endorsed:

1. All members of the delegation should be posted in a general way on all political and financial questions that are likely to be brought up at the conference. Moreover, every member of the delegation should make a special and thorough study of one of the most important diplomatic and one of the most important financial questions.

Chicherin and Litvinov are to be charged with drawing up an assignment of these questions among all the members

of the delegation (with the exception of sick members like Rudzutak, etc.).

2. Every member of the delegation must prepare for the meeting on 22.II (with the Politbureau of the C.C.) the briefest (maximum 2-3 pages telegraphic style) of summaries of his programme of views and policies on all cardinal questions, both diplomatic and financial.

3. Chicherin and Litvinov are to see to it that the appropriate literature in different languages is collected and handed out to the members of the delegation together with a systematic collection of documents in the Russian language.

4. In view of the special importance and special difficulty of financial questions, Chicherin and Litvinov, by arrangement with the People's Commissariat for Finance, the State Planning Commission and A. D. Tsyurupa, are to draw up a list of financial experts and a plan of work distribution among them; this to be done within 1 week.

5. All members of the delegation must be *perfectly familiar* with Keynes's book (*The Economic Consequences of the Peace*) and with similar bourgeois and bourgeois-pacifist books and *parts of books* (Lansing on the "imperialist" nature of the war and the peace of 1918, and so on). Preparations should be on these lines: speeches and statements should give the *communist* point of view in a nutshell, set forth in such a way as to intimate that although we are Communists and hold such-and-such communist views we wish to cite non-Communists to this audience and to pose the question of annulling all debts and so forth from the bourgeois standpoint (see 6 and 7).

6. All speeches and statements by our delegates at the conference should be calculated in advance in such a way that whatever the course or the outcome of the conference (even in the event of its speedy failure, which we, of course, should try to prevent), there would be, as a result, a brief but clear statement of the sum total of communist views (on questions of international relations and economics) and a detailed statement of bourgeois and bourgeois-pacifist views on the irreconcilable contradictions of the imperialist world (and the imperialist peace).

7. It is highly probable, almost certain, that all the bourgeois delegates at the conference will immediately form a silent but strong bloc for attacking us on account of Georgia and with all the usual accusations of petty-bourgeois and big bourgeois diplomacy and democracy. We should be prepared for this in advance and make sure that we are the first to attack (apart from our main object of dividing the different countries and setting them by the ears). The initiative in taking the offensive should be done mostly in a veiled form, for example by "hinting" (or by bourgeois quotations from relevant works) at the most painful and shameful points of imperialist relations (Korea; Amritsar; public flogging of revolutionaries in India; Lloyd George's speech against Briand at Cannes concerning "assassinations" and so on and so forth).

8. In view of the repeatedly proven desire on the part of our specialists in general and the Menshevik-minded ones in particular to fool us (very often successfully) by turning their foreign trips into a holiday and a means of strengthening whiteguard ties, the Central Committee proposes to limit ourselves in this case to an absolute minimum of fully reliable experts, each of whom is to present a guarantee in writing from the People's Commissar concerned and from several Communists. Forty-five is the top limit. The list of experts and of all members to be submitted for approval to the C.C. within 1½ weeks. This § to be taken charge of by Comrades Litvinov, Joffe and Chicherin. They are also to choose a business manager who will not permit night work and such-like scandalous practices.

I move the following addendum to the draft theses of *directives* for the Genoa delegation:

9. Our delegates should cite § 1 of the Cannes terms in their speeches and statements as often as possible, this citing to be done, first, exclusively in the wording of *Petit Parisien*, i.e., using the words "system of property" and not just "system"; secondly, these words and this § to be given an extended meaning as if implying recognition of the inevitability of the capitalist system of property being replaced by the communist system of property, as if the only point at issue "between us" now remains the question of when this replacement will be effected and in

what manner, i.e., by the Russian method of 1917-20 or by the Lloyd George method of "truncated revolution" of the 1921 Irish type or the 1922 Egyptian type.⁴⁵⁰

Lenin

Printed from the manuscript

LETTER TO N. I. BUKHARIN AND G. Y. ZINOVIEV

To Comrades Bukharin and Zinoviev

We must consider beforehand what people, preferably those with a ready tongue, are going to represent the Comintern at the conference with the II and II^{1/2} Internationals.⁴⁵¹ We must also consider beforehand the basic questions of tactics and strategy to be employed at this meeting.

The list of questions to be dealt with at the meeting should be considered beforehand and drawn up in agreement with each of the parties attending the meeting. On our part we should include in this list only questions that have a direct bearing on practical joint action by the working masses and touching on matters that are recognised as indisputable in the official press statement of each of the three participants. We must explain at length the reasons why we confine ourselves to such questions in the interests of a united front. In the event of the yellow fraternity raising mooted questions of policy, such as our attitude to the Mensheviks, the question of Georgia, etc., we should adopt these tactics: 1) declare that the list of questions can be drawn up only by a unanimous decision of all three participants; 2) declare that in drawing up our list of questions we were guided exclusively by the desire for unity of action by the working masses, which unity could be achieved immediately even under existing deep-seated political differences; 3) declare that we fully agree to questions such as our attitude to the Mensheviks; the question of Georgia and any other questions being raised by the II and II^{1/2} Internationals, provided that they

agree to the following questions being raised: 1) the renegade attitude of the II and II^{1/2} Internationals to the Basle Manifesto; 2) complicity of these same parties in the murder of Luxemburg, Liebknecht and other Communists of Germany through the bourgeois governments which those parties support; 3) a similar attitude of these parties to the murder of revolutionaries in the colonies by the bourgeois parties which the II and II^{1/2} Internationals support, etc., etc. We should prepare a list of these and similar questions beforehand and also prepare beforehand theses and speakers on various important questions of this nature.

We must find occasion to declare officially that we regard the II and II^{1/2} Internationals only as inconsistent and vacillating participants of a bloc with the counter-revolutionary world bourgeoisie, and that we agree to attend a meeting on the united front for the sake of achieving possible practical unity of direct action on the part of the masses and in order to expose the political error of the II and II^{1/2} Internationals' entire position, just as the latter (the II and II^{1/2} Internationals) have agreed to attend a meeting with us for the sake of achieving practical unity of direct action by the masses and in order to expose the political error of our position.

Lenin

Dictated over the telephone
February 1, 1922

Printed from the secretary's
notes (typewritten copy)

DRAFT DECISION

• FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) IN CONNECTION WITH THE GENOA CONFERENCE

To Comrade Molotov (for the members of the Politbureau)

I draw attention to the article "The Genoa Conference" by Y. Klyuchnikov in No. 13 of *Smena Vekh*,⁴⁶² and propose:

1. That the question of enlisting Klyuchnikov's services as an expert be discussed jointly with the members of the delegation.

2. That it be made incumbent upon the whole delegation to see to it that several articles on the same subject as that dealt with in Klyuchnikov's article are published in our press, only at greater length and in fuller detail so as to cover the ground thoroughly.

3. That every person who wishes to go as an expert from Russia or who has been nominated for this post be made within 10 days to prepare an article dealing in detail with Russia's relations with foreign countries in his selected field. Those articles (or such parts of them) which contain no confidential matter should immediately be published in our press.

4. That Chicherin and Litvinov be made responsible for reporting the distribution of subjects for the articles and the names of the writers under Points 1 and 2 to the Politbureau within one week.

Lenin

Dictated over the telephone
February 4, 1922

Printed from the secretary's
notes (typewritten copy)

ON THE PUBLICATION OF A TELEGRAM REPORTING THE PAMPHLET BY PARVUS⁴⁵³

To Comrade Molotov
(for members of the Politbureau)

I propose that an inquiry be made as to who was responsible for publishing in our newspapers the other day a telegram giving a summary of Parvus's writings.

When the guilty party has been ascertained, I propose that the ROSTA* manager of that department be severely reprimanded and the journalist directly responsible should be dismissed, for only a perfect fool or a whiteguard could use our newspapers for advertising such a scoundrel as Parvus.

Lenin

Dictated over the telephone
February 4, 1922

Printed from the secretary's
note (typewritten copy)

* ROSTA—Russian Telegraph Agency.— *Ed.*

2

DECISION OF THE POLITBUREAU
OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
MARCH 11, 1922

The Politbureau recognises that the publication of such a telegram was improper, as it gave the impression of advertising Parvus, and the editors of Party and Soviet newspapers are directed to refrain from publishing such telegrams in future.

Printed from the typewritten
copy of the minutes

DRAFT DIRECTIVES OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
FOR THE SOVIET DELEGATION
TO THE GENOA CONFERENCE⁴⁵⁴

I propose the following draft of C.C. directives:

Without endorsing the list of experts, the C.C. directs the candidates nominated in it to submit within a week a *précis* of *programme* and *tactics* (on questions that come within the terms of reference of the given expert) for *the whole* Genoa Conference. All People's Commissars are obliged within 2 days to give *written* testimonials and guarantees for their candidates nominated as experts. Should the experts disgrace themselves in Europe they and the People's Commissars will be held responsible.

In furtherance of the directives concerning the Genoa Conference *I propose the following*:

1. Without pre-determining in what form and at what time the speeches of our delegation should be made, the C.C. considers that the delegation is definitely obliged to develop a full, independent and integral programme on all cardinal issues.

2. This programme should be a bourgeois-pacifist programme with the reservation, timely and clearly expressed

by our delegation, that we do not put forward here a communist programme—the only one that is in keeping with our views—(set it forth briefly) because we wish to put before the other delegations, who hold fundamentally different views, a number of palliatives and measures of a reformist type which have already been proposed in parts in Britain and other capitalist countries by people who share bourgeois views. Under certain conditions this programme of palliatives could serve to mitigate the present difficult situation (the only real way out of which is possible given a final break with all the principles of capitalist property).

3. A tentative list of the main points of this programme:

- (1) annulment of all debts;
- (2) application of the "Irish" solution to all colonies and dependent countries and nations;
- (3) radical revision of the Versailles Treaty;
- (4) the granting of loans on favourable terms to the countries most ruined by the war and too weak to recover their own feet, while being most important for world economy as eventual suppliers of vast quantities of food and raw materials;
- (5) establishment of a unified international gold unit for the currency systems of a number of countries and measures to introduce this unit;
- (6) an agreement among a number of countries on measures to combat inflation and depreciation of money (enumerate some of these measures);
- (7) agreement among a number of countries on measures for coping with the fuel crisis and on measures for the most rational and economical use of power resources on the basis of unified planned electrification;
- (8) the same in regard to the most urgent measures for reorganising and improving international transport to handle deliveries of raw materials and food.

And so on.

4. Such a programme should be elaborated in speeches, and if this is impossible, printed in 3-4 European languages and handed out to the delegates and the press (if only in the form of a précis). (In any case it should be printed.)

5. Only such people should be admitted as experts who are capable of developing, and making out a case for such

a programme (in one or another part of it) and who have *proved this capability*. The experts will have to have their programmes and plans printed *for Europe over their own signatures*. ((Such a programme will evoke comment in the press of the Third International, whose articles will say: this attempt "to convince" will do no harm, but practically it is useless, because what is *needed* is a *revolution*; and in the press of the II and II^{1/2} Internationals—we shall see what they have to say.))

Written February 6, 1922

Printed from the manuscript

MEMO TO V. M. MOLOTOV WITH A MOTION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

Comrade Molotov,

Please put two proposals for the Politbureau to the vote by telephone:

1) Not to publish the decision of the Politbureau on the figure of a single grain tax pending a new decision after the State Planning Commission has completed and submitted its calculations.

(Krzhizhanovsky yesterday complained to me bitterly that they had been doing a big job on these calculations, but it was broken off without him having even been given a hearing. Please give him another 3-4 days and do not publish until then.)

2) The newspaper *Kooperativnoye Dyelo* to be closed down. Arrangements to be made with *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* for using the material.⁴⁵⁵

Lenin

Written February 11, 1922

Printed from the manuscript

MARKS ON N. L. MESHCHERYAKOV'S LETTER AND A DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

...Now as regards the newspaper *Kooperativnoye Dyelo*.

?? 1) The Board of Centrosoyuz, which consists only of Communists, says that the newspaper is necessary if the co-operatives are to fulfil their difficult and new organising work and carry out the trade tasks imposed upon them.

2) The paper's editorial board consists only of Communists: I, Sarabyanov, Shvetsov, Kutuzov-Ilimsky, etc.

?? 3) A delegation of Western co-operators is coming to Russia. The closing of the newspaper will be taken advantage of by the old co-operators and will make co-operative work difficult.

4) The closing of the newspaper will be exploited at the Genoa Conference.

ha—ha!! 5) So far there has been nothing hostile to Soviet power or communism in the paper...

February 11, 1922

N. Meshcheryakov

To Comrade Molotov for the Politbureau:

in view of the obvious flimsiness of Comrade Meshcheryakov's arguments, I propose:

1) that the Board of Centrosoyuz be directed to replace the daily newspaper *Kooperativnoye Dyelo* with a weekly;

2) the personnel and funds thus released should be used wholly for improving the activities of headquarters in supervising and helping to develop proper trade by the co-operatives locally;

3) reports on the fulfilment of § 2 to be made monthly to the Politbureau;

4) more contributions to be made to *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*

14/II

Lenin

Written February 14, 1922

Printed from the manuscript

**LETTER TO MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU
OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
WITH REMARKS TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION
FOR THE FIRST EXTENDED PLENARY MEETING
OF THE COMINTERN EXECUTIVE
ON PARTICIPATION IN A CONFERENCE
OF THE THREE INTERNATIONALS⁴⁵⁶**

To Comrade Molotov
(for members of the Politbureau)

I move the following amendments to the draft resolution sent in by Zinoviev concerning the Comintern's participation in the planned conference of all the workers' parties of the world. After the words: "unity of action among the working class masses which could be achieved immediately, despite fundamental political differences," the phrases following this should be deleted up to the words: "that the working-class masses demand unity of action". The phrase beginning with these last words should be recast as follows: "the class-conscious workers, who are perfectly well aware of these political differences, nevertheless, together with the vast majority of the workers, desire and demand unity of action on practical issues most urgent and close to the interests of the workers. There can be no doubt about this now in the mind of any conscientious person" and so on.

My second amendment is that the phrase beginning with the words: "all controversial issues to be avoided and questions that are not open to argument to be brought into focus" should be amended as follows: "and while postponing for a time the more controversial questions and bringing into focus the less controversial, both sides, or rather all three international organisations taking part in the conference, will naturally count on the ultimate victory of their points of view."

My chief amendment is aimed at deleting the passage which calls the leaders of the II and II¹/₂ Internationals accomplices of the world bourgeoisie. You might as well call a man a "jackass". It is absolutely unreasonable to

risk wrecking an affair of tremendous practical importance for the sake of giving oneself the extra pleasure of scolding scoundrels, whom we shall be scolding a thousand times at another place and time. If there are still people at the enlarged meeting of the Executive who have not grasped the fact that the tactic of the united front will help us to overthrow the leaders of the II and II¹/₂ Internationals, these people should have an extra number of popular lectures and talks read to them. It may be necessary to have a specially popular pamphlet written for them and published in French, say, if the Frenchmen have not yet grasped Marxist tactics. Finally, it were better to adopt this resolution, not unanimously, but by a majority (those who voted against we would afterwards put through a special, thorough and popular course of enlightenment) than run the risk of spoiling a practical affair for the sake of a few political youngsters who tomorrow will be cured of their infantile disorder.

Lenin

Dictated over the telephone
February 23, 1922

Printed from the secretary's
notes (typewritten copy)

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE TASKS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION AT GENOA

Only for circulation among members of the Politbureau

Draft decision for the C.C.

1. The C.C. recognises as correct the appraisal of the situation and the tasks (of our delegation at Genoa) as given in the theses of Comrade Litvinov.

2. The C.C. fully empowers Vice Chairman Chicherin to act as chairman of the delegation.

3. In the event of Comrade Chicherin's illness or departure his powers shall be vested in turn in one of the two trios:

a) Litvinov, Krasin, Rakovsky; b) Litvinov, Joffe, Vorovsky.

4. Our delegation should try to evade the question of acceptance of the Cannes terms. Failing this, and in the event of our being presented with a direct ultimatum, we should try to work Krasin's formula: "All countries recognise their state debts and undertake to compensate damage and losses caused by the acts of their governments."

If this does not work either, we should make for a break, declaring definitely that we are prepared to recognise private debts, but that, not wishing to play hide-and-seek, we point out that we consider them covered, together with the whole sum of our obligations, by our counter-claims. We accept no chief umpire between us and all the bourgeois countries, since the dispute is between two systems of property.

If we have to break, we should make it perfectly clear that the main and sole reason for the break is the greed of a handful of private capitalists, Urquhart, etc., whom the governments serve.

As a maximum concession these capitalists can be offered: a preferential right to concessions (i.e., if we grant X a concession on their former property wholly or in part on such-and-such terms, we undertake to give it to its former owner on the same terms).

5. In view of the possibility of the bourgeois trying to prevent us from developing our programme, we should make every effort in the very first speech to set forth, if not develop, this programme, or at least outline it (and immediately publish it in greater detail).

6. In our programme we should, without concealing our communist views, confine ourselves to a brief and passing mention of them (for instance, in a subordinate clause), and to a forthright statement to the effect that we do not consider this the right place to preach our views, since we have come for trade agreements and for an attempt to reach an agreement with the pacifist section of the other (bourgeois) camp.

By the pacifist section of that camp (or some other well-chosen polite expression) we should make it clear that we mean the petty-bourgeois, pacifist and semi-pacifist

democrats of the II and II^{1/2} International type, and the Keynes type, etc.

One of our main, if not principal, political tasks at Genoa is to single out this wing of the bourgeois camp from the rest of the camp, try to flatter that wing, make it known that we consider possible and desirable not only a trade, but a political agreement with them (as one of the few chances of capitalism's peaceful evolution towards the new order, which we, Communists, do not greatly believe in, but which we agree and consider our duty to help try out, as representatives of one power in face of a hostile majority of other powers).

Everything possible and even impossible should be done to strengthen the pacifist wing of the bourgeoisie and increase if only slightly its chances of success at the elections. This first and foremost. Secondly, to disunite the bourgeois countries that will be united against us at Genoa—such is our dual political task at Genoa, and not at all the development of communist views.

7. Every attempt should be made to develop at length and publicise as widely as possible (in print, if not in speeches) the plan for the rehabilitation of the national economy in Russia and in Europe—in the spirit of the State Planning Commission's researches and on the basis of these researches.

8. If the bourgeois camp in Genoa presents an ultimatum to us not to touch on questions of pacifism, but to speak only on narrow trade subjects, we should express our regret, but comply with this ultimatum, saying that we had two aims at this conference—a pacifist aim and a trade aim. This will leave only one.

9. The C.C. leaves it to the delegation to elaborate the pacifist programme, confining itself to the general directive that they should try to develop it as broadly as possible in order to split the pacifist camp of the international bourgeoisie away from the gross-bourgeois, aggressive-bourgeois, reactionary-bourgeois camp.

10. On the question of trade and concessions (including the question of loans), the forests of the North, etc., should be put forward as the principal guarantee. We agree to no derogation of the rights of our state. No agreements

are to be signed without the special consent, by telegraph, of the Central Committee.⁴⁵⁷

Lenin

Written February 24, 1922

Printed from the manuscript

MEMO TO V. M. MOLOTOV
FOR MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU
OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
WITH A DRAFT DECISION
ON THE NOTE TO ITALY

Comrade Molotov for Members of the Politbureau

I think the question of Genoa is clear after the memos of Chicherin, Joffe, Krasin and Litvinov.

I propose a draft decision.

Plan: all members of the Politbureau attempt to come to an agreement *in writing*. Failing this, all meet and sit for 1 hour *alone* (and without a secretary).

Then 1 or 2 hours with the delegation and finis.

24.II. *Lenin*

I move: That the Politbureau direct Comrade Chicherin to send a Note to Italy, a longish, meticulously courteous Note, but with plenty of digs in it hinting that it is not we who are violating one of the first "conditions", the 8.III convocation, that we propose 1) confirming 8.III; but if (2) the majority are against, we protest and propose 15.III.⁴⁵⁸

Lenin

Written February 24, 1922

Printed from the manuscript

**AMENDMENTS AND REMARKS -
TO THE DRAFT REGULATIONS
ON THE NARROW C.P.C.⁴⁵⁹**

this is un-Russian

This is the wrong
word, *clerical* or
pertaining to
clerical—would be
better

10. All decisive resolutions of the Narrow Council of People's Commissars, viz., those deciding a question in substance, other than those mentioned in Article 5, are referred to the C.P.C. All particular decisions of an incidental nature, such as: sundry investigations, collection of necessary material, forwarding papers to the departments concerned all kinds of answers to inquiries from government departments addressed to the Narrow Council, as well as management and business affairs of the C.P.C. are passed finally by the Narrow Council in its own name and are not referred to the Large Council.

+ I advise the addition of: a representative of the Moscow Soviet must always be called in on all questions that concern him.

+ *all* the People's Commissariats concerned must always be called in.

Written in February 1922

Printed from the manuscript

**DRAFT DECISION FOR THE POLITBUREAU
OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
ON THE SWEDISH LOAN⁴⁶⁰**

I move: that in principle it be approved and that the Foreign Trade Commissariat be directed to continue negotiations *on the understanding*, however, that (1) no final decision is made without the Politbureau (which should retain

the right of *refusal*); (2) an attempt is made to contract a *similar loan* on better terms with another (Italian) *offerer*.

13/III. *Lenin**

Written March 13, 1922

Printed from the manuscript

**LETTER TO MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU
OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
WITH PROPOSALS ON THE DRAFT DIRECTIVES
OF THE COMINTERN EXECUTIVE
FOR THE COMINTERN DELEGATION
TO THE CONFERENCE OF THE THREE
INTERNATIONALS⁴⁶¹**

Zinoviev

Stalin

Kamenev and other members of the Politbureau:

I propose

p. 11 (2nd part) (re changing attitude towards the Mensheviks) should be thrown out.

We cannot speak of this even provisionally just now.

In my opinion the directives should be amended this way:

AA) If you wish to raise the most controversial questions, i.e., those that evoke the greatest hostility of the III International towards the II and II¹/₂ Internationals, then we agree on condition

- (a) that the list of questions be arranged with us
- (b) ... and the most detailed rules of procedure in discussing the rights of the III International; these rights to be safeguarded in greatest detail, etc., etc.

* The draft was signed also by Kamenev and Stalin; Trotsky abstained.—*Ed.*

BB) We, on our part, propose raising *only* the least controversial questions with the aim of attempting partial, but joint action by the rank and file of the working class.

If they accept AA, we shall insert: a general appraisal by us of the II and II^{1/2} Internationals, the *sum* of our accusations against them, etc., etc.

Further: on 25.III, i.e., at the preliminary meeting, our delegates should be extremely discreet, *so long as* there is still hope of achieving our purpose, i.e., enticing all 3 Internationals ((the II and the II^{1/2})) into a general conference.

We should not make a break at once because of its *composition*, and in any case we should not break without getting in touch with Moscow, unless it is something *glaringly* mean, *absolutely* intolerable.

Lenin

Written March 14 or 15, 1922

Printed from the manuscript

LETTER TO THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) WITH A DRAFT OF DIRECTIVES TO COMRADES TRAVELLING ABROAD

Comrade Molotov for members of the Politbureau

In view of Comrade Radek's trip abroad, and *Comrade Sosnovsky's, too, I hear,*

—in view of the fact that a *flair for diplomacy is not one of the strong points* of these most valuable and important workers, I propose that the following directive be issued by the Politbureau:

"The Politbureau impresses upon all comrades travelling abroad that the present moment calls, on the one hand, for

the greatest restraint in utterances and talks about the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and, on the other hand, for a relentless struggle against and the greatest distrust towards them (as the most dangerous *de facto* accomplices of the whiteguards)".

17/III.

Lenin

P.S. Please get this *voted by telephone*.⁴⁶²

Lenin

Written March 17, 1922

Printed from the manuscript

LETTER TO THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)⁴⁶³

Comrade Molotov for members of the Politbureau

This is not the first time that the Moscow Committee (and Comrade Zelensky too) is showing *indulgence* towards communist criminals, who deserve to be hanged.

This is done "by mistake". The danger of this "mistake", however, is enormous. *I move:*

1. That Comrade Divilkovsky's proposal *be adopted*.
2. That the Moscow Committee be severely reprimanded for being *indulgent* to Communists (the form of indulgence—a special commission).
3. That it be confirmed to all Gubernia Party Committees that for the slightest attempt to "influence" the courts in the sense of "mitigating" the responsibility of Communists, the C.C. will *expel* such persons *from the Party*.

4. That a circular be issued notifying the People's Commissariat for Justice (copies to the Gubernia Party Committees) to the effect that the courts are obliged to punish Communists *more severely* than non-Communists.

People's judges and members of the Board of the Commissariat for Justice who fail to observe this are to be *dismissed from office*.

5. That the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee be asked to *inflict* a reprimand on the Presidium of the Moscow Soviet in the press.

Lenin

18.III.

P. S. It is a crying shame, disgraceful—the ruling Party defends “its own” scoundrels!!

Written March 18, 1922

Printed from the manuscript

NOTE TO N. P. GORBUNOV
AND PROPOSALS ON THE QUESTION
OF THE CO-OPERATIVES⁴⁶⁴

Comrade Gorbunov,

Read this, make a note of it for yourself and forward it *immediately* to Comrade Molotov for the members of the Politbureau, then for *Tsyurupa* and *Rykov*.

In my opinion, the co-operatives are not the trade unions.

The co-operatives should remain obligatory as regards membership.

Contributions should be voluntary. If our co-operatives will carry on trade (and not play at publishing dailies in which idle chatter-mongers engage in political twaddle, which everyone is fed up with), then trading should yield an income. Those who make contributions will receive an income.

Everybody should be a member of the co-operatives. We need this for the future. I don't see how this interferes with anything.

Shares are voluntary. Those who have paid their contributions should receive a share of the profit.

Conclusion: I think the matter should be postponed; it should not be raised at this session.

Lenin

18/III.

Written March 18, 1922

Printed from the manuscript

AMENDMENTS AND REMARKS TO THE DRAFT DECLARATION OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION AT THE GENOA CONFERENCE⁴⁶⁵

Comrade Molotov

With reference to Comrade Chicherin's motion entitled "Elements of a first speech at the Conference" I propose the following amendments:

1) Lines 7 and 8 down on the first page—I propose that we speak about "systems of property" and not just politico-economic systems.⁴⁶⁶

2) On the same page, lines 8 and 9 up—all mention of "inevitable forcible revolution and the use of sanguinary struggle" must definitely be thrown out; instead we should speak only of the fact that we Communists do not share the views of the pacifists—a fact which is sufficiently well known from communist literature—but having come here as merchants, we positively consider it our duty to give our fullest support to any attempts at a peaceful settlement of outstanding problems.

3) On the same page, 2nd and 3rd lines up—the words stating that our "historic conception includes the use of forcible measures" should definitely be deleted.

4) Page 2, 2nd and 3rd lines down—the words about our historic conception being definitely based on the inevitability of new world wars should be definitely deleted.

Under no circumstance should such frightful words be used, as this would mean playing into the hands of our opponents. We should confine ourselves only to mentioning that the views of the Communists do not coincide with the views of such pacifists as the states we are beginning negotiations with, such statesmen as Henderson, Keynes, etc., but that we consider it our duty, in order to achieve the economic agreement we are desirous of concluding, to do everything in our power for the broadest possible fulfilment of at least a certain part of this pacifist programme.

Lenin

Dictated over the telephone
March 23, 1922

Printed from the secretary's
notes (typewritten copy)

ELEVENTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.)**MARCH 27-APRIL 2, 1922 467****1****PROPOSAL TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION
ON THE REPORT
OF THE R.C.P.(B.) DELEGATION IN THE COMINTERN**

The purpose and sense of the tactics of the united front consist in drawing more and more masses of the workers into the struggle against capital, even if it means making repeated offers to the leaders of the II and II¹/₂ Internationals to wage this struggle together. When the majority of the workers have already established their class, i.e., their Soviet, and not "general national" (i.e., in common with the bourgeoisie) representation, and have overthrown the political domination of the bourgeoisie, then the tactics of the united front, of course, cannot require co-operation with parties such as that of the Mensheviks (the "R.S.D.L.P.") and the S.R.s (the "Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries") for these have turned out to be opponents of Soviet power. Influence upon the working-class masses under Soviet rule has to be extended *not* by seeking co-operation with the *Mensheviks* and *S.R.s*, but in the manner mentioned above.⁴⁶⁸

Written between March 29
and April 2, 1922

Printed from the manuscript

2**SPEECH ON THE QUESTION
OF PRINTING ADVERTISEMENTS IN PRAVDA
APRIL 2⁴⁶⁹**

Comrades, an almost fatal mistake has occurred here. I have risen to a point of order (as the chairman made clear) and not to make a closing speech. I have taken the floor to ask the congress to waive standing orders and

procedure. There is a rule that after a decision has been passed there can be no interference on that question. I ask the congress to give me 4 or 5 minutes in order to oppose the decision that has been wrongly passed here.

When I heard that the congress had passed this decision and when I heard that Comrade Ryazanov had defended it ... (*Ryazanov*: "That is not so.") All the better—at least one absurd decision has by-passed Ryazanov. If we were dealing here with an innocent young lady of some twelve summers, who had learned only yesterday that there was such a thing in the world as communism, and she would have put on a frilly white frock with red ribbons and said that Communists were just pure tradesmen—that would be funny, and we could enjoy a hearty laugh over it, but seriously, what are we doing? Where will *Pravda* get the money to make up for the advertisements we have deprived it of? I ask—how much money does *Pravda* need to keep up with *Izvestia*? You don't know? Nor do I!

Printed from the shorthand
record

3

NOTES AT THE CONGRESS MEETING APRIL 2

Sedoi:

- α) ... Contradictions, abnormality, inconsistency....
- β) "*greatest trust*" and!!?

- 1) Groundlessness of the accusation that the C.C. is persecuting the former *Workers' Opposition*
- 2) refusal to do positive work
- 3) concentration on playing at opposition
- 4) behaviour at metalworkers' congress
- 5) ditto after the congress
- 6) is there such a division within the former *Workers' Opposition*, which makes the Party draw a line between the majority who are working loyally in the Party, despite

difference in views, and the minority (perhaps even an insignificant one) who are behaving in a definitely unloyal manner.

Written April 2, 1922

Printed from the manuscript

DRAFT DECISION FOR THE PLENUM OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON ORGANISING THE WORK OF THE SECRETARIAT

The C.C. directs the Secretariat to strictly fix and adhere to the schedule of official reception hours and to publish it; the secretaries are to make it a rule not to personally undertake any work other than major tasks of a principled nature, and to turn such work over to their assistants and technical secretaries.

Comrade Stalin is directed to immediately find himself deputies and assistants relieving him of work (other than general management and guidance of a principled nature) in government offices.

The C.C. directs the Orgbureau and the Politbureau to submit within a fortnight a list of candidates for members of the Board and deputy commissars of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.⁴⁷⁰

Written April 3, 1922

Printed from the manuscript

NOTES TO THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) WITH DRAFT DECISIONS

1

Comrade Molotov, please put this article and my following proposals to the vote of the Politbureau by sending them round to the members.

1. That there is no objection to having this article of Lenin's published in *Izvestia* and *Pravda* on Tuesday.

2. That directives be given to the Soviet and Party press to appraise the Berlin agreement from this angle, and to dwell at special length on the factual existing links between the S.R.s and Mensheviks, the Right wing of both these parties, and the international bourgeoisie.

3. That the publication for the said purpose in all European languages of Savinkov's pamphlet *Fighting the Bolsheviks* and of S. Ivanovich's pamphlet *The Twilight of Russian Social-Democracy* should be speeded up and a detailed account given of how these pamphlets prove the real ties that exist between the Right-wing Mensheviks and S.R.s and international reaction.

4. That Comrade Trotsky be directed to see to it that these and similar materials are published in all languages with appropriate comments as quickly as possible.

5. That Comrade Radek be asked by wire to return to Moscow as soon as possible with the full minutes of the Berlin Conference.

6. That Comrade Bukharin shall be forbidden to return to Russia until he has completed his cure.

Lenin

Dictated over the telephone
April 9, 1922

Printed from the secretary's
notes (typewritten copy)

2

Comrade Stalin for the Politbureau

In view of Comrade Zinoviev's proposal, I now vote for not having Radek called back, but asking instead for all the detailed minutes of the Berlin Conference to be forwarded through the diplomatic mail.

I object most emphatically to Bukharin's coming here, as this will needlessly interfere with his medical treatment.⁴⁷¹

Lenin

Dictated over the telephone
April 10, 1922

Printed from the secretary's
notes (typewritten copy)

**REMARKS AND PROPOSALS
TO THE DRAFT DECISION
FOR THE COMINTERN EXECUTIVE FOLLOWING
THE CONFERENCE
OF THE THREE INTERNATIONALS⁴⁷²**

LETTERS TO G. Y. ZINOVIEV

1

On Point 1 I propose the addendum: dwell at greater length 1) on the real links between our Mensheviks and S.R.s and the common front of the landowners and bourgeoisie against the Soviet government, special attention being given for this purpose to Savinkov's pamphlet *Fighting the Bolsheviks* (Warsaw, 1920) and S. Ivanovich's pamphlet *The Twilight of Russian Social-Democracy*, as these booklets very clearly reveal what is known, of course, from a number of other documents—namely, that Right-wing Mensheviks and S.R.s take refuge behind the name of a common party, as a matter of form, while in fact they act quite independently; 2) pay special attention to showing up the identity of our Mensheviks and S.R.s with the leaders of the II and II^{1/2} Internationals, the highly pernicious nature of Otto Bauer's recent pamphlet, which virtually proposes and preaches panic retreat in the face of capitalism. Such preaching we regard as tantamount to preaching panic flight at the front during war.

Point 2, I accept.

Re Point 3:

I have my doubts about this, as I believe that a precisely worded ruling calling for unanimity should save us from making mistakes, while general appeals on subjects clarifying the points endorsed at the Berlin Conference (defence of Soviet Russia, etc.) will be extremely useful to us, as we shall repeatedly make use of them in future to expose the muddle our opponents have got themselves into.

Re Point 4—I definitely support this.

Re Point 5—I have no objection.

Re Point 6:

The purport of this point is not clear to me. I believe that the Berlin agreement should be ratified immediately upon receipt of the official text of the adopted decisions, or, better still perhaps, it should be ratified at once with the reservation that the text being ratified was the one that was published in *Pravda* on 9/IV.

I would particularly ask you to arrange for the full text of the minutes of the Berlin Conference to be dispatched as quickly as possible by special courier and to check whether these minutes have been signed by the official representatives of each of the three Internationals.

Lenin

Dictated over the telephone
April 11, 1922

Printed from the secretary's
notes (typewritten copy)

2

Comrade Zinoviev,

The following should be added to those points of the Comintern Executive's decision on which we exchanged notes this morning:

Criticism of the policy of the II and II¹/₂ Internationals should now be given a somewhat different character, namely, this criticism (especially at meetings attended by workers who support the II and II¹/₂ Internationals, and in special leaflets and articles written for them) should tend to be of a clarifying nature, made with particular patience and thoroughness, so as not to scare away these workers with harsh words, and bring home to them the irreconcilable contradictions between the slogans their representatives have adopted in Berlin (for example, the fight against capital, the eight-hour day, defence of Soviet Russia, aid to the famine-stricken) and the entire reformist policy.

Perhaps, before publishing this, we ought to verify whether the Berlin decisions have been ratified by the II and II¹/₂ Internationals.

Lenin

Dictated over the telephone
April 11, 1922

Printed from the secretary's
notes (typewritten copy)

INTERVIEW WITH THE CORRESPONDENT OF *THE NEW YORK HERALD*⁴⁷³

In his talk with the correspondent of the American newspaper *The New York Herald* on the subject of the Genoa Conference, Lenin stated:

This Conference should be guided only by one economic principle. Russia is well aware of what she can expect from the bourgeois states. The present state of affairs cannot continue any longer. It is disastrous both for Russia and for the whole world.

Russia stands in need of trade with the bourgeois states. On the other hand, the bourgeois governments are well aware that the economic life of Europe cannot be adjusted without Russia.

However, those who intend to offer humiliating terms to the Russian delegation at Genoa are deeply mistaken. Russia will not allow herself to be treated as a vanquished country. If the bourgeois governments try to adopt such a tone towards Russia they will be committing the greatest folly.

Krasnaya Gazeta (Petrograd)
No. 84, April 14, 1922

Printed from the newspaper
text

DECISION OF THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE PUBLICATION OF THE WORKS OF G. V. PLEKHANOV

APRIL 27, 1922⁴⁷⁴

Comrade Kamenev shall be directed to talk over with Comrade Ter and make arrangements for the publication of Plekhanov's revolutionary works in one volume.

Printed from the typewritten
copy of the minutes

**DRAFT DECISION
FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
ON PRESENTATION TO THE C.C.
OF SUMMARISED INFORMATION
CONCERNING THE TAX IN KIND**

- 1) The Commissariat for Food
- 2) The Commissariat for Agriculture
- 3) The Central Statistical Board
- 4) The State Planning Commission
agricultural section

shall be directed to present to the C.C. within four days a summary of information on the tax in kind, length not more than *1 page*, containing a clear and precise summary of the amount of the tax in kind collected in 1921-1922 and that expected in 1922-1923 as mentioned in the press.⁴⁷⁵

Written May 11, 1922

Printed from the manuscript

**NOTE TO J. V. STALIN
WITH A DRAFT DECISION
FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
ON THE QUESTION
OF THE FOREIGN TRADE MONOPOLY⁴⁷⁶**

Comrade Stalin,

In view of this, please get a directive passed through the Politbureau by *collecting the votes* of members that "The C.C. reaffirms the monopoly of foreign trade and resolves that a stop be put everywhere to the working up of the question of merging the Supreme Economic Council with the Commissariat for Foreign Trade. All People's Commissars to sign confidentially" and return the original to Stalin. No copies to be made.

15/V.

Lenin

Written May 15, 1922

Printed from the manuscript

**ADDENDUM TO THE DRAFT PREAMBLE
TO THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE R.S.F.S.R.
AND A LETTER TO D. I. KURSKY⁴⁷⁷**

Draft

PREAMBLE TO THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE R.S.F.S.R. ¶

... 5. Pending the establishment of conditions guaranteeing Soviet power against counter-revolutionary encroachments upon it, the revolutionary tribunals shall be given the right to apply capital punishment for crimes under Articles 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63+64..... of the Criminal Code).

×) Add also Articles 64 and 65 and 66 and 67 and 68 and 69.

× ×) Add the right, by decision of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, to commute the death sentence to deportation (for a term or for life).

× × ×) Add: death penalty for illicit return from abroad.

Comrade Kursky,

I think the application of the death sentence should be extended (commutable to deportation). See *1st line down*—to all forms of activity by the Mensheviks, *S.R.s and so on*; to be formulated so as to identify these acts with those of the *international bourgeoisie* and their struggle against us (bribing the press and agents, working for war and so on).

Please return urgently with your comments.

15/V.

Lenin

Written May 15, 1922

Printed from the manuscript

LETTER TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE QUESTION OF REDUCING THE RED ARMY⁴⁷⁸

I think it should be put on the agenda and a reduction by one-fourth announced, the reason given being that a real, if only small and not very reliable, step towards a truce has been made at Genoa.

Lenin

Dictated over the telephone
May 20, 1922

Printed from the secretary's notes
(typewritten copy)

LETTER TO J. V. STALIN FOR THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) WITH A DRAFT DECISION ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE ALL-RUSSIA C.E.C.

Comrade Stalin for the *Politbureau*:

The session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee has shown how wrongly the A.C.E.C. is constituted. The great majority of its members are officials.

I propose that the Politbureau pass a decision:

"To recognise as essential that no less than 60 per cent of the members of the A.C.E.C. should be workers and peasants not occupying any official posts in government bodies; that no less than 67 per cent of the A.C.E.C.'s members should be Communists; a three-man commission consisting of Comrades Kalinin, Yenukidze and Kamenev, be directed to work up this question for the next plenum of the C.C. To be passed first through the Politbureau, then to the Plenum of the C.C. for enactment by the next All-Russia Congress of Soviets."⁴⁷⁹

23/V.1922

Lenin

Printed from the manuscript

TO THE FIRST CONGRESS OF WORKING WOMEN OF TRANSCAUCASIA⁴⁸⁰

I greet the First Congress of working women of Transcaucasia. Thank you for electing me. I cannot attend owing to illness.

Lenin

Written in May, not
later than 26th, 1922

Published on May 29, 1922
in the newspaper
Bakinsky Rabochiy (Baku Worker)
No. 117

Printed from the newspaper
text

ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE U.S.S.R.

LETTER TO L. B. KAMENEV
FOR MEMBERS OF THE POLITBUREAU⁴⁸¹

26.IX.

Comrade Kamenev, Stalin has probably already sent you the resolution of his commission on the entry of the independent republics into the R.S.F.S.R.

If he has not, please take it from the secretary at once, and read it. I spoke about it with Sokolnikov yesterday, and with Stalin today. Tomorrow I shall see Mdivani (the Georgian Communist suspected of "independent" sentiments).

In my opinion the matter is of utmost importance. Stalin tends to be somewhat hasty. Give the matter good thought (you once intended to deal with it, and even had a bit to do with it); Zinoviev too.

Stalin has already consented to make one concession: in Clause 1, instead of "entry" into the R.S.F.S.R., to put: "Formal unification with the R.S.F.S.R. in a Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia."

I hope the purport of this concession is clear: we consider ourselves, the Ukrainian S.S.R. and others, equal, and enter with them, on an equal basis, into a new union, a new

federation, the Union of the Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia.

Clause 2 needs to be amended as well. What is needed besides the sessions of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of the R.S.F.S.R. is a

"Federal All-Union Central Executive Committee of the Union of the Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia."

If the former should hold sessions once a week, and the latter once a week (or once a fortnight even), this may be easily arranged.

The important thing is not to provide material for the "pro-independence" people, not to destroy their *independence*, but to create another *new storey*, a federation of *equal* republics.

The second part of Clause 2 could stand: the dissatisfied will appeal (against decisions of the *Council of Labour and Defence*, and the *Council of People's Commissars*) to the Federal All-Union Central Executive Committee, *without thereby suspending* implementation (just as in the R.S.F.S.R.).

Clause 3 could stand, but its wording should be: "amalgamate in *federal* People's Commissariats whose seat shall be in Moscow, with the proviso that the respective People's Commissariats of the R.S.F.S.R. have their authorised representatives with a small staff in all the Republics *that have joined the Union of Republics of Europe and Asia*."

Part 2 of Clause 3 remains; perhaps it could be said to emphasise equality: "by agreement of the *Central Executive Committees* of the member republics of the Union of the Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia."

Let's think about Part 3: perhaps we had better substitute "*mandatory*" for "*desirable*"? Or perhaps insert *conditionally* mandatory at least in the form of a *request for instructions* and the authority to decide without such instructions solely in cases of "*specially urgent importance*"?

Clause 4 could perhaps also be "amalgamate by agreement of the Central Executive Committees"?

Perhaps add to Clause 5: "with the establishment of joint (or general) conferences and congresses of a *purely consultative* nature (or perhaps of a *solely consultative* nature)?

Appropriate alterations in the 1st and 2nd comments.

Stalin has agreed to delay submission of the resolution to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee until my return. I shall arrive on Monday, October 2. I should like to see you and Rykov for about two hours in the morning, say 12 noon to 2 p.m., and, if necessary, in the evening, say 5-7 or 6-8.

That is my tentative draft. I shall add or amend on the strength of talks with Mdivani and other comrades. I beg you to do the same, and to reply to me.

Yours,
Lenin

P. S. Send copies to *all* members of the Political Bureau.

Written September 26, 1922

Printed from the manuscript

TO THE CONGRESS OF TEXTILE WORKERS⁴²²

10.X.1922

Dear Comrades,

I apologise for having had to let you down. I had the toothache, which not only kept me from my work just when I had started it, but kept me fretting for a whole week. All meetings (at congresses) have to be cancelled again for a week.

I am very sorry that I cannot meet you at your congress. I hope that Comrade Kutuzov will tell you everything in detail and convey to you my best greetings and wishes.

Yours,
Lenin

ADDENDA TO THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT WITH L. URQUHART⁴⁸³

- 1) Further: the territory of the concession should be reduced, definitely ensuring to the R.S.F.S.R. a part of Ekibastuz that will be sufficient for the Urals (not less than one-fourth or one-sixth);
- 2) most important: the sums payable to Urquhart should be cut so that our receipts should not be deferred until 1934 (?).

Lenin

- 3) What are these amendments for? For *approximate* directives to our agents?

For.

Lenin

Written not before
October 25, 1922

Printed from the manuscript

THESES ON THE CO-OPERATIVE BANK⁴⁸⁴

- 1) Premiums for size of transactions and uyezd coverage;
- 2) ditto—deposits;
- 3) participation in the bank of leading agricultural communist co-operators for purposes of control and drive;
- 4) stimulation of the Co-operative Bank by the State Bank by way of reduced %;
- 5) allocation of a certain sum by the State Bank.

Written November 2, 1922

Printed from the manuscript

TO THE TEXTILE WORKERS OF PETROGRAD⁴⁸⁵

3.XI.1922

Dear Comrades,

I thank you sincerely for the woollen blanket you have sent me. I find it excellent. I am very sorry I was unable to see Shorov.

My best greetings,

Yours,

V. Ulyanov . (*Lenin*)

Printed from the manuscript

**MOTION FOR
THE POLITBUREAU OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.)
ON THE REDUCTION OF THE ARMY**

Comrade Stalin

Please obtain today a viva voca vote of the Politbureau members on this motion of mine:

that Comrade Trotsky's plan for submitting to the Government a proposal for reducing the army by 200,000 men in the course of January be endorsed;

that Comrade Trotsky be asked to state what period he considers possible for such a question to be introduced to the C.P.C. in the form of a completed draft.⁴⁸⁶

13/XI.1922

*Lenin*Printed from the typewritten
copy**TO THE RUSSIAN COLONY IN NORTH AMERICA⁴⁸⁷**

Comrade Reichel, a representative of the American Society for Technical Aid for Soviet Russia, told me about the incorrect view on the New Economic Policy prevalent

among some members of the Russian colony in North America.

This incorrect view could, I believe, be the result of deliberate misinterpretation of this policy by the capitalist press and the ridiculous tales spread by the embittered whiteguards, who have been driven out of Soviet Russia, as well as by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries.

In Europe these tales about us and especially about our New Economic Policy are falling into disuse. The New Economic Policy has changed nothing radically in the social system of Soviet Russia, nor can it change anything so long as the power is in the hands of the workers—and that Soviet power has come to stay, no one now, I think, can have any doubt. The malignity of the capitalist press and the influx of Russian whiteguards in America merely prove our strength.

The state capitalism, which is one of the principal aspects of the New Economic Policy, is, under Soviet power, a form of capitalism that is deliberately permitted and restricted by the working class. Our state capitalism differs essentially from the state capitalism in countries that have bourgeois governments in that the state with us is represented not by the bourgeoisie, but by the proletariat, who has succeeded in winning the full confidence of the peasantry.

Unfortunately, the introduction of state capitalism with us is not proceeding as quickly as we would like it. For example, so far we have not had a single important concession, and without foreign capital to help develop our economy, the latter's quick rehabilitation is inconceivable.

Those to whom the question of our New Economic Policy—the only correct policy—is not quite clear, I would refer to the speeches of Comrade Trotsky and my own speech at the Fourth Congress of the Communist International* devoted to this question.

Comrade Reichel has told me about the preparatory work which the Society for Technical Aid is doing to organise American agricultural and other producers' communes who wish to come out to work in Russia and intend to bring with them new instruments of production, tractors, seeds of improved cultures, and so on.

I have already expressed my gratitude to the American comrades in my letters to the Society for Technical Aid and the Society of Friends of Soviet Russia in connection with the very successful work of their agricultural communes and units in Russia in the summer of 1922.*

I take this opportunity to thank you once more on behalf of the Soviet Government and to stress the fact that of all the forms of aid *the aid* to our agriculture and improvement of its technical methods is the most important and valuable for us.

V. Ulyanov (*Lenin*)

Chairman, Council of People's Commissars

Written November 14, 1922

Published January 10, 1923
in the newspaper *Russky Golos* No. 2046,
New York

Printed from the typewritten
copy collated with the newspaper
text

DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR THE FOURTH CONGRESS OF THE COMINTERN ON THE QUESTION OF THE PROGRAMME OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL⁴⁸⁸

Proposals adopted at a meeting of the C.C. Five
(*Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Radek, Bukharin*)
November 20, 1922

1. All the programmes are handed to the Executive of the Comintern or to a committee appointed by it for detailed working up and study.

The Executive of the Comintern is obliged within the shortest possible time to publish all the draft programmes forwarded to it.

2. The congress confirms that all the national parties which do not yet have their own national programmes must immediately start drafting them so that they may be submitted to the Executive not later than within three months of the next congress, which shall endorse them.

* *Ibid.*, pp. 380, 381.—*Ed.*

3. The necessity of fighting for transition demands subject to appropriate reservations making these demands dependent on concrete conditions of place and time should be stated explicitly and categorically in the national programmes.

4. The theoretical basis for all such transition or limited demands should be definitely stated in the general programme, the Fourth Congress declaring that the Comintern emphatically condemns both the attempts to represent the inclusion of limited demands in the programme as opportunism, and all and any attempts to use limited demands to obscure and side-track the basic revolutionary task.

5. The general programme should clearly state the basic historical types of transition demands of the national parties depending on cardinal differences of economic structure, as for example, Britain and India, and such-like.⁴⁸⁹

Printed from the typewritten
copy

PROPOSALS FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF FUNCTIONS BETWEEN THE DEPUTY CHAIRMEN OF THE C.P.C. AND THE C.L.D.⁴⁹⁰

Distribution of functions between the Deputy Chairmen:

1. One deputy takes the *C.L.D.*, the other two the *C.P.C.* monthly.
2. They divide the People's Commissariats between them according (or similar) to the spring list of 1922.
3. Work already started (for example, the trusts—the Trust Commission; account of expenditure on heavy industry) is to be continued by Comrade Kamenev.
4. Each deputy chairman undertakes a check of staffs;—a certain part weekly or fortnightly (to be calculated and scheduled in such a way that each check is devoted in turn to one or another People's Commissariat;—now top,

now bottom;—that each check is documented by a detailed statement in writing; those parts of the unchecked commissariats which do not carry out similar reductions and improvements ordered for other commissariats shall incur a penalty, including arrest and dismissal).

4/XII.1922

Lenin

Printed from the manuscript

**RE DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR THE POLITBUREAU
OF THE C.C., R.C.P.(B.) ON THE REPORT
OF THE STATE SUPPLIES COMMISSION**

All schools, including teachers and pupils, to have their requirements in bread fully provided for over and above the given calculations, and Comrades Kamenev, Tsyurupa and Yakovleva to figure out exactly what amount of bread should be earmarked for this purpose, with the addition of a minimum, specially verified, quantity for office employees.

Another 1 million gold rubles to be added for school expenses.⁴⁹¹

Lenin

Written December 6 or 7, 1922

Printed from the typed copy
signed by Lenin

**PROPOSAL FOR THE PLENUM
REGARDING
THE POLITBUREAU STANDING ORDER**

1. The Politbureau meets on Thursdays from 11 to 2 (not later).

2. If any questions remain outstanding, they are to be dealt with either on Friday or on Monday during the same hours.

3. The agenda of the Politbureau should be forwarded to members not later than 12 o'clock on Wednesday. Material (in written form) pertaining to the agenda should be sent in within the same period.

4. Additional questions may be introduced on the day of the meeting only on the following conditions:

- a) in cases of absolute urgency (especially diplomatic questions),
- b) only in writing,
- c) only in cases where no objection is raised by any single member of the Politbureau.

The latter condition regarding non-objection to new questions being introduced in the agenda may be waived only in the case of diplomatic questions which brook no delay.

Lenin

Dictated over the telephone
December 8, 1922

Printed from the secretary's
notes (typewritten copy)

PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE WORK ROUTINE OF THE DEPUTY CHAIRMEN AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE C.P.C.

*Work Routine of the Deputy Chairmen and the Chairman
of the C.P.C.*

1. Working hours: 11-2, 6-9; together with the C.P.C. chairman on *Monday and Tuesday, Thursday and Friday*.
2. Special meetings of all the deputies and the chairman of the C.L.D. (minus the Politbureau, C.P.C. and C.L.D.) on these days and at these hours whenever there is need, but *generally not less than twice a week* for one hour. This hour to be fixed on the eve not later than 9 p.m.
3. All the work of the deputies is divided into:
 - (a) close supervision over the work of the Narrow C.P.C.;
 - (b) similar supervision over the work of the business meetings of the C.L.D.

(it is necessary to resume the business meetings of the *C.L.D.* in order to disengage the deputies for other more important work. The business meetings are *not* chaired by the deputies but *their* signatures *alone* endorse the decisions of these meetings);

(c) chairmanship at those parts of the *C.P.C.* and *C.L.D.* meetings where the chairman of the *C.P.C.* does not preside;

(d) participation in the Financial Committee (plus Sokolnikov and his deputy and the chairman of the Narrow *C.P.C.*; the latter need not attend all meetings of the Financial Committee).

(Perhaps arrange a meeting of the Financial Committee once a week for one hour chaired by the *C.P.C.* chairman? Think this over.);

(e) determining the agenda of all bodies, including the Narrow *C.P.C.*, and the order of priority, the most important questions being chosen by all four under the chairmanship of the *C.P.C.* chairman;

(f) close supervision of the various People's Commissariats and their apparatus both by means of instructions to the People's Commissars and their deputies personally and by means of studying their apparatus top and bottom;

(g) the commissariats, for this purpose (Point f), are allocated among the deputies, such allocation to be endorsed by the chairman of the *C.P.C.*

4. All the above-mentioned work is distributed among the deputies in such a way that each of the three (and if need be their assistants from among the business managers) handles a definite job *for two months* and afterwards *changes it* for another.

(This is necessary in order that all the deputies may acquaint themselves with the *entire* apparatus and in order to achieve real unity of management.)

5. The draft of such a distribution among the three deputies is to be drawn up by them immediately and approved by all four.

6. Since the work of improving and correcting the whole apparatus is far more important than the work of chairmanship and the chatting with Deputy People's Commissars and

People's Commissars, which has up till now fully occupied all the deputies' time, it is necessary to arrange and strictly carry out a practice under which each deputy, *for not less than two hours* a week, "goes down to the bottom", makes a personal study of all the various parts of the apparatus, top and bottom, and the most unexpected ones at that. The official record of such a study, made, confirmed and communicated (in certain cases) to *all* government departments, should lead to a *reduction* in staff and tighten up discipline throughout our state machinery.

Lenin

Written December 9, 1922

Printed from the manuscript

**LETTER TO L. B. KAMENEV, A. I. RYKOV
AND A. D. TSYURUPA
ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF WORK BETWEEN
THE DEPUTY CHAIRMEN
OF THE C.P.C. AND THE C.L.D.**

Comrades Kamenev, Rykov and Tsyurupa

Owing to a recurrence of my illness I must wind up all political work and take a holiday again.⁴⁰² Therefore our disagreements with you lose their practical significance. I must say, however, that I utterly disagree with Rykov's practical addendum, and I move the exact opposite against it—namely, that reception should be quite free, unlimited and even extended.⁴⁰³ I am leaving the details until a personal meeting.

To a considerable extent I disagree also with the distribution of the commissariats. I think this distribution should be more closely adjusted to the ability for purely administrative work on the part of the various deputies; in my opinion, the chief fault of your yesterday's distribution consists in the lack of such adjustment.⁴⁰⁴ The functions of chairmanship and supervision of the proper legal wording

of both legislative acts and decisions of the Financial Committee and so forth should be far more strictly separated from the functions of checking and improving the administrative apparatus. Comrade Kamenev is more suitable for the former functions (i.e., chairmanship, supervision of proper wording, etc.) whereas the purely administrative functions are more in Tsyurupa's and Rykov's line.

For the general reason mentioned above I must defer this question until my return from leave. But please bear in mind that I give my consent to your proposed distribution, not for three months (as you suggest), but pending my return to work, should this take place earlier than within three months.

I see that your distribution has overlooked such an important organ as *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*, which needs someone to keep a special eye on it. I think this could best be done by Rykov.

Lenin

13.XII.1922

Dictated over
the telephone

Printed from the secretary's
notes (typewritten copy)

MATERIALS TO THE ARTICLE "HOW WE SHOULD REORGANISE THE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' INSPECTION"*

PLAN OF AN ARTICLE "WHAT SHOULD WE DO WITH THE W.P.I.?"

1. — Our state apparatus as a whole is most closely tied, most imbued with the old spirit.

In this way we may better renovate it.

* See Vol. 33 of this edition, pp. 481-86.—*Ed.*

2. — Such a type of apparatus as that directly connected with the Central Committee makes for the greatest mobility.

3. — It enjoys greatest authority.

4. — Won't that make for too many C.C. members?

5. — The conference nature of the C.C. plenums has already grown out of our previous Party building.

6. — A ruling is possible limiting attendance of C.C. members at meetings of higher government bodies (the C.P.C., C.L.D., All-Russia Central Executive Committee, etc.).

7. — It is possible to arrange their taking turns in attending these meetings.

8. — It is possible to arrange their taking turns at the meetings of the Board of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.

9. — Possible objections to this plan: too many inspectors, too much supervision, too many chiefs having the right to demand an immediate reply and tearing the staff away from their direct duties, etc.

10. — Answer: we propose an unusual type of personnel for the W.P.I.

11. — How account for the fact that the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has a better type of staff? And what are the conditions for making a similar renovated apparatus out of the W.P.I.?

12. — The W.P.I. should start right away organising the work on new lines, guided by five years experience.

13. — New organisation of work on the part of the C.C. Secretariat (training new members of the C.C. in all the details of administration).

14. — Better organisation of Politbureau meetings will come about in the course of the work itself.

15. — Important gain from increasing the number of C.C. members—lessening of the personal and casual element in its decisions, etc.

Dictated not later than
January 9, 1923

Printed from the secretary's
notes (typewritten copy)

2

WHAT SHOULD WE DO WITH THE W.P.I.?

Without a doubt, the W.P.I. is an enormous difficulty for us. So far nothing has come of it, and the question of its organisation and even its expediency remains a question.

I think that those who doubt whether there is any need for it are wrong. At the same time, however, I do not deny that the problem presented by our state machinery and the task of improving it is very difficult and far from being solved.

With the exception of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, our state apparatus is largely a survival of the past, and least of all affected by any drastic change. It has only been slightly touched up on the surface. In all other respects, in order to get it to work properly, it has always been necessary for the workers' and peasants' state—a state built entirely on new lines—to concentrate members of the Party in it throughout the hierarchical framework.

It is worth remembering how we acted in the critical moments of the civil war, how we concentrated our best Party forces in the Red Army, how we resorted to the mobilisation of the advanced workers from among the Party ranks—in order to confirm what has been said.

And so, I believe, as a result of all our attempts to reorganise the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection there emerges the conclusion that we have not made one more attempt. Namely, we have not tried to put this matter into the hands of our workers and peasants, by placing them at the head of our Party as members of the Central Committee.

I visualise this reform of the W.P.I. in the following manner: some 50 to 75 workers and peasants, fully tried and trusted as to conscientiousness and devotion, are elected to the C.C. of the Party in addition to the other C.C. members. At the same time, the staff of the W.P.I. should be reduced at last (at long last!) to several hundred, consisting, on the one hand, of persons with most experience in W.P.I. work in general, i.e., persons who are most familiar with the general supervision of our apparatus of highly skilled specialists and who have a knowledge of

both our apparatus and of the principles and problems of office work organisation, methods of verification and investigation—and, on the other hand, of persons of the purely secretarial, auxiliary staff.

The task of the new members of the C.C., who have fully equal rights with the other members of the C.C., is, by long hard work, to make a study of and improve our state machinery. All the other members of the W.P.I. staff are to help them in this, some as persons most familiar with this machinery and with the work of the W.P.I., others as employees of the secretarial type.

At the same time the People's Commissariat of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection could remain the same commissariat it has been up till now. The new members of the C.C. could be considered temporarily attached to it. The People's Commissar of the W.P.I. could retain his present rank, position and rights along with the members of his Board.

What do we stand to gain from such an organisation? First of all, we would drop once and for all the practice of new reorganisations undertaken on the basis of an inadequate study of our apparatus. Secondly, we would enhance the authority of this commissariat both by means of enlisting members of the C.C. to it and by reducing its staff to a few hundred members. From the present position, under which the members of the People's Commissariat of the W.P.I. as a general rule live on sops from the inspected institutions, we would pass immediately to a position under which the maximum independence of the W.P.I. employees would be guaranteed either by a very high salary (this could be achieved by reducing the number of the staff to a few hundred very highly skilled and tested top-level workers), or by those assistants of a purely secretarial type, who would be under the constant control and supervision of both the above-mentioned members of the C.C. and of the few specialists left by us after careful screening of the commissariat's staff.

The new members of the Central Committee would be assigned the task of making a closer and more careful study of our machinery of state in all its ramifications, including, incidentally, the state trusts.

This job cannot be done quickly. No definite time limit, therefore, would be set for them. On the other hand, they could reckon on several years work by alternating members of the C.C. working on the same assignment, i.e., by a decision of a Party congress we would guarantee to members of the C.C. the possibility of working at this job for several years and then returning to their former jobs.

Lenin

January 9, 1923

Taken down by M. V.

WHAT SHOULD WE DO WITH THE W.P.I.?

(continuation)

I foresee that this plan will evoke no end of objections, most of which will be prompted by the vicious howl of the worst of the old elements in our state apparatus, who have remained really old, that is, pre-revolutionary. They will say that this will lead to nothing but complete chaos in the work, that the C.C. members, not knowing what to do, will loiter about the commissariats and government offices, interfering everywhere with the work, demanding explanations, etc., etc.

I think that the nature of these objections clearly betrays the source they come from, and are hardly worth answering. Obviously, if we had in mind an ordinary type of staff, some of these objections might be warranted. But the thing is, we do not have in mind the usual type of staff for this commissariat, but single out for it the best workers, who, on verification by the Party congress, deserve to be elected to the C.C. In this way, I believe, we guarantee that the staff of the People's Commissariat of the W.P.I. will be as good as the best of our commissariats, namely, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. How do we account for the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs having the best staff of employees? In the first place, because diplomats of the old stamp could not remain there to any noticeable degree; secondly, because we selected people there anew, selected them by entirely new standards, by their fitness for the new tasks; thirdly, because there, in the Foreign Commissariat, we do not have, as in other commissariats, that plethora

of haphazardly selected employees who, practically speaking, have inherited all the old qualities of officialdom; and fourthly, because the Foreign Commissariat is working under the direct guidance of our Central Committee. This, as a matter of fact, is the only one of our commissariats that has been fully renovated and that is really working for the workers' and peasants' government and in the spirit of that government, and not merely giving the impression of working for it, while actually, in the main, working against it or in the wrong spirit.

Now what conditions are we faced with in our attempt to make a truly renovated apparatus out of the W.P.I.? The first condition—conscientiousness, will be fully ensured by selection; the second condition is the high qualities of the staff members as regards their devotion to the cause and their abilities; the third condition is their closeness to the highest Party body and their equal rights with those who lead our Party, and, through it, the whole of our state apparatus.

It may be said that no amount of conscientiousness or Party authoritativeness can make up for what, in this case, is the most important thing, namely, knowledge of one's business, knowledge of our state apparatus, and knowledge of the way it should be remodelled.

My reply to this is that one of the essential conditions of my proposal is that we are not to expect quick results in the work of the new commissariat and anticipate that this work will go on for many years. The question then boils down to organising the work of the new commissariat.

And here I feel justified in presuming that both our Party workers and the people now in charge of the W.P.I. have accumulated sufficient experience, sufficient knowledge, sufficient ability and other qualities to properly organise the training of the new C.C. members, and a practical training at that, i.e., by combining their familiarisation with all the details of our state apparatus with a study of what modern science has achieved in the bourgeois states as regards efficient organisation of every kind of staff work.

Lenin

January 13, 1923

Taken down by L. F.

WHAT SHOULD WE DO WITH THE W.P.I.?

(continuation 2)

I assume that it goes without saying that the W.P.I. will start at once, on the basis of five years experience, organising the work on new lines; that it will divide the new workers into a number of groups and assign the work among these groups systematically; that it will divide these groups into: periodically employed people making a practical study of foreign experience; into people engaged in theoretical work and studying the results of modern science in the field of organisation of labour generally and managerial work in particular. It will arrange for all the W.P.I. workers to go through the jobs assigned to them, systematically working from the bottom upwards, performing varied functions in varied fields of administration, in varied localities, in varied conditions of work as regards nationalities, and so on.

In short, I assume that the comrades in the W.P.I. have learned something during these five years and will be able to apply the knowledge they have gained to the new organisation of the commissariat. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that we have, I believe, three scientific institutions carrying out research into problems of work organisation (the Central Institute of Labour, a special group under the W.P.I. and a group under the Military Commissariat). A meeting of these three groups was held recently,⁴⁹⁵ and it is to be hoped that their work will now proceed in a more efficient manner and in a better team spirit than heretofore.

What is the new work organisation that I propose on the part of the Secretariat of our C.C.? Naturally, the increased number of C.C. members will require a new organisation of the work. I must point out, however, that actually we have already passed to a form of organisation of our C.C. plenums after the type of highest conferences. The thing now is to organise the training of these new C.C. members in all Central Committee work and familiarise them with the work of the leading state institutions. If we are late with this, we shall not be fulfilling one of our main duties, namely, that of taking advantage of our being in power in order

to teach the best elements of the working people all the details of administration. Such measures as making better arrangements for the meetings of our Politbureau, holding them twice a week and reducing the length of sittings, better preparation of all the documents for these meetings and arranging for these documents to be at the disposal of all the members of the C.C. in good time. These measures now follow from the entire course of the work and are essential, so much so that any kind of objection to this is hardly conceivable. Naturally, this will call for an increase in expenditure on secretarial type personnel, but to grudge the money for these expenses would be most unwise.

Besides, frankly speaking, an important advantage in increasing the number of C.C. members I consider to be the diminished chances of a personal, incidental element being introduced in its decisions; these decisions will be better prepared, the endorsements made at such meetings will be more thoroughly verified, and as a result there will be greater stability in our C.C., both as regards the continuity of its work and its power to resist splits that might arise from insufficient contact of this body with the masses.

Lenin

January 13, 1923

Taken down by L.F.

Dictated January 9 and 13, 1923

Printed from the secretary's
notes (typewritten copy)

APPENDIX

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DELEGATES OF THE NINTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.)

1. Name in full: Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov
(Lenin)
2. No. of delegate's card $\frac{\text{voting}}{\text{debating}^*}$: 381
3. What organisation do you belong to (Uyezd, Gubernia):
Moscow
4. Membership of your organisation: 35,000
5. How were you elected (at gubernia conference, uyezd conference, general meeting, etc.) and when:
Moscow city conference
6. Number of Party members represented at the gubernia conference, uyezd conference, or general meeting, at which you were elected to the congress: 35,000
7. Age: 50
8. Education: university
9. Former profession (state definitely), or what professions do you know:
former: barrister's assistant
publicist
10. Nationality: Russian
11. Family status: married
- Party work.*
12. When did you become a member of the R.C.P. (year, month):
in 1893

* The word "debating" is crossed out by Lenin.—Ed.

13. What All-Russia Party congresses did you attend:
Practically all, I believe
14. What Party work have you done, when and where:
member of the C.C. and editor
of the Central Organ
15. How long have you been doing illegal Party work:
1893-1917
16. What Party work are you doing now:
member of the C.C.
Chairman of the C.P.C. and the Council of
Defence
17. Did you belong to any other party before joining the R.C.P.,
when and how long: no

Soviet administrative work.

18. What Soviet administrative work have you done, when, where:
Chairman of the C.P.C. and the Council of
Defence
19. What Soviet administrative work are you doing now: the same
20. What trade unions did you belong to, and when, and what
t.u. do you belong to now: none
21. Were you persecuted for doing Party work, when and on what
occasions:
was arrested in 1887, 1894 and 1900
22. Where were you at the beginning of the February revolution
(in exile, penal servitude, prison, abroad, in military service, factory
employment, etc.):
in emigration (in Zurich)
23. How long were you in prison: 14 months plus
several days
- | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|------------------|----------------------------|
| " | " | " | " | in exile: | 3 years |
| " | " | " | " | penal servitude: | I was not |
| " | " | " | " | in emigration: | 1900-1905 and
1908-1917 |

Signed: V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

29th of March, 1920

Printed from the form filled in
by Lenin

**REREGISTRATION FORM FOR MEMBERS
OF THE MOSCOW ORGANISATION
OF THE R.C.P.(B.)**

- 1) Name in full: Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov
- 2) Age: 50 years
- 3) Place of birth (gubernia, town, uyezd, volost, village):
town of Simbirsk
- 4) Parents' profession and their address: dead
- 5) Members of your family (by age) and number of dependents:
wife 51
brother 45
sister 44
- 6) Do you own immovable property (land allotment, house) or
means of production and where: no
- 7) Nationality: } Russian
- 8) Mother-tongue: }
- 9) In what languages, besides Russian, do you speak, read, write
(underline):
French, German, English; all 3 poorly
- 10) Basic profession: litterateur
- 11) What education did you receive and where:
 - a) General { High School
 - b) Special { Passed university extern examinations
in 1891 at law faculty
- 12) Have you been abroad, when and where:
1895; 1900-1905; 1907-1917 in emigration (Switzerland, France, England, Germany, Galicia)
- 13) What localities of Russia do you know well:
I lived only on the Volga and in the capital cities

14) Were you in military service in the old army (rank, unit and how long): no

15) Did you take part in fighting and were you wounded (where and when):
no

16) In what enterprise or office are you working at the present time (its address and telephone No.), in what post:
C.P.C.

17) What salary do you get and are you doing any by-work:
13¹/₂ thousand (13,500)⁴⁰⁶
by-work—literary

18) How long have you been a member of the R.C.P.:
since its foundation and earlier (1893)

19) Did you join during Party Week: —no—

20) What organisation originally admitted you to membership of the R.C.P.:
see § 18

21) Did you attend lectures on socio-political questions, where, when, and did you take a course in the rudiments of political knowledge and what grade:

22) What Party cell do you belong to:

Kremlin subdistrict

23) Were you on party trial, when and what for:

by the Mensheviks in the R.S.D.L.P. during splits

24) Did you belong to any other party, what party and when and in what capacity: no

25) What documents or certificates do you have testifying that you were in our illegal Party organisation:

history of the Party—document

26) Chief places of previous work:

1. Before the February revolution:

a) civil work:

b) Party work:

2. Before the October Revolution:

abroad and
Petrograd

a) civil work:

b) Party work:

27) What was your part in the February revolution:

apart from general Party work, none
(in emigration)

28) Ditto in October Revolution: member of the C.C.

29) Were you subject to repressive measures for political crimes, where and when, and what sentence did you serve:

arrest 1887 (several days)

" 1895-1897 (14 months and 3 years

" exile in Eastern Siberia)

1900 (several days)

30) What trade union did you belong to, where and when:
none

31) What trade union do you belong to at present (give No. of membership card): none

32) Did you hold elective office after the February revolution and where:

a) Administrative: Chairman of the C.P.C.

b) Trade Union: no

c) Party: member of the C.C.

d) Factory:

e) Army units: } no

f) Others:

33) Did you undergo military training (army rank) and are you registered in the Special Detachment, if so in what company and what number: no

34) Were you mobilised in the Red Army, when, by what organisation and under what arrangement (general mobilisation or Party mobilisation), how long were you at the front and where (indicate exactly), what duties did you perform, did you take part in the fighting, were you wounded, when and where: no

35) Were you mobilised for transport work, when and by what organisation: no

36) What Party and administrative work can you do (organiser, administrator, lecturer, propagandist, culture worker, etc.):

37) Did you ever address big meetings and preside at them:
yes

38) What Party work are you doing at the present time:
member of the C.C.

39) What further information do you wish to give:

40) Your address and telephone No.:
Kremlin. Upper switchboard

41) What works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Kautsky and Plekhanov
have you read:
practically all works (of underlined authors)

42) On what subjects did you have occasion to address the workers
and peasants or read lectures:
mostly political

43) Do you write articles for the newspapers, where and on what
subjects:
seldom, on political subjects

44) Can you write leaflets and appeals, and what have you written
in this field:
Yes. Rather too numerous to list

45) In what field of knowledge do you feel strongest and on what
subjects can you read lectures or conduct lessons:
mostly on political questions

(Signed:) *V. Ulyanov (Lenin)*

17/IX.1920

**QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DELEGATES
OF THE NINTH ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE
OF THE R.C.P. (BOLSHEVIKS)**

1. Name in full: Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov
2. No. of delegate's card $\frac{\text{debating}}{\text{voting}}$ not yet received
3. By what organisation delegated: Central Committee
4. Age: 50 years
5. Education: university
6. Former profession (state definitely) or what professions do you know:
litterateur
7. Nationality: Russian
8. When did you join the R.C.P. (year, month):
1893, formally 1898
9. What Party work are you doing at the present time:
Member of the C.C.
10. What administrative work are you doing at the present time:
Chairman of the C.P.C. and Chairman
of the Council of Defence
11. What trade unions do you belong to:
none
12. Did you belong to any other party before joining the R.C.P.
when and for how long: no

Signed: *V. Ulyanov (Lenin)*

20.IX. 1920

Printed from the form filled in
by Lenin

**QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DELEGATES
OF THE TENTH ALL-RUSSIA CONGRESS
OF THE R.C.P.**

1. Surname:	Ulyanov (Lenin)
2. First name and patronymic:	Vladimir Ilyich
3. What Party organisation do you belong to (gubernia, town, uyezd army, division):	C.C., R.C.P. Moscow
4. No. of delegate's card $\frac{\text{voting}}{\text{debating}}$	No. 21. debating ⁴⁹⁷
5. How were you elected (at gubernia conference, uyezd conference, army conference, division conference, general meeting, etc.) and when:	from the C.C. debating delegate
6. Number of Party members represented—at gubernia, uyezd, army, division conferences at which you were elected to the congress:	C.C. of 19 people
7. What All-Russia Party congresses did you attend:	all except that of July 1917 (or August?)
8. Date of birth:	1870

9. State of health or disablement:	in good health
10. Family status (number of members of the family and dependents):	wife and sister live together with me
11. Nationality:	Russian
12. Mother-tongue:	Russian
13. What other languages do you know and how well	English, German, French poorly; Italian very poorly
14. What localities of Russia do you know well and how long did you live there:	best of all the Volga district where I was born and lived till 17
15. Were you abroad (when, where and how long):	in a number of countries of Western Europe 1895; 1900-1905; 1908-1917
16. Military training:	none
17. Education (at what educational establishments did you study; did you graduate, if not how many classes or courses did you complete):	graduated Petrograd University (passed extern examinations), law faculty in 1891

18. Basic occupation up to 1917:	litterateur
19. What trades do you know:	none

20. What occupations were you engaged in after 1917 apart from Party, administrative, trade union and other similar work: apart from those listed, only literary work

21. What trade union do you belong to at the present time: Journalists' Union

22. What work have you been doing since 1917—administrative, military, trade union, business (apart from Party) work:

When (date from/to, indicate month/year)	Where (gub., uyezd, town, army, div.)	In what agency	In what post
from X. 1917 to III. 1921	Moscow	C.P.C. and C.L.D.	chairman

23. What work—administrative, military, business, trade union are you doing at the time of filling in this form (apart from Party work):

When (date from/to, indicate month/year)	Where (gub., uyezd, town, army, div.)	In what agency	In what post
since X. 1917	Moscow	C.P.C. and C.L.D.	chairman

24. How long have you been a member of the R.C.P.(Bolsheviks): since 1894

25. Did you belong to any other parties, if so, to which, when and for how long: no

26. Did you take part in the revolutionary movement before 1917:

When (date from/to)	Where (gub., uyezd, town)	In what organisation	What work
1892-1893 1894-1895	Samara		
1895-1897 1898-1900	St. Petersburg prison Siberia (Yenisei Gubernia)	illegal S.D. circles, and after the founding of the R.S.D.L.P.	
1900-1905 1905-1907	abroad St. Petersburg	its member	
1908-1917	abroad		

27. Were you subject to repressive measures for revolutionary activities (when, on what occasions): 1887 arrest; 1895-1897 arrest; 1898-1900 Siberia; 1900 arrest

28. How long were you in:

(prison
penal servitude
exile
emigration

several days
+ 14 months
I was not
three years
9-10 years

29. What Party work have you been doing since 1917:

When (date from/to, indicate month/year)	Where (gub., uyezd, town, army, div., etc.)	In what agency	In what post
from X. 1917 to III. 1921	Moscow	C.C.	member C.C.

30. What Party work are you doing at the time of filling in this form:

When (from what date)	Where (town, gub., uyezd, army, div.)	In what agency	In what post
from X. 1917 to III. 1921	Moscow	C.C.	member C.C.

31. Were you on trial before a Court of Law of the RSFSR or a Party court (when, where, on what charge):

no

7th of March 1921

Delegate's signature:

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

Printed from the form filled in
by Lenin

**QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DELEGATES
OF THE ELEVENTH ALL-RUSSIA CONFERENCE
OF THE R.C.P.(BOLSHEVIKS)**

1. Name in full: Ulyanov (Lenin) Vladimir Ilyich
2. With what voice (voting or debating) are you attending?
3. Delegate's card: No. 1
4. What organisation delegated you: C.C., R.C.P.
5. What All-Russia Party conferences and congresses did you attend as a voting delegate:

congresses:	all, except those of 1898 and the summer of 1917	conferences: practically all
-------------	-----------------------------------------------------	---------------------------------
6. Year of birth: 1870
7. Nationality: Russian
8. Education (elementary, secondary, higher)
9. a) Basic profession and speciality up to 1917:
litterateur

b) How many years have you worked at this profession:
from 1894 to 1917, i.e., 23 years

10. a) Principal means of livelihood before 1914:
literary earnings and salary from the Party
- b) during 1914-1917: ditto
- c) during 1917-1921: ditto up to 25.X. 1917. After
25/X salary from the Soviet
Government
11. What administrative work are you doing at present:
Chairman of the C.P.C. and C.L.D.
12. What part are you taking at present:
- a) in co-operative work } I am not taking any actual part
b) in trade union work }
13. What Party work are you doing at the present time:
member of the C.C., R.C.P.
14. When did you join the R.C.P.: in 1895
15. Did you previously belong to any other parties, if so when and
to which: no
16. Were you subject to repressive measures for revolutionary
activity (when):
arrest and exile in 1887; arrest and exile
to Eastern Siberia 1895 (XII) — 1900
- How long were you:
- 1) in prison: for several days in 1887 and 1900; 14 months
1895-1897
- 2) in penal servitude: not at all
- 3) in exile: three years (Yenisei Gubernia, Minusinsk
Uyezd)
- 4) in emigration: 1900-1905 and 1908-1917

Signed: *V. Ulyanov (Lenin)*

14th of December 1921

ALL-RUSSIA CENSUS FORM FOR MEMBERS OF THE R.C.P.(B.)

February 13, 1922

G.C., R.C.P.
STATISTICAL DEPT.
Form "A"
No. 38

ALL-RUSSIA CENSUS
OF MEMBERS
OF THE RUSSIAN
COMMUNIST PARTY
(BOLSHEVIKS)
1922

*Workers
of the World,
Unite!*

1. Location of Party cell: town Moscow uyezd Zam-
vil. volost district
gub. Kremlin area No. 1
region
2. Name of enterprise (office, army unit) at which the cell is
organised: C.P.C., Party card
224,332
3. Name of Party organisation which issued the card: Zam-
district
committee
4. Surname: Ulyanov (Lenin)
5. First name and patronymic: Vladimir Ilyich
6. Sex: M. 7. Date of birth: born in 1870; age: 52 years
8. Spoken language: Russian 9. What other languages can you
freely speak: I can freely speak in none
10. a) Do you hold any religious beliefs (convictions)? (yes, no)
specify which: No
b) If you are an atheist, state since what age: 16
11. Number of members of the family (excluding the signer):
dependents: two
working: two
12. Education: a) can you read and write (yes, no): Yes
b) if you studied or are studying, state: —

Table I. Educational Qualification

Type of school (2-class rural zemstvo, 4-class town school; technical vocational school; evening motor classes; aviation classes, high school); university; Party school). Out-of-school education to be indicated by the words "self-taught", "home-taught"	How many years did you study	Did you finish school (yes, no, finished such-and-such a class, still studying)
13	14	15
a. Finished classic school in 1887 b. and passed university finals c. at extern law faculty in 1891	8 years (in classic school)	Finished classic school. Passed extern university finals

16. If you have a desire to study, what would you take up (reading and writing, the sciences, arts, trades—specify which):—

Table II. Social and National Origin

Relation to the signer	Basic profession or occupation, post, rank	Trade status (employer; self-employed, wage-worker, professional man, houseowner, housewife	Nationality
17	18	19	20
1. Grandfather (on father's side) 2. Father 3. Mother	I don't know Director of elementary schools —		

21. At what age did you start earning your own living: at 27 (approximately); as employee or self-employed: litterateur

22. a) Basic profession and speciality before 1917: litterateur

b) How many years have you worked at this profession:

about 20 (1897-1917)

23. Principal source of income before 1914:

literary work and salary from the Party.

in 1914-1917: Ditto

Table III. Record of Employment from 1917 to Date

Work period	Place of work		Kind of occupation	Employed, elected, appointed	Length of employment			
	Name of enterprise (office, army unit) where you have worked no less than 3 months and where you are working at present	Town or gubernia			Period, from/to		Total employment	
					Month year	Month year	Years	Months
24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32
A. From 1917 to time of entering present employment	a							
	b							
	c							
	d							
	e							
B. At time of filling in this form:	a. from X. 1917 Chairman C.P.C.	Moscow		By appointment	from 25. X. 1917		4	3
	b.							

33. Last monthly pay: (monetary): wage category 17, basic rate rubles, total pay 4,700,000 rubles

Table IV. Length of Party Membership

Name of Party and Group	Status in the organisation ("professional", committee member, Committee Secretary, organiser, agitator, propagandist; combat-squad member, technical worker, rank-and-file member)	Place of work (town, gubernia)	Period of Party membership		
			Joined (year, month)	Quitted (year, month)	Total length of Party membership (in years and months)
34	35	36	37	38	39
R.C.P.(B.)	professional, C.C. member	Moscow	1895 (actual-ly)	—	about 27 years

Table V. Revolutionary Record

Participation	Number of occasions
40	41
1. In economic strikes.....	—
2. In political ".....	—
Total.....	
3. In street political demonstrations.....	—
4. In students' movements.....	(1887)
5. In illegal circles.....	many
6. In illegal mass rallies and meetings.....	many
7. In May Day rallies.....	
8. In armed uprisings and partisan actions.....	—
9. In Party conferences.....	} In practically all
10. In Party congresses.....	

42. Prison record: a) length of imprisonment: years 1 months 2;
in administrative exile: years 3 months—; deportation years—
months—; political emigration: years about 10 months—; number of escapes: —
43. a) What newspapers and magazines did you read in 1921 (name them): various
- b) Regularly, occasionally, never: irregularly
- c) If you never read, state why (no newspapers, no time, no interest) —
- d) If you do read state where (at home, at work, at a library, reading-room, on paper stands: at home
44. a) How long have you been a member of a trade union: from 19_____
- b) Do you take part at the present time in trade union work (yes, no): no
- c) If you do, specify what:

Table VI. Military Record as Serviceman and Political Commissar

In what army	Arm of service and speciality (infantry, cavalry, artillery, sappers, engineers)	Military rank (private, company commander)	Length of service				Number or occasions of				
			Date, from/to		Total service		Participation		Wounds		Military awards
			Month, year	Month, year	Years Months	In skirmishes	In hand-to-hand fighting	Firearm	Cold steel		
45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56
1. In tsarist army	No										
2. In White army											
3. In Green army											
4. In Red army											

57. If you were not in military service, did you undergo General Military Training (yes, no): No

58. When were you demobilised month_____ of, year 19 ____

59. a) If you are a town dweller or a worker do you maintain any contacts with the village (yes, no) ____

b) If so, specify (I have a farm, a market garden, a bee-garden, etc., of my own or in partnership with other persons) ____

c) What is your part in this business (personal labour, financial support) ____

Notes:

Town of *Moscow* ----- February 13, 1922

V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DELEGATES OF THE ELEVENTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(BOLSHEVIKS)

1. Name in full:.....Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov*
2. Are you attending as debating or voting delegate:
3. Delegate's card No.:
4. What organisation have you been delegated by:.....Moscow
5. Age:.....52 years
6. Nationality:.....Russian
7. Education:.....university
8. What social group do you belong to (worker, peasant, office employee):
9. How long have you worked at your profession: 28 years as litterateur
10. What Party work are you doing at the present time:
member of the C.C., R.C.P.
11. What administrative work are you doing at the present time:
Chairman of the C.P.C. and C.L.D.
12. What part are you taking at the present time:

a) in the co-operative movement	}	no part
b) in the trade union movement		
13. When did you join the R.C.P.:.....at its foundation (1895)
14. Did you previously belong to any other parties, when, which:
No

Signed: *V. Ulyanov (Lenin)*

27th of March 1922

Printed from the form filled
in part by Lenin

* The answers printed in small type are in the handwriting of Lenin's sister Maria.—*Ed.*

JOURNAL
OF LENIN'S
DUTY SECRETARIES⁴⁹⁸

November 21, 1922-March 6, 1923

November 21, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

In the morning Vladimir Ilyich received Gorbunov.⁴⁹⁹ After 11.30 Kamenev; meeting at 6 o'clock.⁵⁰⁰ There have been no orders. Lydia Alexandrovna [Fotieva] has a paper⁵⁰¹ for voting* which Vladimir Ilyich asked to be reminded of from 5-6 p.m. in order to have a talk with Stalin. But Lydia Alexandrovna kept it and said that the explanations he wished to receive from Stalin she would give him herself, so there was no need to remind him, but Lydia Alexandrovna would remind him. Kamenev 10.15-10.45.

November 21, evening.

Haskell—11.30 }

Stalin—12.30 } appointment for November 22**

Re Haskell and Lers (interpreter), orders given to the commandant's office.

November 22, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

I. Morning no orders. Appointments kept.

[For] the evening—Kivdilo and Brodovsky at 6 o'clock (workers of the porcelain works),*** will be received in the following order: at 6 they will arrive at Gorbunov's office and he will interview them and inform us, and then Vladimir Ilyich will drop in for a minute.

An order has to be given concerning the pass (through the Troitsky Gate).

Notes in the "Execution" column:

* Voted. Passed on to the Politbureau. Chicherin and Stalin informed. Volodicheva.

** Haskell⁵⁰²—through Kamenev. Lers—interpreter. Stalin—carried out. Both received.

*** Kivdilo and Brodovsky have been notified through Zax,⁵⁰³ all information about them can be got from Zax.

II. Vladimir Ilyich has given a letter, strictly confidential, concerning Haskell's proposal, to be sent round to all the members of the Politbureau and Chicherin. Eight copies have been sent to Nazaretyan⁵⁰⁴ to be circulated for voting.* Check with Burakova⁵⁰⁵—received.

III. Gorbunov's papers addressed to the presiding committee of the Fifth All-Russia Congress of the Soviet Employees Trade Union⁵⁰⁶ to be given to Vladimir Ilyich to sign (to be returned to Gorbunov after signing).

November 23, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

At 11 in the morning Vladimir Ilyich has a meeting of the Politbureau up to 2.30.⁵⁰⁷ So far no orders have been given.

If Vladimir Ilyich asks about the letter to Hoover he is to be told that Chicherin is seeing to that himself. Haskell is leaving today at 7.20. The letter will be handed to him through Lander (as Vladimir Ilyich asked). No reception for the evening so far.

November 23, evening (entry by S. M. Manucharyants).

At 5.40 Vladimir Ilyich was in his office. Asked for the packet from Sklyansky⁵⁰⁸ and when the Politbureau minutes would be ready and how this was being handled technically. I got in touch with Sklyansky, who promised to deliver the packet in the morning of November 24.

6.45 packet to Sokolnikov.⁵⁰⁹

8.05 Vladimir Ilyich wanted to talk with Stalin, who proved to be engaged at a meeting of the Central Committee Secretariat. Vladimir Ilyich said: "either in the evening or the morning, there's no need to bother him now." At 8.30 he left.

Vladimir Ilyich looked through all the new books. I gave Vladimir Ilyich the packet from Zinoviev⁵¹⁰ and the material from Zax. Vladimir Ilyich asked for the agenda of the meeting of the Large Council of People's Commissars and gave a letter to be translated from Russian into English. At 10.05 Vladimir Ilyich left.

Note in the "Execution" column:

* Forwarded 15/20 min. No. 8565.

November 24, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

Vladimir Ilyich wanted to receive Meisner (of the Fishing Industry Board), he may possibly receive him today—so far it is unknown.

Possibly this evening or tomorrow in the daytime Vladimir Ilyich will receive Sklyansky and Pantsendjansky on the question of the ship-repair programme.*⁵¹¹

Vladimir Ilyich asked that Earsman and Garden⁵¹²—delegates of the Australian Party, should be kept on phone call this evening from 5 to 9, they will be waiting in the "Luxe" 294, can be called through the commandant's office.

Burakova phoned, asked that Chicherin's proposal concerning Vorovsky's wire about the Straits be given to Vladimir Ilyich for voting.**⁵¹³

November 24, evening (entry by S. M. Manucharyants).

Before the meeting Vladimir Ilyich received Kamenev. From 6 to 7.30 Vladimir Ilyich was at the meeting of the Council of Labour and Defence.⁵¹⁴ The question of the composition of the commission in connection with the statement by the C.C. of Georgia was handed to Vladimir Ilyich from the Politbureau for voting.⁵¹⁵ Vladimir Ilyich did not vote.

Passed on the voting on the Straits to be forwarded to the Politbureau. 7.30-8.30 Sklyansky, and then Krzhizhnikovsky—at the flat.

November 25, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

Vladimir Ilyich is unwell,⁵¹⁶ he stayed only five minutes in his office, dictated three letters over the phone,⁵¹⁷ to which he wanted inquiries made later for answers.

Maria Ilyinichna [Ulyanova] said that he should not be bothered in any way—if he asked about the answers himself, then inquiries should be made in the proper quarters. No reception, no orders so far. There are two packets from Stalin and Zinoviev⁵¹⁸—but this to be kept under the hat until special instructions and permission are given.

Notes in the "Execution" column:

* Sklyansky was received.

** Forwarded to Politbureau in the evening.

November 25, evening.

Came at 6 o'clock. Spoke on the telephone for several minutes. A. D. Tsyurupa was with him from 6.30 to 7.30. Afterwards, left immediately, asking that all Kamenev's papers on his desk in two folders should be sent to Tsyurupa,⁵¹⁹ and the articles on the Urquhart concession to Chicherin.⁵²⁰ This has been done. (But part of the materials is with Nikolai Petrovich [Gorbunov] or in the files.)

Chicherin asked Vladimir Ilyich to be told that he would like to receive personal instructions concerning the Urquhart concession. He (Chicherin) is leaving tomorrow evening. This has to be reported first thing in the morning on Sunday. (Not yet reported.)

8.30 to 8.45 telephone conversation. Gorbunov asked for all the materials concerning the trusts, questions of financing and information from Kamenev's secretariat to be passed on to him, as Vladimir Ilyich had asked him to show them to Tsyurupa. I have already sent Tsyurupa the opinions on the trusts and the information from Kamenev—Tsyurupa has received them and asked they should be left with him for a time to study. Apparently, Nikolai Petrovich has given him some other materials.

I have not shown the packets. But they are all apparently very important. Lydia Alexandrovna ought to be consulted about this.

November 26, Sunday, morning (entry by S. M. Manucharyants).

Vladimir Ilyich arrived at 12, spoke on the telephone, sorted out the books, took several with him. Left at 1.30, taking V. Milyutin's report⁵²¹ and other papers.

November 26, Sunday, evening (entry by S. M. Manucharyants).

Vladimir Ilyich came at 6.50, spoke on the telephone. At 7.30 Tsyurupa arrived. At 8.30 Tsyurupa left, and so did Vladimir Ilyich.

November 27, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

Vladimir Ilyich was in his office round about 12, asked for no one and shortly went away. Through Nadezhda

Konstantinovna asked for all the materials on foreign trade. All sent to his flat. No orders so far, no reception. No packets either.

November 27, evening (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Gorbunov asked, if possible, that the paper from Zinoviev in connection with Münzenberg⁵²² be given to Vladimir Ilyich to sign (if received) and the materials on foreign trade to be passed on to him (Gorbunov), since Vladimir Ilyich had asked him to show them to Tsyurupa. But today Vladimir Ilyich has not given them. They are at his flat. No orders from Vladimir Ilyich. A little after 6 I gave orders to the commandant's office to admit Kramer⁵²³ to the flat.

Quite a few packets. Among them the mail from Berlin.

November 28, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

Vladimir Ilyich did not come to his office, spoke twice on the phone with Lydia Alexandrovna.* Asked for Sorokin's article in *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn* for November 26²²⁵ concerning 159 directives**—then gave orders to Lydia Alexandrovna; no orders for the evening so far. I am not leaving the packets either.

November 28, evening (entry by S. M. Manucharyants).

At 7.45 Vladimir Ilyich asked to get hold of Avanesov⁵²⁶ and ask him whether he could phone him. Phoned a second time and gave his number. I told Vladimir Ilyich that Avanesov was at a board conference of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. "Then don't trouble, I'll ring you in the morning." There was a paper for Vladimir Ilyich to sign from Gorbunov to the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, copies to Bogdanov⁵²⁷ and Fomin⁵²⁸ on the question of the All-Russia C.E.C. revising the decision to transfer the creosoting works from the Supreme Economic Council to the People's Commissariat for Railways.⁵²⁹ Vladimir Ilyich signed it (at his flat and passed it on to the Secretariat).

Notes in the "Execution" column:

* See supplementary card.⁵²⁴

** Article cut out, pasted and sent to his flat.

November 29, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

Vladimir Ilyich was in his office at 12.20, sent for Stalin, who sat till 13.40. No orders for the evening. No packets either so far.

November 29, evening (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Notice from the Politbureau (8812) that the question of the Union Republics will be discussed at the Politbureau tomorrow (sent not for information, but for consideration).⁵³⁰

Vladimir Ilyich phoned from 5.30 till 6. Asked whether the paper on the ship-repair programme had been received from Stalin. Talked for several minutes on the phone with Kamenev. Dictated over the phone his views on the ship-repair programme which he asked to be sent to Stalin and Kamenev (this has been done).⁵³¹

Asked whether a telegram had been sent to Haskell in London. The duty secretary in Chicherin's office answered in the affirmative.* He will send confirmation in writing tomorrow morning. Vladimir Ilyich has been informed.

Avanesov was from 7.50 to 8.55. They talked in Vladimir Ilyich's office. Left at 9. During the talk with Avanesov inquired what date the plenum of the Central Committee was fixed for. Tomorrow this question is on the order of the day of the Politbureau (together with the agenda), and at the last plenum of the C.C. it was decided to time the plenum to the Congress of Soviets. This has been reported to Vladimir Ilyich.⁵³²

November 30, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

Vladimir Ilyich came to his office at 1.10, phoned and asked for No. 763 of *Posledniye Novosti* [Latest News] for October 13. He was interested in Peshekhonov's article there.⁵³³ I found it and took it to his flat. Vladimir Ilyich was in his office exactly five minutes and went home at once. No orders. No packets either. Lydia Alexandrovna asked to make a note—just for information—that Haskell's and Chicherin's packets addressed to Vladimir Ilyich had been handed to Kamenev.

Note in the "Execution" column:

* Copy of the telegram mailed to Haskell over Litvinov's signature. Received November 30.

November 30, evening (entry by S. M. Manucharyants).

Vladimir Ilyich came to his office at 6.45, asked what news there was and when the Politbureau meeting ended. I told Vladimir Ilyich that there were some new books. He asked to bring them to him. Returned the newspaper *Posledniye Novosti* for October 13.

At 7.55 Adoratsky⁵³⁴ came to see Vladimir Ilyich, sat till 8.40. Vladimir Ilyich spoke on the telephone. Asked for the minutes of the Politbureau. I gave them to him. Vladimir Ilyich asked that the Politbureau minutes be put away. He asked that special care be taken of Engels's book "Political Testament".⁵³⁵ Handed over the new books he had looked through. Vladimir Ilyich left at 9.

December 1, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

Vladimir Ilyich phoned Lydia Alexandrovna at 11.20, asked to see Molotov at 12.*

Molotov and Syrtsov⁵³⁶ called, were together from 12 till 1.30. No orders for the evening so far. No packets either.

December 1, evening (entry by S. M. Manucharyants).

Vladimir Ilyich arrived at 5.30, and at 5.45 Tsyurupa came.

Earsman, Garden and interpreter Voitinsky came at 7 o'clock and left at 8.40. Vladimir Ilyich left at 8.45.

December 2, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

Vladimir Ilyich arrived at 12.30, stayed only 10 minutes, sent for Lydia Alexandrovna. Asked her to collect the materials on the Fishing Board for his interview with Knipovich,⁵³⁷ which he asked to arrange for 7 p.m. The materials are with Gorbunov, see to it that they should all be here by 6 o'clock. Orders have to be given at all posts for Knipovich to be let through, as he has no pass.

The doctor was with Vladimir Ilyich in the morning and told him that once or even twice in two months Vladimir Ilyich had to go away for several days for a rest. On Tuesday he did not permit him to preside, but would permit him

Note in the "Execution" column:

* Molotov's appointment made for 12. He kept it.

on Thursday, but not for long—and after Thursday he was to go away positively for several days.

Gorbunov phoned and asked that Vladimir Ilyich be told at the first opportunity that Rykov had left Tiflis on December 1 by express train. Vladimir Ilyich has to be told this as he is very interested in it.

Vladimir Ilyich asked for Kamenev to see him at 8 p.m. (he phoned at 14.05).

Lydia Alexandrovna has to be reminded to find out from Vladimir Ilyich exactly what article of Kin's⁵³⁸ he spoke to Tsyurupa about, as the latter can't find it.

December 2, evening.

From 6.30 in his office; from 7 to 8—Knipovich; from 8 to 9.15—Kamenev.

Gave English letter and asked to find out when Earsman was leaving. Inquiries made of "Luxe" commandant Kaizer, who said that Earsman would probably not be leaving today and that tomorrow he would report the exact day of his departure.* This, should then be reported to Vladimir Ilyich and the letter given to him.

Signed the letter to Münzenberg**⁵³⁹ with the reservation that he does not agree to the beginning of the letter which is incorrectly worded in German. Asked for a copy to be left with him (No. 8579) in the Secretariat.

He has a letter to Svidersky to be signed, we have a copy. If he signs it, it is to be forwarded to destination.⁵⁴⁰

Gorbunov has handed in press cuttings***; one folder with fresh material, the other older. These are materials for Vladimir Ilyich's speech at the Congress of Soviets, which he asked to be collected. I think Lydia Alexandrovna should be asked whether it can be handed to him on Sunday.

Vladimir Ilyich asked that inquiries should be made of Belenky⁵⁴¹ as to when (exactly) Rykov and Dzerzhinsky

Notes in the "Execution" column:

* Kaizer reported: Earsman does not know himself when he is going away, but will spend a long time here, possibly even a few months.

** The letter has been delivered to Münzenberg through Gorbunov. M. Volodicheva.

*** Put on Vladimir Ilyich's desk.

are arriving.* He is very interested in this. I have not made inquiries of Belenky.

Vladimir Ilyich has been told that Frumkin is preparing the material and will send it in on Monday morning or Sunday evening.⁵⁴²

Vladimir Ilyich asked Gorbunov several times for Mikhailovsky's memo on the financial question. Nadya [Alliluyeva] must have it. He asked that both memos, Mikhailovsky's and Krasnoshchokov's⁵⁴³, should be returned to him when finished with. Left at 9.30.

December 3, morning (entry by S. A. Flakserman).

Vladimir Ilyich came to his office at 2 p.m. Asked for the stenographer. Volodicheva was not at home, and Vladimir Ilyich said we shouldn't trouble to look for her as he did not have much writing to do and would do it by hand. Reported to Vladimir Ilyich: Belenky's information about the arrival of Rykov and Dzerzhinsky, also Kaizer's report on when Earsman is leaving. Vladimir Ilyich asked to find out through Voitinsky of the Comintern, who knows English, when Earsman wants the memo.

Vladimir Ilyich stayed in his office 20 m. and left.

December 3, Sunday evening (entry by S. A. Flakserman).

Vladimir Ilyich came to his office at 6 p.m.

Belenky reported that according to the information received from the People's Commissariat for Railways Rykov left Baku on December 3 and was expected at Rostov on December 5. A wire has been sent to Dzerzhinsky for checking. I did not tell Vladimir Ilyich.

6.45. Vladimir Ilyich asked to tell Avanesov that he received his letter, read it and would like to talk with him first over the phone.⁵⁴⁴ Pass message on tomorrow morning.

At 7 p.m. Vladimir Ilyich left his office.

Note in the "Execution" column:

* Belenky reported that Dzerzhinsky was leaving Tiflis round about December 8, would stop on the way for inspections and be in Moscow round about December 13. Rykov left Tiflis on December 2 and will be here on December 4 in the morning. (As regards Rykov, he will check again and phone). Belenky phoned again and said that Rykov would be here at 6 p.m. today, said he would check it again and phone up. He has made inquiries down the line.

December 4, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

Vladimir Ilyich came to his office at 11.05. Asked to get exact information on Rykov's arrival.* At 10.40 Vladimir Ilyich phoned to ask that Avanesov be invited at 11 a.m. Avanesov arrived at 11.15, left at 12.10. Talk was on the question of foreign trade. At 12.30 Vladimir Ilyich went to Gorbunov's office,⁵⁴⁵ then came back and began to dictate to Volodicheva over the telephone, went home at 2. At 6 p.m. Vladimir Ilyich will be seeing Kolegayev⁵⁴⁶ (telephone 174—14 or through Trotsky's switchboard).

When Rykov arrives (if Vladimir Ilyich is in the country by that time, he is leaving on Thursday) he is to be put through to Vladimir Ilyich.** At 5.50 Zhukov⁵⁴⁷ is to be with Lenin for 10 minutes. From 7 to 8 Frumkin, from 8.15 to 9 Tsyurupa (tentatively, if this time is inconvenient to Vladimir Ilyich, then tomorrow at 11 or 12.30 a.m.).

December 4, evening (entry by S. M. Manucharyants).

At 5.30 Vladimir Ilyich dictated to Volodicheva a letter to Litvinov and greetings to the Third Congress of the Young Communist International.⁵⁴⁸ Dialed and asked me what I have for the day, told him the schedule of reception. At 5.50 Kolegayev went in, on the closing of the theatres, up to 6.10. Soon after Zhukov went in with Holtzmann⁵⁴⁹ and Lavrentyev, up to 6.50, talked about electrical industry. After them Frumkin went in at 6.50 till 7.25 on the question of foreign trade. At 7.30 Vladimir Ilyich left his office, at 8 o'clock he came into his office. Vladimir Ilyich asked about Litvinov's answer. Asked for Haskell's wire. Handed over the book by the Spaniard Cesar Reyes, asked that the inscription and contents of the book be translated.⁵⁵⁰ The commission made up of Zinoviev, Trotsky and Bukharin met on December 4 (today) in the evening, to whom was sent a copy of Vladimir Ilyich's notes (addressed to

Note in the "Execution" column:

* I phoned Belenky, asked him again to find out exactly. Promised to answer this evening.

** Watch this.

Bukharin) on the question of the tasks of our delegation at the Hague.⁵⁵¹

At 9 o'clock Vladimir Ilyich left his office.

December 5, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

Litvinov reported that there was confirmation of receipt of the telegram by Haskell through our mission. Tell Vladimir Ilyich.

Vladimir Ilyich came to his office at 10.45, asked whether the Bukharin-Zinoviev-Trotsky commission had met. I told him it had that night; he left at 1.40.

At 6 o'clock Vladimir Ilyich is to receive the Czechoslovak workers (see list).⁵⁵² Orders have to be given to all posts to let them through; they have passes to the Kremlin (for 15 m.). They have been notified.

Popov⁵⁵³ is coming at 7 for half an hour (notified). There should be a written report from Litvinov concerning receipt of the telegram by Haskell.

December 5, evening (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

From 6 to 6.45 the Czechoslovaks: Josef Hans, Hamosta, Fránek, Richtér, Chapěra, with Antselovich.⁵⁵⁴

From 7 to 8 Popov (on the census). Several minutes break (went home). At 8.20 Tsyurupa in his office. Left at 9.25.

December 6, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

Vladimir Ilyich came to his office a little after 11. He asked Lydia Alexandrovna to write several letters on his behalf (to Yakovleva, Kamenev, Tsyurupa⁵⁵⁵). Asked to be put through to Stalin, made arrangements to see him. At 12.40 Stalin came, sat with him till 2.20. Asked to invite Eiduk at 7.30, Dovgalevsky⁵⁵⁶ at 6, Bogdanov at 7. After Stalin he wanted to talk with Meshcheryakov.⁵⁵⁷

At 2.25 Vladimir Ilyich went home, Kamenev phoned, said he was sending a packet addressed to Comrade Lenin, has to be handed to him directly.**

Notes in the "Execution" column:

* He did not, as he was kept late.

** Received at a quarter to five and put on the desk. Volodicheva,

December 6, evening (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Kamenev's letter read by Vladimir Ilyich at 6 o'clock. From 6.05 to 6.30 Bogdanov; from 6.55 to 7.20 Eiduk; from 7.25 to—Dovgalevsky.

For 15-20 minutes dictated his reminiscences of N. Y. Fedoseyev.⁵⁵⁸ Left a little after 9. Reminiscences at his request forwarded to Anna Ilyinicha [Yelizarova] (see copy of forwarding note).

December 7, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

Vladimir Ilyich came to his office at 10.55; at 11 the Politbureau meeting started with Kamenev in the chair. Vladimir Ilyich attended.⁵⁵⁹ Vladimir Ilyich left the meeting to go home at 2.20.

December 7, evening (entry by S. M. Manucharyants).

Vladimir Ilyich came to the office at 5.30, talked with Stalin and others over the phone, gave various orders for the Politbureau⁵⁶⁰ and Yakovleva.⁵⁶¹ Left for Gorki at 6.15, taking with him current papers.⁵⁶²

December 8, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

At 12.10 Vladimir Ilyich phoned Lydia Alexandrovna, talked with her about yesterday's decisions of the Politbureau.

At 12.15 the following were sent to Vladimir Ilyich with Belenky: 1) minutes of the Politbureau No. 39⁵⁶³ and 2) list of key-post executives of all-Russia and district level (from Syrtsov). Vladimir Ilyich wanted to phone a little later and dictate something.

December 8, evening (entry by S. M. Manucharyants).

Vladimir Ilyich phoned at 5.35, dictated to Volodicheva⁵⁶⁴; at 5.50 Lydia Alexandrovna spoke with Vladimir Ilyich, who voted on three Politbureau questions: the wire from Vorovsky, Mdivani, Chicherin dated December 7, 1922,⁵⁶⁵ the composition of the commission to examine the resolutions for the Tenth Congress of Soviets, and greetings to the All-Ukraine Congress.⁵⁶⁶ Dictated standing order for the Politbureau.⁵⁶⁷ Agrees to putting off the plenum.⁵⁶⁸ Finished speaking at 6.20. Medicine from Berlin sent.

December 9, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

No orders left in the evening. Maria Ilyinichna phoned, saying that Vladimir Ilyich was going to dictate something at 5.45, and at 6 he was to talk with Rykov—the latter has arrived and is sitting at home. No orders. Some packets have come in.

December 9, evening (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Vladimir Ilyich phoned at 6.05, gave instructions. His letters concerning the work of the deputies⁵⁶⁹ sent off to Rykov, Stalin, Tsyurupa and Kamenev.

Belenky is to bring a packet for Vladimir Ilyich from Kamenev.

Vladimir Ilyich's letter in French will be returned by Souvarine this evening.⁵⁷⁰

Vladimir Ilyich is being sent: 1) his letter on the work of the deputies (original, copy and copy of the old decree⁵⁷¹), letter from Zetkin and medicine.

December 10, morning.

Nothing from Vladimir Ilyich.

December 10, evening.

Phoned a little after 6, asked to be put through to Stalin. Voted on the telegram from Kirov, Vasilyev and Poluyan concerning the S.R.s.⁵⁷²

Send by hand, at first opportunity, Vladimir Ilyich's letter, to Lazzari in French, corrected by Souvarine; it has been left at the gate; at 8.45 Vladimir Ilyich asked to send Frumkin his letter asking for his comments on Avanesov's theses. Sent. Find out tomorrow morning from Frumkin when he is sending his comments.⁵⁷³

Also make inquiries of Gorbunov first thing in the morning (see copies Nos. 8605 and 8606).⁵⁷⁴

The letter to Lazzari should not be sent specially. To be sent only by hand. Vladimir Ilyich said so.

December 11, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

No orders given. Vladimir Ilyich did not phone once. Check the temperature in his office, to be no less than 14 degrees. (R.)

December 11, evening (entry by S. M. Manucharyants).

There have been no orders. Vladimir Ilyich did not phone once.

December 12, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

Vladimir Ilyich arrived in Moscow at 11, came to his office at 11.15, stayed there a short time and went home before 12. At 12 he was to see Rykov, Kamenev and Tsyurupa.*

Vladimir Ilyich left his office at 2 o'clock. Rykov, Kamenev and Tsyurupa sat with him till 2.

For the evening so far nothing.

December 12, evening (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Vladimir Ilyich in his office at 5.30. Spoke on the phone for several minutes. Gave a letter to the Italian Lazzari to be sent off and asked to see to it that the person taking it was a trustworthy comrade. Dzerzhinsky from 6 to 6.45.⁵⁷⁵

Stomonyakov⁵⁷⁶—(question of the foreign trade monopoly)—7.45.

Left at 8.15.

Vladimir Ilyich's letter to Lazzari forwarded to Souvarine ("Luxe", 23). He will make arrangements with reliable comrades and let us know about it tomorrow morning, or better still will phone him**.

December 13, morning (entry by L. A. Fotieva).

Doctors came at 11. Ordered complete rest, he was to leave town.⁵⁷⁷

Round about 12 sent for Fotieva for winding up affairs. Dictated letters: to the Central Committee concerning Rozhkov,⁵⁷⁸ to Frumkin, Stomonyakov and Trotsky concerning foreign trade,⁵⁷⁹ and to his deputies concerning distribution of functions.⁵⁸⁰ At 12.30 Stalin came, left at 2.35.

Note in the "Execution" column:

* Saw them.

** Check carefully at Vladimir Ilyich's request. Souvarine signed for the letter, his personal signature received.

December 13, evening (entry by L. A. Fotieva).

At 5.55 sent for Fotieva. Told of Frumkin's and Trotsky's answers. Arranged to see Krzhizhanovsky at 12 on December 14. Dictated, from 7.30 to 8.25, a letter to the plenum of the Central Committee on the question of foreign trade.⁵⁸¹ Wanted to see Frumkin, but cancelled the engagement. Fairly good humour, joked. Only worried about the winding up of affairs.

December 14, morning (entry by L. A. Fotieva).

Phoned at 11, spoke with Fotieva about yesterday's letter on foreign trade, asked not to give it to anybody, as he had an addition to make. Inquired whether Krzhizhanovsky was coming. Phoned again at 11.10.

At 1.10 asked to be put through to Yaroslavsky.⁵⁸² As Yaroslavsky could not be found, put off his talk or interview with him for the evening. At 2.25 sent for Fotieva, gave her a note for Avanesov to be sent to him together with the letter on foreign trade.⁵⁸³ Gave orders for the letter, when returned, to be sent to Frumkin, whom he would probably receive in the evening. Was very pleased to hear of the Politbureau's decision concerning Rozhkov, laughed and said that this was very good news.⁵⁸⁴ Outwardly in good humour, jokes and laughs.

December 14, evening (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Vladimir Ilyich phoned at a quarter to six. Asked about the Politbureau minutes. Said he intended to dictate. Asked to be put through to Yaroslavsky. (Yaroslavsky was with him). At 7 o'clock, the doctor. Frumkin came, but did not see Vladimir Ilyich. At a little past eight Vladimir Ilyich inquired whether he was there. Asked Lydia Alexandrovna to remind him about Frumkin tomorrow at 12, when Frumkin would be seeing Tsyurupa. Asked to find out whether all the materials concerning the foreign trade monopoly had been sent to Trotsky and handed over those he had been keeping. They have to be shown to Lydia Alexandrovna. Vladimir Ilyich's letter concerning Bukharin's letter has been sent to Stalin and Trotsky at Vladimir Ilyich's request.^{*585} The addition, as he said, he would write separately.

Note in the "Execution" column:

* Does it have to be sent to Frumkin?

Before 8 told Lydia Alexandrovna that he would dictate: 1) a letter to Zinoviev concerning Rozhkov in Pskov; 2) to Kamenev concerning the Union of Socialist Republics; 3) an addition to the letter on foreign trade.

Repeated round about 9 o'clock that he reserved the right to phone up to 10 o'clock. Round about 10 Maria Ilyinichna phoned and said that Vladimir Ilyich would not dictate today.

December 15, morning (entry by L. A. Fotieva).

Phoned at 11.50. Asked for copies of yesterday's letters. Sent for Fotieva and gave a letter he had written to Trotsky, telling Fotieva to type it herself and send it off, keeping a copy in a sealed envelope in the secret files.⁵⁸⁶ He found it very difficult to write, asked that the original be destroyed but it is preserved in the secret file together with the copy.

Gave instructions about his books. Technical, medical and other books to be separated and sent back, books on agriculture to be turned over to Maria Ilyinichna, those on production propaganda, labour organisation and pedagogics to Nadezhda Konstantinovna, fiction to be kept until claimed, and publicist, political books, memoirs, etc., to be kept for him.

He also gave orders that all the minutes of the Finance Committee be turned over to him with a memo of the secretary, not too long, but neither too short, from which he could get a clear idea of the work of the Finance Committee. Not very cheerful, said he was feeling worse, had not slept that night.

December 15, evening (entry by L. A. Fotieva).

Phoned at 8.30. Dictated (first over the telephone, then invited me over to his flat) letters to Stalin and Trotsky. To Stalin concerning his possible speech at the Congress of Soviets.⁵⁸⁷ To Trotsky on a categorical protest against the question of foreign trade being removed from the agenda of the plenum, should that be contemplated.⁵⁸⁸ He finished round about 9.

December 16, morning (entry by L. A. Fotieva).

At 11-11.45 doctors called (Kramer and Kozhevnikov⁵⁸⁹). Nadezhda Konstantinovna sent down the letter to the deputies

which she had taken down, apparently, yesterday evening or today before the doctors came.⁵⁹⁰ Pakaln⁵⁹¹ says that Vladimir Ilyich has no wish to go to Gorki, saying that the journey by aero-sleigh was tiring and you could not go down by car. Pakaln tells that every day at 9.30 a dog (Aidu) is brought to him with whom he plays and is very fond of. A telegram has arrived from Foerster⁵⁹² confirming that before addressing the congress he should have no less than 7 days complete rest. Vladimir Ilyich did not phone once and has given no orders.

December 16, evening (entry by L. A. Fotieva).

Nadezhda Konstantinovna phoned asking that Stalin be told in Vladimir Ilyich's name that he would not address the Congress of Soviets. On being asked how Vladimir Ilyich was feeling, she said middling, he looked all right, but then it was difficult to say. She also asked, on his instructions, to phone Yaroslavsky secretly and ask him to make notes of the speeches of Bukharin and Pyatakov, and if possible others at the plenum, on the question of foreign trade.

December 18, morning (entry by N. S. Alliluyeva).

A meeting of the Central Committee plenum is on. Vladimir Ilyich is not attending, he is ill—no orders or instructions.

December 18, evening.

The plenum is in session. Vladimir Ilyich is not attending. With the evening session the plenum is closed.⁵⁹³

December 23 (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

A little after 8 Vladimir Ilyich called me to his flat. In the course of 4 minutes he dictated. Felt bad. Doctors called.⁵⁹⁴ Before starting to dictate, he said: "I want to dictate to you a letter to the congress. Take it down".⁵⁹⁵ Dictated quickly, but his sick condition was obvious. Towards the end he asked what the date was. Why was I so pale, why wasn't I at the congress,⁵⁹⁶ was sorry that he was taking up the time that I could have spent there. I received no more orders.

December 24 (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Next day (December 24) between 6 and 8 Vladimir Ilyich called me in again. Warned me that what he had dictated yesterday (December 23) and today (December 24) was strictly confidential. He emphasised this again and again. Demanded that everything he was dictating should be kept in a special place under special responsibility and to be considered categorically secret. He then added another order.⁵⁹⁷

Sukhanov's "Notes on the Revolution", Volumes III and IV, were taken for Vladimir Ilyich.

December 29.

Through Nadezhda Konstantinovna Vladimir Ilyich asked that lists of the new books be made up. The doctors have allowed him to read. Vladimir Ilyich is reading Sukhanov's "Notes on the Revolution" (Volumes III and IV). Vladimir Ilyich is not interested in fiction. He asked that the lists be made up by sections.

January 5, 1923.

Vladimir Ilyich asked for lists of new books as from January 3 and Titlinov's book "The New Church".⁵⁹⁸

January 17 (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Vladimir Ilyich called me in for half an hour between 6 and 7. He read and made corrections to his notes on Sukhanov's book on the revolution. In the course of 10-15 minutes dictated a continuation on the same subject.⁵⁹⁹

Was pleased with the new stand that made it easier for him to read books and his own manuscripts.

When dictating the sentence "Our Sukhanovs ..." he paused at the words "... never even dream ..." and while pondering the continuation, jokingly remarked: "What a memory! I have completely forgotten what I was going to say! Dash it! Extraordinary forgetfulness!" He asked me to type the notes at once and give them to him.

Watching him during dictation for several days running I noticed that he did not like to be interrupted in the middle of a sentence, as he lost the thread of his thoughts.

January 18 (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Vladimir Ilyich did not send for me.

January 19 (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Vladimir Ilyich sent for me round about 7 and a little after 8. Dictated his second variant about the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection ("How We Should Reorganise the W.P.I."⁶⁰⁰) for about 30 minutes. Said he wished to get it finished as quickly as possible.

January 20.

Vladimir Ilyich called me in today between 12 and 1 o'clock. Read his article "How We Should Reorganise the W.P.I." Made amendments and additions to it.

Said that Nadezhda Konstantinovna would give him information relating to one part of his article, and asked Lydia Alexandrovna to find out the same thing: what and how many bodies there were dealing with the scientific organisation of labour, how many congresses had been held on the subject and what groups had been represented at them. Was there any material in Petrograd? (Khlopyankin⁶⁰¹ had sent the same material as Nadezhda Konstantinovna had, a little more detailed.)

Asked for a full list of books.⁶⁰² I was with him for about 30 minutes.

January 21 (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Vladimir Ilyich did not send for me.

January 22 (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Vladimir Ilyich called me in for 25 minutes (from 12 to 12.25). Made corrections in the 2nd variant of the W.P.I. article. Finally chose this variant. As his time was limited he was in a great hurry. Asked me to put the article in order, retype it and give it to him by the evening. Nadezhda Konstantinovna, when letting me in, said he had stolen several minutes to look through the article. Nadezhda Konstantinovna told me that the nurse (on duty) had not wanted to let me in to him. After I had left, Nadezhda Konstantinovna came into the secretariat to tell me Vladimir Ilyich's request "to leave a space in the places, if any, which I had not

managed to take down". She said that Vladimir Ilyich, being in a hurry, imagined that I had difficulty in following him. I asked him to be told that I had taken it all down, and if I had any doubts I would do as he had asked.

January 23 (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Vladimir Ilyich sent for me between 12 and 1 o'clock. Once more glanced through the article mentioned above and made slight changes. Asked me to insert them in his copy and ours and give one to Maria Ilyinichna for *Pravda*. Article corrected and handed to Maria Ilyinichna before 3 o'clock. He asked whether Lydia Alexandrovna had come back and whether our holidays were over?

January 30 (entry by L. A. Fotieva).

On January 24 Vladimir Ilyich sent for Fotieva and gave instructions to ask Dzerzhinsky or Stalin for the materials of the commission on the Georgian question and to make a detailed study of them. This assignment was given to Fotieva, Glyasser and Gorbunov. Object—report to Vladimir Ilyich, who wanted this for the Party congress. Apparently, he did not know the question was up at the Politbureau.⁶⁰³ He said: "Just before I got ill Dzerzhinsky told me about the work of the commission and about the 'incident', and this had a very painful effect upon me."

On Thursday, January 25, he asked whether the materials had been received. I answered that Dzerzhinsky would not be arriving until Saturday. Therefore I had not yet been able to ask him.

On Saturday I asked Dzerzhinsky, he said Stalin had the materials. I sent Stalin a letter, but he was out of town. Yesterday, January 29, Stalin phoned saying he could not give the materials without the Politbureau. Asked whether I had not been telling Vladimir Ilyich things he was not to be told—how was it he was posted about current affairs? For instance, his article about the W.P.I. showed that certain circumstances were known to him. I answered that I had not been telling anything and had no reason to believe he was posted about affairs. Today Vladimir Ilyich sent for me to learn the answer and said that he would fight to get the materials.

On January 26 Vladimir Ilyich gave instructions for Tsyurupa, Svidersky and Avanesov to be told that if they agree with his article, they should arrange a number of conferences and discuss by way of preparation for the congress whether or not a plan should be drawn up, a synopsis of textbooks (apparently on the normalisation of labour). Do they know the books by Kerzhentsev and Yermansky?⁶⁰⁴ There is a plan of scientific organisation of labour, there is a normalisation department at the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.

Today he asked what answer Tsyurupa had given, whether he, Svidersky, Avanesov, and Reske⁶⁰⁵ agreed with the article. And other members of the Board? I said I did not know this. He asked, wasn't Tsyurupa dilly-dallying, procrastinating, was he frank with me. I said I had not had a chance to speak to him yet, I had only given him the instructions, which he said would be duly carried out.

On January 24 Vladimir Ilyich said: "First of all, about this 'secret' job of ours—I know that you are deceiving me." To my assurances to the contrary, he answered: "I have my own opinion about that."

Today, January 30, Vladimir Ilyich said that yesterday, on asking whether he could address the congress on March 30, the doctor had answered in the negative, but had promised that he would be up by that time and within a month would be allowed newspapers. Reverting to the question of the Georgian commission, he said, laughingly: "That is not newspapers, so I can read it now." Apparently not in a bad humour. No compress on his head.

February 1 (entry by L. A. Fotieva).

Today Vladimir Ilyich sent for me (at 6.30 p.m.). I told him the Politbureau had permitted the materials to be given out.⁶⁰⁶ He gave instructions what to pay attention to and generally how to use them.⁶⁰⁷ Vladimir Ilyich said: "If I were at large (at first he made a slip, then repeated, laughing: if I were at large) I would easily do all this myself." It had been estimated that their study would take 4 weeks.

He asked what the attitude of Tsyurupa and the others was towards his article, I answered, according to the direc-

tions of Tsyurupa and Svidersky, that Svidersky was fully in agreement. Tsyurupa approved it in the part referring to the enlistment of Central Committee members, and doubted whether it was possible for the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection to discharge all its present functions with a staff reduced to 300-400 people. I do not know Avanesov's point of view. Tomorrow there is to be a meeting of the whole Board.

I asked whether the question of the article had been up before the Central Committee. I answered that I did not know this. Vladimir Ilyich was satisfied with these reports.

February 2 (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Vladimir Ilyich sent for me at 11.45. Dictated article "Better Fewer, But Better".⁶⁰⁸ Finished at 12.30.

Asked Lydia Alexandrovna to come every other day. When asked, "At what time", he said that he was now a free man. Casually mentioned that the only time that was ruled out was from 2 to 5; said 6 might do, or to arrange it with his sister.

I had not seen him since January 23. Outwardly, a considerable change for the better: fresh, cheerful looking. Dictates, as always, excellently: without halts, seldom at a loss for words, speaks, gesticulating, rather than dictates.⁶⁰⁹ No compress on his head.

February 3 (entry by L. A. Fotieva).

Vladimir Ilyich sent for me at 7 o'clock for a few minutes. Asked whether we had looked through the materials. I answered that only externally and that they were less than we had expected. Asked whether this question had been up before the Politbureau. I answered that I had no right to talk about it. Asked: "Have you been forbidden to speak precisely and particularly about this?" "No, I have no right generally to talk about current business." "So this is current business?" I realised that I had made a slip. I repeated that I had no right to talk. He said: "I heard about this business from Dzerzhinsky before I got ill. Has the commission reported to the Politbureau?" "Yes, it has. The Politbureau has endorsed its decision as far as I remember." He said;

"Well, I think you will make your report in about three weeks, and then I'll send them a letter." I answered: "We may not manage it in three weeks." The doctors came (Foerster, who had just arrived, Kozhevnikov and Kramer) and I went away. Looked cheerful and buoyant, perhaps somewhat excited at Foerster's visit—Foerster had not seen him for some time.

February 4 (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Vladimir Ilyich sent for me today round about 6 o'clock. Asked whether I did not mind him calling me on holidays. ("You must take a rest, too, sometimes, mustn't you?")

Dictated continuation of his article "Better Fewer, But Better" for over half an hour. Looked fresh, voice cheerful. No compress. Ended with the words: "Well, that'll do for the time being. I'm a bit tired." Asked me to type it out and phone him when I had finished, as he would probably continue the article that day; said it was an old habit of his to write with the manuscript in front of him, otherwise he found it difficult to write.

Nadezhda Konstantinovna told me that the German doctor (Foerster) had seen him, had told him a lot of pleasant things, allowed him to do gymnastic exercises and allowed him extra time for dictating articles, and that Vladimir Ilyich was very pleased.

At 8 o'clock he sent for me again. He did not dictate, however, but looked through what he had written and made amendments. When he had finished he said that before sending the article to the press he wanted to show it to Tsyurupa and perhaps some other members of his board and intended to make certain additions to these thoughts of his. Dictated more slowly than usual. Compress on his head. Face went pale. Obviously tired.

February 5 (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Today Vladimir Ilyich called me in at 12 o'clock. I was with him three-quarters of an hour. Dictated slowly. In one place, finding difficulty to express himself, he said: "It doesn't go smoothly with me today somehow, not briskly" (he stressed the word). Asked for his article "How We Should

Reorganise the W.P.I." Read it for 3 or 4 minutes in silence. Then he continued a little longer and decided to stop, saying he would call me in today at 4 or 5, maybe 6 o'clock.

February 5, evening (entry by M. I. Glyasser).

Vladimir Ilyich sent for Lydia Alexandrovna at 7 o'clock (ten to 7), but as she was indisposed he sent for me.

Asked whether we had started sorting out the materials of the Georgian commission and by what date we planned to finish this work. I answered that we had distributed the materials and begun to read them, and as for the date, we expected to keep the deadline he had given us, that is, three weeks. He asked how we intended to read the materials. I said we had come to the conclusion that it was necessary for each of us to read everything. "Is that your unanimous decision?" "Yes." Vladimir Ilyich began to figure out how much time was left until the congress. When I said a month and 25 days, he said that this term was probably sufficient, but if extra information was required, it might prove too little, all the more considering that it would take still longer to go to the Caucasus. He asked how much each of us was working, and said that in case of need we could use Volodicheva and Shushanika Manucharyants. Then he asked whether the decision for all to read everything had been formally adopted. I answered that we had no record of this decision in writing and asked whether he had anything against it maybe. He said that he would like us all to read everything, of course, but the tasks of our commission were very indefinite. On the one hand, he would not like to give us too much trouble, but on the other, we have to reckon with the need for widening these tasks as the work progresses. It may be necessary to obtain additional material. He asked where the materials were being kept, how we use them, whether we would make a brief summary of all the materials and whether we would have it typed ("wouldn't it be too much trouble?"). Finally, Vladimir Ilyich decided that in the course of the next week we would decide how much time we needed and in what form we would handle these materials, and in handling them we would be guided by the necessity of drawing up a general survey of all the data on the points which the commission had mapped out as well

as on those questions which he would put to us in the course of the work.

Then Vladimir Ilyich ordered inquiries to be made of Popov as to how things stood with the working up of the census materials of the Central Statistical Board in Petrograd, Moscow and Kharkov (if a census in the last-named city was carried out), and by what date he intends to have them worked up and whether they would be published.⁶¹⁰ Vladimir Ilyich would like to see them in print before the Party congress; he considers that in view of the special importance of this census the materials ought to be published even though those of previous censuses had not been published and Popov had only sent Vladimir Ilyich the tables. Popov, therefore, had to be got moving. An official inquiry should be sent to him about this, following a preliminary talk.

I was with Vladimir Ilyich altogether 20 minutes. I was seeing him for the first time since his illness. I thought he looked well and cheerful, only slightly paler than before. Speaks slowly, gesticulating with his left hand and stirring the fingers of his right. No compress on his head.

February 6, evening (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Vladimir Ilyich called me in between 7 and 9. I was there for about an hour and a half. First he began to read his article "Better Fewer, But Better". The corrections, made in red ink, put Vladimir Ilyich in a good humour (not the corrections themselves, but the way they were inserted!). The article at his request had not been retyped, and the first deciphered copy had had the corrections added to it which Vladimir Ilyich had made during his reading. The corrections having been made not in proof-reader style, but in the ordinary secretarial way, Vladimir Ilyich, on second reading, found this inconvenient. He asked that the next time the whole thing should be retyped anew. Running through the article, Vladimir Ilyich made passing remarks, spoke about his old habit of writing and not dictating; that he understood now why stenographers do not satisfy him ("did not satisfy him," he said); that he was accustomed to seeing his manuscript in front of him, stopping, pausing to think over difficult passages, passages in which he had

"got stuck", walking up and down the room, even running away to take a walk somewhere; that even now he often felt like seizing a pencil and writing or introducing corrections himself.

He recollected how he tried to dictate an article of his to Trotsky's stenographer back in 1918, and how, when he felt himself getting "stuck", he "plunged" on in confusion with "incredible" speed, and how this led to his having had to burn the whole manuscript, after which he sat down to write himself and wrote "The Renegade Kautsky",⁶¹¹ with which he was pleased.

Vladimir Ilyich talked about all this very gaily, laughing his infectious laugh. I had never seen him in such a mood. He went on dictating part of this article. Dictation lasted 15-20 minutes. He stopped the dictation himself.

February 7 (entry by L. A. Fotieva).

Vladimir Ilyich sent for me. Spoke on 3 questions.

1) On the results of the census (asked to be shown the proofs of the census book. I said there would have to be Stalin's permission for this).

2) On the Georgian commission. Asked how the work was getting on, when we would finish reading, when we would get together, and so on.

3) On the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. Did the Board now intend to make any decision, "to take a step of state importance" or was it putting things off until the congress. Said he was writing an article, but was not getting on with it at all, nevertheless he was thinking of revising it and giving it to Tsyurupa to read before sending it to the press. Gave instructions to ask Tsyurupa whether he was to hurry up with this article or not.

Today Kozhevnikov said that there was a tremendous improvement in Vladimir Ilyich's health. He was now moving his arm and had begun to believe himself that he would regain the use of it.

February 7, morning (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

I was with Vladimir Ilyich at about 12.30. Said that he would dictate on any subjects and arrange the material

at some future time. Dictated on the subject of 1) how Party and administrative bodies could be merged, and 2) whether it was convenient to combine educational activities with official activities.

At the words "And the more abrupt the revolution ..." he stopped, repeated them several times, obviously struggling with them; asked me to help him, re-read the preceding passages, laughed and said "Here I've got completely stuck, I'm afraid, make a note of that—stuck on this very spot!"

To my remark that I was his unavoidable evil for a short space of time, as he would soon be able to write himself, he said: "Oh, that won't be so soon!" His voice sounded weary, with a hint of pain in it.

February 7, evening (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Vladimir Ilyich called me between 7 and 9. Was with him for about an hour and a half. Completed the sentence at which he had stopped yesterday. Said: "I shall now try to develop the next subject." There and then asked about the subjects he had already noted previously⁰¹²; when these were read out, he remarked that one of them he had forgotten (on the correlation between the Central Board for Vocational Education and the general educational work among the people). Dictated the general part of his article "Better Fewer, But Better". Dictated fast and freely, without difficulty, gesticulating.

On finishing, said he would try later to fit this part in with his article as a whole. Tired. In the evening I learned from Nadezhda Konstantinovna that Vladimir Ilyich would not dictate tomorrow; he intended to read.

February 9 (entry by L. A. Fotieva).

In the morning Vladimir Ilyich sent for me. Confirmed that he would move the question of the Workers' and Peasant's Inspection at the congress. As for the census, he was worried whether the tables would be printed the way they should be. Agreed to my suggestion that instructions for having this checked should be put through Kamenev or Tsyurupa. The assignment to be given to Krzhizhanovsky or Svidersky. Mood and appearance excellent. Said that Foerster was inclined to allow him to receive visitors rather

than newspapers. On my remarking that this really would seem to be the best from the medical point of view, he said very gravely after a thoughtful pause that in his opinion it would be worse precisely from the medical point of view, because printed matter could be read and done with, whereas visits evoke an exchange.

February 9, morning (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Vladimir Ilyich called me in a little after 12. Said the retyped stuff pleased him better. Read the part of the article he had dictated yesterday, made practically no corrections. On finishing, said: "I think I've made a good job of it." I had the impression that he was very pleased with that part of his article. Asked me to take down the end: "That is how I link up ...", etc. I stayed for about an hour.

February 9, evening.

Vladimir Ilyich sent for Lydia Alexandrovna. Nadezhda Konstantinovna asked her to be given the general part of the article, as Vladimir Ilyich wanted her to read it.

February 10 (entry by L. A. Fotieva).

Called me in a little past 6. Asked that the article "Better Fewer, But Better" be given to Tsyurupa to read, if possible within 2 days.

Asked for listed books.⁶¹³ Looks tired, speaks with great difficulty, losing the thread of his thoughts and confusing words. Compress on his head.

February 12 (entry by L. A. Fotieva).

Vladimir Ilyich is worse. Bad headache. Called me in for several minutes. According to Maria Ilyinichna, the doctors had upset him so much that his lips quivered. Foerster the day before had said that he was emphatically prohibited newspapers, visitors and political information. Asked what he meant by the latter, Foerster replied: "Well, this, for example. You are interested in the census of Soviet employees." The fact that the doctors knew about this upset Vladimir Ilyich. Apparently, furthermore, Vladimir Ilyich had the impression that it was not the doctors who gave

instructions to the Central Committee, but the Central Committee that gave instructions to the doctors.

Talked with me about the same 3 subjects, pleaded a headache. I said jokingly that I would treat him by suggestion and in two days he would have no more headaches.

February 14 (entry by L. A. Fotieva).

Vladimir Ilyich sent for me a little after 12. No headache. Said that he was quite well. That his was a nervous illness, that sometimes he felt quite well, i.e., his head quite clear, but sometimes he felt worse. Therefore we had to hurry with his requests, as he wanted to put some things through without fail in time for the congress and hoped that he would manage it. But if we dragged it out and thus ruined the business, he would be very very annoyed. The doctors came and we had to break off.

February 14, evening.

Called me in again. Impediment in speech, obviously tired. Spoke again on the three points of his instructions. In special detail on the subject that agitated him most of all, namely, the Georgian question. Asked to hurry things up. Gave certain instructions.⁶¹⁴

March 5 (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Vladimir Ilyich did not send for me until round about 12. Asked me to take down two letters: one to Trotsky,⁶¹⁵ the other to Stalin⁶¹⁶; the first letter to be telephoned personally to Trotsky and the answer given to him as soon as possible. As to the second letter, he asked it to be put off, saying that he was not very good at it that day. He wasn't feeling too good.

March 6 (entry by M. A. Volodicheva).

Asked about a reply to the first letter (reply over the telephone was taken down in shorthand). Read the second letter (to Stalin) and asked it to be handed to him personally and receive the answer from his own hands. Dictated a letter to the Mdivani group.⁶¹⁷ Felt bad. Nadezhda Konstantinovna asked that this letter to Stalin should not be sent, and it was held up throughout the 6th. On the 7th I said I had to

carry out Vladimir Ilyich's instructions. She spoke to Kamenev, and the letter was handed to Stalin and Kamenev, and afterwards to Zinoviev when he got back from Petrograd. Stalin's answer was received immediately on receipt of Vladimir Ilyich's letter (the letter was handed to Stalin personally by me and his answer to Vladimir Ilyich dictated to me). The letter has not yet been handed to Vladimir Ilyich, as he has fallen ill.⁶¹⁸

Printed from the secretaries'
notes

